[51] "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, p. 231. "Official Correspondence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.

[52] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 18.

[53] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 406.

[54] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 24.

[55] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 412.

[56] "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XI, p. 458. Bagot's reports of interviews with Adams.

[57] Hamilton, "Writings of James Monroe," Vol. VI, pp. 323-325.

[58] Ford, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. X, pp. 277-278.

[59] Hamilton, "Writings of James Madison," Vol. IX, pp. 161-162.

[60] W. C. Ford, "Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," in Ma.s.s. Hist. Soc.

_Proceedings_, second series, Vol. XV, p. 392.

[61] See especially G. L. Beer, "The English-Speaking Peoples," p. 79.

[62] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 419.

[63] _Ibid._, pp. 429, 443.

[64] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 26.

[65] Rush's "Residence at the Court of London," p. 448.

[66] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 33.

[67] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 209.

[68] "Messages and Papers of the Presidents," Vol. II, p. 218.

[69] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 276.

[70] "Wharton's Digest," Sec. 57, Vol. I, p. 272.

[71] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 42.

[72] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 54.

[73] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. II, p. 242. Letter to Granville. On the general question of recognition, see "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, pp. 297-304.

[74] "Political Life of Canning," Vol. II, p. 1.

[75] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, pp. 794-796, and Vol. VI, pp.

1006-1014.

[76] Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 850 ff.

CHAPTER III

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES IN REGARD TO CUBA

The Cuban question had its origin in the series of events that have been narrated in the two preceding chapters--the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the resulting paralysis of Spanish power in America. The declaration of President Monroe, enforced by the well-known att.i.tude of England, dealt the death-blow to Spanish hopes of recovering the Southern continent. Hence the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, which had remained loyal to the king, were clung to with all the greater tenacity as the sole remains of the imperial possessions over which the successors of Ferdinand and Isabella had ruled for three centuries. The "Ever-faithful Island of Cuba" was rewarded for her loyalty by the concession of certain liberties of trade and invited to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes--a privilege which was subsequently withdrawn. Spain was now too weak to protect her two West Indian dependencies--the remains of her former glory, but her very weakness secured their possession to her.

The naval and commercial importance of Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," made it a prize too valuable to be acquired by any one of the great maritime powers without exciting the jealousy and opposition of the others. Henceforth, to borrow the figure of a contemporary journalist, Cuba was to be the trans-Atlantic Turkey, trembling to its fall, but sustained by the jealousies of those who were eager to share the spoils.

The strategic importance of Cuba, commanding to a large extent the commerce of the West Indies and of the Central American states, and, what was of vital interest to us, the traffic of the Mississippi valley, attracted at an early period the attention of American as well as of European statesmen. In a letter to President Madison in 1809, Jefferson, in speaking of Napoleon's policy in regard to the Spanish-American colonies, said:

That he would give up the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of those colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price; because they are ours in the first moment of the first war; and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southern-most limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a _ne plus ultra_ as to us in that direction.[77]

President Madison expressed his views on the Cuban question in a letter to William Pinkney, October 30, 1810:

The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States.[78]

This was the first statement in the evolution of a Cuban policy consistently adhered to by the United States until the successes of the Mexican war super-induced larger ideas of the mission and destiny of the Union.

As early as 1817 fears as to the fate of Cuba were raised in the minds of the American public by newspaper reports to the effect that England had proposed a relinquishment of her claim against Spain for the maintenance of the British army during the Peninsular campaign, amounting to 15,000,000, in return for the cession of the island.[79]

Reports of this nature were circulated for several months on both sides of the Atlantic, but the question did not a.s.sume any very great importance until 1819, when the treaty for the cession of the Floridas to the United States was being negotiated with Spain. It was then insisted by the British press that the acquisition of the Floridas would give the United States such a preponderating influence in West Indian affairs as to render necessary the occupation of Cuba by Great Britain as the natural and only offset.[80] The Florida treaty was ratified after some delay, which, however, does not appear to have been caused by the British government, as was supposed at the time. The British papers, nevertheless, continued to condemn in strong terms the treaty as well as the inaction of their government in not making it a pretext for the seizure of Cuba.

As the preparations of France for the invasion of Spain in 1823 progressed the fate of Cuba became a question of absorbing interest in America. There was little hope that the island would continue a dependency of Spain. It was rumored that Great Britain had engaged to supply the const.i.tutional government of Spain with money in her struggle with France and would occupy Cuba as a pledge for its repayment. Both Spanish and French journals spoke of British occupation of Cuba as a matter no longer to be doubted, and the presence in the West Indies of a large British squadron, sent nominally for the purpose of suppressing piracy, seemed to lend color to the reports.[81] The British press was clamoring for the acquisition of Cuba. The _Packet_ declared: "The question then comes to this, shall England occupy Cuba, or by permitting its acquisition by the United States (which they have long desired) sacrifice her whole West India trade? There can be no hesitation as to the answer."

The British government, however, officially disclaimed all designs upon Cuba, but this disclaimer did not fully rea.s.sure the American government, and our representatives abroad were instructed to exercise a close scrutiny upon all negotiations between Spain and England. In the spring of 1823 Mr. Forsyth was succeeded by Mr. Nelson at the court of Madrid. In his instructions to the new minister, which went much beyond the usual length and were occupied almost exclusively with a discussion of the Cuban question, John Quincy Adams used the following remarkable words:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." We were not then prepared for annexation, he continued, "but there are laws of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom."[82]

President Monroe consulted Jefferson on the subject of Spanish-American affairs and the entanglements with European powers likely to arise therefrom. Jefferson replied, June 11, 1823:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us.

Its possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable as if it were our own.

But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do so.[83]

During the summer of 1825 a large French squadron visited the West Indies and hovered for several weeks about the coasts of Cuba. This action on the part of the French government, without explanation, excited the alarm of both England and the United States and drew forth strong protests from Mr. Canning and from Mr. Clay. Canning wrote to Granville, the British minister at Paris, that he could not consent to the occupation of Havana by France, even as a measure of protection against possible attacks from Mexico and Colombia.[84] Again some two months later he wrote:

As to Cuba you cannot too soon nor too amicably, of course, represent to Villele the impossibility of our allowing France (or France us, I presume) to meddle in the internal affairs of that colony. We sincerely wish it to remain with the mother-country. Next to that I wish it independent, either singly or in connection with Mexico. But what cannot or must not be, is that any great maritime power should get possession of it. The Americans (Yankees, I mean) think of this matter just as I do.[85]

The expressions of the United States, as to the designs of France, were as emphatic as those of England. Mr. Clay declared "that we could not consent to the occupation of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any contingency whatever."[86]

In this connection Canning wished to bring about the signature, by England, France, and the United States, of "ministerial notes, one between France and the United States, and one between France and Great Britain, or one tripart.i.te note signed by all, disclaiming each for themselves, any intention to occupy Cuba, and protesting against such occupation by either of the others."[87] The government of the United States held this proposal under advis.e.m.e.nt, but on France declining, it was dropped.[88] In 1826 when an attack upon Portugal was feared Canning advised, in case of such an attack, the immediate seizure of Cuba by Great Britain as more effective than half a dozen Peninsular campaigns.[89]

The Cuban question was involved in the long debate on the proposal of the executive of the United States to send delegates to the congress of Spanish-American republics a.s.sembled at Panama in 1826. This debate occupied the attention of Congress during the winter and spring of 1826, and was engaged in with great earnestness. One of the chief objections to the proposed mission was the fact that the question of Cuba and Porto Rico would come up and that the United States government had already committed itself to the foreign powers on that subject. The report of the Senate committee on foreign relations declared that,