32 On the same principle corn is reckoned to become a part of the soil in which it is sown. But exactly as (according to what we said) a man who builds on another's land can defend himself by the plea of fraud when sued for the building by the owner of the land, so here too one who has in good faith and at his own expense put crops into another man's soil can shelter himself behind the same plea, if refused compensation for labour and outlay.

33 Writing again, even though it be in letters of gold, becomes a part of the paper or parchment, exactly as buildings and sown crops become part of the soil, and consequently if t.i.tius writes a poem, or a history, or a speech on your paper and parchment, the whole will be held to belong to you, and not to t.i.tius. But if you sue t.i.tius to recover your books or parchments, and refuse to pay the value of the writing, he will be able to defend himself by the plea of fraud, provided that he obtained possession of the paper or parchment in good faith.

34 Where, on the other hand, one man paints a picture on another's board, some think that the board belongs, by accession, to the painter, others, that the painting, however great its excellence, becomes part of the board. The former appears to us the better opinion, for it is absurd that a painting by Apelles or Parrhasius should be an accessory of a board which, in itself, is thoroughly worthless. Hence, if the owner of the board has possession of the picture, and is sued for it by the painter, who nevertheless refuses to pay the cost of the board, he will be able to repel him by the plea of fraud. If, on the other hand, the painter has possession, it follows from what has been said that the former owner of the board, [if he is to be able to sue at all], must claim it by a modified and not by a direct action; and in this case, if he refuses to pay the cost of the picture, he can be repelled by the plea of fraud, provided that the possession of the painter be in good faith; for it is clear, that if the board was stolen by the painter, or some one else, from its former owner, the latter can bring the action of theft.

35 If a man in good faith buys land from another who is not its owner, though he believed he was, or acquires it in good faith by gift or some other lawful t.i.tle, natural reason directs that the fruits which he has gathered shall be his, in consideration of his care and cultivation: consequently if the owner subsequently appears and claims the land by real action, he cannot sue for fruits which the possessor has consumed.

This, however, is not allowed to one who takes possession of land which to his knowledge belongs to another person, and therefore he is obliged not only to restore the land, but to make compensation for fruits even though they have been consumed.

36 A person who has a usufruct in land does not become owner of the fruits which grow thereon until he has himself gathered them; consequently fruits which, at the moment of his decease, though ripe, are yet ungathered, do not belong to his heir, but to the owner of the land. What has been said applies also in the main to the lessee of land.

37 The term 'fruits,' when used of animals, comprises their young, as well as milk, hair, and wool; thus lambs, kids, calves, and foals, belong at once, by the natural law of ownership, to the fructuary.

But the term does not include the offspring of a female slave, which consequently belongs to her master; for it seemed absurd to reckon human beings as fruits, when it is for their sake that all other fruits have been provided by nature.

38 The usufructuary of a flock, as Julian held, ought to replace any of the animals which die from the young of the rest, and, if his usufruct be of land, to replace dead vines or trees; for it is his duty to cultivate according to law and use them like a careful head of a family.

39 If a man found treasure in his own land, the Emperor Hadrian, following natural equity, adjudged to him the ownership of it, as he also did to a man who found one by accident in soil which was sacred or religious. If he found it in another man's land by accident, and without specially searching for it, he gave half to the finder, half to the owner of the soil; and upon this principle, if a treasure were found in land belonging to the Emperor, he decided that half should belong to the latter, and half to the finder; and consistently with this, if a man finds one in land which belongs to the imperial treasury or the people, half belongs to him, and half to the treasury or the State.

40 Delivery again is a mode in which we acquire things by natural law; for it is most agreeable to natural equity that where a man wishes to transfer his property to another person his wish should be confirmed.

Consequently corporeal things, whatever be their nature, admit of delivery, and delivery by their owner makes them the property of the alienee; this, for instance, is the mode of alienating stipendiary and tributary estates, that is to say, estates lying in provincial soil; between which, however, and estates in Italy there now exists, according to our const.i.tution, no difference.

41 And ownership is transferred whether the motive of the delivery be the desire to make a gift, to confer a dowry, or any other motive whatsoever. When, however, a thing is sold and delivered, it does not become the purchaser's property until he has paid the price to the vendor, or satisfied him in some other way, as by getting some one else to accept liability for him, or by pledge. And this rule, though laid down also in the statute of the Twelve Tables, is rightly said to be a dictate of the law of all nations, that is, of natural law. But if the vendor gives the purchaser credit, the goods sold belong to the latter at once.

42 It is immaterial whether the person who makes delivery is the owner himself, or some one else acting with his consent.

43 Consequently, if any one is entrusted by an owner with the management of his business at his own free discretion, and in the execution of his commission sells and delivers any article, he makes the receiver its owner.

44 In some cases even the owner's bare will is sufficient, without delivery, to transfer ownership. For instance, if a man sells or makes you a present of a thing which he has previously lent or let to you or placed in your custody, though it was not from that motive he originally delivered it to you, yet by the very fact that he suffers it to be yours you at once become its owner as fully as if it had been originally delivered for the purpose of pa.s.sing the property.

45 So too if a man sells goods lying in a warehouse, he transfers the ownership of them to the purchaser immediately he has delivered to the latter the keys of the warehouse.

46 Nay, in some cases the will of the owner, though directly only towards an uncertain person, transfers the ownership of the thing, as for instance when praetors and consuls throw money to a crowd: here they know not which specific coin each person will get, yet they make the unknown recipient immediately owner, because it is their will that each shall have what he gets.

47 Accordingly, it is true that if a man takes possession of property abandoned by its previous owner, he at once becomes its owner himself: and a thing is said to be abandoned which its owner throws away with the deliberate intention that it shall no longer be part of his property, and of which, consequently, he immediately ceases to be the owner.

48 It is otherwise with things which are thrown overboard during a storm, in order to lighten the ship; in the ownership of these things there is no change, because the reason for which they are thrown overboard is obviously not that the owner does not care to own them any longer, but that he and the ship besides may be more likely to escape the perils of the sea. Consequently any one who carries them off after they are washed on sh.o.r.e, or who picks them up at sea and keeps them, intending to make a profit thereby, commits a theft; for such things seem to be in much the same position as those which fall out of a carriage in motion unknown to their owners.

t.i.tLE II. OF INCORPOREAL THINGS

Some things again are corporeal, and others incorporeal.

1 Those are corporeal which in their own nature are tangible, such as land, slaves, clothing, gold, silver, and others innumerable.

2 Things incorporeal are such as are intangible: rights, for instance, such as inheritance, usufruct, and obligations, however acquired. And it is no objection to this definition that an inheritance comprises things which are corporeal; for the fruits of land enjoyed by a usufructuary are corporeal too, and obligations generally relate to the conveyance of something corporeal, such as land, slaves, or money, and yet the right of succession, the right of usufruct, and the right existing in every obligation, are incorporeal.

3 So too the rights appurtenant to land, whether in town or country, which are usually called servitudes, are incorporeal things.

t.i.tLE III. OF SERVITUDES

The following are rights appurtenant to country estates: 'iter,'

the right of pa.s.sage at will for a man only, not of driving beast or vehicles; 'actus,' the right of driving beasts or vehicles (of which two the latter contains the former, though the former does not contain the latter, so that a man who has iter has not necessarily actus, while if he has actus he has also iter, and consequently can pa.s.s himself even though unaccompanied by cattle); 'via,' which is the right of going, of driving any thing whatsoever, and of walking, and which thus contains both iter and actus; and fourthly, 'aquaeductus,' the right of conducting water over another man's land.

1 Servitudes appurtenant to town estates are rights which are attached to buildings; and they are said to appertain to town estates because all buildings are called 'town estates,' even though they are actually in the country. The following are servitudes of this kind--the obligation of a man to support the weight of his neighbour's house, to allow a beam to be let into his wall, or to receive the rain from his neighbour's roof on to his own either in drops or from a shoot, or from a gutter into his yard; the converse right of exemption from any of these obligations; and the right of preventing a neighbour from raising his buildings, lest thereby one's ancient lights be obstructed.

2 Some think that among servitudes appurtenant to country estates ought properly to be reckoned the rights of drawing water, of watering cattle, of pasture, of burning lime, and of digging sand.

3 These servitudes are called rights attached to estates, because without estates they cannot come into existence; for no one can acquire or own a servitude attached to a town or country estate unless he has an estate for it to be attached to.

4 When a landowner wishes to create any of these rights in favour of his neighbour, the proper mode of creation is agreement followed by stipulation. By testament too one can impose on one's heir an obligation not to raise the height of his house so as to obstruct his neighbour's ancient lights, or bind him to allow a neighbour to let a beam into his wall, to receive the rain water from a neighbour's pipe, or allow a neighbour a right of way, of driving cattle or vehicles over his land, or conducting water over it.

t.i.tLE IV. OF USUFRUCT

Usufruct is the right of using and taking the fruits of property not one's own, without impairing the substance of that property; for being a right over a corporeal thing, it is necessarily extinguished itself along with the extinction of the latter.

1 Usufruct is thus a right detached from the aggregate of rights involved in ownership, and this separation can be effected in very many ways: for instance, if one man gives another a usufruct by legacy, the legatee has the usufruct, while the heir has merely the bare ownership; and, conversely, if a man gives a legacy of an estate, reserving the usufruct, the usufruct belongs to the heir, while only the bare ownership is vested in the legatee. Similarly, he can give to one man a legacy of the usufruct, to another one of the estate, subject to the other's usufruct. If it is wished to create a usufruct in favour of another person otherwise than by testament, the proper mode is agreement followed by stipulation. However, lest ownership should be entirely valueless through the permanent separation from it of the usufruct, certain modes have been approved in which usufruct may be extinguished, and thereby revert to the owner.

2 A usufruct may be created not only in land or buildings, but also in slaves, cattle, and other objects generally, except such as are actually consumed by being used, of which a genuine usufruct is impossible by both natural and civil law. Among them are wine, oil, grain, clothing, and perhaps we may also say coined money; for a sum of money is in a sense extinguished by changing hands, as it constantly does in simply being used. For convenience sake, however, the senate enacted that a usufruct could be created in such things, provided that due security be given to the heir. Thus if a usufruct of money be given by legacy, that money, on being delivered to the legatee, becomes his property, though he has to give security to the heir that he will repay an equivalent sum on his dying or undergoing a loss of status. And all things of this cla.s.s, when delivered to the legatee, become his property, though they are first appraised, and the legatee then gives security that if he dies or undergoes a loss of status he will ay the value which was put upon them. Thus in point of fact the senate did not introduce a usufruct of such things, for that was beyond its power, but established a right a.n.a.logous to usufruct by requiring security.

3 Usufruct determines by the death of the usufructuary, by his undergoing either of the greater kinds of loss of status, by its improper exercise, and by its nonexercise during the time fixed by law; all of which points are settled by our const.i.tution. It is also extinguished when surrendered to the owner by the usufructuary (though transfer to a third person is inoperative); and again, conversely, by the fructuary becoming owner of the thing, this being called consolidation. Obviously, a usufruct of a house is extinguished by the house being burnt down, or falling through an earthquake or faulty construction; and in such case a usufruct of the site cannot be claimed.

4 When a usufruct determines, it reverts to and is reunited with the ownership; and from that moment he who before was but bare owner of the thing begins to have full power over it.

t.i.tLE V. OF USE AND HABITATION

A bare use, or right of using a thing, is created in the same mode as a usufruct, and the modes in which it may determine are the same as those just described.

1 A use is a less right than a usufruct; for if a man has a bare use of an estate, he is deemed ent.i.tled to use the vegetables, fruit, flowers, hay, straw, and wood upon it only so far as his daily needs require: he may remain on the land only so long as he does not inconvenience its owner, or impede those who are engaged in its cultivation; but he cannot let or sell or give away his right to a third person, whereas a usufructuary may.

2 Again, a man who has the use of a house is deemed ent.i.tled only to live in it himself; he cannot transfer his right to a third person, and it scarcely seems to be agreed that he may take in a guest; but besides himself he may lodge there his wife, children, and freedmen, and other free persons who form as regular a part of his establishment as his slaves. Similarly, if a woman has the use of a house, her husband may dwell there with her.

3 When a man has the use of a slave, he has only the right of personally using his labour and services; in no way is he allowed to transfer his right to a third person, and the same applies to the use of beasts of burden.

4 If a legacy be given of the use of a herd or of a flock of sheep, the usuary may not use the milk, lambs, or wool, for these are fruits; but of course he may use the animals for the purpose of manuring his land.

5 If a right of habitation be given to a man by legacy or in some other mode, this seems to be neither a use nor a usufruct, but a distinct and as it were independent right; and by a const.i.tution which we have published in accordance with the opinion of Marcellus, and in the interests of utility, we have permitted persons possessed of this right not only to live in the building themselves, but also to let it out to others.

6 What we have here said concerning servitudes, and the rights of usufruct, use, and habitation, will be sufficient; of inheritance and obligations we will treat in their proper places respectively. And having now briefly expounded the modes in which we acquire things by the law of nations, let us turn and see in what modes they are acquired by statute or by civil law.