The Vedantin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture, need not be disconcerted by the Mimamsa-theory of all speech having informing power with regard to actions only.

Here another prima facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself.

The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done (karya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things to be done. From this it follows that the Vedanta-texts cannot claim the position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance-- which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one, &c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some particular const.i.tuent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person, afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non- existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it; for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and permanent result, such result being const.i.tuted by Brahman, which is (not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished ent.i.ty. The Veda does, on the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result ('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the katurmasya-sacrifices,'

and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent, is an altogether unjustified proceeding.

To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to a.s.sert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in the following way. The father and mother and other people about him point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion that the application of such and such words to such and such things is based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first, have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.

And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedanta-texts tell us about Brahman, which is an accomplished ent.i.ty, and about meditation on Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.

We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.

For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brahmana having known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.

VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'

(Mahanar. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action, viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.

There are a.n.a.logous instances in the Karmakanda of the Veda. When an arthavada-pa.s.sage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of the heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that 'those who perform certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform the ratri-sattras' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a person threatening a Brahmana is to be punished with a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory pa.s.sage, 'Let him not threaten a Brahmana'(Pu. Mi. Su. III, 4, 17).

We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done '(karya). You understand by 'karya' that which follows on the existence of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is 'agreeable' (anukula) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is 'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (pratikula), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha), while itself it holds the position of something princ.i.p.al to be subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin; for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhana') is capable of action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of 'karya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is correlative to karya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.-- Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus 'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is desired, karya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and stands to action in the relation of princ.i.p.al matter (pradhana or seshin).

(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the apurva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces the sensible result--const.i.tutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of the action.--But) the apurva also can, as it is something different from the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain, be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as svargakamah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the (sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is a.s.sumed an altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apurva) effect of it which (later on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apurva'

can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to a.s.sert that the apurva, which is a.s.sumed to the end of firmly establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakamah'

(desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover, do you understand by the apurva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apurva a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then define the apurva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any pleasure springing from consciousness of your apurva, which could in any way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative doctrine gives us the notion of an apurva as something beneficial to man, we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the authoritative doctrine establishing such an apurva beneficial to man?

Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apurva only on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apurva as intimated by Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakamah. And we, moreover, do not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apurva, in addition to those advantages which const.i.tute the special result of the work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apurva being a pleasure. The arthavada-pa.s.sages of the Veda also, while glorifying certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apurva.

From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the effort of the agent. And that what const.i.tutes the meaning of roots, viz.

the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is accomplished, we shall show later on, under Su. III, 2, 37--It is thus finally proved that the Vedanta-texts give information about an accomplished ent.i.ty, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand, Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the katurmasya- sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.

We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Enquiry.'

What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should be enquired into?--To this question the second Sutra gives a reply.

[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas.]

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).

The expression 'the origin', &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and reabsorption'. The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down to blades of gra.s.s, all of which experience the fruits (of their former actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.

e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is Brahman: such is the meaning of the Sutra.--The definition here given of Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Varuni went to his father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman', &c., up to 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'

A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this pa.s.sage?--It is not possible, the Purvapakshin contends. The attributes stated in that pa.s.sage--viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on--do not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself.--But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young, has reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only; similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only!--Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other means of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the a.s.sumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several Brahmans.--But we maintain that the unity of the term 'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'!--By no means, we reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about them, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated horns, or no horns,' the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only; and in the same way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason, even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition of which is desired.--Nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. pa.s.sage (viz. creation of the world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks (upalakshana), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of something already known from a certain point of view, being known in a different aspect--as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Devadatta.'--But may we not say that from the text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c., of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to something already known in a certain way)?--Not so, we reply; either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force.--Brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.

To this prima facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possessing supreme greatness (brihattva) and power of growth (brimhana)--this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which 'Brahman' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under discussion, the relative p.r.o.noun--which appears in three forms, (that) 'from whence,' (that) 'by which,' (that) 'into which'--refers to something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on, of the world. This previous knowledge rests on the Ch. pa.s.sage, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' &c., up to 'it sent forth fire'--which declares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal material, and instrumental cause. There the clause 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general material cause; the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a second operative cause; and the clauses 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth', and 'it sent forth fire', establish that one being (as the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination, subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently indicate Brahman as that ent.i.ty which is their material and operative cause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies greatness (brihattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as hence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.--Nor is there really any objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive attributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not otherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way involving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed to each other, necessarily lead to the a.s.sumption of several individual cows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only, and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman in succession.--The text 'from whence these beings', &c., teaches us that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman', tells us that its essential nature marks it off from everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes it from non-intelligent matter, the abode of change, and the souls implicated in matter; for as both of these enter into different states of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned being. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently non-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state.

And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and attributes are not unsurpa.s.sable, and who are distinct from the two cla.s.ses of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true being' and 'knowledge').--The entire text therefore defines Brahman-- which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the world--as that which is in kind different from all other things; and it is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks--such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.

To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second Sutra can be acceptable; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the first Sutra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology, something of supreme greatness; and according to the second Sutra it is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world.

The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sutras, and the scriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for its object things possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an attribute 'to be proved.' And even if, in agreement with your view, we explained the second Sutra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds the error of the origination, &c., of the world', we should not thereby advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and speech (vyavahara). All this implies the presence of difference--if there were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is, it would be something altogether void, without any meaning.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on.'

An objection to the purport of the preceding Sutras here presents itself.-- The a.s.sertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, must be known through the Vedanta-texts is unfounded; for as Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative texts.--To this objection the next Sutra replies.

3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).

Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known through Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true nature of Brahman.--But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture has meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources of knowledge.--But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are those other sources of knowledge? It cannot, in the first place, be Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense- organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of the special object const.i.tuted by a supreme Self that is capable of being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance, and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for although such perception--which springs from intense imagination-- implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if, after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of error.--Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on generalizations (cp. Nyaya Su. I, 1,5,). Not inference of the former kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind, because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious of, and constructing, the universe of things.--But there _is_ such a feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing produced. It further is matter of experience that whatever consists of non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health, which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its consisting of parts.--Against this argumentation also objections may be raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife, e.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way of so-called intimate relation (sama-vaya), and this requires a certain combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea, mountains, &c.--all of which are included in the cla.s.s of things concerning which you wish to prove something--, and we therefore miss a uniform kind of existence common to all those things.--Let us then understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on the latter!--This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, ma.s.ses of stone, trees, &c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no proof.--Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes, such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the unseen principle--called 'apurva,' or by similar names--which resides in the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what _is_ required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of the implements of their work--the wheel, the staff, &c.--without troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves to their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they are a.s.sured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers possessed by sacrifices and the like.--Moreover, experience teaches that agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced, nor can their material and other causes ever be known; we therefore have no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the causes of which, is possible at all.--Experience further teaches that earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on; the quality of being an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and those other attributes that belong--to the highest Soul, whose existence you wish to establish.--Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature which maybe suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case under discussion, however, the thine; to be inferred is something not guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of constructing the entire universe; here there is nothing to interfere with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.--The conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of a Lord does not admit of proof.

Against all this the Purvapakshin now restates his case as follows:--It cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. 'The earth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of parts; in the same way as jars and similar things.' 'The earth, seas, mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big; (i.e. non-atomic), they are capable of motion; just as jars and the like.' 'Bodies, the world, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid (murtta); just as jars and the like.'--But, an objection is raised, in the case of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining that the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is effected, and that thing is not'; and, on the other hand, we do observe it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about, and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the bringing about of the effect presupposes).--Not so, we reply. In the case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of the effect. From the circ.u.mstance of a thing consisting of parts we know it to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's manifold knowledge and skill. a.n.a.logously, when a living body and the world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer--as their maker-- some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their nature and skill to construct them.--Pleasure and pain, moreover, by which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also compels us to a.s.sume a being capable of allotting to each individual soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non- intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may be favoured by circ.u.mstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and stupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be guided by an intelligent principle.)--Nor may we a.s.sume, as a 'less complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world- constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, dest.i.tute of such power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and ruling all things in the universe.--The contention that from the world being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence, omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent with regard to things other than the particular effect; for such incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any causal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his knowledge of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant) incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because those incapabilities, &c., are observed to exist together with his special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded because no agent, a potter e.g., is quite ignorant of all other things but his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all agents [FOOTNOTE 168:1], and hence exceptions would arise with regard to every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise) is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord, creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord).

A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of the universe.--But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience, that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what way the volition of a bodiless Lord can put other bodies in motion; for volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.--But volitions, even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!--This objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that--as the individual souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body, and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the text quoted under the preceding Sutra cannot be taken to convey instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct from each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements; and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g.

ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.

Against all this we now argue as follows:--The Vedanta-text declaring the origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman possessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing because it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and construct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of material and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c., although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are a.n.a.logous to one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful universe, and that if an additional principle be a.s.sumed to account for the world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to a.s.sume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an increase of religious merit; and as we may a.s.sume that through an eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to a.s.sume a highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving reason (viz. the circ.u.mstance of something being an effect) is not invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further, is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is the fault of the proving collateral instances being dest.i.tute of what has to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).--Moreover, if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not established (for experience does not show that all things are produced together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict Scripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is born' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover, as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on, are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of sattva (goodness) and the other primary const.i.tuents of matter, we must conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes.

Sattva and so on--which const.i.tute the distinctive elements of the causal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects.

Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different effects we must necessarily a.s.sume the connexion of an intelligent agent with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various effects presuppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that it is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on, and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows that individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference leads to a Lord different from them in nature.--This admits of various expressions in technical form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are'; 'the Lord is not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls have none'; 'the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of bodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by means of which they enter into gross bodies).--'Time is never devoid of created worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which has its created world).'

Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects, with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body, and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body, different from it (which would account for the origination of the body).

Nor could the Lord himself be a.s.sumed as the cause of the body, since a bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained that the Lord can be a.s.sumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other body; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._--Should we, moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged in effort or not?--The former is inadmissible, because he is without a body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.

e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion (i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the Lord of all and const.i.tutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether unsurpa.s.sable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus altogether excluded.--The Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we shall show later on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1.

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Scripture being the source.'

A new objection here presents itself.--Brahman does not indeed fall within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished within itself.--To this objection the following Sutra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of producing effects of some other kind.]

4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the highest aim of man).

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. _That_, i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on account of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man--that is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for their subject, Brahman, which const.i.tutes the highest aim of man. For such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which const.i.tutes the Upanishads--'That from whence these beings are born'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that, owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases we observe connexion with what const.i.tutes the general aim, i.e. the benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a son is born to thee.' 'This is no snake'--evidently have an aim, viz. in so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.

Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedanta- texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose is in fact impossible. And what const.i.tutes such purpose is the attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be effected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak digestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the heavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the a.s.sertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a son is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man, viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.

g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.--You will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by his knowledge of the thing.--It then appears, we rejoin, that man's purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose; they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity, or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished ent.i.ty.

At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedanta-texts _are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure h.o.m.ogeneous knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.--But which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of knowledge?--Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e.

represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed accomplished through itself, but all the same it may const.i.tute an object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from the apparent world.

This view (the Mimamsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that injunction const.i.tutes the meaning of sentences must be able to a.s.sign the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined (but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set forth by the antagonist), const.i.tutes the qualification of the person to whom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of a cause or of a result.--Let it then be said that what const.i.tutes the qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman (on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).--This, we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.-- Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something