Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the following extracts will suffice:--

"China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.

China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.

Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of the Government of China, China can never go to war with any first-cla.s.s power; it is too near the sea."

The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the smallest possible s.p.a.ce, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the regeneration of China might be brought about.

"In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_ united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government, crediting the Government with the power to support their strong words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people, each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never intending to enter into war.

"The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago: they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.

They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in ignorance, and to r.e.t.a.r.d their progress to the same pace they themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.

"It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick, is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never move.

"The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.

"From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese people have to remain pa.s.sive under the humiliations which come upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-cla.s.s Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie, that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may last for years and cause endless misery.

"It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?

How can China maintain the high position that the wealth, industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people ent.i.tle her to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not have the blessing of G.o.d, and, in the second, it would result in the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through the Press and by pet.i.tions, on the Central Government, and to request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not one life need be lost.

"The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin, where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into consideration, and grant our wishes.'

"I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of the drones in winter."

There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already quoted.

Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation not accepted." As he had already taken his pa.s.sage home he did not reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might have trusted me. My pa.s.sage from China was taken days before the arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous diplomatists and selfish governments.

With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country a.s.sociated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in 1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--

"The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I used the following argument to them when I was there:--The present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight; if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China are Russia and England. Russia could march without much difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China, but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.

As for the European population in China, write them down as identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is, without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The Isle of Bourbon or Reunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those countries?"

In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same views are expressed:--

"I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say, humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so b.u.mptious that any success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pa.s.s, would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."

In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote finally on this branch of the subject:--

"I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take, and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power, could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore, etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."

There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--

"PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.

"About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted on their being imported, and carried out such importation in spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.

"I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to say that all that they urge is fict.i.tious about morality; and I would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up, for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and China.

"I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is wrong, even if it was eggs.

"Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China, this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of 1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.

The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his chance.

"A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him; therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing whether eggs are good or not.

"Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li Hung Chang.

"People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it is outrageous.

"Note this, only certain cla.s.ses of vessels are subject to the Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under that Office the Chinese Government would make 2,000,000 a year more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however, because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose it. Did you ever read the letters of the Amba.s.sador before Marquis Tseng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding, 'These people are wonderful, but the ma.s.ses are miserable far beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare of the people.'

"Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying, 'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'

"I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same position of having been defeated and forced to accept some article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it, though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing, ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a deleterious drug.

"The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a political question, and so the question of opium import is now.

As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"

In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--

"As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it, as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat; yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am not very clear.

"What I mean is that no one country forces another country to take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice; thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the case.

"What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say, let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.

"Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."

CHAPTER X.

THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.

There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came, and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that, as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan, and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear when events confirmed them.

After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to his sympathy, and with characteristic prompt.i.tude he put his views on paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on 3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.

The following is its text:--

"You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I may say the same of you.

"I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as a nation.

"I have come to the conclusion that--