Lefevre Pontalis, L'a.s.semblee nationale et M.

Thiers, in _Le Correspondant_, Feb. 10, 1879; A.

Thiers, Notes et Souvenirs de 1870 a 1873 (Paris, 1903); J. Simon, Le gouvernement de M. Thiers (Paris, 1878); E. de Marcere, L'a.s.semblee nationale de 1871 (Paris, 1904).]

[Footnote 456: Marquis de Castallane, Le dernier essai de restauration monarchique de 1873, in _Nouvelle Revue_, Nov. 1, 1895.]

In the hope that eventually they might gain sufficient strength to place their candidate on the throne without the co-operation of the Legitimists, the Orleanists joined with the Bonapartists and the republicans, November 20, 1873, in voting to fix the term of President MacMahon definitely at seven years.[457] By the Orleanists it was a.s.sumed that if within that period an opportunity should be presented for the establishment of the Count of Paris upon the throne, the President would clear the way by retiring. The opportunity, however, never came, and the septennial period for the French presidency, established thus by monarchists in their own interest, was destined to pa.s.s into the permanent mechanism of a republican state.

[Footnote 457: Duguit et Monnier, Les Const.i.tutions, 319; Anderson, Const.i.tutions, 630.]

VI. THE CONSt.i.tUTION OF TO-DAY

*329. Circ.u.mstances of Formation.*--Meanwhile the way was opening for France to acquire what for some years she had lacked completely, i.e., a const.i.tution. May 19, 1873, the minister Dufaure, in behalf of the Government, laid before the a.s.sembly _projets_ of two organic measures, both of which, in slightly amended form, pa.s.sed in 1875 into the permanent const.i.tution of the Republic. May 24 occurred the retirement of President Thiers, and likewise that of Dufaure, but in the a.s.sembly, the two proposed measures were none the less referred to a commission of thirty. Consideration in committee was sluggish, and the a.s.sembly itself was not readily roused to action. During the twelvemonth that followed several _projets_ were brought forward, and there was desultory discussion, but no progress. In the summer of (p. 305) 1874 a new commission of thirty was elected and to it was intrusted the task of studying and reporting upon all of the numerous const.i.tutional laws that had been suggested. The majority of this commission, monarchist by inclination, contented itself with proposing, in January, 1875, a law providing simply for the continuance of the existing "septennate." Only after earnest effort, and by the narrow vote of 353 to 352, were the republican forces in the a.s.sembly able to carry an amendment, proposed by the deputy Wallon, in which was made definite provision for the election of the President of the Republic, and therefore, by reasonable inference, for the perpetuity of the Republic itself.[458]

[Footnote 458: Anderson, Const.i.tutions, 633.]

Before the year 1875 was far advanced the a.s.sembly threw off its lethargy and for the first time in its history addressed itself systematically to the drafting of a national const.i.tution. To this course it was impelled by the propaganda of Gambetta and other republican leaders, by fear on the part of the Legitimists and Orleanists that the existing inchoate situation would lead to a Bonapartist revival, and by a new _modus operandi_ which was cleverly arranged between the republicans and the Orleanists. Convinced that an Orleanist monarchy was, at least for a time, an impossibility, and preferring a republic to any alternative which had been suggested, the Orleanist members of the a.s.sembly gave their support in sufficient numbers to the programme of the republicans to render it at last possible to work out for the nation a conservatively republican const.i.tutional system.

*330. Texts and General Nature.*--Of the organic laws which comprise the const.i.tution of France to-day five which date from 1875 are of princ.i.p.al importance: (1) that of February 24, on the Organization of the Senate; (2) that of February 25,--the most important of all,--on the Organization of the Public Powers; (3) that of July 16, on the Relations of the Public Powers; (4) that of August 3, on the Election of Senators; and (5) that of November 30, on the Election of Deputies.

Collectively, these measures are sometimes referred to as the "const.i.tution of 1875." Other and later const.i.tutional enactments of considerable importance include (1) the law of July 22, 1879, relating to the seat of the Executive Power and of the two Chambers at Paris; (2) the law of December 9, 1884, amending existing organic laws on the Organization of the Senate and the Election of Senators; and (3) laws of June 16, 1885, and February 13 and July 17, 1889, respecting the Election of Deputies.[459]

[Footnote 459: The original texts of these doc.u.ments are printed in Duguit et Monnier, Les Const.i.tutions, 319-350, and Helie, Les Const.i.tutions, 1348-1456. For English versions see Dodd, Modern Const.i.tutions, I., 286-319; C. F. A.

Currier, Const.i.tutional and Organic Laws of France, in _Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science_, March, 1893, supplement; and Anderson, Const.i.tutions, 633-640. Albert Duc de Broglie, Histoire et Politique: etude sur la const.i.tution de 1875 (Paris, 1897); R. Saleilles, The Development of the Present Const.i.tution of France, in _Annals of Amer. Academy_, July, 1895.]

Springing from the peculiar conditions which have been described, (p. 306) the handiwork of a body in which only a minority felt the slightest degree of enthusiasm for it, the const.i.tution of the French Republic is essentially unlike any instrument of government with which the English-speaking world is familiar. It differs from the British in having been put almost wholly into written form. It differs from the American in that it consists, not of a single doc.u.ment, but of many, and in that it emanated, not from a great const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, charged with the specific task of formulating a governmental system, but from a law-making body which in truth had never been formally intrusted by the nation with even the powers of legislation proper, and had merely arrogated to itself those functions of const.i.tution-framing which it chose to exercise.[460] It consists simply of organic laws, enacted chiefly by the provisional a.s.sembly of 1871-1875, but amended and amplified to some extent by the national parliament in subsequent years. Unlike the majority of const.i.tutions that went before it in France, it is not orderly in its arrangement or comprehensive in its contents. It is devoid of anything in the nature of a bill of rights,[461] and concerning the sovereignty of the people it has nothing to say. Even in respect to many essential aspects of governmental organization and practice it is mute. It contains no provision respecting annual budgets, and it leaves untouched the entire field of the judiciary. The instrument lays down only certain broad lines of organization; the rest it leaves to be supplied through the channels of ordinary legislation.

[Footnote 460: Among French writers upon const.i.tutional law there has been no small amount of difference of opinion as to whether the National a.s.sembly is to be regarded as having been ent.i.tled to the exercise of const.i.tuent powers. For a brief affirmative argument see Duguit et Monnier, Les Const.i.tutions, cxvii. Cf. Dicey, Law of the Const.i.tution, 121, note.]

[Footnote 461: It is to be observed, however, that many authorities agree with Professor Duguit in his contention that although the individual rights enumerated in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 are pa.s.sed without mention in the const.i.tutional laws of 1875, they are to be considered as lying at the basis of the French governmental system to-day. Any measure enacted by the national parliament in contravention of them, says Professor Duguit, would be unconst.i.tutional. They are not mere dogmas or theories, but rather positive laws, binding upon not only the legislative chambers but upon the const.i.tuent National a.s.sembly. Traite de droit const.i.tutionnel (Paris, 1911), II., 13.]

*331. Amendment.*--It was the desire of all parties in 1875 that (p. 307) the const.i.tutional laws should be easy of amendment, and indeed most men of the time expected the governmental system which was being established to undergo, sooner or later, fundamental modification. The process of amendment is stipulated in the law of February 25, 1875.[462] Amendments may be proposed by the President of the Republic or by either of the chambers of Parliament. When, by a majority of votes in each, the Senate and Chamber of Deputies declare a revision of the const.i.tutional laws necessary, the two chambers are required to be convened in the character of a National a.s.sembly, and amendments are adopted by absolute majority of this composite body. Contrary to earlier French practice, the exercise of const.i.tuent and of ordinary legislative powers is thus lodged in the same body of men, the only difference of procedure in the two instances arising from the temporary amalgamation of the chambers for const.i.tuent purposes. The sole limitation that has been imposed upon the revising powers of the a.s.sembly is contained in a clause adopted in an amendment of August 14, 1884, which forbids that the republican style of government be made the subject of a proposed revision. In point of fact, amendments have been few, although some, as that of December 9, 1884, modifying the methods of electing senators and those of June 16, 1885, and February 13 and July 17, 1889, re-establishing single districts for the election of deputies and prohibiting multiple candidatures, have been of a high degree of importance.

[Footnote 462: Art. 8. Dodd, Modern Const.i.tutions, I., 288.]

CHAPTER XVI (p. 308)

THE PRESIDENT, THE MINISTRY, AND PARLIAMENT

I. THE PRESIDENT

Under the French system of government functions of a purely executive nature are vested in the President of the Republic and the Ministry, a.s.sisted by a numerous and highly centralized body of administrative officials. The presidency had its origin in the unsettled period following the Prussian war when it was commonly believed that monarchy, in one form or another, would eventually be re-established.

The t.i.tle "President of the Republic" was created in 1871; but the office as it exists to-day hardly antedates the election of Marshal MacMahon in 1873. The character and functions of the presidency were determined in no small measure by the circ.u.mstance that by those who created the dignity it was intended merely to keep the French people accustomed to visible personal supremacy, and so to make easier the future transition to a monarchical system. Counting Thiers, the Republic has had thus far nine presidents: Adolphe Thiers, 1871-1873; Marshal MacMahon, 1873-1879; Jules Grevy, 1879-1887; F. Sadi-Carnot, 1887-1894; Casimir-Perier, June, 1894, to January, 1895; Felix Faure, 1895-1899; emile Loubet, 1899-1906; Armand Fallieres, 1906-1913; and Raymond Poincare elected early in 1913.

*332. Election and Qualifications.*--The President is chosen for seven years by an electoral college consisting of the members of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, meeting at Versailles in National a.s.sembly. The choice is by absolute majority of the combined body. The const.i.tutional law of July 16, 1875, stipulates that one month, at least, before the expiration of his term the President shall call together the National a.s.sembly for the election of a successor. In default of such summons, the meeting takes place automatically on the fifteenth day before the expiration; and in the event of the death or resignation of the President the Chambers are required to a.s.semble immediately without summons.[463] There is no vice-president, nor (p. 309) any law of succession, so that whenever the presidential office falls vacant there must be a new election; and, at whatever time and under whatever circ.u.mstance begun, the term of the newly elected President is regularly seven years. As upon the occasion of the a.s.sa.s.sination of Sadi-Carnot in 1894, a vacancy may arise wholly unexpectedly. Under even the most normal conditions, however, the election of a President in France is attended by no period of campaigning comparable with that which attends a similar event in the United States. The a.s.sembly habitually selects a man who has long been a member, and has perhaps served as president, of one or the other of the chambers, who has had experience in committee work and, as a rule, in one or more ministerial offices, and who, above all things, is not too aggressive or domineering. An election is likely to be carried through all stages within the s.p.a.ce of forty-eight hours. The qualifications requisite for election are extremely broad. Until 1884 any male citizen, regardless of age, affiliation, or circ.u.mstance, was eligible. In the year mentioned members of families that have reigned in France were debarred, and this remains the only formal disqualification. A President is eligible indefinitely for re-election.[464]

[Footnote 463: Art. 3. Dodd, Modern Const.i.tutions, I., 291.]

[Footnote 464: A. Tridon, France's Way of Choosing a President, in _Review of Reviews_, Dec., 1912.]

*333. Privileges.*--The President is paid the sum of 1,200,000 francs a year, half as salary, half to cover travelling expenses and the outlays inc.u.mbent upon him as the official representative of the nation. He resides in the Palais de l'elysee, where he maintains in a measure the state and ceremony that ordinarily are a.s.sociated only with monarchy. His dignity is safeguarded by special and effective penalties for insult and libel. Like the President of the United States, during his term of office he is exempt from the processes of the ordinary courts; but, like his American counterpart, he may be tried by the Senate, on articles of impeachment presented by the lower legislative chamber. The President of the United States may be impeached for "treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors"; the French President may be impeached for treason only.

On the other hand, whereas the penalty that may be imposed upon the American President by the judgment of the Senate is confined to removal from office and disqualification to hold office, the French const.i.tution fixes no limit to the penalty which may be visited upon a President convicted of treason. So far as the law is concerned, he might be condemned to death.

*334. Powers: Partic.i.p.ation in Law-making.*--The President possesses powers which are numerous and, on paper at least, formidable. A (p. 310) first group pertains to the making of law. "The President of the Republic," says the const.i.tutional law of February 25, 1875, "shall have the initiative of laws, concurrently with the members of the two chambers. He shall promulgate the laws when they have been voted by the two chambers; and he shall look after and secure their execution."[465] The concurrent power of initiating legislation, exercised through the Ministry, is something that is not possessed by the American President, who can do no more than suggest and recommend measures he deems desirable. The President of France, on the other hand, possesses only a suspensive veto. He may remand a measure of which he disapproves for fresh consideration by Parliament; but if it is re-enacted, by even a simple majority, it is inc.u.mbent upon him to promulgate it as law. If, however, the veto power is virtually non-existent, the President possesses an important prerogative in the right of issuing ordinances with the force of supplementary legislation. These may be not merely executive orders in matters of detail, such as are issued by the President of the United States, but sweeping injunctions deemed essential to the enforcement of the laws in general. The only limitation is that such ordinances must not contravene the const.i.tution or any enactment of the chambers. The power is one which, rather curiously, rests upon no express const.i.tutional provision, but simply upon custom. The right which the President possesses, with the consent of the Senate, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its term, thereby precipitating a general election, may also be made the means of exercising considerable influence upon legislative processes and achievements.

[Footnote 465: Art. 3. Dodd, Modern Const.i.tutions, I., 286.]

*335. Powers: Executive and Judicial.*--As the head of the national administration, the President appoints to all civil and military offices connected with the central government. His appointments do not require ratification by the Senate, or by any other body. He may even create, by decree, new offices. And his power of removal from office, save in certain cases, is absolutely without restriction. Appointments and removals, however, are in practice made through the Ministry, and the President has no patronage at his immediate disposal other than that of the posts in his own household. In respect to foreign affairs the President's powers are more substantial. Like the American President, he represents his country in the sending and receiving of amba.s.sadors, ministers, envoys, and consuls, and in the negotiation and conclusion of treaties. Treaties affecting peace, commerce, territorial possessions, finances, or the status of Frenchmen in foreign countries, require the ratification of the chambers; others call for no such action, and even a foreign alliance may be (p. 311) concluded by the Executive working independently. On the military side, the President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the nation, military and naval. He may not declare war without the consent of the chambers; but through the conduct of foreign affairs he may at any time, very much as may the President of the United States, create a situation by which war will be rendered inevitable. Finally, the President is vested with the powers of pardon and reprieve, although amnesty may be granted only by law.[466]

[Footnote 466: Dupriez, Les Ministres, II., 358-372; J. Nadal, Attributions du president de la republique en France et aux etats-Unis (Toulouse, 1909). For a brief American discussion of the same subject see M. Smith, The French Presidency and the American, in _Review of Reviews_, Feb., 1906. Cf.

A. Cohn, Why M. Fallieres is an Ideal French President, ibid., July, 1908.]

II. THE MINISTRY

*336. Importance in the Government.*--"There is," says an English writer of the last generation, "no living functionary who occupies a more pitiable position than a French President. The old kings of France reigned and governed. The Const.i.tutional King, according to M. Thiers, reigns, but does not govern. The President of the United States governs, but he does not reign. It has been reserved for the President of the French Republic neither to reign nor yet to govern."[467] The weakness of the French President's position arises specifically from two clauses of the const.i.tutional law of February 25, 1875. One of them stipulates that "every act of the President of the Republic shall be countersigned by a minister." The other provides that "the ministers shall be collectively responsible to the chambers for the general policy of the government, and individually for their personal acts."[468] Under the operation of these principles the Ministry becomes the real executive. Like the sovereign of Great Britain, the President can do no wrong, because the acts that are officially his are in reality performed by the ministers, who alone (save in the case of treason) are responsible for them. Chosen by the members of Parliament, the President belongs normally to the party group which is at the time in the ascendant, and by it he is kept in tutelage. The leaders of this group are the ministers, and, in a very large measure, the President simply approves pa.s.sively the policies of this body of men and signs and promulgates the measures which it carries through the chambers.

[Footnote 467: Henry Maine, Popular Government (London, 1885), 250.]

[Footnote 468: Arts. 3 and 6. Dodd, Modern Const.i.tutions, I., 287.]

*337. Organization and Functions.*--Ministerial portfolios are created by executive decree. Their number has been somewhat variable. In (p. 312) 1875 there were nine. In 1879 there was created a tenth. Between 1881 and 1887 there were eleven. To-day there are twelve, as follows: (1) Interior; (2) Finance; (3) War; (4) Justice and Public Worship; (5) Marine; (6) Colonies; (7) Public Instruction; (8) Foreign Affairs; (9) Commerce; (10) Agriculture; (11) Public Works and Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones; and (12) Labor. Portfolios may be not only created but rearranged by simple executive decree, though of course the necessary financial provisions are conditioned upon the approval of the chambers. The premier may occupy any one of the ministerial posts, or even two of them at one time. He is named by the President, and he, acting with the President, designates his colleagues and allots to them their respective portfolios. Usually, though not necessarily, the ministers are members of the Senate or of the Chamber of Deputies, princ.i.p.ally the latter.[469] Whether members or not, they have a right to attend all sessions of both chambers and to take an especially privileged part in debate. Ministers receive annual salaries of 60,000 francs and reside, as a rule, in the official mansions maintained for the heads of the departments they control.

[Footnote 469: In earlier days the ministers of war and of the marine were selected not infrequently from outside Parliament, but this practice has been discontinued.]

Collectively the ministers possess two sets of functions which are essentially distinct. The one they fulfill as a "council"; the other as a "cabinet." In the capacity of a council they exercise a general supervision of the administration of the laws, to the end that there may be efficiency and unity in the affairs of state. In the event of the President's death, incapacitation, or resignation, the Council is authorized to act as head of the state until the National a.s.sembly shall have chosen a successor. As a cabinet the ministers formulate the fundamental policies of the Government and represent it in the chambers. The Council is administrative and is expressly recognized by law; the Cabinet is political and is not so recognized. In the meetings of the Council the President of the Republic not only sits, but presides; in those of the Cabinet he rarely even appears. Aside from the President, however, the two bodies, in personnel, are identical.[470]

[Footnote 470: Dupriez, Les ministres, II., 332-357. A recent treatise of value is H. Noell, L'Administration centrale; les ministeres, leur organisation, leur role (Paris, 1911). Mention may be made of L. Rolland, Le Conseil d'etat et les reglements d'administration publique, in _Revue du Droit Public_, April-June, 1911; J. Barthelemy, Les sous-secretaires d'etat, ibid.; P. Ma, L'organisation du Ministere des Colonies, in _Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales_, Sept. 1, 1910.]

*338. The Parliamentary System: Multiplicity of Parties.*--On paper France has to-day a parliamentary system of government substantially like that which prevails in Great Britain. The President's (p. 313) authority is but nominal. The real executive consists of the ministers.

These ministers are responsible, collectively in general matters and individually in particular ones, to the chambers, in reality to the Chamber of Deputies. When defeated on any important proposition, they resign as a body. Parliamentary government in France means, however, in practice, something very different from what it means across the Channel. The princ.i.p.al reason why this is so is to be found in the totally different status of political parties in the two countries. In Great Britain, while in later years small political groups have sprung up to complicate the situation, the political life of the nation is still confined very largely to the two great rival parties, which oppose to each other a fairly united front, and between which there is not likely to be anything like fusion or affiliation. In France, on the contrary, there is a multiplicity of parties and no one of them is likely ever to be in a position to dominate the Government alone. The election of 1910 sent to the Chamber of Deputies representatives of no fewer than nine distinct political groups. No ministry can be made up with any hope of its being able to command a working majority in the Chamber unless it represents in its membership a coalition of several parties. A Government so const.i.tuted, however, is almost inevitably vacillating and short-lived. It is unable to please all of the groups and interests upon which it relies; it dares displease none; it ends not infrequently by displeasing all.

*339. Frequency of Ministerial Changes.*--It is from this condition of things that there arises the remarkable frequency with which ministerial crises and ministerial changes take place in France. The ministry of M. Poincare, established in January, 1912, was the forty-fifth in the history of French parliamentarism since 1875--a period of but thirty-seven years. Between 1875 and 1900 but four years elapsed without at least one change of ministry. Since 1900 changes have been somewhat less frequent. The Waldeck-Rousseau ministry of 1899-1902--the longest-lived since 1875--endured virtually three years; the Combes ministry of 1902-1905 lasted more than two years and a half; and the Clemenceau ministry of 1906-1909 fell but little short of two years and nine months. None the less, a total of nine ministries within the s.p.a.ce of thirteen years means an average of but one year and a half to the ministry. It is but fair to say that the ordinary "crisis" is not likely to involve a complete ministerial change. Defeated in the Chamber, or unable to make progress, the ministry as a body resigns; but, as a rule, many of the members are immediately reappointed, with perhaps a change of portfolios. A certain continuity arises also from the fact that the subordinate (p. 314) officials in the various departments enjoy a reasonable fixity of tenure. Nevertheless the most obvious feature of parliamentary government as it exists to-day in France, and in other continental countries, is its instability. Only where, as in England, there are two great parties, each possessing solidarity and sufficient strength, if returned to power, to support a h.o.m.ogeneous and sympathetic ministry, can the more desirable results of the parliamentary system be realized in full. There is as yet no evidence that such parties are in France in process of development.[471]

[Footnote 471: A French scholar writes: "Power cannot pa.s.s alternately, as in England and the United States, from the party on one side over to the party in opposition. This alternation, this game of see-saw between two opposing parties, which certain theorists have declared to be the indispensable condition of every parliamentary regime, does not exist, and has never existed, in France. The reason why is simple. If the party of the Right, hostile to the Republic, should come into power, the temptation would be too strong for them to maintain themselves there by establishing an autocratic government, which would put an end to the parliamentary regime, as in 1851. The electors are conscious of this tendency of the Conservatives, and will not run the risk of entrusting the Republic to them. When they are discontented with the Republicans in power, they vote for other Republicans. Thus, new Republican groups are being ceaselessly formed, while the old ones fall to pieces." C. Seign.o.bos, The Political Parties of France, in _International Monthly_, Aug., 1901, 155. On the French parliamentary system see Dupriez, Les Ministres, II., 345-357, 373-461; E. Pierre, Principes du droit politique electoral et parlementaire en France (Paris, 1893).]

*340. Interpellation.*--The precariousness of the position occupied by French ministries is enhanced by the parliamentary device of interpellation. As in Great Britain, every member of the two chambers possesses the right at any time to put to an executive head a direct question concerning any affair of state which, without impropriety, may be made the subject of open discussion. A minister may not, however, be questioned without his consent, and the incident ordinarily pa.s.ses without debate. In France, however, any member may direct at a minister an interpellation, designed not to obtain information, but to put the Government on the defensive and to precipitate a debate which may end in the overthrow of the ministry on some mere technicality or other matter in itself of but slight importance. The interpellation is a challenge. It is made the special order for a day fixed by the chamber, and it almost invariably results in a vote of confidence, or want of confidence, in the ministers. As employed in France, the interpellation lends itself too readily to the ends of sheer factiousness to be adjudged a valuable feature of parliamentary procedure.[472]

[Footnote 472: Dupriez, Les Ministres, II., 432-461. L. Gozzi, L'Interpellation a l'a.s.semblee rationale (Ma.r.s.eilles, 1909); J. Poudra and E.

Pierre, Traite pratique de droit parlementaire, 8 vols. (Versailles, 1878-1880), VII., Chap. 4.]

III. PARLIAMENT: SENATE AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (p. 315)

*341. The Bicameral System.*--With the dissolution of the States General in 1789, France definitely abandoned a parliamentary system based upon the mediaeval principle of orders or estates. Throughout upwards of a hundred years, however, the scheme of parliamentary organization which was to take the place of that which had been cast aside continued uncertain. During the Revolution ultra-democratic reformers very generally favored the maintenance of a national a.s.sembly of but a single house, and it was not until the promulgation of the const.i.tution of 1795 that a frame of government including provision for a legislature of two houses was brought into operation. The bicameral system of 1795-1799 was succeeded by the anomalous legislative regime of Napoleon, but under the Const.i.tutional Charter of 1814 the two-house principle was revived and continuously applied through a period of thirty-four years. The legislative organ of the Second Republic was a unicameral a.s.sembly, but an incident of the transition to the Second Empire was the revival of a Senate, and throughout the reign of Napoleon III. the legislative chambers were nominally two in number, although it was not until 1870 that the Senate as a legislative body was made co-ordinate with the _Corps legislatif_. On the whole, it can be affirmed that at the period when the const.i.tution of the Third Republic was given form, the political experience of the nation had demonstrated the bicameral system to be the most natural, the safest, and the most effective. The opening stipulation of the Const.i.tutional Law on the Organization of the Public Powers, adopted February 25, 1875, was that the law-making power of France should be exercised by a national parliament consisting of (1) a Chamber of Deputies and (2) a Senate. The one, it was determined, should rest upon a broadly democratic basis. The other was planned, as is customary with second chambers, to stand somewhat further removed from the immediate control of the voters of the country. But the two were intended to exist fundamentally to enact into law the will of the people, in whom the sovereignty of the French nation is clearly lodged. And even the most casual survey of the French governmental system as it operates to-day will impress the fact that the structure and organization of the parliamentary body have lent themselves to the usages of a democratic state in a measure even exceeding that intended by the founders of the existing order.