xxviii. 11-13.

_Sect._ 7. The Bishop comes on and tells us that Hezekiah did apply his regal power to the reformation of the Levites, and of the worship of G.o.d in their hands, saying, "Hear me, ye Levites, sanctify now yourselves, and sanctify the house of the Lord G.o.d of your fathers, and carry forth the filthiness out of the holy place."

_Ans._ He exhorted them to no more than G.o.d's law required of them, for the law ordained them to sanctify themselves, and to do the service of the house of the Lord, Num. viii. 6, 11, 15; xviii. 32; so that Hezekiah did here const.i.tute nothing by his own arbitration and authority, but plainly showeth his warrant, ver. 11, "The Lord hath chosen you to stand before him, to serve him, and that you should minister unto him."

But the Bishop further allegeth out of 2 Chron. x.x.xi. that Hezekiah appointed the courses of the priests and Levites, every man according to his service.

_Ans._ He might have read 2 Chron. xxix., 25, that Hezekiah did all this according to the commandment of David, and of Gad, the king's seer, and Nathan the prophet, "For so was the commandment of the Lord by his prophets." And who doubteth but kings may command such things as G.o.d hath commanded before them?

_Sect._ 8. The next example which the Bishop allegeth is out of 2 Chron.

x.x.xv. where we read that Josias did set the priests and Levites again in their charges, which example cannot prove that kings have the supreme power of governing ecclesiastical causes, unless it be evinced that Josias changed those orders and courses of the Levites and priests which the Lord had commanded by his prophets, 2 Chron. xxix. 25, and that he did inst.i.tute other orders by his own regal authority, whereas the contrary is manifest from the text; for Josias did only set the priests and Levites those charges and courses which had been a.s.signed unto them after the writing of David and Solomon, ver. 4, and by the commandment of David, and Asaph, and Heman, and Jeduthun, the king's seer, ver. 15. Neither did Josias command the priests and Levites any other service than that which was written in the book of Moses, ver. 12; so that, from his example, it only followeth, that when princes see the state of ecclesiastical persons corrupted, they ought to interpose their authority for reducing them to those orders and functions which G.o.d's word commandeth.

_Sect._ 9. Moreover, the Bishop objecteth the example of Joash, who, while he yet did right in the days of Jehoiada the priest, 2 Chron. xxiv. sent the priests and Levites to gather from all Israel money for repairing the house of the Lord, and when they dealt negligently in this business, he transferred the charge of the same unto others, and, making himself the keeper of the holy money, did both prescribe how it was to be disbursed, and likewise take from good Jehoiada the priest the administration of the same. Now, where he hath read that Joash made himself the keeper of the money, and prescribed how it should be disbursed, also that he took the administration from Jehoiada, I cannot guess; for the text hath no such thing in it, but the contrary, viz. that the king's scribe, and the high priest's officer, kept the money, and disbursed the same, as the king and Jehoiada prescribed unto them. As to that which he truly allegeth out of the holy text, I answer, 1. The collection for repairing the house of the Lord was no human ordinance, for Joash showeth the commandment of Moses for it, ver. 6, having reference to Exod. x.x.x. 12-14. No other collections did Joash impose but those _quae divino jure debebantur_.(925) 2. As for the taking of the charge of this collection from the priests, he behooved to do so, because they had still neglected the work, when the twenty-third year of his reign was come. And so say we, that when the ministers of the church fail to do their duty, in providing that which is necessary for the service of G.o.d, princes ought by some other means to cause these things be redressed. 3. Joash did nothing with these monies without Jehoiada, but _Pontifex eas primum laborantibus tribuit, tum in aedis sacrae restaurationem maxime convert.i.t_.(926) 4. And what if he had done this by himself? I suppose no man will reckon the hiring of masons and carpenters with such as wrought iron and bra.s.s, or the gathering of money for this purpose, among spiritual things or causes. 5. And if these employments about Solomon's temple were not to be called spiritual or ecclesiastical, far less about our material churches, which are not holy nor consecrated as Solomon's was for a typical use. Wherefore, without all prejudice to our cause, we may and do commend the building and repairing of churches by Christian princes.

_Sect._ 10. But the Bishop returneth to another example in Solomon, which is the putting of Abiathar, the chief priest, from his office, and surrogating of another in his place. _Ans._ Abiathar was civilly dead, as the lawyers used to speak, and it was only by accident or by consequent that Solomon put him from his office: he sent him away to Anathoth, because of his treasonable following and aiding of Adonijah, whereupon necessarily followed his falling away from the honour, dignity, and office of the high priest, whence it only followeth, that if a minister be found guilty of _laese_ majesty, the king may punish him either with banishment or proscription, or some such civil punishment, whereupon by consequence will follow his falling from his ecclesiastical office and dignity. 2. As for Solomon's putting of Zadok in the room of Abiathar, it maketh as little against us, for Zadok did fall to the place _jure divino_.

The honour and office of the high-priesthood was given to Eleazar, the elder son of Aaron, and was to remain in his family. How it came to pa.s.s that it was transferred to Eli, who was of the family of Ithmar, we read not. Always after that Abiathar, who was of the family of Ithamar and descended of Eli, had by a capital crime fallen from it, it did of very right belong to Zadok, who was chief of the family of Eleazar. And so all this flowed, not from Solomon's, but from G.o.d's own authority.

_Sect._ 11. The Bishop remembereth another example in Hezekiah too, telling us that he removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brazen serpent, when the children of Israel did burn incense unto it. Now, we wish from our hearts that from this example all Christian kings may learn to remove and destroy the monuments of idolatry out of their dominions. And if it be said that in so doing kings take upon them to govern by their princely authority an ecclesiastical or spiritual cause, it is easily answered, that when they destroy idolatrous monuments, they do nothing by their own authority, but by the authority of G.o.d's law, which commanded to abolish such monuments, and to root out the very names of idols; which commandment is to be executed by the action of temporal power.

_Sect._ 12. Finally, saith the Bishop, the kings of the Jews, 1 Kings xxiii.; 2 Chron. xix.; have in the temple propounded the law of the Lord to the people, renewed the covenant of religion, pulled down profane altars, broken down idols, slain idolatrous priests, liberated their kingdom from abomination, purged the temple, 2 Chron. x.x.xiv., x.x.xv.; 1 Maccab. iv. 59; proclaimed the keeping of the pa.s.sover, and of the feast of dedication, Esth. ix. 26 ; and have also inst.i.tuted new feasts. For all which things they are in the Scriptures much praised by the Holy Spirit, 2 Chron. xxix. 2; x.x.xiv. 2, &c.

_Ans._ True it is, Josias did read the law of the Lord to the people in the temple, and made a covenant before the Lord; but, 1. he prescribed nothing at his own pleasure; only he required of the people to walk after the Lord, and to keep his commandments. 2. Neither did he this work by himself, but did convocate a council of the prophets, priests and elders of Israel, for the advancing of that reformation, 2 Kings xxiii. 1. 3. And if he had done it by himself, yet we are to remember that the reformation of a church generally and greatly corrupted, craveth the more immediate intermeddling of princes, and a great deal more than can be ordinarily and orderly done by them in a church already reformed. The slaying of the idolatrous priests had also the warrant and authority of the law of G.o.d, which appointed a capital punishment for blasphemers,(927) or such as, in contempt of G.o.d and to rub some ignominy upon his name, did traduce his doctrine and religion, and either detract from him, and attribute to idols that which appertained properly unto him, or else attributed unto him either by enunciation or imprecation, such things as could not stand with the glory of the G.o.dhead. Concerning the abolishing of idolatry and all the relics thereof, we have answered that it was commanded by G.o.d. The keeping of the pa.s.sover was also commanded in the law; but publish G.o.d's own express ordinance.

Last of all, touching two remaining examples: 1. The feast of the dedication was not ordained by the sole authority of Judas, but by his brethren and by the whole congregation of Israel;(928) and the days of Purim were established by Mordecai, a prophet. Esth. ix. 20, 21. 2. We have elsewhere made it evident, that the days of Purim, by their first inst.i.tution, were only days of civil joy and solemnity, and that the feast of the dedication was not lawfully inst.i.tuted.

_Sect._ 13. Thus having dismissed the Bishop, we will make us for clearing the purpose in hand. But before we come to show particularly what princes may do, and what they may not do, in making laws about things ecclesiastical, we will first of all lay down these propositions following:-

1. Whatsoever the power of princes be in things and causes ecclesiastical, it is not, sure, absolute nor unbounded. _Solius Dei est_ (saith Stapleton),(929) _juxta suam sanctissimam voluntatem, uctiunes suas omnes dirigere, et omniafacere quaecunquc voluit._ And again, _Vis tuam voluntatem esse regulam rerum omnium, ut omnia fiant pro uuo beneplacito?_ Whether we respect the persons or the places of princes, their power is confined within certain limits, so that they may not enjoin whatsoever they list. As touching their poisons, Bishop Spotswood would do no less than warrant the articles of Perth by king James's personal qualities: "His person (saith he(930)), were he not our sovereign, gives them sufficient authority, being recommended by him; for he knows the nature of things, and the consequences of them, what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than we do all."

I mean not to derogate anything from king James's duly-deserved praise, nor to obscure his never-dying memory; only I say, that such a prince as the Bishop speaketh of, who knoweth what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than many learned and G.o.dly pastors a.s.sembled in a synod, is _rara avis in terris nigroque simillima Cygno_. For a prince being but a man, and so subject to error, being but one man, and so in the greater hazard of error; for _plus videns oculi, quam oculus_; and, "woe to him that is alone when he falleth, for he hath not another to help him up,"

saith the wisest of mortal kings, Eccl. iv. 10; being also compa.s.sed or a.s.sailed with so many tentations which other men are free of; and lastly, being so taken up and distracted with secular affairs and cares, that very seldom is he found well versed or singularly learned in the controversies of religion; may not such a one, in the common sense of Christians, be thought more like to fail and miscarry in his judgment about things ecclesiastical, than a whole synod, wherein there are many of the learned, judicious, and G.o.dly ministers of the church. Papists tell us, that they will not defend the personal actions of the Pope, _quasi ipse solus omnibus horis sapere potuerit, id quod recte nemini concessum perhibetur_.(931) Their own records let the world know the abominable vices and impieties of popes. Witness Platina, in the life of John X., Benedict IV., John XIII., Boniface VII., John XX., John XXII., Paul II., &c. And further, when our adversaries dispute of the Pope's infallibility, they grant, for his own person, he may be an heretic, only they hold that he cannot err _e cathedra_.

And shall we now idolise the persons of princes more than Papists do the persons of popes? Or shall Papists object to us, that we extol the judgment of our princes to a higher degree of authority and infallibility than they yield to the judgment of their popes? Alas, why would we put the weapons in the hands of our adversaries!

_Sect._ 14. But what say we of princes in respect of their place and calling? Is not their power absolute in that respect? _Recte quidam_ (saith Saravia),(932) _illiberalis et inverecundi censet esse ingenii, de prencipum potestate et rebus gestis questionem movere, quando et imperator sacrilegium este scribit, de eo quod a principe factum est disputare._ Camero holdeth,(933) that in things pertaining to external order in religion, kings may command what they will _pro authoritate_, and forbid to seek another reason beside the majesty of their authority; yea, that when they command _frivola, dura, et iniqua respectu nostri_, our consciences are bound by those their frivolous and unjust commandments, not only in respect of the end, because scandal should possibly follow in case we obey them not, but also _jubentis respectu_, because the Apostle biddeth us obey the magistrate for conscience' sake. At the reading of these pa.s.sages in Saravia and Camero, horror and amazement have taken hold on me. O wisdom of G.o.d, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice, upon whose thigh and vesture is written, "King of kings and Lord of lords," make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but _regulae regulatae_, and _mensurae mensuratae_! Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings, be instructed ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, and lay down your crowns at the feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne,(934) _discite just.i.tiam moniti_, and remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ, who, albeit he hath given the kingdoms of this world unto your hands, and non _auferet mortalia, qui regna datio caelestia_, yet hath he kept the government of his church upon his own shoulder, Psalm ix. 6, xxii. 21. So that _rex non est propie rector ecclesiae sed reipublicae, ecclesiae vero defensor est_.

O all ye subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, ye are not the servants of men, to do what they list, and that for their listing, 1 Cor. vii. 23. The Apostle, Rom. xiii. urgeth, not obedience to magistrates for conscience'

sake, but only subjection for conscience' sake, for he concludeth his whole purpose,(935) ver. 7, "Render therefore to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour."(936) There is not in all that chapter one word of obedience to magistrates.

And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just, they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of them. For, _per se_, they cannot bind more than the church's laws can.

Which things Dr Forbesse(937) hath also told you out of Calvin.

And hence it followeth, that whensoever you may omit that which princes enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not holden to obey them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye Formalists, of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in Rome; publish it not among the va.s.sals of antichrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the worshippers of the Beast triumph! O how small confidence have the cardinals, I say not now into the Pope's person, but even into his chair, when being entered in the conclave for the election of a new pope, they spend the whole day following in the making of laws belonging to the administration and handling of all things by him who shall be advanced to the popedom; which laws every one of them subscribeth, and sweareth to observe, if he be made pope, as Onephrius writeth. Though the Pope's own creatures, the Jesuits, in their schools and books, must dispute for his infallibility _e cathedra_, yet we see what trust the wise cardinals, shut up in the conclave, do put in him, with what bond they tie him, and within what bounds they confine his power. Albeit the Pope, after he is created, observeth not strictly this oath, as that wise writer of the _History of the Council of Trent_ noteth,(938) yet let me say once again, Shall we set up the power of princes higher, or make their power less limited than Papists do the power of popes? or shall they set bounds to popes and we set none to princes?

_Sect._ 15. But I find myself a little digressed after the roving absurdities of some opposites. Now, therefore, to return,-the second proposition which I am here to lay down, before I speak particularly of the power of princes, is this: Whatsoever princes can commendably either do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any way appertain to the external worship of G.o.d, must be both lawful in the nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience.

For, 1. The very ground and reason wherefore we ought to obey the magistrate(939) is, for that he is the minister of G.o.d, or a deputy set in G.o.d's stead to us. Now, he is the minister of G.o.d only for our good, Rom.

xiii. 4. Neither were he G.o.d's minister, but his own master, if he should rule at his pleasure, and command things which serve not for the good of the subjects. Since, therefore, the commandments of princes bind only so far as they are the ministers of G.o.d for our good,-and G.o.d's ministers they are not in commanding such things as are either in their nature unlawful, or in their use inconvenient,-it followeth that such commandments of theirs cannot bind.

2. Princes cannot claim any greater power in matters ecclesiastical than the apostle Paul had, or the church herself yet hath; that is to say, princes may not by any temporal or regal jurisdiction, urge any ceremony or form of ecclesiastical policy which the Apostle once might not, and the church yet may not, urge by a spiritual jurisdiction. But neither had the Apostle of old, nor hath the church now, power to urge either a ceremony or anything else which is not profitable for edifying. Paul could do nothing against the truth, but for the truth; and his power was given to him to edification, and not to destruction, 2 Cor. xiii. 8, 10; neither shall ecclesiastical persons, to the world's end, receive any other power beside that which is for the perfecting of the saints, and for the edifying of the body of Christ, Eph. iv. 12. Therefore, as the church's power(940) is only to prescribe that which may edify, so the power of princes is in like sort given to them for edification, and not for destruction; neither can they do aught against the truth, but only for the truth.

3. We are bound by the law of G.o.d to do nothing which is not good and profitable, or edifying, 1 Cor. vi. 12; xiv. 26. This law of charity is of a higher and straiter bond than the law of any prince in the world:-

"The general rule of all indifferent things, is, Let all things be done to edification; and, Rom. xv. 1, 2, 'Let every man please his neighbour to edification, even as Christ pleased not himself but others.' Whatsoever, then, is of this rank, which either would weaken or not edify our brother, be it ever so lawful, ever so profitable to ourselves, ever so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined,-Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it," saith one(941) well to our well to our purpose.

_Sect._ 16. A third proposition I promit, which is this, Since the power of princes to make laws about things ecclesiastical is not absolute, but bound and adstricted unto things lawful and expedient, which sort of things, and no other, we are allowed to do for their commandments; and since princes many times may, and do, not only transgress those bounds and limits, but likewise pretend that they are within the same, when indeed they are without them, and enjoin things unlawful and inconvenient, under the name, t.i.tle, and show of things lawful and convenient; therefore it is most necessary as well for princes to permit, as for subjects to take liberty to try and examine by the judgment of discretion, everything which authority enjoineth, whether it be agreeable or repugnant to the rules of the word; and if, after trial, it be found repugnant, to abstain from the doing of the same.

For, 1. The word teacheth us, that the spiritual man judgeth all things, 1 Cor. ii. 15; trieth the things that are different, Phil. i. 10; hath his senses exercised to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; and that every one who would hold fast that which is good, and abstain from all appearance of evil, must first prove all things, 1 Thess. v. 21.

2. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. 23. But whatsoever a man doth without the trial, knowledge, and persuasion of the lawfulness of it by the word of G.o.d, that is not of faith; therefore a sin. It is the word of G.o.d, and not the arbitration of princes whereupon faith is grounded.

And though the word may be without faith, yet faith cannot be without the word. By it therefore must a man try and know a.s.suredly the lawfulness of that which he doth.

3. "Every one of us shall give account of himself to G.o.d." But as we cannot give an account to G.o.d of those actions which we have done in obedience to our prince, except we have examined, considered, and understood the lawfulness of the same; so an account could not be required of us for them, if we were bound to obey and to keep all his ordinances in such sort that we might not try and examine them, with full liberty to refuse those which we judge out of the word to be unlawful or inconvenient; for then princes' ordinances were a most sufficient warrant to us: we needed try no more. Let him make an account to G.o.d of his command; we have account to make of our obedience.

4. If we be bound to receive and obey the laws of princes, without making a free trial and examining of the equity of the same, then we could not be punished for doing, unwillingly and in ignorance, things unlawful prescribed by them. Whereas every soul that sinneth shall die; and when the blind leads the blind, he who is lead falls in the ditch as well as his leader.

5. No man is permitted to do everything which seemeth right in his eyes, and to follow every conceit which takes him in the head; but every man is bound to walk by rule, Gal. vi. 6. But the law of a prince cannot be a rule, except it be examined whether it be consonant to the word of G.o.d, _index secundum legem_, and his law is only such a rule as is ruled by a higher rule. In so far as it is ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is a rule to us; and in so far as it is not ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is not a rule to us. _Quid ergo? an non licebit Christiano cuique convenientiam regulae et regulati (ut vocant) observare?_ saith Junius.(942)

6. The rule whereby we ought to walk in all our ways, and according to which we ought to frame all our actions, is provided of G.o.d a stable and sure rule, that it being observed and taken heed unto, may guide and direct our practice aright about all those things which it prescribeth.

But the law of a prince (if we should, without trial and examination, take it for our rule) cannot be such a stable and sure rule. For put the case that a prince enjoin two things which sometimes fall out to be incompatible and cannot stand together, in that case his law cannot direct our practice, nor resolve us what to do; whereas G.o.d hath so provided for us, that the case can never occur wherein we may not be resolved what to do if we observe the rule which he hath appointed us to walk by.

7. Except this judgment of discretion which we plead for be permitted unto us, it will follow that in point of obedience we ought to give no less, but as much honour unto princes as unto G.o.d himself. For when G.o.d publisheth his commandments unto us, what greater honour could we give him by our obedience than to do that which he commandeth, for his own sole will and authority, without making further inquiry for any other reason?

8. The Apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 23, forbiddeth us to be the servants of men, that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant beside the pleasure and will of men. Which interpretation is grounded upon other places of Scripture, that teach us we are not bound to obey men in anything which we know not to be according to the will of G.o.d, Eph. vi. 6, 7; that we ought not to live to the l.u.s.ts of men, but to the will of G.o.d, 1 Pet. iv. 2, and that, therefore, we ought in everything to prove what is acceptable to the Lord, Eph. v. 20.

9. They who cleanse their way must take heed thereto according to the word, Psal. cxix. 9; therefore, if we take not heed to our way, according to the word, we do not cleanse it. They who would walk as the children of light, must have the word for a lamp unto their feet, and a light unto their path, Psal. cxix. 105; therefore, if we go in any path without the light of the word to direct us, we walk in darkness and stumble, because we see not where we go. They who would not be unwise, but walk circ.u.mspectly, must understand what the will of Lord is, Eph. v. 17; therefore, if we understand not what the will of the Lord is concerning that which we do, we are unwise, and walk not circ.u.mspectly.

10. _Dona Dei in sanctis non sunt otiosa_.(943) Whatsoever grace G.o.d giveth us, it ought to be used and exercised, and not to lie idle in us; but G.o.d giveth us _actionem cognoscendi, ta d?afe???ta discernendi_,(944) &c. a certain measure of the spirit of discretion, to teach us what to choose as good, and what to refuse as evil, 1 John ii. 27, "The same anointing teacheth you of all things;" 1 Cor. ii. 15, "He that is spiritual judgeth all things." Therefore G.o.d would have us to exercise that measure of the gift of discretion which he hath bestowed on us, in discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be done or not.

11. Do not our divines plead for this judgment of private discretion which ought to be permitted to Christians, when anything is propounded to be believed or done by them? And this their judgment is to be seen in their writings against Papists about the controversies _de interpretatione Scripturae, de fide implicita_, &c.

12. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his prelections _de Judice Controversiarum_, doth often and in many places commend unto Christians the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holdeth it necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or prelates command them to do. _Coactiva_, &c. "The coactive power of a prince (saith he(945)), doth not absolutely bind the subject, but only with this condition, except he would compel him to that which is unlawful.

Therefore there is ever left unto subjects a power of proving and judging in their own mind, whether that which is propounded be unG.o.dly and unlawful or not; and if it be unG.o.dly, that which the king threateneth should be suffered, rather than that which he commandeth be done. This Augustine hath taught," &c. And whereas it may be objected, that this maketh a subject to be his prince's judge, he answereth thus.(946) _Non se_, &c. He maketh not himself another's judge, who pondereth and examineth a sentence published by another, in so far as it containeth something either to be done or to be believed by him; but only he maketh himself the judge of his own actions. For howsoever he who playeth the judge is truly said to judge, yet every one who judgeth is not properly said to play the judge. He playeth the judge who, in an external court p.r.o.nounceth a sentence, which by force of jurisdiction toucheth another; but he judgeth, who in the inferior court of his own private conscience, conceiveth such a sentence of the things to be believed or done, as pertaineth to himself alone. This latter way private men both may and ought to judge of the sentences and decrees of magistrates, neither by so doing do they const.i.tute themselves judges of the magistrates, but judges of their own actions.

_Sect._ 17. Finally, there is none of our opposites but saith so much as inferreth the necessity of this judgment of private and practical discretion; for every smatterer among them hath this much in his mouth, that if the king or the church command anything unlawful, then we ought to obey G.o.d rather than men; but when they command things indifferent and lawful, then their ordinance ought to be our rule. But (good men) will they tell us how we shall know whether the things which the king or the church (as they speak) do enjoin are lawful or unlawful, indifferent or not indifferent? and so we shall be at a point. Dare they say, that they may judge those things indifferent which our superiors judge to be such?

and those unlawful which our superiors so judge of? Nay, then, they should deliver their distinction in other terms, and say thus: If our superiors enjoin anything which they judge to be unlawful, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey G.o.d rather than men; but if they enjoin such things as they judge to be indifferent, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey their ordinance. Which distinction, methinks, would have made Herac.l.i.tus himself to fall a laughing with Democritus. What then remaineth? Surely our opposites must either say nothing, or else say with us, that it is not only a liberty but a duty of inferiors, not to receive for a thing lawful that which is enjoined by superiors, because they account it and call it such, but by the judgment of their own discretion following the rules of the word, to try and examine whether the same be lawful or unlawful.

_Sect._. 18. These _praecognita_ being now made good, come we to speak more particularly of the power of princes to make laws and ordinances about things which concern the worship of G.o.d. The purpose we will unfold in three distinctions: 1. Of things; 2. Of times; 3. Of ties. First, Let us distinguish two sorts of things in the worship of G.o.d, viz., things substantial, and things circ.u.mstantial. To things substantial we refer as well sacred and significant ceremonies as the more necessary and essential parts of worship, and, in a word, all things which are not mere external circ.u.mstances, such as were not particularly determinable within those bounds which it pleased G.o.d to set to his written word, and the right ordering whereof, as it is common to all human societies, whether civil or sacred, so it is investigable by the very light and guidance of natural reason. That among this kind of mere circ.u.mstances sacred significant ceremonies cannot be reckoned, we have otherwhere made it evident. Now, therefore, of things pertaining to the substance of G.o.d's worship, whether they be sacred ceremonies, or greater and more necessary duties, we say that princes have not power to enjoin anything of this kind which hath not the plain and particular inst.i.tution of G.o.d himself in Scripture. They may indeed, and ought to publish G.o.d's own ordinances and commandments, and, by their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the same. Notwithstanding, it is a prince's duty, "that in the worship of G.o.d, whether internal or external, he move nothing, he prescribe nothing, except that which is expressly delivered in G.o.d's own written word."(947) We must beware we confound not things which have the plain warrant of G.o.d's word with things devised by the will of man. David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, Josiah, and other kings among the people of G.o.d, did, as well laudably as lawfully, enjoin and command that worship and form of religion which G.o.d, in his law and by his prophets, commanded; and forbid, avoid, and abolish such corruptions as G.o.d had forbidden before them, and appointed to be abolished; whence it followeth not that kings may enjoin things which want the warrant of the word, but only this much, which all of us commend, viz., "That a Christian prince's office in religion,(948) is diligently to take care that, in his dominion or kingdom, religion out of the pure word of G.o.d, expounded by the word of G.o.d itself, and understood according to the first principles of faith (which others call the a.n.a.logy of faith), either be inst.i.tuted, or, being inst.i.tuted, be kept pure, or, being corrupted, be restored and reformed, that false doctrines, abuses, idols, and superst.i.tions, be taken away, to the glory of G.o.d, and to his own and his subjects' salvation."

_Sect._ 19. But in all the Scripture princes have neither a commendable example, nor any other warrant, for the making of any innovation in religion, or for the prescribing of sacred significant ceremonies of men's devising. Jeroboam caused a change to be made in the ceremonies and form of G.o.d's worship, whereas G.o.d ordained the ark of the covenant to be the sign of his presence, and that his glory should dwell between the cherubims. Jeroboam set up two calves to be the signs representative of that G.o.d who brought "Israel out of Egypt;" and this he means while he saith, "Behold thy G.o.ds," &c., 1 Kings xii. 28, giving to the signs the thing signified; whereas G.o.d ordained Jerusalem to be the place of worship, and all the sacrifices to be brought to the temple of Solomon, Jeroboam made Dan and Bethel to be places of worship, and built there altars and high places for the sacrifices; whereas G.o.d ordained the sons of Aaron only to be his priests, Jeroboam made priests of the lowest of the people, which were not of the sons of Levi; whereas G.o.d ordained the feast of tabernacles to be kept on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, Jeroboam appointed it on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. Now, if any prince in the world might have fair pretences for the making of such innovations in religion, Jeroboam much more. He might allege for his changing of the signs of G.o.d's presence, and of the place of worship, that since Rehoboam's wrath was incensed against him, and against the ten tribes which adhered unto him (as appeareth by the accounting of them to be rebels, 2 Chron. xiii. 6, and by the gathering of a huge army for bringing the kingdom again to Rehoboam, 2 Chron. xi. 1), it was no longer safe for his subjects to go up to Jerusalem to worship, in which case G.o.d, who required mercy more than sacrifice, would bear with their changing of a few ceremonies for the safety of men's lives. For his putting down of the priests and Levites, and his ordaining of other priests which were not of the sons of Levi, he might pretend that they were rebellious to him, in that they would not a.s.sent unto his new ordinances,(949) which he had enacted for the safety and security of his subjects, and that they did not only simply refuse obedience to these his ordinances, but in their refusal show themselves so stedfastly minded, that they would refuse and withstand even to the suffering of deprivation and deposition; and not only so, but likewise drew after them many others of the rest of the tribes to be of their judgment, 2 Chron. xi. 16, and to adhere to that manner of worship which was retained in Jerusalem. Lastly, For the change which he made about the season of the feast of tabernacles, he might have this pretence, that as it was expedient for the strengthening of his kingdom(950) to draw and allure as many as could be had to a.s.sociate and join themselves with him in his form of worship (which could not be done if he should keep that feast at the same time when it was kept at Jerusalem); so there was no less (if not more) order and decency in keeping it in the eighth month, when the fruits of the ground were perfectly gathered in(951) (for thankful remembrance whereof that feast was celebrated) than in the seventh, when they were not so fully collected.

These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine faith and religion, that the changes which he had made were only about some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of G.o.d, and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin.

Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of a.s.syria, 2 Kings xvi.

10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the people's sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged(952) specious reasons for excusing themselves,-as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange G.o.ds, but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in wherein G.o.d was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs, that the groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to the worship of G.o.d, and that they did consecrate these places for divine worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to G.o.d's honour,-yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of G.o.d, neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly G.o.d was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies to those which he himself hath appointed.(953)

_Sect._ 20. Now as touching the other sort of things which we consider in the worship of G.o.d, namely, things merely circ.u.mstantial, and such as have the very same use and respect in civil which they have in sacred actions, we hold that whensoever it happeneth to be the duty and part of a prince to inst.i.tute and enjoin any order or policy in these circ.u.mstances of G.o.d's worship, then he may only enjoin such an order as may stand with the observing and following of the rules of the word, whereunto we are tied in the use and practice of things which are in their general nature indifferent.

Of these rules I am to speak in the fourth part of the dispute. And here I say no more but this: Since the word commandeth us to do all things to the glory of G.o.d, 1 Cor. x. 31; to do all things to edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 29; and to do all things in faith, and full persuasion of the lawfulness of that which we do, Rom. xiv. 5, 23, therefore there is no prince in the world who hath power to command his subjects to do that which should either dishonour G.o.d, or not honour him; or that which should either offend their brother, or not edify him; or, lastly, that which their conscience either condemneth or doubteth of. For how may a prince command that which his subjects may not do? But a wonder it were if any man should so far refuse to be ashamed that he would dare to say we are not bound to order whatsoever we do according to these rules of the word, but only such matters of private action wherein we are left at full liberty, there being no ordinance of superiors to determine our practice, and that if such an ordinance be published and propounded unto us, we should take it alone for our rule, and no longer think to examine and order our practice by the rules of the word;