194. Qu. Whether it was not an Irish professor who first opened the public schools at Oxford? Whether this island hath not been anciently famous for learning? And whether at this day it hath any better chance for being considerable?

195. Qu. Whether we may not with better grace sit down and complain, when we have done all that lies in our power to help ourselves?

196. Qu. Whether the gentleman of estate hath a right to be idle; and whether he ought not to be the great promoter and director of industry among his tenants and neighbours?

197. Qu. Whether the real foundation for wealth must not be laid in the numbers, the frugality, and the industry of the people? And whether all attempts to enrich a nation by other means, as raising the coin, stock-jobbing, and such arts are not vain?

198. Qu. Whether a door ought not to be shut against all other methods of growing rich, save only by industry and merit? And whether wealth got otherwise would not be ruinous to the public?

199. Qu. Whether the abuse of banks and paper-money is a just objection against the use thereof? And whether such abuse might not easily be prevented?

200. Qu. Whether national banks are not found useful in Venice, Holland, and Hamburg? And whether it is not possible to contrive one that may be useful also in Ireland?

201. Qu. Whether any nation ever was in greater want of such an expedient than Ireland?

202. Qu. Whether the banks of Venice and Amsterdam are not in the hands of the public?

203. Qu. Whether it may not be worth while to inform ourselves in the nature of those banks? And what reason can be a.s.signed why Ireland should not reap the benefit of such public banks as well as other countries?

204. Qu. Whether a bank of national credit, supported by public funds and secured by Parliament, be a chimera or impossible thing?

And if not, what would follow from the supposal of such a bank?

205. Qu. Whether the currency of a credit so well secured would not be of great advantage to our trade and manufactures?

206. Qu. Whether the notes of such public bank would not have a more general circulation than those of private banks, as being less subject to frauds and hazards?

207. Qu. Whether it be not agreed that paper hath in many respects the advantage above coin, as being of more dispatch in payments, more easily transferred, preserved, and recovered when lost?

208. Qu. Whether, besides these advantages, there be not an evident necessity for circulating credit by paper, from the defect of coin in this kingdom?

209. Qu. Whether the public may not as well save the interest which it now pays?

210. Qu. What would happen if two of our banks should break at once?

And whether it be wise to neglect providing against an event which experience hath shewn us not to be impossible?

211. Qu. Whether such an accident would not particularly affect the bankers? And therefore whether a national bank would not be a security even to private bankers?

212. Qu. Whether we may not easily avoid the inconveniencies attending the paper-money of New England, which were incurred by their issuing too great a quant.i.ty of notes, by their having no silver in bank to exchange for notes, by their not insisting upon repayment of the loans at the time prefixed, and especially by their want of manufactures to answer their imports from Europe?

213. Qu. Whether a combination of bankers might not do wonders, and whether bankers know their own strength?

214. Qu. Whether a bank in private hands might not even overturn a government? and whether this was not the case of the Bank of St.

George in Genoa? [Footnote: See the Vindication and Advancement of our national Const.i.tution and Credit. Printed in London 1710.]

215. Qu. Whether we may not easily prevent the ill effects of such a bank as Mr Law proposed for Scotland, which was faulty in not limiting the quantum of bills, and permitting all persons to take out what bills they pleased, upon the mortgage of lands, whence by a glut of paper, the prices of things must rise? Whence also the fortunes of men must increase in denomination, though not in value; whence pride, idleness, and beggary?

216. Qu. Whether such banks as those of England and Scotland might not be attended with great inconveniences, as lodging too much power in the hands of private men, and giving handle for monopolies, stock-jobbing, and destructive schemes?

217. Qu. Whether the national bank, projected by an anonymous writer in the latter end of Queen Anne's reign, might not on the other hand be attended with as great inconveniencies by lodging too much power in the Government?

218. Qu. Whether the bank projected by Murray, though it partake, in many useful particulars, with that of Amsterdam, yet, as it placeth too great power in the hands of a private society, might not be dangerous to the public?

219. Qu. Whether it be rightly remarked by some that, as banking brings no treasure into the kingdom like trade, private wealth must sink as the bank riseth? And whether whatever causeth industry to flourish and circulate may not be said to increase our treasure?

220. Qu. Whether the ruinous effects of Mississippi, South Sea, and such schemes were not owing to an abuse of paper money or credit, in making it a means for idleness and gaming, instead of a motive and help to industry?

221. Qu. Whether those effects could have happened had there been no stock-jobbing? And whether stock-jobbing could at first have been set on foot, without an imaginary foundation of some improvement to the stock by trade? Whether, therefore, when there are no such prospects, or cheats, or private schemes proposed, the same effects can be justly feared?

222. Qu. Whether by a national bank, be not properly understood a bank, not only established by public authority as the Bank of England, but a bank in the hands of the public, wherein there are no shares: whereof the public alone is proprietor, and reaps all the benefit?

223. Qu. Whether, having considered the conveniencies of banking and paper-credit in some countries, and the inconveniencies thereof in others, we may not contrive to adopt the former, and avoid the latter?

224. Qu. Whether great evils, to which other schemes are liable, may not be prevented, by excluding the managers of the bank from a share in the legislature?

225. Qu. Whether the rise of the bank of Amsterdam was not purely casual, for the security and dispatch of payments? And whether the good effects thereof, in supplying the place of coin, and promoting a ready circulation of industry and commerce may not be a lesson to us, to do that by design which others fell upon by chance?

226. Qu. Whether the bank proposed to be established in Ireland, under the notion of a national bank, by the voluntary subscription of three hundred thousand pounds, to pay off the national debt, the interest of which sum to be paid the subscribers, subject to certain terms of redemption, be not in reality a private bank, as those of England and Scotland, which are national only in name, being in the hands of particular persons, and making dividends on the money paid in by subscribers? [Footnote: See a Proposal for the Relief of Ireland, &c. Printed in Dublin A. D. 1734]

227. Qu. Whether plenty of small cash be not absolutely necessary for keeping up a circulation among the people; that is, whether copper be not more necessary than gold?

228. Qu. Whether it is not worth while to reflect on the expedients made use of by other nations, paper-money, bank-notes, public funds, and credit in all its shapes, to examine what hath been done and devised to add to our own animadversions, and upon the whole offer such hints as seem not unworthy the attention of the public?

229. Qu. Whether that, which increaseth the stock of a nation be not a means of increasing its trade? And whether that which increaseth the current credit of a nation may not be said to increase its stock?

230. Qu. Whether it may not be expedient to appoint certain funds or stock for a national bank, under direction of certain persons, one-third whereof to be named by the Government, and one-third by each House of Parliament?

231. Qu. Whether the directors should not be excluded from sitting in either House, and whether they should not be subject to the audit and visitation of a standing committee of both Houses?

232. Qu. Whether such committee of inspectors should not be changed every two years, one-half going out, and another coming in by ballot?

233. Qu. Whether the notes ought not to be issued in lots, to be let at interest on mortgaged lands, the whole number of lots to be divided among the four provinces, rateably to the number of hearths in each?

234. Qu. Whether it may not be expedient to appoint four counting-houses, one in each province, for converting notes into specie?

235. Qu. Whether a limit should not be fixed, which no person might exceed, in taking out notes?

236. Qu. Whether, the better to answer domestic circulation, it may not be right to issue notes as low as twenty shillings?

237. Qu. Whether all the bills should be issued at once, or rather by degrees, that so men may be gradually accustomed and reconciled to the bank?

238. Qu. Whether the keeping of the cash, and the direction of the bank, ought not to be in different hands, and both under public control?

239. Qu. Whether the same rule should not alway be observed, of lending out money or notes, only to half the value of the mortgaged land? and whether this value should not alway be rated at the same number of years' purchase as at first?

240. Qu. Whether care should not be taken to prevent an undue rise of the value of land?

241. Qu. Whether the increase of industry and people will not of course raise the value of land? And whether this rise may not be sufficient?