The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja.

by Trans. George Thibaut.

INTRODUCTION.

In the Introduction to the first volume of the translation of the 'Vedanta-Sutras with Sankara's Commentary' (vol. x.x.xiv of this Series) I have dwelt at some length on the interest which Ramanuja's Commentary may claim--as being, on the one hand, the fullest exposition of what may be called the Theistic Vedanta, and as supplying us, on the other, with means of penetrating to the true meaning of Badarayana's Aphorisms. I do not wish to enter here into a fuller discussion of Ramanuja's work in either of these aspects; an adequate treatment of them would, moreover, require considerably more s.p.a.ce than is at my disposal. Some very useful material for the right understanding of Ramanuju's work is to be found in the 'a.n.a.lytical Outline of Contents' which Messrs. M. Rangakarya and M. B. Varadaraja Aiyangar have prefixed to the first volume of their scholarly translation of the Sribhashya (Madras, 1899).

The question as to what the Sturas really teach is a critical, not a philosophical one. This distinction seems to have been imperfectly realised by several of those critics, writing in India, who have examined the views expressed in my Introduction to the translation of Sankara's Commentary. A writer should not be taxed with 'philosophic incompetency,' 'hopeless theistic bias due to early training,' and the like, simply because he, on the basis of a purely critical investigation, considers himself ent.i.tled to maintain that a certain ancient doc.u.ment sets forth one philosophical view rather than another. I have nowhere expressed an opinion as to the comparative philosophical value of the systems of Sankara and Ramanuja; not because I have no definite opinions on this point, but because to introduce them into a critical enquiry would be purposeless if not objectionable.

The question as to the true meaning of the Sutras is no doubt of some interest; although the interest of problems of this kind may easily be over-estimated. Among the remarks of critics on my treatment of this problem I have found little of solid value. The main arguments which I have set forth, not so much in favour of the adequacy of Ramanuja's interpretation, as against the validity of Sankarakarya's understanding of the Sutras, appear to me not to have been touched. I do not by any means consider the problem a hopeless one; but its solution will not be advanced, in any direction, but by those who will be at the trouble of submitting the entire body of the Sutras to a new and detailed investigation, availing themselves to the full of the help that is to be derived from the study of all the existing Commentaries.

The present translation of the Sribhashya claims to be faithful on the whole, although I must acknowledge that I have aimed rather at making it intelligible and, in a certain sense, readable than scrupulously accurate. If I had to rewrite it, I should feel inclined to go even further in the same direction. Indian Philosophy would, in my opinion, be more readily and widely appreciated than it is at present, if the translators of philosophical works had been somewhat more concerned to throw their versions into a form less strange and repellent to the western reader than literal renderings from technical Sanskrit must needs be in many pa.s.sages. I am not unaware of the peculiar dangers of the plan now advocated--among which the most obvious is the temptation it offers to the translator of deviating from the text more widely than regard for clearness would absolutely require. And I am conscious of having failed in this respect in more than one instance. In other cases I have no doubt gone astray through an imperfect understanding of the author's meaning. The fact is, that as yet the time has hardly come for fully adequate translations of comprehensive works of the type of the Sribhashya, the authors of which wrote with reference--in many cases tacit--to an immense and highly technical philosophical literature which is only just beginning to be studied, and comprehended in part, by European scholars.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received from various quarters in preparing this translation. Pandit Gangadhara Sastrin, C. I. E., of the Benares Sanskrit College, has, with unwearying kindness and patience, supplied me throughout with comments of his own on difficult sections of the text. Pandit Svamin Rama Misra Sastrin has rendered me frequent a.s.sistance in the earlier portion of my task. And to Mr. A. Venis, the learned Princ.i.p.al of the Benares Sanskrit College, I am indebted for most instructive notes on some pa.s.sages of a peculiarly technical and abstruse character. Nor can I conclude without expressing my sense of obligation to Colonel G. A. Jacob, whose invaluable 'Concordance to the Princ.i.p.al Upanishads' lightens to an incalculable degree the task of any scholar who is engaged in work bearing on the Vedanta.

VEDANTA-SuTRAS

WITH

RAMANUJA'S SRiBHASHYA

FIRST ADHYAYA.

FIRST PADA.

MAY my mind be filled with devotion towards the highest Brahman, the abode of Lakshmi who is luminously revealed in the Upanishads; who in sport produces, sustains, and reabsorbs the entire Universe; whose only aim is to foster the manifold cla.s.ses of beings that humbly worship him.

The nectar of the teaching of Parasara's son (Vyasa),--which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishads--which restores to life the souls whose vital strength had departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence--which was well guarded by the teachers of old--which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions,--may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words.

The lengthy explanation (vritti) of the Brahma-sutras which was composed by the Reverend Bodhayana has been abridged by former teachers; according to their views the words of the Sutras will be explained in this present work.

1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

In this Sutra the word 'then' expresses immediate sequence; the word 'therefore' intimates that what has taken place (viz. the study of the karmakanda of the Veda) const.i.tutes the reason (of the enquiry into Brahman). For the fact is that the enquiry into (lit.'the desire to know') Brahman--the fruit of which enquiry is infinite in nature and permanent--follows immediately in the case of him who, having read the Veda together with its auxiliary disciplines, has reached the knowledge that the fruit of mere works is limited and non-permanent, and hence has conceived the desire of final release.

The compound 'brahmajijnasa' is to be explained as 'the enquiry of Brahman,' the genitive case 'of Brahman' being understood to denote the object; in agreement with the special rule as to the meaning of the genitive case, Panini II, 3, 65. It might be said that even if we accepted the general meaning of the genitive case--which is that of connexion in general--Brahman's position (in the above compound) as an object would be established by the circ.u.mstance that the 'enquiry'

demands an object; but in agreement with the principle that the direct denotation of a word is to be preferred to a meaning inferred we take the genitive case 'of Brahman' as denoting the object.

The word 'Brahman' denotes the hightest Person (purushottama), who is essentially free from all imperfections and possesses numberless cla.s.ses of auspicious qualities of unsurpa.s.sable excellence. The term 'Brahman'

is applied to any things which possess the quality of greatness (brihattva, from the root 'brih'); but primarily denotes that which possesses greatness, of essential nature as well as of qualities, in unlimited fulness; and such is only the Lord of all. Hence the word 'Brahman' primarily denotes him alone, and in a secondary derivative sense only those things which possess some small part of the Lord's qualities; for it would be improper to a.s.sume several meanings for the word (so that it would denote primarily or directly more than one thing).

The case is a.n.a.logous to that of the term 'bhagavat [FOOTNOTE 4:1].' The Lord only is enquired into, for the sake of immortality, by all those who are afflicted with the triad of pain. Hence the Lord of all is that Brahman which, according to the Sutra, const.i.tutes the object of enquiry.

The word 'jijnasa' is a desiderative formation meaning 'desire to know.'

And as in the case of any desire the desired object is the chief thing, the Sutra means to enjoin knowledge--which is the object of the desire of knowledge. The purport of the entire Sutra then is as follows: 'Since the fruit of works known through the earlier part of the Mimamsa is limited and non-permanent, and since the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman--which knowledge is to be reached through the latter part of the Mimamsa--is unlimited and permanent; for this reason Brahman is to be known, after the knowledge of works has previously taken place.'--The same meaning is expressed by the Vrittikara when saying 'after the comprehension of works has taken place there follows the enquiry into Brahman.' And that the enquiry into works and that into Brahman const.i.tute one body of doctrine, he (the Vrittikara) will declare later on 'this Sariraka-doctrine is connected with Jaimini's doctrine as contained in sixteen adhyayas; this proves the two to const.i.tute one body of doctrine.' Hence the earlier and the later Mimamsa are separate only in so far as there is a difference of matter to be taught by each; in the same way as the two halves of the Purva Mimamsa-sutras, consisting of six adhyayas each, are separate [FOOTNOTE 5:1]; and as each adhyaya is separate. The entire Mimamsa-satra--which begins with the Sutra 'Now therefore the enquiry into religious duty' and concludes with the Sutra '(From there is) no return on account of scriptural statement'-- has, owing to the special character of the contents, a definite order of internal succession. This is as follows. At first the precept 'one is to learn one's own text (svadhyaya)' enjoins the apprehension of that aggregate of syllables which is called 'Veda,' and is here referred to as 'svadhyaya.' Next there arises the desire to know of what nature the 'Learning' enjoined is to be, and how it is to be done. Here there come in certain injunctions such as 'Let a Brahnmana be initiated in his eighth year' and 'The teacher is to make him recite the Veda'; and certain rules about special observances and restrictions--such as 'having performed the upakarman on the full moon of Sravana or Praushthapada according to prescription, he is to study the sacred verses for four months and a half--which enjoin all the required details.

From all these it is understood that the study enjoined has for its result the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called Veda, on the part of a pupil who has been initiated by a teacher sprung from a good family, leading a virtuous life, and possessing purity of soul; who practises certain special observances and restrictions; and who learns by repeating what is recited by the teacher.

And this study of the Veda is of the nature of a samskara of the text, since the form of the injunction 'the Veda is to be studied' shows that the Veda is the object (of the action of studying). By a samskara is understood an action whereby something is fitted to produce some other effect; and that the Veda should be the object of such a samskaara is quite appropriate, since it gives rise to the knowledge of the four chief ends of human action--viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final release--and of the means to effect them; and since it helps to effect those ends by itself also, viz. by mere mechanical repet.i.tion (apart from any knowledge to which it may give rise).

The injunction as to the study of the Veda thus aims only at the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables (const.i.tuting the Veda) according to certain rules; it is in this way a.n.a.logous to the recital of mantras.

It is further observed that the Veda thus apprehended through reading spontaneously gives rise to the ideas of certain things subserving certain purposes. A person, therefore, who has formed notions of those things immediately, i.e. on the mere apprehension of the text of the Veda through reading, thereupon naturally applies himself to the study of the Mimamsa, which consists in a methodical discussion of the sentences const.i.tuting the text of the Veda, and has for its result the accurate determination of the nature of those things and their different modes. Through this study the student ascertains the character of the injunctions of work which form part of the Veda, and observes that all work leads only to non-permanent results; and as, on the other hand, he immediately becomes aware that the Upanishad sections--which form part of the Veda which he has apprehended through reading--refer to an infinite and permanent result, viz. immortality, he applies himself to the study of the Sariraka-Mimamsa, which consists in a systematic discussion of the Vedanta-texts, and has for its result the accurate determination of their sense. That the fruit of mere works is transitory, while the result of the knowledge of Brahman is something permanent, the Vedanta-texts declare in many places--'And as here the world acquired by work perishes, so there the world acquired by merit perishes' (Ch. Up.

VIII, 1,6); 'That work of his has an end' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 10); 'By non-permanent works the Permanent is not obtained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 10); 'Frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 7); 'Let a Brahmana, after he has examined all these worlds that are gained by works, acquire freedom from all desires. What is not made cannot be gained by what is made. To understand this, let the pupil, with fuel in his hand, go to a teacher who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.

To that pupil who has approached him respectfully, whose mind is altogether calm, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true Person' (Mu. Up. I, 2, 12, 13). 'Told' here means 'he is to tell.'--On the other hand, 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who sees this does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'He becomes a self-ruler'

(Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Knowing him he becomes immortal here' (Taitt. Ar.

III, 12, 7); 'Having known him he pa.s.ses over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. VI, 15); 'Having known as separate his Self and the Mover, pleased thereby he goes to immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6).

But--an objection here is raised--the mere learning of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines gives rise to the knowledge that the heavenly world and the like are the results of works, and that all such results are transitory, while immortality is the fruit of meditation on Brahman.

Possessing such knowledge, a person desirous of final release may at once proceed to the enquiry into Brahman; and what need is there of a systematic consideration of religious duty (i.e. of the study of the Purva Mimamsa)?--If this reasoning were valid, we reply, the person desirous of release need not even apply himself to the study of the Sariraka Mimamsa, since Brahman is known from the mere reading of the Veda with its auxiliary disciplines.--True. Such knowledge arises indeed immediately (without deeper enquiry). But a matter apprehended in this immediate way is not raised above doubt and mistake. Hence a systematic discussion of the Vedanta-texts must he undertaken in order that their sense may be fully ascertained--We agree. But you will have to admit that for the very same reason we must undertake a systematic enquiry into religious duty!

[FOOTNOTE 4:1. 'Bhagavat' denotes primarily the Lord, the divinity; secondarily any holy person.]

[FOOTNOTE 5:1. The first six books of the Purva Mimamsa-sutras give rules for the fundamental forms of the sacrifice; while the last six books teach how these rules are to be applied to the so-called modified forms.]

THE SMALL PuRVAPAKSHA.

But--a further objection is urged--as that which has to precede the systematic enquiry into Brahman we should a.s.sign something which that enquiry necessarily presupposes. The enquiry into the nature of duty, however, does not form such a prerequisite, since a consideration of the Vedanta-texts may be undertaken by any one who has read those texts, even if he is not acquainted with works.--But in the Vedanta-texts there are enjoined meditations on the Udgitha and the like which are matters auxiliary to works; and such meditations are not possible for him who is not acquainted with those works!--You who raise this objection clearly are ignorant of what kind of knowledge the Sariraka Mimamsa is concerned with! What that sastra aims at is to destroy completely that wrong knowledge which is the root of all pain, for man, liable to birth, old age, and death, and all the numberless other evils connected with transmigratory existence--evils that spring from the view, due to beginningless Nescience, that there is plurality of existence; and to that end the sastra endeavours to establish the knowledge of the unity of the Self. Now to this knowledge, the knowledge of works--which is based on the a.s.sumption of plurality of existence--is not only useless but even opposed. The consideration of the Udgitha and the like, which is supplementary to works only, finds a place in the Vedanta-texts, only because like them it is of the nature of knowledge; but it has no direct connexion with the true topic of those texts. Hence some prerequisite must be indicated which has reference to the princ.i.p.al topic of the sastra.--Quite so; and this prerequisite is just the knowledge of works; for scripture declares that final release results from knowledge with works added. The Sutra-writer himself says further on 'And there is need of all works, on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like' (Ve. Su. III, 4, 26). And if the required works were not known, one could not determine which works have to be combined with knowledge and which not. Hence the knowledge of works is just the necessary prerequisite.--Not so, we reply. That which puts an end to Nescience is exclusively the knowledge of Brahman, which is pure intelligence and antagonistic to all plurality. For final release consists just in the cessation of Nescience; how then can works--to which there attach endless differences connected with caste, asrama, object to be accomplished, means and mode of accomplishment, &c.--ever supply a means for the cessation of ignorance, which is essentially the cessation of the view that difference exists? That works, the results of which are transitory, are contrary to final release, and that such release can be effected through knowledge only, scripture declares in many places; compare all the pa.s.sages quoted above (p. 7).

As to the a.s.sertion that knowledge requires sacrifices and other works, we remark that--as follows from the essential contrariety of knowledge and works, and as further appears from an accurate consideration of the words of scripture--pious works can contribute only towards the rise of the desire of knowledge, in so far namely as they clear the internal organ (of knowledge), but can have no influence on the production of the fruit, i.e. knowledge itself. For the scriptural pa.s.sage concerned runs as follows Brahmanas desire to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22).

According to this pa.s.sage, the desire only of knowledge springs up through works; while another text teaches that calmness, self-restraint, and so on, are the direct means for the origination of knowledge itself.

(Having become tranquil, calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, he is to see the Self within the Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).)

The process thus is as follows. After the mind of a man has been cleaned of all impurities through works performed in many preceding states of existence, without a view to special forms of reward, there arises in him the desire of knowledge, and thereupon--through knowledge itself originated by certain scriptural texts--'Being only, this was in the beginning, one only without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, I, 2); 'Truth, Knowledge, the Infinite, is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Without parts, without actions, calm, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); 'Thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 7), Nescience comes to an end. Now, 'Hearing,' 'reflection,' and 'meditation,' are helpful towards cognising the sense of these Vedic texts. 'Hearing' (sravana) means the apprehension of the sense of scripture, together with collateral arguments, from a teacher who possesses the true insight, viz. that the Vedanta-texts establish the doctrine of the unity of the Self. 'Reflection' (mananam) means the confirmation within oneself of the sense taught by the teacher, by means of arguments showing it alone to be suitable. 'Meditation'

(nididhyasanam) finally means the constant holding of thai sense before one's mind, so as to dispel thereby the antagonistic beginningless imagination of plurality. In the case of him who through 'hearing,'

'reflection,' and meditation,' has dis-dispelled the entire imagination of plurality, the knowledge of the sense of Vedanta-texts puts an end to Nescience; and what we therefore require is a statement of the indispensable prerequisites of such 'hearing,' 'reflection,' and so on.

Now of such prerequisites there are four, viz. discrimination of what is permanent and what is non-permanent; the full possession of calmness of mind, self-restraint and similar means; the renunciation of all enjoyment of fruits here below as well as in the next world; and the desire of final release.

Without these the desire of knowledge cannot arise; and they are therefore known, from the very nature of the matter, to be necessary prerequisites. To sum up: The root of bondage is the unreal view of plurality which itself has its root in Nescience that conceals the true being of Brahman. Bondage itself thus is unreal, and is on that account cut short, together with its root, by mere knowledge. Such knowledge is originated by texts such as 'That art thou'; and work is of no help either towards its nature, or its origination, or its fruit (i.e.

release). It is on the other hand helpful towards the desire of knowledge, which arises owing to an increase of the element of goodness (sattva) in the soul, due to the destruction of the elements of pa.s.sion (rajas) and darkness (tamas) which are the root of all moral evil. This use is referred to in the text quoted above, 'Brahmanas wish to know him,'

&c. As, therefore, the knowledge of works is of no use towards the knowledge of Brahman, we must acknowledge as the prerequisite of the latter knowledge the four means mentioned above.

THE SMALL SIDDHANTA.

To this argumentation we make the following reply. We admit that release consists only in the cessation of Nescience, and that this cessation results entirely from the knowledge of Brahman. But a distinction has here to be made regarding the nature of this knowledge which the Vedanta-texts aim at enjoining for the purpose of putting an end to Nescience. Is it merely the knowledge of the sense of sentences which originates from the sentences? or is it knowledge in the form of meditation (upasana) which has the knowledge just referred to as its antecedent? It cannot be knowledge of the former kind: for such knowledge springs from the mere apprehension of the sentence, apart from any special injunction, and moreover we do not observe that the cessation of Nescience is effected by such knowledge merely. Our adversary will perhaps attempt to explain things in the following way.

The Vedanta-texts do not, he will say, produce that knowledge which makes an end of Nescience, so long as the imagination of plurality is not dispelled. And the fact that such knowledge, even when produced, does not at once and for every one put a stop to the view of plurality by no means subverts my opinion; for, to mention an a.n.a.logous instance, the double appearance of the moon--presenting itself to a person affected with a certain weakness of vision--does not come to an end as soon as the oneness of the moon has been apprehended by reason.

Moreover, even without having come to an end, the view of plurality is powerless to effect further bondage, as soon as the root, i.e.