1.

983 ?a? d?? t??t? d? ?a?ep?? a?t?? ?ae?? t? ?st??. _Nat. Ausc._ III.

ii.

984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, referred to as a signal example of fallacy.

985 "de infinite, &c." Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the _a.n.a.lyst_ pa.s.sim, for Berkeley's treatment of infinitesimals.

986 "confundere." Cf. sect. 3-42 for ill.u.s.trations of this confusion.

987 The modern conception of the "conservation of force."

988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and solves it in cap. iv.

989 "mutatio loci" is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; "vitale principium" the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency.

990 "moventis et moti," i.e. as concauses.

991 "motum localem." Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or empty s.p.a.ce, in contrast with concrete s.p.a.ce realised in perception of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute s.p.a.ce and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See Locke's _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which pa.s.sed between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute s.p.a.ce "an ideal of some modern Englishman."

992 Newton's _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P.

I. cap. vi. -- 1.

993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the "possibility of s.p.a.ce existing without matter," _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13.

994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with a?s??s??, fa?tas?a, and ???? in Aristotelian psychology.

995 "attributorum divinorum particeps." See Samuel Clarke, in his _Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_.

996 "nostrum," sc. corpus. When we imagine s.p.a.ce emptied of bodies, we are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world.

997 [Vide quae contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De Principiis Cognitionis Humanae_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis edito.]-AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_.

998 He treats absolute s.p.a.ce as nothing, and relative s.p.a.ce as dependent on Perception and Will.

_ 999 Phys._ a. 5. 188a. 22, 23.

1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, ---- 7-10.

1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the former?

_ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV.

_ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._

_ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX.

1005 Newton's third law of motion.

1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible and intelligible worlds-a conception unfolded in his _Siris_, more than twenty years later.

1007 "provincia sua." The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion perceptible to the senses, is a.s.signed to physics; in contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.