As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.

I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon, who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his a.s.sisting Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883, Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."

Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible, but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty, and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children, making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of February had been spent.

The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were r.e.t.a.r.ded by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient, and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."

But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the situation required that something should be done as soon as possible, for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.

The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with 10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and "concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.

On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on 9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum, which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the greatest prompt.i.tude, but which involved the desertion of the other garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a hopeless errand.

All these circ.u.mstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January, because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one "English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance, some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January, Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks whether he would not be of some a.s.sistance under the altered circ.u.mstances. The "altered circ.u.mstances" must have been inserted for the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible, for the only alteration in the circ.u.mstances was that six weeks had been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.

The publication of General Gordon's views in the _Pall Mall Gazette_ of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high, dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's name. But he had not made allowance for an embarra.s.sed and purposeless Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and willing to adopt any suggestion--even to resign its place to "the unspeakable Turk"--so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.

At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too strong.

On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.

In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the British representative could make no demur short of resigning his post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that "Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.

In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the heavy responsibility of a.s.signing the just blame to those individuals who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague; that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that r.e.t.a.r.ded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards, the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord Cromer.

Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster, and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do, this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.

Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of H.M.'s Government."

Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it, left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had a.s.sembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger which I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be far behind."

Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a subject upon which he felt very strongly and held p.r.o.nounced views.

The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province after providing for its administration. The letter given in the previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.

The following instructions should be read by the light of these reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and had widely different goals in view:--

"FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.

"Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum.

"You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best be secured.

"In connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior.

"You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.

"You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.

Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will a.s.sist you in the duties thus confided to you.

"On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _via_ the Nile."

General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of doc.u.mentary evidence to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own policy had been well set forth in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and might be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there was a wide and impa.s.sable gulf between the views of the British Government and its too brilliant agent.

The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.

It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared, for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.

During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the board--that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge of the country."

General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position a.s.signed by the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to "throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon, who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham; and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one, that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it, although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year; but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its emissary to accept the t.i.tle of Governor-General of a province which it had decided should cease to exist.

This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon, whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe att.i.tude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.

This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and ent.i.tled by him "Zebehr Pasha _v._ General Gordon":--

"Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo, being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was in August 1877. He and his men a.s.sumed an hostile att.i.tude to the Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.

Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.

I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman, under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a sort of _expose_ to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been put down--viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court martial was held under Ha.s.san Pasha Halmi; the court condemned Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him, and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about Zebehr and myself.

"Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.

All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.

Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a father.

"I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.

"It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, _i.e._ to evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, _vis-a-vis_ the safety of the Egyptian employes.

"To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a _sine qua non_.

"Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then do not send him, and I have confidence one will (_D.V._) get out the Egyptian employes in three or four months, and will leave a c.o.c.kpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.

"With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.

that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would bear the responsibility of recommending it.

"C. G. GORDON, Major-General."

An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two princ.i.p.als, there were present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham, Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter, signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other incriminating doc.u.ments to the Khedive in 1879. The pa.s.sage in that letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's instructions to attack him.

"Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards G.o.d, therefore do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a mischief-maker, and G.o.d loveth not them who make mischief."

It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the original; but Gordon had had all the doc.u.ments copied in 1879, and bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.

In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the incriminating doc.u.ment, but really to avert a worse scene. General Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's att.i.tude towards him personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo; but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of safety was not adopted.

The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's att.i.tude towards himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he considered merely the pa.s.sing excitement from discussing a matter of great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him, and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote: "I hope _much_ from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.

Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To that Zebehr replied as follows:--

"TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON,--I am very grateful to you for having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi, because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.

"Please accept my best respects.

ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.