The First Seven Divisions.

by Ernest W. Hamilton.

PREFACE

The 1st Expeditionary Force to leave England consisted of the 1st A.C.

(1st and 2nd Divisions) and the 2nd A.C. (3rd and 5th Divisions).

The 4th Division arrived in time to prolong the battle-front at Le Cateau, but it missed the terrible stress of the first few days, and can therefore hardly claim to rank as part of the 1st Expeditionary Force in the strict sense. The 6th Division did not join till the battle of the Aisne. These two divisions then formed the 3rd A.C.

In the following pages the doings of the 3rd A.C. are only very lightly touched upon, not because they are less worthy of record than those of the 1st and 2nd A.C., but simply because they do not happen to have come within the field of vision of the narrator.

The 7th Division's doings are dealt with because these were inextricably mixed up with the operations of the 1st A.C. east of Ypres. The 3rd A.C., on the other hand, acted throughout as an independent unit, and had no part in the Ypres and La Ba.s.see fighting with which these pages are attempting to deal.

The main point aimed at is accuracy; no attempt is made to magnify achievements, or to minimise failures.

It must, however, be clearly understood that the mention from time to time of certain battalions as having been driven from their trenches does not in the smallest degree suggest inefficiency on the part of such battalions. It is probable that every battalion in the British Force has at some time or another during the past twelve months been forced to abandon its trenches. A battalion is driven from its trenches as often as not owing to insupportable sh.e.l.l-fire concentrated on a particular area. Such trenches may be afterwards retaken by another battalion under entirely different circ.u.mstances, and in any case in the absence of sh.e.l.l-fire. That goes without saying. It may, therefore, quite easily happen that lost trenches may be retaken by a battalion which is inferior in all military essentials to the battalion which was driven out of the same trenches the day before, or earlier in the same day, as the case may be.

I wish to take this opportunity of expressing the great obligations under which I lie to the many officers who have so kindly a.s.sisted me in the compilation of this work.

THE FIRST SEVEN DIVISIONS

BEFORE MONS

When an entire continent has for eighteen months been convulsed by military operations on so vast a scale as almost to baffle imagination, the individual achievements of this division or of that division are apt to fade quickly out of recognition. Fresh scenes peopled by fresh actors hold the public eye, and, in the quick pa.s.sage of events, the l.u.s.tre of bygone deeds soon gets blurred. People forget. But when the deeds are such as to bring a thrill of national pride; when they set up an all but unique standard of valour for future generations to live up to, it is best not to forget.

On the outbreak of war with Germany on August 3rd, 1914, the British Army was so small as to be a mere drop in the ocean of armed men who were hurrying to confront one another on the plains of Belgium. It was derisively described as "contemptible." And yet, in the first three months of the war, this little army, varying in numbers from 80,000 to 130,000, may justly claim to have in some part moulded the history of Europe. It was the deciding factor in a struggle where the sides--at first--were none too equally matched. For this alone its deeds are worthy of record, and they are worthy of record too for another reason.

They represent the supreme sacrifice in the interests of the national honour of what was familiarly known as our "regular army." Since the outbreak of the war, fresh armies have arisen, of new and unprecedented proportions. The members of these new armies are as familiar now to the public eye as the representatives of the old regular army are scarce.

With the doings of these new armies the present pages have no concern.

They are, it is true, the expression of a spirit of patriotism and duty so remarkable that their voluntary growth must for ever stand out as one of the grandest monuments in the history of Britain. But they form no part of the subject matter of these pages, which deal solely with the way in which the old regular army, led by the best in the land, saved the national honour in the acutest crisis in history, and practically ceased to exist in the doing of it.

The regular army, small as it was, did not lie under the hands of those who would use it. Much of it was far away across the seas, guarding the outposts of the Empire. A certain proportion, however, was at hand, and with a smoothness and expedition which silenced, no less than it amazed, the critics of our military administration, 50,000 infantry, with its artillery and five brigades of cavalry, were shipped off to France almost before the public had realized that we were at war. From Havre or Boulogne, as the case might be, these troops either marched or were trained northwards; shook themselves into shape; gradually a.s.sumed the form of two army corps of two divisions each, of which the 1st Division was on the right and the 5th on the left (the 4th Division having not yet arrived), and in this formation faced the Belgian frontier to meet and check the invaders.

The two advancing forces met at Mons, or, to be more accurate, the British force took up a defensive position at Mons--in conformity with the pre-arranged plan of extending the French line westwards--and there waited.

From this time on, the doings of the Expeditionary Force become historically interesting, and its movements are worthy of study in detail. In the first instance, however, in order to arrive at a proper understanding of the circ.u.mstances which governed the position of the British troops on the occasion of their first stand, and which afterwards dictated the line of retreat and the roads to be followed in that retreat, and the successive points at which the retreating army faced about and fought, it is desirable to get a general grasp of the geographical side of things. The Germans were advancing from the north-east on Paris; that was their avowed intention; there was no secret about it; the leaders openly proclaimed their intentions; the soldiers advertised the fact in chalk legends scribbled on the doors of the houses; and--as the fashion is with Germans in arms--they were taking the most direct route to their objective, their artillery and transport following the great main roads that shoot out north-eastward from Paris towards Brussels, with their infantry swarming in endless thousands along the smaller collateral roads. Here and there, at intervals of from twenty to thirty miles, this system of parallel roads running north-east from Paris is crossed by other main roads running at right angles and forming, as it were, a skeleton check with the point of the diamond to the north. These main cross-roads had, in antic.i.p.ation, been selected for the lines of defence along which our troops should turn and fight if necessary, for though it is laid down in the text-books of the wise that a line of defence must not run along a main road, such a road has obvious value for purposes of correct alignment. As the German advance was from the north-east, it is self-evident that the line of resistance or defence had to extend from north-west to south-east.

When our troops, by forced marches, reached Mons on August 22nd, 1914, the primary business of the British Force was to prolong the French line of resistance in a north-westerly direction. The natural country feature which was geographically indicated for this purpose was the high road which runs from Charleroi through Binche to Mons, and this was the line for which our troops were originally destined. In effect, however, this line proved to be impracticable, for the simple reason that, when we reached it, the Germans were already in possession of Charleroi, and the French on our right had fallen back beyond the point of prolongation of this line. For the British Force in these circ.u.mstances to have occupied the Mons--Charleroi road would have laid it open to the very great risk--if not certainty--of being cut off and completely isolated. In these circ.u.mstances there was no alternative but to range our 1st A.C. along the Mons--Beaumont road, in rear of the original position contemplated, while the 2nd A.C. lined the ca.n.a.l between Mons and Conde. The position was not ideal, the formation being that of a broad arrow, with the two Army Corps practically at right angles to one another. However, it was the best that offered in the peculiar circ.u.mstances of the case. As it turned out in the end, the entire attack at Mons fell on the 2nd A.C., which lay back at an angle of forty-five degrees from the general line of defence. The battle of Mons may, therefore, in a sense be looked upon as an attempt at a flanking or enveloping movement on the part of the enemy, which was frustrated by the interposition of our troops.

In view of the fact that the scene of the first shock with the enemy was fixed by necessity and not by choice, the Mons ca.n.a.l may be considered as a fortunate feature in the landscape. It ran sufficiently true to the required line to offer an obvious line of defence, and an ideal one, except for the flagrant defect that, after running from Conde to Mons in a mathematically straight line, on reaching the town it flings off to the north in a loop some two miles long by one and a half miles across. This loop, as well as the straight reach to Conde, was occupied by our troops. The formation of the British army, then, was not only that of a broad arrow, but of a broad arrow with a loop two miles long by a mile and a half across projecting from the point.

Such a position could obviously not be held for long, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, recognizing this, had prepared in advance a second and more defensible line running through Frameries, Paturages, Wasmes and Boussu. To this second line the troops were to fall back as soon as the salient became untenable. A glance at the map will serve to show that the effect of swinging back the right of the 2nd A.C. to this new position would be to at once bring the whole British Army into line, with a frontage facing the advance of the enemy from the north-east. In view, however, of the preparedness of the Germans and the comparative unpreparedness of the Allies, time was a factor in the case of the very first importance, and therefore the pa.s.sage of the ca.n.a.l had to be opposed, if only for purposes of delay. It is important, however, to keep in mind that the real line which it was intended to defend at Mons was this second line. The intention was never carried out, because it was antic.i.p.ated by an unexpected and most unwelcome order to retire in conformity with French movements on the right, which upset all plans.

In the meanwhile, the enemy's entry into Mons itself had to be delayed as long as possible, which meant that the ca.n.a.l salient, bad as it was, had perforce to be defended. This dangerous but most responsible duty was entrusted to Sir Hubert Hamilton with his 3rd Division, and, as a matter of fact, the battle of Mons in the end proved to be practically confined to the three brigades of this division.

The disposition of the division was as follows:

General Shaw, with the 9th Brigade, was posted along the western face of the ca.n.a.l loop, his right-hand battalion being the 4th R. Fusiliers, who held the line from the Nimy bridge, at Lock 6, to the Ghlin bridge.

To the left of the R. Fusiliers, were the R. Scots Fusiliers, and beyond them again half the Northumberland Fusiliers reaching as far as Jemappes. The Lincolns and the rest of the Northumberland Fusiliers formed the reserve to the brigade and were at Cuesmes in rear of the ca.n.a.l.

On the right of the 9th Brigade was the 8th Brigade, occupying the north-east face of the ca.n.a.l salient. Of this brigade the 4th Middles.e.x on the left took up the line from the R. Fusiliers east of the Nimy bridge, and carried it on as far as the bridge and railway station at Obourg. Between Obourg and St. Symphorien were the 1st Gordon Highlanders, and on their right, thrown back so as to link up with the left of the 1st A.C., were the 2nd Royal Scots. The Royal Irish Regiment formed the brigade reserve at Hyon, and the 7th Brigade the divisional reserve at Cipley. So much then for the salient itself on which, as it turned out, the enemy's attack was mainly focussed. On the left of the 3rd Division, along the straight reach of the ca.n.a.l which runs to Conde, was Sir Charles Fergusson's 5th Division. Of this division we need only concern ourselves with the 13th Brigade, which continued the line of defence on the left of the 9th Brigade, the R.

West Kents holding the ground from Mariette to Lock 5 at St. Ghislain, with the K.O.S.B. extended beyond them as far as Lock 4 at Les Herbieres. The K.O.Y.L.I. and Duke of Wellington's Regiment were in reserve. On the left of the K.O.S.B. was the E. Surrey Regiment and beyond again the 14th and 15th Brigades. Later on the line was still further extended to the west by the 19th Brigade, which arrived during the afternoon of the 23rd.

Such then was the disposition of the 2nd A.C. The 1st A.C. lay back, as has been explained, almost at right angles to the line of the ca.n.a.l, along the two roads that branch off from Mons to Beaumont and Maubeuge respectively. On the first-named road was the 1st Division reaching as far as Grand Reng. This division, however, as events turned out, was merely a spectator of the operations of August 23rd. The 2nd Division was very much scattered, the 6th Brigade being at Givry, and the 5th at Bougnies, while of the 4th Brigade the two Coldstream Battalions were at Harveng and the rest of the brigade at Quevy.

The gap between the 1st and 2nd A.C. was patrolled by the 2nd C.B., an operation which brought about the first actual collision between British and German troops. This was on the 22nd near Villers St.

Ghislain, when Captain Hornby with a squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards fell in with a column of Uhlans, which he promptly charged and very completely routed, capturing a number of prisoners.

The rest of our cavalry was spread along the Binche road as a covering screen for the 1st A.C., with the exception of the 4th C.B. which was at Haulchin cross-roads, guarding the approach to that place from the direction of Binche, and at the same time keeping up a communication between the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

Such then was, generally speaking, the position on August 22nd. During that night, however, all the cavalry was withdrawn from the Binche road and moved across to the left of our line, where they took up a position guarding that flank along the two roads running north and south through Thulin and Eloges to Andregnies. The 4th C.B., having the shortest journey to make, went four miles further west again to Quiverain. This change of position meant a twenty mile night march for the cavalry on the top of a hard day's patrol work, and the journey took them from six o'clock in the evening till two o'clock the following morning.

THE BATTLE OF MONS

The morning of the 23rd opened sunny and bright. The weather was set fair with a breeze from the east, a cloudless sky, and the promise of great heat at midday. A pale blue haze rounded off the distance, and softened the outlines of the tall, gaunt chimney stacks with which the entire country is dotted.

With the first streak of dawn came the first German sh.e.l.l. It was evident from the outset that the ca.n.a.l loop had been singled out as the object of the enemy's special attentions. Its weakness from the defensive point of view was clearly as well known to them as it was to our own Generals. It was also fairly obvious to both sides that, if the enemy succeeded in crossing the ca.n.a.l in the neighbourhood of the salient, the line of defence along the straight reach to Conde would have to be abandoned. The straight reach of the ca.n.a.l was therefore, for the time being, neglected, and all efforts confined to the salient.

The bombardment increased in volume as the morning advanced and as fresh German batteries arrived on the scene, and at 8 a.m. came the first infantry attack.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Map showing disposition of troops at the battle of Mons.

Approximate scale 2 miles to an inch.]

This first attack was launched against the north-west corner of the ca.n.a.l loop, the focus-point being--as had been antic.i.p.ated--the Nimy bridge, on which the two main roads from Lens and Soignies converge.

The attack, however, soon became more general and the pressure quickly extended for a good mile and a half to either side of the Nimy bridge, embracing the railway bridge and the Ghlin bridge to the left of it, and the long reach to the Obourg bridge on the right.

The northern side of the ca.n.a.l is here dotted, throughout the entire length of the attacked position, with a number of small fir plantations which proved of inestimable value to the enemy for the purpose of masking their machine-gun fire, as well as for ma.s.sing their infantry preparatory to an attack.

About nine o'clock the German infantry attack, which had been threatening for some time past, took definite shape and four battalions were suddenly launched upon the head of the Nimy bridge. The bridge was defended by a single company of the R. Fusiliers under Captain Ashburner and a machine-gun in charge of Lieut. Dease.

The Germans attacked in close column, an experiment which, in this case proved a conspicuous failure, the leading sections going down as one man before the concentrated machine-gun and rifle fire from the bridge.

The survivors retreated with some haste behind the shelter of one of the plantations, where they remained for half an hour. Then the attack was renewed, this time in extended order. The alteration in the formation at once made itself felt on the defenders. This time the attack was checked but not stopped. Captain Ashburner's company on the Nimy bridge began to be hard pressed and 2nd Lieut. Mead was sent up with a platoon to its support. Mead was at once wounded--badly wounded in the head. He had it dressed in rear and returned to the firing line, to be again almost immediately shot through the head and killed.

Captain Bowdon-Smith and Lieut. Smith then went up to the bridge with another platoon. Within ten minutes both had fallen badly wounded.

Lieut. Dease who was working the machine-gun had already been hit three times. Captain Ashburner was wounded in the head, and Captain Forster, in the trench to the right of him, had been shot through the right arm and stomach. The position on the Nimy bridge was growing very desperate, and it was equally bad further to the left, where Captain Byng's company on the Ghlin bridge was going through a very similar experience. Here again the pressure was tremendous and the Germans made considerable headway, but could not gain the bridges, Pte. G.o.dley with his machine-gun sticking to his post to the very end, and doing tremendous execution. The defenders too had most effective support from the 107th Battery R.F.A. entrenched behind them, the Artillery Observer in the firing line communicating the enemy's range with great accuracy.

To the right of the Nimy bridge the 4th Middles.e.x were in the meanwhile putting up a no less stubborn defence, and against equally desperate odds. Major Davey, whose company was on the left, in touch with the right of the R. Fusiliers, had fallen wounded early in the day, and the position at that point finally became so serious that Major Abell's company was rushed up from reserve to its support. During this advance Major Abell himself, Captain Knowles and 2nd Lieut. Henstock were killed, and a third of the rank and file fell, but the balance succeeded in reaching the firing line trenches and--with this stiffening added--the position was successfully held for the time being.