The landing of American troops at Paranaque and their going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listen to him, awaiting your order."

On the back of the telegram is written the following:--

"Reply.--You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not timid." [125]

Obviously there was no real cooperation between American and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. _El Senor Noriel, General de Brigade_. Sir: In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arevalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, _F. V. Greene, Brigadier General_, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The att.i.tude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the a.s.sault on the city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:--

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Paranaque for the a.s.sault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pio del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,--

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers." [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:--

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

"_Senor Don Artemio Ricarte_: [131]

"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I a.s.sure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

"_Luis Martinez Alcobendas_.

"_Singalon_, August 10, 1898." [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:--

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right. Sastron has printed a letter from Pio del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]

Taylor continues:--

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pio del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:--

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of cooperation that Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital of the Philippines would a.s.sure them. The great importance which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:--

"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleon Garcia to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleon Garcia was planning to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R., 243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city with the Americans and demand a consideration for the a.s.sistance he had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had a.s.sisted them, but his a.s.sistance had not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as fair booty of war." [137]

There was certainly no need of Insurgent a.s.sistance in the a.s.sault on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey:

"_Senator Patterson_. When did you reach an understanding with the Spanish commander upon the subject, [138]--how long before the 12th or 13th of August?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Several days before.

"_Senator Patterson_. To whom did you communicate the arrangement that you had?

"_Admiral Dewey_. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own captains--General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army officers present when I told the General that; and I may say here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

"_Senator Patterson_. What statement did you make to them, Admiral, in substance?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city. [139] They said I must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make a signal by the international code, 'Do you surrender?' Then they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while, and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not see the white flag--it was rather a thick day--but finally I discovered it on the south bastion; I don't know how long it had been flying there when I first saw it." [140]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because the Americans suspended theirs. [141]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received by him with anger. [142]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent attack of their own, as planned. [143] It promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south side of the Pasig River. [144]

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible. [145]

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject of their entering Manila. [146]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the views of Araneta [147] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find General Anderson. This important communication follows:--

"Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation, and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson they are of the opinion, first that we should continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire reason for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation in the proposed terms and to have a conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt." [148]