PREDESTINATION AND THE CRUCIFIXION OF CHRIST.--Acts ii. 23 is appealed to. It reads thus: "Having been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of G.o.d, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain." But how can these words prove universal foreordination? It might be said, that if G.o.d foreordained the bad deeds of the crucifiers, the principle is established. True; but did He foreordain them? The words simply declare that G.o.d had given up Christ, and that in so doing He had acted in harmony with a settled plan, and that the Jews had wickedly taken the Saviour and slain Him. From the throne of His excellency G.o.d saw the character of the people that lived in A.D. 33; that they stood upon religious punctilio, and "as having the form of G.o.dliness whilst dest.i.tute of its power," that they would do as the Scriptures foretold; and yet He determined to send His son into their very midst, and when He came, they took Him and crucified Him. In all that they did they acted freely. Had it not been so, had they been acting under an iron necessity, then the apostle could not have brought against them the charge of having done what they did with "wicked hands." That charge, that homethrust, explodes the Calvinistic argument, as far as the verse is concerned.

Another pa.s.sage is Acts iv. 27, 28. It reads thus: "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel had determined before to be done." But the question is simply this,--what was it that G.o.d had determined to be done? We cannot admit that G.o.d had fixed unalterably the doings of Herod, Pilate, and their unholy allies, for the simple reason given in explaining Acts ii. 23--viz., that if such were the case, then there is no foothold upon which to condemn those high-handed sinners. They were verily guilty, but we cannot find a shadow of fault with them if they were only doing what they were foreordained to do. What, then, had G.o.d determined to be done? He had determined to send His son into the world to make an atonement for sin. But this might have been done without the betrayal, the trial, and the crucifixion. I may determine to go to a distant city without determining the _mode_ of travel. One way may be pleasant, another disagreeable in the highest degree, and yet the latter may be chosen because of certain collateral issues.

So Christ's death might have been determined on, but not the _mode_.

Atonement might have been made in another way than on the cross. It was not the crucifixion that made the atonement, but its value lay in the death of the Son of G.o.d. Had He expired during the sore agony in the garden, would not His death have been meritorious? The adjuncts, the trial and crucifixion, were not therefore necessary to give His death atoning power. But G.o.d saw what the Jews would do, --that they would, in the exercise of their free agency, and without any decree, put Christ to death; and yet He sent Him at the time He did. All the glory of grace, therefore, redounds to the praise of the Lord, and the ignominy rests upon the Jews and the Gentiles. As a proof of universal foreordination, the pa.s.sage proves nothing.

G.o.d WORKETH ALL THINGS.--Ephes. i. 11 is adduced as upholding the predestination of all events. It reads thus: "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will." The stress of the pa.s.sage as a proof rests on the words, "who worketh all things." But according to the canon of interpretation already stated--viz., that when the literal interpretation of a pa.s.sage leads to absurdity, it cannot be the true one. John in his first epistle (ii. 20) says, "But ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things." To take these words literally would be to make those Christians to whom they were addressed to possess all knowledge, and thus make them equal to G.o.d, which is absurd. The words must be limited to the subject matter in which they are found.

The apostle is speaking of the anointing of Christians, the imparting unto them of the Holy Ghost, and the phrase "all things"

denotes things necessary to salvation, It is said (Acts ii. 44) that the first Christians "had all things common." But to take the words literally would be to outrage propriety. In Philippians ii. 14, it is written: "Do all things without murmurings and disputings." Here, again, the words must be limited in their application, otherwise the Christians were commanded to do all kinds of evil if commanded, without a murmur or dispute. This could not be, hence the words must be restricted to the duties devolving on them. So there must, of necessity, be restriction upon the pa.s.sage in Ephesians quoted in the Confession of Faith. It must be restricted, otherwise it will follow that G.o.d is the only worker in the universe. And what is done in the world? G.o.d's laws are broken; but if He is the only worker, then He is the only breaker of His own laws! This is absurd, hence the literality must be given up. The obvious meaning is, that in the redemptive scheme G.o.d has wrought it all out according to the wise plan He had formed respecting it, just as He works out all His plans in nature and in providence.

We know of no stronger pa.s.sages than those mentioned, although others have been quoted. It is the easiest thing in the world to quote verses from the Bible as supporting a dogma; it is quite a different thing to show that they prove it.

CHAPTER VI.

OBJECTIONS TO CALVINISTIC PREDESTINATION.

THERE are very grave objection's to this doctrine, that G.o.d hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s. They are so formidable, indeed, that in view of them the doctrine to our finding must be rejected. On another occasion we stated several of these, which, with a few modifications, were the following:--

(1.) In the first place, we object to the doctrine of universal foreordination because, if adhered to, it makes science and philosophy _impossible_. These are all based upon the trustworthiness of consciousness, and if this is false we have no foundation to build upon. When we interrogate consciousness it testifies to our freedom. But if every volition is fixed, as it is held it is, by a power _ab extra_ from the mind exercising the volition, then consciousness is mendacious; it lies when it testifies to our freedom, and, therefore, cannot be trusted; thus, science, philosophy, and religion become impossible. The old Latin saw _falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus_, which, when freely translated, is--one who gives false evidence on one point may be doubted on all points. And where does this lead to? It leads to Pyrrhonism in science and philosophy, and indifferentism in religion. The doctrine is thus a foundation for universal scepticism.

(2.) In the second place, we object to universal foreordination because it leads to Pantheism, a phase of Atheism. Pantheism as Pantheism may be viewed statically or dynamically. The static Pantheist a.s.sumes that all properties are properties of one substance. This was the feature of the vedanta system of Hindu philosophy, which holds that nothing exists but Brahma. "He is the clay, we are the forms; the eternal spider which spins from its own bosom the tissue of creation; an immense fire, from which creatures ray forth in myriads of sparks; the ocean of being, on whose surface appear and vanish the waves of existence; the foam of the waves, and the globules of the foam, which appear to be distinct from each other, but which are the ocean itself." Now, if our consciousness is only a dream, which this doctrine of foreordination makes it out to be, what are we all, in such a case, but mere _simulacra_, ghosts, shadows? This, and nothing more. We thus reach the fundamental principle of the Hindu philosophy, which is this, _Brahma only exists, all else is an illusion_.

The dynamic Pantheist holds that all events are produced by one and the same cause. This is precisely the doctrine of the out-and-out Calvinist. G.o.d is said to be the "fixer" of whatsoever comes to pa.s.s; and Pantheism says every movement of nature is necessary, because necessarily caused by the Divine volition. He is the soul of the world, or as Sh.e.l.ley says--

"Spirit of nature, all-sufficing power, Necessity, thou mother of the world."

The only platform from which Pantheism can be a.s.sailed is our consciousness of self,--of our own personality and freedom,--from which we rise to the personality and the freedom of G.o.d. The tenet of universal foreordination takes from us this "coigne of vantage,"

and lands us in dynamic Pantheism.

(3.) In the third place, we object to universal foreordination because it destroys all moral distinctions. Praise has been bestowed upon Spinoza because he showed that moral distinctions are annihilated by the scheme of necessity. But, indeed, it requires very little perception to see that this must be the case. If G.o.d has, as is said, determined every event, then it is impossible for the creature to act otherwise than he does. A vast moral difference stands between the murderer and the saint. But if the doctrine of universal foreordination is true, we can neither blame the one nor praise the other. Each does as it was determined he should do, and could not but do, and to blame or praise anyone is impossible.

"Man fondly dreams that he is free in act; Naught is he but the powerless worthless plaything Of the blind force that in his will itself Works out for him a dread necessity."

There is therefore, according to this system, no right, no wrong, no sin, no holiness; for wherever necessity reigns, virtue and vice terminate. "Evil and good," says the Pantheist, "are G.o.d's right hand and left--evil is good in the making." Everything being fixed by G.o.d we can no more keep from doing what we do, than we can keep the earth from rolling round the sun. Since this monstrosity in morals results from the doctrine, it is evidently false.

(4.) We object, in the fourth place, to universal foreordination, because it makes G.o.d the author of sin, the caveat of the Confession notwithstanding. It is said that G.o.d's foreknowledge involved foreordination. If so, the matter may be easily settled thus:--Does G.o.d foresee that men will sin? Of course He does. But if foreknowledge involves foreordination, then by the laws of logic He has foreordained sin. Syllogistically thus:--G.o.d only foreknows what He has fixed; but He foreknows sin, ergo, He fixed sin. We cannot resist this conclusion if we hold the premises. The Confession says He has foreordained everything, yet is He not the author of sin. But is it not clear as day that the author of a decree is the author of the thing decreed? David was held responsible for his decree regarding Uriah, and justly so. Had he been as clever as the authors of the Confession he could have parried that homethrust of Nathan, "Thou art the man." If everything that comes to pa.s.s was foreordained; David might have said, "I beg pardon, Nathan; it is true that I made the decree to have Uriah killed, but I did not kill him. Is it not the case that the author of a decree is not responsible for the sin of the decree?" Would Nathan have understood this logic? We think not. But if the Confession had been then in existence (if the anachronism may be pardoned), he might have appealed to it against Nathan; and we never should have had that awful threnody--the fifty-first Psalm. There is, then, no escape from the conclusion, that if everything that comes to pa.s.s has been foreordained, so also must it be the case with sin, for it also comes to pa.s.s. I open the page of history, and find it bloated with tears and blood. It is full of robberies, ma.s.sacres, and murders. As specimens, look at the Murder of John Brown by Claverhouse; the ma.s.sacre of St. Bartholomew; the sack of Magdeburg, when the Croats amused themselves with throwing children into the flames, and Pappenheim's Walloons with stabbing infants at their mothers'

b.r.e.a.s.t.s. Who ordained these and a thousand such horrid deeds? The Confession says that G.o.d ordained them, for He foreordains whatsoever comes to pa.s.s. Tilly, the queen-mother, the infamous Catherine de Medici, Charles IX., the b.l.o.o.d.y "Clavers" were mere puppets. The Confession goes past all these, and says that G.o.d fixed them to take place. This is nothing else, in effect, than to place an almighty devil on the throne of the universe. This is strong language, but it is time, and more than time, that sickly dilettanteism should be left behind, and this gross libel on the Creator should be utterly rejected. He foreordains all His own deeds, but not the deeds of men.

(5.) We object to the doctrine of universal foreordination, in the _fifth_ place, because it makes the day of judgment a farce. The books are opened, and men are about to receive acquittal or condemnation. This is perfectly right if men were free when on earth, but not so if all their deeds were foreordained by G.o.d. One of the most interesting sights in Strasbourg is the clock of the cathedral when it strikes twelve. Then the figures move. A man and a boy strike the bell, the apostles come out, and Christ blesses them.

It is a wonderful piece of mechanism. But the figures are simply automatic. They move as they are moved. To try them in a court of justice (should anything go wrong), would be simply ridiculous--a farce. And if every one of our deeds is fixed, what better are men than mere automata? To try them, to judge them, and to award praise and blame for what was done, would be to burlesque justice. The judgment day, therefore, and foreordination of all things cannot stand in the same category. If we hold by the one we must give up the other. G.o.d foreknows all things, but foreordains only what He himself brings to pa.s.s. Man will be judged, condemned, or rewarded, according as he has acted in life; which judgment implies his freedom or the non-foreordination of his acts.

The objections thus adduced are, in our judgment, quite sufficient to condemn the dogma of universal foreordination. Yet others of a grave character may be urged against it. It is a sacred duty as well as a privilege of the Christian, to defend the Divine administration when attacked by infidels. But if everything has been fixed how can this be done? Look at the fall. G.o.d knew that it would occur, but, according to Calvinism, He knew it because He had foreordained it.

But the actors in the whole transaction were severely blamed and punished. To the serpent it was said, "Because thou hast done this, thou art cursed above all cattle and above every beast of the field." The woman was told that because she had done what she did, her sorrow was to be multiplied; and the man was driven out of Paradise, because he had hearkened unto the voice of his wife. Can such declarations be justified if the transactions recorded were all foreordained? Each of the parties condemned might have asked, and done so pertinently--Why put this punishment upon me when I was simply carrying out the Divine decrees? And what answer could be given? None that we know of which would satisfy the reason. And what, then? This--viz., that in the light of the drama of the fall, the doctrine of universal foreordination must be given up as a myth which ignores philosophy, and reflects injuriously upon the Divine character.

In Jeremiah vii. 29-31 it is written: "Cut off thy hair, O Jerusalem, and cast it away, and take up a lamentation on high places . . . for the children of Judah have done evil in my sight, saith the Lord: they have set their abominations in the house which is called by my name, to pollute it. And they have built the high places of Tophet, . . . to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire; which I commanded them not, nor came it into my heart."

Here the Lord expressly declares, that instead of having foreordained these deeds, such an idea was never in His heart. There is here a clear "Thus saith the Lord" against the dogma of universal predestination.

In Mark v. 6, it is said of Jesus that "He marvelled because of their unbelief." But we only marvel when we are ignorant of the _cause_ of a phenomenon. As soon as we know this the marvel ceases.

Had Jesus, therefore, known that all was fixed, He never would have marvelled. Would you marvel that the fire had gone out when it was decreed not to give additional fuel? Would the miller marvel that the mill did not go when he had ordained that the water should be shut off? The prefixing of all events, and "marvelling" at anything, are out of the question. But since Christ did "marvel" it shows that He believed that they _could_ and _ought_ to have believed, and that He knew of no reason why they did not. It may be said that He was a man, and spake and felt like a man. True, but will the followers of Calvin maintain that he knew more of divinity than Christ? We should think not.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF THE DOCTRINE.

WE have thus endeavoured to show that the doctrine of universal predestination--the foundation of the Calvinistic theology--is not based upon the principle of the Divine wisdom, nor upon Divine power, nor upon Divine foreknowledge, nor proved by the Scripture texts advanced on its behalf. It is closely allied to Pantheism and the fate of the Stoics. It shakes hands with Socialism, which maintains that man can have no merit or demerit, that he could not be otherwise than he has been and is (_Socialism_, by Owen). It is the creed of the Mahometans. According to them every action in a man's life has been written down in the _preserved tablets_, which have been kept in the seventh heaven from all eternity. "No accident," saith the Koran, "happeneth on the earth, or on your persons, but the same was entered into the book of our decrees before we created it. Verily this is easy with G.o.d: and this is written lest ye immoderately grieve for the good which escapeth you, or rejoice for that which happeneth unto you." They might fall in battle, but it was so decreed, and at the resurrection they would appear with their "wounds brilliant as vermilion, and odorous as musk." Since the primary principle of Calvinism is a foundation principle of Pantheism, Socialism, Stoicism, and Mahometanism, Calvinists may well question whether they have not been building upon the sand, instead of the eternal rock of immutable truth.

In view of the doctrine we have advocated, viz., that G.o.d has not ordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s, but has left each man to be the arbiter of his own fate, we can see the propriety of the exhortation, "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live" (Deut. x.x.x. 19). It is the same still. G.o.d has provided a Saviour for all, and, therefore, for each. It is the province of the Holy Spirit to testify respecting Christ,--that He is able to save the very worst, and as willing as He is able. Each may choose to neglect this Saviour, or reject Him by choosing some other ground; or may choose Him as his only refuge. This choice has to be made by each man himself. No man can choose for another any more than he can eat or drink for another. It belongs entirely to each to do this. To choose Him is to choose life. To neglect or reject Him is to choose --death. Which will it be? The principle--viz., of choice, runs through life. Your happiness here depends on it in numberless instances. It is recognised everywhere in the Bible. Its exhortations summed up are expressed thus--"Turn ye, turn ye, why will you die?" It thus rests with you, and with you only--after what G.o.d has done for you--whether you shall live or die.

PART II.--REPROBATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE OF REPROBATION STATED.

THE subjects of reprobation and election are so closely connected that they might be considered in one chapter. Indeed, so close is the connection, that certain verses supposed to prove one of them, are also adduced to prove the other, as--"Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." It is, however, stoutly maintained that election is scriptural, whilst reprobation is repudiated. It is important to have clear ideas on the subject.

What, then, are we to understand by the doctrine of reprobation? The question is not whether those dying in impenitency shall be subjected to suffering; for this is held by the opponents of Calvinism as well as by Calvinists themselves. The question is this, Is it true that G.o.d in a past eternity foreordained millions of men to endless misery, that to this end they were born, and to this end they must go? John Calvin held that it was so. He says, "All are not created on equal terms, but some are foreordained to eternal life, others to eternal d.a.m.nation; and accordingly as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death." He says, again, "If we cannot a.s.sign any reason for G.o.d's bestowing mercy on His people, but just that it so pleases Him, neither can we have any reason for His reprobating others; but His will. When G.o.d is said to visit in mercy, or to harden whom He will, men are reminded that they are not to seek for any cause beyond His will." He says, again, "The human mind, when it hears this doctrine, cannot restrain its petulance, but boils and rages, as if aroused by the sound of a trumpet. Many, professing a desire to defend the Deity from an invidious charge, admit the doctrine of election, but deny that any one is reprobated.

This they do ignorantly and childishly, since there could be no election without its opposite--reprobation. Those, therefore, whom G.o.d pa.s.ses by He reprobates, and that for no other cause but because He is pleased to exclude them from the inheritance which He predestines to His children". (_Inst_., b. iii.). Zanchius held--"It was therefore the first thing which G.o.d determined concerning them from eternity--namely, the ordination of certain men to everlasting destruction" (_Thesis de Reprob_.). Elnathan Parr maintained, "If a man be reprobated he shall certainly be d.a.m.ned, do what he can"

(_Grounds of Divinity_). Maccovius says that "G.o.d has indeed decreed to d.a.m.n some men eternally, and on this account He has ordained them to sin but each sins on his own account, and freely." To like purpose we might quote Maloratus, Amandus Polla.n.u.s, John Norton, John Brown of Wamphray, Piscator, &c. (_Vide Old Gospel_, &c., Young, Edin.) Calvin and his followers did not mince the matter, as these extracts clearly show.

The Lambeth Articles expressed the same ideas as above. Article First says, "G.o.d hath from eternity predestinated certain persons to life, and hath reprobated certain persons to death." Article Third runs thus, "The predestinate are a predeterminate and certain number, which can neither be lessened nor increased." Article Ninth has these words, "It is not in the will or power of every man to be saved." The Lambeth Articles were drawn up as expressing the sense of the Church of England, or, rather, a section of it. They were merely declaratory, and recommended to the students of Cambridge, where a controversy had arisen regarding grace. They received the sanction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of London, and a few others.

The Synod of Dort, as intimated, was held in 1618, and had divines in it from Switzerland, Hesse, the Palatinate, Bremen, England, and Scotland. Its first article runs thus: "That G.o.d by an absolute decree had elected to salvation a very small number of men, without any regard to their faith or obedience whatsoever; and secluded from saving grace all the rest of mankind, and appointed them by the same decree to eternal d.a.m.nation, without any regard to their infidelity or impenitency" (Tom., p. 567). The Synods of Dort and Arles declared that if they knew the reprobates, they would not, by Austin's advice, pray for them any more than they would for the devils (_Old Gospel_, &c.) In this they were entirely consistent, whatever else they might be.

The Westminster a.s.sembly met in London in 1643. They drew up the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms. In its third chapter the Confession declares:--"By the decree of G.o.d, for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number is so certain and definite that it can neither be increased nor diminished." The Confession of Faith is the declared standard of doctrine of Presbyterians in general in this country. It is proper to note this fact, because it has been denied that whilst election is held reprobation is denied.

They are both in the Confession.

From what we have thus brought forward it appears evident that, according to Calvin, reputed Calvinistic divines, the Lambeth Articles, the Synod of Dort, and the Westminster a.s.sembly, there is a portion of the human family born under the decree of reprobation --born--we do not like the expression, but it is the case--born to be d.a.m.ned. It is a harsh expression, but the blame does not rest with us, but with those who hold the doctrine.

CHAPTER II.

THE BIBLE USAGE OF THE WORD REPROBATION.

THE word "reprobation," according to the _Imperial Dictionary_, means "to disallow," "not enduring proof or trial," "disallowed,"