Up. I, 6; I, 9), and in so far the two vidyas are alike. But while the former text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of a golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference of attributes the two meditations must be held separate (a_ fortiori_, then, those meditations are separate which have different objects of meditation).

8. If that be declared on account of name; (we object, since) that is also (where the objects of injunction differ).

If the oneness of the vidyas be maintained on the ground that both have the same name, viz. udgitha-vidya, we point out that oneness is found also where the objects enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is applied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which forms part of the sacrifice called 'Kundapayinam ayanam'; and the term udgitha is applied equally to the many different meditations described in the first prapathaka of the Chandogya.

9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.

Since the pranava, which is a part of the udgitha, is introduced as the subject of meditation in the first prapathaka of the Chandogya, and extends over the later vidyas also, it is appropriate to a.s.sume that also in the clause 'the G.o.ds took the udgitha'--which stands in the middle--the term udgitha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The conclusion from all this is that in the Chandogya the object of meditation is const.i.tuted by the pranava--there termed udgitha--viewed under the form of prana; while in the Vajasaneyaka the term udgitha denotes the whole udgitha, and the object of meditation is he who produces the udgitha, i.e. the udgatri, viewed under the form of prana.

And this proves that the two vidyas are separate.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference.'

10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.

The Chandogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana; the object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up.

VI, 1). In the text of the Kaus.h.i.takins, on the other hand, there is a meditation on Prana which mentions the former qualities ('being the best' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,'

and so on). This, the Purvapakshin maintains, const.i.tutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations themselves.--This view the Sutra sets aside 'on account of non- difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Prana of the Kaus.h.i.takins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,'

i.e. since the text of the Kaus.h.i.takins also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that Prana is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that Prana should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be comprised in the meditation of the Kaus.h.i.takins also. Hence there is no difference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non- difference of everything.'

In the same way as the meditation on Prana as the oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Prana being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on Prana of the Kaus.h.i.takins, although they are not expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included in all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.

11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.

The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.-- Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned should be included!--This prima facie view is negatived by the Sutra.

The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding Sutra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on Brahman!--This the next Sutra negatives.

12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease.

The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compa.s.sion, and so on--all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the next Sutra removes.

13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.

Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this cla.s.s belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compa.s.sion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned.

But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of a.s.sisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next Sutra disposes of this difficulty.

14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.

As no other purpose can be a.s.signed, the text must be supposed to represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the Selfs mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food, the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation that involves the idea of that Self.

15. And on account of the term 'Self.'

That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term 'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the preceding sections, the term _Self_ had been applied to what is _not_ of the nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true _Self_?--To this the next Sutra replies.

16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of the subsequent pa.s.sage.

In the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in other pa.s.sages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes the highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent pa.s.sagel, i.e. by the pa.s.sage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.

17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of ascertainment.

But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent pa.s.sage!--It _is_ possible, the Sutra replies, 'on account of ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self, and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were viewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'

18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has to be done.

The Sutra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath. Both texts--the Chandogya as well as the Vajasaneyaka-declare that water const.i.tutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prana as having water for its dress.--The Purvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the Vajasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,'

while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing.

And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to the meditation on prana.--To this the Sutra replies that what the text enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of prana. 'On account of the statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of what is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vajasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for prana; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also explains why the Chandogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'

19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.

In the book of the Vajasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called Sandilyavidya; and there is also a Sandilya- vidya in the Brihadaranyaka. The Purvapakshin holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such as Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former; the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.--This the Sutra negatives. The object of meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as 'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in the Brihad-aranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ'

from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'