In addition the Air Force wanted a secure virtual private network that could mask the IP addresses behind all of this persona traffic. Every day, each user would get a random IP address to help hide "the existence of the operation." The network would further mask this persona work by "traffic mixing, blending the user's traffic with traffic from mult.i.tudes of users from outside the organization. This traffic blending provides excellent cover and powerful deniability."

This sort of work most interested HBGary Federal's Aaron Barr, who was carving out a niche for himself as a social media expert. Throughout late 2010 and early 2011, he spent large chunks of his time attempting to use Facebook, Twitter, and Internet chat to map the network of Exelon nuclear plant workers in the US and to research the members of Anonymous. As money for his company dried up and government contracts proved hard to come by, Barr turned his social media ideas on pro-union forces, getting involved in a now-controversial project with two other security firms.

But e-mails make clear that he mostly wanted to sell this sort of capability to the government. "We have other customers, mostly on offense, that are interested in Social Media for other things," he wrote in August 2010. "The social media stuff seems like low hanging fruit."

How does one use social media and fake "personas" to do anything of value? An e-mail from Barr on August 22 makes his thinking clear. Barr ponders "the best way to go about establishing a persona to reach an objective (in this case ft. belvoir/INSCOM/1st IO)."

The Army's Fort Belvoir, like any secretive inst.i.tution, might be more easily penetrated by pretending to be an old friend of a current employee. "Make your profile swim in a large sea," Barr wrote. "Pick a big city, big high school, big company. Work your way up and in. Recreate your history. Start by friending high school people. In my case I am in the army so after you have ama.s.sed enough friends from high school, then start friending military folks outside of your location, something that matches the area your in, bootcamp, etc. Lastly start to friend people from the base, but start low and work your way up. So far so good."

Once the persona had this network of friends, "I will start doing things tricky. Try to manipulate conversations, insert communication streams, etc," said Barr. This sort of social media targeting could also be used to send your new "friend" doc.u.ments or files (such as the Al-Qaeda poison doc.u.ment discussed above) [that] come complete with malware, or by directing them to specially-crafted websites designed to elicit some specific piece of information: directed attacks known as "spear phishing."

But concerns arose about obtaining and using social media data, in part because sites like Facebook restricted the "sc.r.a.ping" of its user data. An employee from the link a.n.a.lysis firm Palantir wrote Barr at the end of August, asking, "Is the idea that we'd want to ingest all of Facebook's data, or just a targeted subset for a few users of interest?" wrote Barr at the end of August, asking, "Is the idea that we'd want to ingest all of Facebook's data, or just a targeted subset for a few users of interest?"

The more data that was grabbed from Facebook, the more chance a problem could arise. The Palantir employee noted that a researcher had used similar tools to violate Facebook's acceptable use policy on data sc.r.a.ping, "resulting in a lawsuit when he crawled most of Facebook's social graph to build some statistics. I'd be worried about doing the same. (I'd ask him for his Facebook data-he's a fan of Palantir-but he's already deleted it.)"

Still, the potential usefulness of sites like Facebook was just too powerful to ignore, acceptable use policy or not.

Feeling twitchy While Barr fell increasingly in love with his social media sleuthing, Hoglund still liked researching his rootkits. In September, the two teamed up for a proposal to DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that had been instrumental in creating the Internet back in the 1960s.

DARPA didn't want incrementalism. It wanted breakthroughs (one of its most recent projects is the "100-Year Starship Study"), and Barr and Hoglund teamed up for a proposal to help the agency on its Cyber Insider Threat (CINDER) program. CINDER was an expensive effort to find new ways to watch employees with access to sensitive information and root out double agents or disgruntled workers who might leak cla.s.sified information.

So Barr and Hoglund drafted a plan to create something like a lie detector, except that it would look for signs of "paranoia" instead.

"Like a lie detector detects physical changes in the body based on sensitivities to specific questions, we believe there are physical changes in the body that are represented in observable behavioral changes when committing actions someone knows is wrong," said the proposal. "Our solution is to develop a paranoia-meter to measure these observables."

The idea was to take an HBGary rootkit like 12 Monkeys and install it on user machines in such a way that users could not remove it and might not even be aware of its presence. The rootkit would log user keystrokes, of course, but it would also take "as many behavioral measurements as possible" in order to look for suspicious activity that might indicate wrongdoing.

What sort of measurements? The rootkit would monitor "keystrokes, mouse movements, and visual cues through the system camera. We believe that during particularly risky activities we will see more erratic mouse movements and keystrokes as well as physical observations such as surveying surroundings, shifting more frequently, etc."

The rootkit would also keep an eye on what files were being accessed, what e-mails were being written, and what instant messages were being sent. If necessary, the software could record a video of the user's computer screen activity and send all this information to a central monitoring office. There, software would try to pick out employees exhibiting signs of paranoia, who could then be scrutinized more closely.

Huge and obvious challenges presented themselves. As the proposal noted: Detecting insider threat actions is highly challenging and will require a sophisticated monitoring, baselining, a.n.a.lysis, and alerting capability. Human actions and organizational operations are complex. You might think you can just look for people that are trying to gain access to information outside of their program area of expertise. Yet there are legitimate reasons for accessing this information. In many cases the activity you might call suspicious can also be legitimate. Some people are more or less inquisitive and will have different levels of activity in accessing information outside their specific organization. Some of the behaviors on systems vary widely depending on function. Software developer behavior will be very different than an HR person or senior manager. All of these factors need to be taken into account when developing detection capabilities for suspicious activity. We cannot focus on just [whether] a particular action is potentially suspicious. Instead we must quantify the legitimate reasons for the activity and whether this person has a baseline, position, attributes, and history to support the activity.

DARPA did not apparently choose to fund the plan.

Grey areas The ideas got ever more grandiose. a.n.a.lyzing malware, HBGary's main focus, wasn't enough to keep up with the hackers; Hoglund had a plan to get a leg up on the compet.i.tion by getting even closer to malware authors. He floated an idea to sniff Russian GSM cell phone signals in order to eavesdrop on hackers' voice calls and text messages.

"GSM is easily sniffed," he wrote to Barr. "There is a SHIELD system for this that not only intercepts GSM 5.1 but can also track the exact physical location of a phone. Just to see what's on the market, check [redacted]... these have to be purchased overseas obviously."

The note concluded: "Home alone on Sunday, so I just sit here and sharpen the knife."

Barr, always enthusiastic for these kinds of ideas, loved this one. He wanted to map out everything that would be required for such an operation, including "personas, sink holes, honey nets, soft and hard a.s.sets... We would want at least one burn persona. We would want to sketch out a script to meet specific objectives.

And, he noted, "We will likely ride in some grey areas."

Back to basics In January 2011, Barr had moved on to his research into Anonymous-research that would eventually do his company in. Over at HBGary, Hoglund continued his pursuit of next-gen rootkits. He had hit on a new approach that he called "Magenta."

This would be a "new breed of Windows-based rootkit," said a Magenta planning doc.u.ment, one that HBGary called a "multi-context rootkit."

The Magenta software would be written in low-level a.s.sembly language, one step up from the ones and zeroes of the binary code with which computers do their calculating. It would inject itself into the Windows kernel, and then inject itself further into an active process; only from there would the main body of the rootkit execute.

Magenta would also inject itself routinely into different processes, jumping around inside the computer's memory to avoid detection. Its command-and-control instructions, telling the rootkit exactly what to do and where to send the information, wouldn't come from some remote Internet server but from the host computer's own memory-where the control instructions had been separately injected.

"This is ideal because it's trivial to remotely seed C&C messages into any networked Windows host," noted Hoglund, "even if the host in question has full Windows firewalling enabled."

Nothing like Magenta existed (not publicly, at least), and Hoglund was sure that he could squeeze the rootkit code into less than 4KB of memory and make it "almost impossible to remove from a live running system." Once running, all of the Magenta files on disk could be deleted. Even the best anti-rootkit tools, those that monitored physical memory for signs of such activity, "would only be of limited use since by the time the responder tried to verify his results Magenta will have already moved to a new location & context."

Hoglund wanted to build Magenta in two parts: first, a prototype for Windows XP with Service Pack 3-an old operating system but still widely installed. Second, if the prototype generated interest, HBGary could port the rootkit "to all current flavors of Microsoft Windows."

Shortly thereafter, Anonymous broke into HBGary Federal's website, cracked Barr's hashed pa.s.sword using rainbow tables, and found themselves in a curious position; Barr was also the administrator for the entire e-mail system, so they were able to grab e-mail from multiple accounts, including Hoglund's.

A world awash in rootkits The leaked e-mails provide a tantalizing glimpse of life behind the security curtain. HBGary and HBGary Federal were small players in this s.p.a.ce; indeed, HBGary appears to have made much of its cash with more traditional projects, like selling anti-malware defense tools to corporations and scanning their networks for signs of infection.

If rootkits, paranoia monitors, cartoons, and fake Facebook personas were being proposed and developed here, one can only imagine the sorts of cla.s.sified projects underway throughout the entire defense and security industry.

Whether these programs are good or bad depends upon how they are used. Just as Hoglund's rootkit expertise meant that he could both detect them and author them, 0-day exploits and rootkits in government hands can be turned to many uses. The FBI has had malware like c.i.p.aV (the Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier) for several years, and it's clear from the HBGary e-mail leak that the military is in wide possession of rootkits and other malware of its own. The Stuxnet virus widely believed to have at (the Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier) for several years, and it's clear from the HBGary e-mail leak that the military is in wide possession of rootkits and other malware of its own. The Stuxnet virus widely believed to have at least damaged Iranian nuclear centrifuge operations is thought to have originated in the Iranian nuclear centrifuge operations is thought to have originated in the US or Israeli governments, for instance.

But the e-mails also remind us how much of this work is carried out privately and beyond the control of government agencies. We found no evidence that HBGary sold malware to nongovernment ent.i.ties intent on hacking, though the company did have plans to repurpose its DARPA rootkit idea for corporate surveillance work. ("HBGary plans to transition technology into commercial products," it told DARPA.) And another doc.u.ment, listing HBGary's work over the last few years, included this entry: "HBGary had multiple contracts with a consumer software company to add stealth capability to their host agent."

The actions of HBGary Federal's Aaron Barr also serve as a good reminder that, when they're searching for work, private security companies are more than happy to switch from military to corporate clients-and they bring some of the same tools to bear.

When asked to investigate pro-union websites and WikiLeaks, Barr turned immediately to his social media toolkit and was ready to deploy personas, Facebook sc.r.a.ping, link a.n.a.lysis, and fake websites; he also suggested computer attacks on WikiLeaks infrastructure and pressure be brought upon journalists like Glenn Greenwald.

His compatriots at Palantir and Berico showed, in their many e-mails, few if any qualms about turning their national security techniques upon private dissenting voices. Barr's ideas showed up in Palantir-branded PowerPoints and Berico-branded "scope of work" doc.u.ments. "Reconnaissance cells" were proposed, network attacks were acceptable, "target dossiers" on "adversaries" would be compiled, and "complex information campaigns" involving fake personas were on the table. showed, in their many e-mails, few if any qualms about turning their national security techniques upon private dissenting voices. Barr's ideas showed up in Palantir-branded PowerPoints and Berico-branded "scope of work" doc.u.ments. "Reconnaissance cells" were proposed, network attacks were acceptable, "target dossiers" on "adversaries" would be compiled, and "complex information campaigns" involving fake personas were on the table.

Critics like Glenn Greenwald contend that this nexus of private and public security power is a dangerous mix. "The real issue highlighted by this episode is just how lawless and unrestrained is the unified axis of government and corporate power," he wrote last week.

Especially (though by no means only) in the worlds of the Surveillance and National Security State, the powers of the state have become largely privatized. There is very little separation between government power and corporate power. Those who wield the latter intrinsically wield the former.

The revolving door between the highest levels of government and corporate offices rotates so fast and continuously that it has basically flown off its track and no longer provides even the minimal barrier it once did. It's not merely that corporate power is unrestrained; it's worse than that: corporations actively exploit the power of the state to further entrench and enhance their power.

Even if you don't share this view, the e-mails provide a fascinating glimpse into the origins of government-controlled malware. Given the number of rootkits apparently being developed for government use, one wonders just how many machines around the globe could respond to orders from the US military. Or the Chinese military. Or the Russian military.

While hackers get most of the attention for their rootkits and botnets and malware, state actors use the same tools to play a different game-the Great Game-and it could be coming soon to a computer near you.

Opening photo ill.u.s.tration contains elements from Shutterstock.

The RSA security conference took place February 14-18 in San Francisco, and malware response company HBGary planned on a big announcement. The firm was about to unveil a new appliance called "Razor," a specialized computer plugged into corporate networks that could scan company computers for viruses, rootkits, and custom malware-even malicious code that had never been seen before.

Razor "captures all executable code within the Windows operating system and running programs that can be found in physical memory," said HBGary, and it then "'detonates' these captured files within a virtual machine and performs extremely low level tracing of all instructions." Certain behaviors-rather than confirmed signatures-would suggest the presence of malware inside the company.

The HBGary team headed over early to the RSA venue at the Moscone Center in order to set up their booth on the exhibition floor. Nerves were on edge. A week before, HBGary and related company HBGary Federal were both infiltrated by members of the hacker collective Anonymous, which was upset that HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr had compiled a dossier of their alleged real names. In the wake of the attack, huge batches of sensitive company e-mail had been splashed across the 'Net. HBGary employees spent days cleaning up the electronic mess and mending fences with customers.

On the RSA floor, a team put together the HBGary booth and prepared for the Razor announcement. CEO Greg Hoglund prepped his RSA talk, called "Follow the Digital Trail."

The HBGary team left for the night. When they returned the next morning, the opening day of the conference, they found a sign in their booth. It was from Anonymous.

"We had a lot to think about," HBGary's Vice President of Services, Jim b.u.t.terworth, told Ars. "We had just spent the previous week trying to clean things up and get ourselves back to normal, harden our systems, [and we] continued to hear the telephone calls and the threats-and I will add, these are very serious threats."

Now, with the appearance of the note in their RSA booth, the team felt not just electronically exposed; they felt physically threatened and stalked. "They decided to follow us to a public place where we were to do business and make a public mockery of our company," b.u.t.terworth said. "Our position was that we respected RSA and our fellow vendors too much to allow this spectacle to occur."

Instead, HBgary Inc. pulled out of the conference. ZDNet journalist Ryan Naraine snapped a photo from the show floor: from the show floor: The attacks continue On Sunday, February 6, the electronic a.s.sault had begun in earnest. As America sat down to watch the Super Bowl kickoff, five "members" of Anonymous infiltrated the website of security firm HBGary Federal. They had been probing HBGary Federal and related firm HBGary Inc. since Sat.u.r.day, but on Sunday they struck gold with an SQL injection attack on HBGary Federal's content management system.

They quickly grabbed and decrypted user pa.s.swords from the website, which they used to move into HBGary Federal's hosted Google e-mail. By the time the attack was through, the hackers had compromised HBGary Federal's website, deleted its backup data, took over Greg Hoglund's rootkit.com site, and locked both companies out of their e-mail accounts by changing the pa.s.swords.

While HBGary Federal was truly "hacked," HBGary Inc. was not; attackers simply used existing usernames and pa.s.swords to access key systems. HBGary had in fact hardened its Web defenses, fully patching them on the Thursday before the attack began in antic.i.p.ation of some unpleasantness. b.u.t.terworth told Ars that the company was able to bring down its compromised offsite Web servers within 42 minutes of the attack's beginning. (He also confirmed the accuracy of our earlier exclusive report on how Anonymous penetrated the two companies.) on how Anonymous penetrated the two companies.) Over the last week, this part of the story became well known. What was not visible outside the hallways of HBGary's Sacramento offices, however, was just how long the attacks continued. Indeed, although the electronic a.s.sault stopped soon after it began, the hara.s.sment has yet to end.

b.u.t.terworth sounded tired as he recounted the days for us-when we spoke, 17 days had pa.s.sed since the initial attack. Since then, HBGary has been flooded with phone calls and voicemails of the "you should be ashamed of yourself" type and worse; the fax machines have been overwhelmed with Anonymous outpourings; people have been "directly threatening our employees with extortion"; threats have been made. Then came RSA.

b.u.t.terworth, with a long career in military signals intelligence and private security firms, is no stranger to the dark world of cyberattacks, but he's used to adversaries who retreat after an electronic strike.

Instead, he believes that Anonymous has "decided to continue their antics. They're in it for the laughs... this is a real funny game for them." Not content with the damage they have inflicted, they "hara.s.s a company that's trying to get back to work." Each time a new story about the company appears in the press, b.u.t.terworth said that these attacks spike again.

"Millions in damages"

The fallout from the whole debacle endures. In the wake of the attack, HBGary's Penny Leavy and Greg Hoglund (they are married) entered the Anonymous IRC channel #ophbgary to plead in vain for Greg's e-mails to stay private. (Several less relevant remarks have been removed from the transcript for easier reading.) so you got my email spool too then yes greg.

greg we got everything Greg, I'm curious to know if you understand what we are about?

Do you understand why we do what we do?

you realize that releasing my email spool will cause millions in damages to HBGary?

yes greg: another reason its not out yet.

yes we do greg greg is will be end of you :) and your company Asked if HBGary has in fact seen a financial impact from the Anonymous attack, b.u.t.terworth would only say, "Time will tell." He did admit that the hack had an impact on the company-"the tainting of a brand name, a company that has a very good product"-and that "we've received indications that folks are having second thoughts" about working with the firm.

The company also had to devote nearly a week of its time to performing client notification, a job that must've been anything but pleasant. And b.u.t.terworth has been tasked with overseeing HBGary's internal forensic investigation into the attack. He hopes to compile enough information to eventually prosecute those responsible.

"A lot of federal crime has been committed," he said.

Despite the fact that the attackers hid themselves behind Tor software and proxy servers, he believes the company stands a "very good chance" of catching the perpetrators. software and proxy servers, he believes the company stands a "very good chance" of catching the perpetrators.

But what has the attack meant for Anonymous, HBGary Federal's Aaron Barr, and the security companies linked with Barr's ideas?

Anonymous For Anonymous, the most obvious result of the hack was publicity, glorious publicity. The attack has been covered in every outlet from Ars to the BBC and back again, though the group was unbelievably lucky to stumble on a cache of e-mails involving dirty tricks against WikiLeaks and using intelligence a.s.sets against pro-union websites. Without those revelations, the hack and e-mail release might have looked far more self-interested-Anonymous protecting its mask.

Why have the attacks on HBGary Inc. continued? We spoke to people with knowledge of the initial Anonymous hack. All have denied the existence of continuing operations against HBGary and note that the IRC channel used for coordination, #ophbgary, has been shuttered; most expressed disbelief that these attacks are even happening.

We asked HBGary for a copy of some of the faxes received at its offices, but were told that the fax machines had been turned over to the authorities as part of the investigation. HBGary did pa.s.s along a representative e-mail that an employee received last week (all header information has been removed): Subject: Security Problem loooooooooooooooooool owned by anonymous. niiiice.

hope your strategy wont work and ppl of this planet will become free without beeing surpressed or monitored.

shame on you for your "business" - it is ppl like you who try to stop human revelation all in the name of allmighty america.

nice to see you failing hard and getting exposed yourself. how does it feel, suckers ?

i am looking forward to see your next fail.

greets one of your monitored sheep that actually dont like to be monitored.

ps: please do us (the human race that is not trying to be n.a.z.is like you) a favor and get aids and die slow and painfull, thanks in advance.

The real impact of the attacks on Anonymous may not be felt for months, or even years. HBGary says it is working with the authorities on the case, and one presumes that the FBI is interested in busting those responsible. The FBI has previously arrested those a.s.sociated with mere denial of service attacks, and it recently executed 40 search warrants in connection with Anonymous' Operation Payback. in connection with Anonymous' Operation Payback.

In a press release regarding the search warrants, the FBI reminded Anonymous that "facilitating or conducting a DDoS [Distributed denial of service] attack is illegal, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, as well as exposing partic.i.p.ants to significant civil liability."

b.u.t.terworth, who touted his own (lengthy) list of advanced security credentials during our call, told us that based on his investigation so far, the Anonymous "operational security was not that good... they're pretty dirty."

If he's right, the Anonymous attack, so far free of consequences, might end with some serious ones indeed.

Palantir Those consequences have already been felt at the link a.n.a.lysis firm Palantir, based in Silicon Valley. The company was part of "Team Themis," a group comprised of Palantir, Berico, and HBGary Federal, which got involved with the DC law firm Hunton & Williams. Hunton & Williams was looking for ways to help the US Chamber of Commerce, and later a major US bank, deal with troublesome opponents (pro-union websites and WikiLeaks, respectively.) As a member of Team Themis, Palantir became part of Aaron Barr's plans to go after WikiLeaks, put pressure on commentators like Salon.com's Glenn Greenwald, and set up a surveillance cell for the Chamber of Commerce. No one in the e-mails that we saw objected to any of the proposed ideas.

When news of the proposals came out, Palantir said it was horrified. Dr. Alex Karp, the company's CEO, issued a statement: "We make data integration software that is as useful for fighting food borne illness as it is to fighting fraud and terrorism. Palantir does not make software that has the capability to carry out the offensive tactics proposed by HBGary. Palantir never has and never will condone the sort of activities recommended by HBGary. As we have previously stated, Palantir has severed all ties with HBGary going forward."

As we noted in our initial report on the situation, several of the key ideas had come from Aaron Barr-but they were quickly adopted by other team members, including Palantir. I asked the company for more information on why Barr's ideas had shown up in Palantir-branded material. The company's general counsel, Matt Long, supplied the following answer: We did make a mistake-one of a fast growing company with lots of decentralized decision making authority. Initial results of our ongoing internal diagnostic show that a junior engineer allowed offensive material auth.o.r.ed by HBGary to end up on a slide deck with Palantir's logo. The stolen emails conclusively show that Aaron Barr from HBGary auth.o.r.ed the content which was collated well past midnight for an early morning presentation the next day. This doesn't excuse the incident, but hopefully it brings much needed context to a context-less email dump.

That junior engineer, a 26-year-old, has been put on leave while his actions are being reviewed.

"We should have cut ties with HBGary sooner and raised internal concerns about this sooner," Long told me. "This is a huge mistake for sure; we aren't making excuses. But our company never approved hacking or carrying out dirty tricks on anyone."

As for the engineer's e-mail in which he said that the Team Themis project "got approval from Dr. Karp and the Board" on a new revenue sharing plan, Long said that it was simply "cla.s.sic salesmanship ('I need to get my manager's permission for that. I really argued hard for you and got you this deal'). In our case we don't have sales people so it is very transparent/obvious coming from a 26-year-old engineer. Dr. Karp and the Board did not know about the specifics of the proposal-including pricing."

Berico Berico, one of the three companies involved with Team Themis, initially promised a response to our questions about its handling of the situation. The company later changed its mind and declined to comment.

Berico did issue one public statement back on February 11, saying that it "does not condone or support any effort that proactively targets American firms, organizations or individuals. We find such actions reprehensible and are deeply committed to partnering with the best companies in our industry that share our core values. Therefore, we have discontinued all ties with HBGary Federal." back on February 11, saying that it "does not condone or support any effort that proactively targets American firms, organizations or individuals. We find such actions reprehensible and are deeply committed to partnering with the best companies in our industry that share our core values. Therefore, we have discontinued all ties with HBGary Federal."

The company added that it was "conducting a thorough internal investigation to better understand the details of how this situation unfolded and we will take the appropriate actions within our company."

Aaron Barr HBGary Federal was in the process of selling itself after the company couldn't meet revenue projections and had difficulty paying taxes and salaries. On January 19, Penny Leavy (the largest single investor in HBGary Federal) suggested in an e-mail to Aaron Barr that he give the two companies considering a purchase a set of deadlines. Under her projected scenario, the two firms would bid on February 4 and HBGary Federal would make a final decision on February 7. On February 6, Anonymous attacked.

What happened to Barr? Anonymous loudly and angrily demanded that Penny Leavy fire him, since his list of Anonymous names could allegedly have gotten "innocent people" into serious trouble. Leavy made clear that HBGary Federal was a separate company from HBGary, one in which she owned only a 15 percent stake, and that she couldn't simply "fire" the CEO.

Barr, too, had a stake in HBGary Federal. He couldn't just be fired-but he told Ars that he has taken a leave of absence from the company in order to focus on some other things.

When he finally regained control of his Twitter account last week, Barr's first new message since the attack said just about all there was left to say: "My deepest personal apology to all those that were negatively effected [sic] by the release of my e-mail into the public."

Embattled HBGary Federal CEO Aaron Barr quit his job yesterday as the prospect of a Congressional investigation loomed. A dozen Democrats in Congress asked various Republican committee chairs to launch probes of HBGary Federal's idea for a "reconnaissance cell" targeting pro-union organizers. of HBGary Federal's idea for a "reconnaissance cell" targeting pro-union organizers.

HBGary Federal was hacked last month by Anonymous after Aaron Barr believed he had unmasked much of the group's leadership-and Barr's entire cache of corporate e-mails was made public. Those messages after Aaron Barr believed he had unmasked much of the group's leadership-and Barr's entire cache of corporate e-mails was made public. Those messages revealed that Barr had joined up with two other security firms, Palantir and Berico, to pitch the powerhouse DC law firm of Hunton & Williams on an idea to go after union-backed websites who opposed the US Chamber of Commerce. The scheme, if adopted, would have cost the Chamber up to $2 million a month. that Barr had joined up with two other security firms, Palantir and Berico, to pitch the powerhouse DC law firm of Hunton & Williams on an idea to go after union-backed websites who opposed the US Chamber of Commerce. The scheme, if adopted, would have cost the Chamber up to $2 million a month.

The three companies called themselves Team Themis, and instead of providing simple "business intelligence," they had a few other ideas: Create a false doc.u.ment, perhaps highlighting periodical financial information, and monitor to see if US Chamber Watch acquires it. Afterward, present explicit evidence proving that such transactions never occurred. Also, create a fake insider persona and generate communications with [union-backed Change to Win]. Afterward, release the actual doc.u.ments at a specified time and explain the activity as a CtW contrived operation.

- If needed, create two fake insider personas, using one as leverage to discredit the other while confirming the legitimacy of the second. Such work is complicated, but a well-thought out approach will give way to a variety of strategies that can sufficiently aid the formation of vetting questions US Chamber Watch will likely ask.