The United States and Latin America - Part 16
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Part 16

Why do you not go to President Juarez? We are not the government of Mexico and you do us too much honor to treat us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to secure certain important interests, but we are not responsible for Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you, as to any other government, if he violated its rights, and you have the same remedies there that we had.[231]

The American government was now relieved from the burden of civil war, and for several months the correspondence of Mr. Seward had been a.s.suming a more decided tone. On September 6, 1865, he reminded the French government that the attention of the country was now no longer occupied by the civil war, and that henceforth both the Congress and the people of the United States might be expected to give a very large share of their attention to questions of foreign policy, chief among which was likely to be that of their relations with France in regard to Mexico.

About this time Major General Schofield was sent to Paris on a mission, the precise object of which was long a matter of mystery. It appears from John Bigelow's memoirs that Grant, Schofield, and a number of other army officers were bringing great pressure to bear upon the government to intervene by force and drive Maximilian from Mexico. Seward, with his usual political sagacity, concluded that the best method of holding Grant and his followers in check was to send Schofield to Paris on an informal mission. According to the latter, Seward said to him: "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get out of Mexico." Seward knew perfectly well that Schofield would not be as belligerent in the presence of the Emperor as he was in Washington, and above all he had confidence in Bigelow's tact and ability to handle Schofield when he arrived in Paris. The plan worked beautifully. Neither Bigelow nor Schofield reported just what took place at the interview with the Emperor, but we may be sure that Schofield did not say in Paris what he had intended to say when he left Washington. After Bigelow returned from Paris in 1867, he had a conversation with Seward in which the latter said:

I sent General Schofield to Paris to parry a letter brought to us from Grant insisting that the French be driven head over heels and at once out of Mexico. It answered my purpose. It gave Schofield something to do, and converted him to the policy of the Department by convincing him that the French were going as fast as they could. That pacified Grant and made everything easy.[232]

On November 6 Seward wrote:

The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico, and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the people of the United States.... They still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and impracticable. For these reasons they could not now agree to compromise the position they have hitherto a.s.sumed. They are not prepared to recognize any political inst.i.tutions in Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government with which we have so long and so constantly maintained relations of amity and friendship.

Finally, on December 16, 1865, Seward addressed what was practically an ultimatum to France. He pointed out the likelihood that Congress, then in session, would direct by law the action of the executive on this important subject, and stated that:

It has been the President's purpose that France should be respectfully informed upon two points, namely: First, that the United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate sincere friendship with France. Second, that this policy would be brought into imminent jeopardy, unless France could deem it consistent with her interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republican government existing there, and to establish upon its ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inaugurated in the capital of that country.

In conclusion he added:

It remains now only to make known to M. Drouyn de Lhuys my profound regret that he has thought it his duty to leave the subject, in his conversation with you, in a condition that does not authorize an expectation on our part that a satisfactory adjustment of the case can be effected on any basis that thus far has been discussed.

As late as November 29, 1865, the French government, through the Marquis de Montholon, still insisted on recognition of Maximilian by the United States as the only basis for an arrangement for the recall of the French troops.[233]

The formal reply to Mr. Seward's note of December 16 was received through the Marquis de Montholon, January 29, 1866. M. Drouyn de Lhuys still insisted that the French expedition had in it nothing hostile to the inst.i.tutions of the new world, and a.s.suredly still less to those of the United States. He called attention to the fact that the United States had acknowledged the right of France to make war on Mexico, and continued: "On the other part, we admit, as they do, the principle of non-intervention; this double postulate includes, as it seems to me, the elements of an agreement." He also contended that the right to make war implied the right to secure the results of war; that they had to demand guarantees, and these guarantees they could not look for from a government whose bad faith they had proven on so many occasions; that they found themselves engaged in the establishment of a regular government, which showed itself disposed to keep its engagements; that the Mexican people had spoken, and that the Emperor Maximilian had been called to the throne by the will of the people of the country.[234]

Mr. Seward's counter-reply was dated February 12, 1866. He declared that the proceedings in Mexico were regarded in the United States as having been taken without the authority, and prosecuted against the will and opinions of the Mexican people; that the United States had not seen any satisfactory evidence that the people of Mexico had spoken and called into being or accepted the so-called empire, and that the withdrawal of the French troops was deemed necessary to allow such a proceeding to be taken. He added, however, that:

France need not for a moment delay her proposed withdrawal of military forces from Mexico, and her putting the principle of non-intervention into full and complete practice in regard to Mexico through any apprehension that the United States will prove unfaithful to the principles and policy in that respect which, on their behalf, it has been my duty to maintain in this now very lengthened correspondence.[235]

He concluded with a virtual ultimatum:

We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us ...

definite information of the time when French military operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.

Napoleon finally decided that, in view of the European situation, he could not risk a war with the United States, and in the issue of April 5, 1866, the _Moniteur_ announced that the Emperor had decided that the French troops should evacuate Mexico in three detachments: the first to leave in November, 1866; the second in March, 1867; and the third in November, 1867. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Bigelow the day following M. Drouyn de Lhuys acknowledged that this statement was official.[236] The decision of the emperor was officially made known to the United States in a note of April 21, 1866. Seward had very fortunately left a loophole in his dispatch of February 12, in the statement that the United States would continue to pursue its policy of neutrality after the French evacuation. De Lhuys said:

We receive this a.s.surance with entire confidence and we find therein a sufficient guarantee not any longer to delay the adoption of measures intended to prepare for the return of our army.[237]

American historians have usually attributed Napoleon's backdown to Seward's diplomacy supported by the military power of the United States, which was, of course, greater then than at any other time in our history. All this undoubtedly had its effect on Napoleon's mind, but it appears that conditions in Europe just at that particular moment had an even greater influence in causing him to abandon his Mexican scheme.

Within a few days of the receipt of Seward's ultimatum Napoleon was informed of Bismarck's determination to force a war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. Napoleon realized that the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia, without any corresponding gains by France, would be a serious blow to his prestige and in fact endanger his throne. He at once entered upon a long and hazardous diplomatic game in which Bismarck outplayed him and eventually forced him into war. In order to have a free hand to meet the European situation he decided to yield to the American demands.

About the time that the French government announced its intention of withdrawing its forces from Mexico, it was found that troops were being enlisted in Austria for the Mexican "foreign legion." The United States government at once took measures to prevent the French troops from being replaced by Austrians by declaring to the Austrian government through Mr. Motley, "that in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as const.i.tuting a state of war by Austria against the republic of Mexico; and in regard to such war, waged at this time and under existing circ.u.mstances, the United States could not engage to remain as silent and neutral spectators."[238]

Mr. Motley seems to have been somewhat surprised and puzzled at the sudden and emphatic change of tone in the instructions of his government, and failed to carry them out in the spirit intended by Mr.

Seward. This brought forth a sharp reprimand. Mr. Seward expressed his strong disapproval of the position taken by Mr. Motley in his communication of the instructions of the department to the Austrian government, and directed him to carry out his instructions according to the strict letter, adding:

I refrain from discussing the question you have raised, "Whether the recent instructions of this department harmonize entirely with the policy which it pursued at an earlier period of the European intervention in Mexico."

Mr. Motley was instructed to withdraw from Vienna in case troops were sent from Austria to Mexico. The embarkation of troops for this purpose was stopped. Austria was in a great state of excitement over the approaching war with Prussia, and, besides needing all her available troops at home, did not care to antagonize the United States.

It was now a question of great interest in this country and in Europe, whether Maximilian would withdraw from Mexico with the French troops or attempt to maintain himself there without foreign support. Napoleon sent one of his aides to Mexico to make known his intentions to Maximilian.

This fact was communicated to the United States government, October 16, 1866:

Mr. de Castelnau has for his mission to make it well understood that the limit of our sacrifices is reached and that if the Emperor Maximilian, thinking to find in the country itself a point of sufficient support, may wish to endeavor to maintain himself there, he cannot for the future count on any succor on the part of France. But it may happen that, deeming it impossible to triumph through his own resources over the difficulties which surround him, this sovereign may determine to abdicate. We will do nothing to dissuade him from this, and we think that on this hypothesis there would be ground to proceed, by way of election, in the establishment of a new government.[239]

When the time came for the withdrawal of the first contingent of French troops, no action to that end was taken by the French government, and the United States had once more to seek an explanation. The Emperor a.s.sured the American government, however, that he had decided from military considerations to withdraw all his troops in the spring in a body, as the recent successes of the insurgents would render any large reduction of his forces perilous to those who remained. He further stated that he had counselled Maximilian to abdicate.[240] To the surprise of everyone, however, Maximilian seemed to think that honor demanded that he should remain in Mexico and share the fate of his supporters.

After the withdrawal of Mr. Corwin, owing to the unsettled state of affairs in Mexico, the United States had no one accredited to that government until May, 1866, when Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, was appointed. He left New York for his post in November, 1866, accompanied by Lieutenant General William T. Sherman of the army. They proceeded in the U. S. S. _Susquehanna_ by way of Havana, but as they found the princ.i.p.al Mexican ports on the Atlantic still occupied by the French, they proceeded to New Orleans, from which point Mr. Campbell tried to establish regular communication with President Juarez. The President had first decided to dispatch General Grant with Mr. Campbell, in the hope "that some disposition might be made of the land and naval forces of the United States without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico, or violating the laws of neutrality, which would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, order and republican government in that country."

This demonstration was intended to insure the withdrawal of the French army according to the promises of the Emperor. A hitch occurred through some question raised by General Grant and General Sherman was subst.i.tuted.[241]

The French army was withdrawn in the spring of 1867, and it very soon became evident that Maximilian's cause would speedily collapse. In view of the almost inevitable capture of Maximilian, Mr. Seward telegraphed to Mr. Campbell at New Orleans, April 6, 1867:

You will communicate to President Juarez, promptly and by effectual means, the desire of this government, that in case of capture, the prince and his supporters may receive the humane treatment accorded by civilized nations to prisoners of war.

Some of the prisoners already taken had been summarily executed.

Mr. Campbell at once dispatched a special messenger, who succeeded in getting through to the headquarters of Juarez, and who returned with an answer from the Mexican government, dated April 22, 1867. This answer not only undertook to defend the execution of prisoners above referred to, but also intimated that similar severity would be practiced on Maximilian and his leading a.s.sociates, if captured, on the ground that, by his harsh decrees, he had placed himself beyond the pale of the law of nations.[242]

Maximilian and his chief supporters were taken prisoners, May 15, 1867.

This information was received in the United States toward the last of the month, and along with it a report, not well authenticated and which afterward proved to be false, that they had been executed on the 16th.

As soon as these rumors reached Washington, Mr. Seward telegraphed to Mr. Campbell, then at New Orleans, June 1, 1867, directing him to proceed at once to the residence of the President of Mexico and enter on his mission, and if necessary to urge clemency to Maximilian and the other prisoners of war. Mr. Campbell failed to act under these instructions. He requested first that a public vessel of the United States should be detailed to carry him to Mexico. When it was found that no ship was available for this purpose, he was ordered to proceed to Havana and thence by the British or French line of steamers to Vera Cruz. He replied that under the circ.u.mstances he did not think it becoming the dignity of the representative of the United States to return to Mexico under the flag of a nation which had shown such hostility to that country. He thus remained at New Orleans from the first to the fifteenth of June. He was then ordered peremptorily to proceed at once according to instructions. He replied that he was ill and was afraid to go by way of Havana, where yellow fever was raging; that he would resign, if desired. The same day Mr. Seward telegraphed him that his resignation would be accepted.

Mr. Seward then informed Mr. Romero, the Mexican minister at Washington, that Austria, France, and Great Britain had appealed to the United States to use its good offices to avert the execution of Prince Maximilian. He strongly recommended clemency to President Juarez, as good policy, and requested Mr. Romero to make the same known to his government at once. This was June 15, the same day that Mr. Campbell's resignation was accepted. On the 21st, Mr. Seward requested Mr. Romero to inform President Juarez that the Emperor of Austria would restore Maximilian to all his rights of succession upon his release and renouncing forever all projects in Mexico.[243]

Meanwhile Maximilian of Hapsburg, Miguel Miramon, and Tomas Mejia had been tried by court-martial and sentenced to death, June 14. The sentence was confirmed by the government on the 15th, and the execution fixed for the 16th, but at the request of Maximilian's counsel, it was suspended by order of President Juarez until the 19th, in order to allow the prince to arrange certain business affairs of a private character.

At seven o'clock on the morning of June 19 the prisoners were shot.

FOOTNOTES:

[193] Brit. and For. St. Pap., 1861-62, Vol. LII. Also House Exec. Doc.

No. 100, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[194] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 359.

[195] Wharton's Digest, Sec. 58, Vol. I, p. 312.

[196] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 237.

[197] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 294.

[198] Mr. Seward to Mr. Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861. House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p. 22, Thirty-seventh Cong., Second Sess.

[199] Brit. and For. St. Pap., Vol. LII, p. 325.

[200] Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861. Brit. and For. St.

Pap., Vol. LII, p. 329.

[201] Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. Brit. and For. St.

Pap., Vol LII, p. 375.

[202] Thirty-Seventh Cong., Second Sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 100, p.