463, 470).]

On the other hand, Eckardstein, the German amba.s.sador in London, is said to have made proposals of an Anglo-German-j.a.panese Alliance in March-April 1901. If we may trust the work ent.i.tled _Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi_ (j.a.panese amba.s.sador in London) these proposals were dangled for some weeks, why, he could never understand. Probably Germany was playing a double game; for Hayashi believed that she had a secret understanding with Russia on these questions. He found that the Salisbury Cabinet welcomed her adhesion to the principles of maintaining the territorial integrity of China and of freedom of commerce in the Far East[506].

[Footnote 506: _Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi_ (London, 1915), pp.

97-131. There are suspicious features about this book. I refer to it with all reserve. Reventlow (_Deutschlands auswartige Politik_, p. 178) thinks Eckardstein may have been playing his own game--an improbable suggestion.]

In October 1901 Germany proposed to the United Kingdom that each Power should guarantee the possessions of the other in every Continent except Asia. Why Asia was excepted is not clear, unless Germany wished to give Russia a free hand in that Continent. The Berlin Government laid stress on the need of our support in North and South America, where its aim of undermining the Monroe Doctrine was notorious. The proposed guarantee would also have compelled us to a.s.sist Germany in any dispute that might arise between her and France about Alsace-Lorraine or colonial questions. The aim was obvious, to gain the support of the British fleet either against the United States or France. A British diplomatist of high repute, who visited Berlin, has declared that the German Foreign Office made use of garbled and misleading doc.u.ments to win him over to these views[507]. It was in vain. The British Government was not to be hoodwinked; and, as soon as it declined these compromising proposals, a storm of abuse swept through the German Press at the barbarities of British troops in South Africa. That incident ended all chance of an understanding, either between the two Governments or the two peoples.

[Footnote 507: _Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1914, pp. 426-9.]

The inclusion of Germany in the Anglo-j.a.panese compact proving to be impossible, the two Island Powers signed a treaty of alliance at London on January 30, 1902. It guaranteed the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Far East, and offered armed a.s.sistance by either signatory in the event of its ally being attacked by more than one Power[508]. The alliance ended the isolation of the British race, and marked the entry of j.a.pan into the circle of the World-Powers. The chief objections to the new departure were its novelty, and the likelihood of its embroiling us finally with Russia and France or Russia and Germany. These fears were groundless; for France and even Russia(!) expressed their satisfaction at the treaty. Lord Lansdowne's diplomatic _coup_ not only ended the isolation of two Island States, which had been severally threatened by powerful rivals; it also safeguarded China; and finally, by raising the prestige of Great Britain, it helped to hasten the end of the Boer War. During the discussion of their future policy by the Boer delegates at Vereeniging on May 30, General Botha admitted that he no longer had any hope of intervention from the Continent of Europe; for their deputation thither had failed. All the leaders except De Wet agreed, and they came to terms with Lords Kitchener and Milner at Pretoria on May 31. That the Anglo-j.a.panese compact ended the last hopes of the Boers for intervention can scarcely be doubted.

[Footnote 508: _E.g._, if the Russians alone attacked j.a.pan we were not bound to help her: but if the French also attacked j.a.pan we must help her. The aim clearly was to prevent j.a.pan being overborne as in 1895 (see p. 577). The treaty was signed for five years, but was renewed on August 12, 1905, and in July 1911.]

Still more significant was the new alliance as a warning to Russia not to push too far her enterprises in the Far East. On April 12, 1902, she agreed with China to evacuate Manchuria; but (as has appeared in Chapter XX.) she finally pressed on, not only in Manchuria, but also in Korea, in which the Anglo-j.a.panese treaty recognised that j.a.pan had predominant interests. For this forward policy Russia had the general support of the Kaiser, whose aims in the Near East were obviously served by the transference thence of Russia's activities to the Far East. It is, indeed, probable that he and his agents desired to embroil Russia and j.a.pan. Certain it is that the Russian people regarded the Russo-j.a.panese War, which began in February 1904, as "The War of the Grand Dukes." The Russian troops fought an uphill fight loyally and doggedly, but with none of the enthusiasm so conspicuous in the present truly national struggle. In Manchuria the mistakes and incapacity of their leaders led to an almost unbroken series of defeats, ending with the protracted and gigantic contests around Mukden (March 1-10, 1905). The almost complete destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet by Admiral Togo at the Battle of Tsushima (May 27-28) ended the last hopes of the Tsar and his ministers; and, fearful of the rising discontent in Russia, they accepted the friendly offers of the United States for mediation. By the Treaty of Portsmouth (Sept. 5, 1905) they ceded to j.a.pan the southern half of Saghalien and the Peninsula on which stands Port Arthur: they also agreed to evacuate South Manchuria and to recognise Korea as within j.a.pan's sphere of influence. No war indemnity was paid. Indeed it could not be exacted, as j.a.pan occupied no Russian territory which she did not intend to annex. To Russia the material results of the war were the loss of some 350,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners; of two fleets; and of the valuable provinces and ice-free harbours for the acquisition of which she had constructed the Trans-Siberian Railway. So heavy a blow had not been dealt to a Great Power since the fall of Napoleon III.; and worse, perhaps, than the material loss was that of prestige in accepting defeat at the hands of an Island State, whose people fifty years before fought with bows and arrows.

j.a.pan emerged from the war triumphant, but financially exhausted.

Accordingly, she was not loath to conclude with Russia, on July 30, 1907, a convention which adjusted outstanding questions in a friendly manner[509]. The truth about this Russo-j.a.panese _rapprochement_ is, of course, not known; but it may reasonably be ascribed in part to the good services of England (then about to frame an _entente_ with Russia); and in part to the suspicion of the statesmen of Petrograd and Tokio that German influences had secretly incited Russia to the policy of reckless exploitation in Korea which led to war and disaster.

[Footnote 509: Hayashi, _op. cit._ ch. viii. and App. D. On June 10, 1907, j.a.pan concluded with France an agreement, for which see Hayashi, ch. vi. and App. C.]

The chief results of the Russo-j.a.panese War were to paralyse Russia, thereby emasculating the Dual Alliance and leaving France as much exposed to German threats as she was before its conclusion; also to exalt the Triple Alliance and enable its members (Germany, Austria, and Italy) successively to adopt the forward policy which marked the years 1905, 1908, 1911, and 1914. The Russo-j.a.panese War therefore inaugurated a new era in European History. Up to that time the Triple Alliance had been a defensive league, except when the exuberant impulses of Kaiser William forced it into provocative courses; and then the provocations generally stopped at telegrams and orations. But in and after 1905 the Triple Alliance forsook the watchwords of Bismarck, Andra.s.sy and Crispi. Expansion at the cost of rivals became the dominant aim.

We must now return to affairs in France which predisposed her to come to friendly terms, first with Italy, then with Great Britain. Her internal history in the years 1895-1906 turns largely on the Dreyfus affair. In 1895, he, a Jewish officer in the French army, was accused and convicted of selling military secrets to Germany. But suspicions were aroused that he was the victim of anti-Semites or the scapegoat of the real offenders; and finally, thanks to the championship of Zola, his condemnation was proved to have been due to a forgery (July 1906).

Meanwhile society had been rent in twain, and confidence in the army and in the administration of justice was seriously impaired. A furious anti-militarist agitation began, which had important consequences.

Already in May 1900, the Premier, Waldeck-Rousseau, appointed as Minister of War General Andre, who sympathised with these views and dangerously relaxed discipline. The Combes Ministry, which succeeded in June 1902, embittered the strife between the clerical and anti-clerical sections by measures such as the separation of Church and State and the expulsion of the Religious Orders. In consequence France was almost helpless in the first years of the century, a fact which explains her readiness to clasp the hand of England in 1904 and, in 1905, after the military collapse of Russia in the Far East, to give way before the threats of Germany[510].

[Footnote 510: Even in 1908 reckless strikes occurred, and there were no fewer than 11,223 cases of insubordination in the army. Professor Gustave Herve left the University in order to direct a paper, _La Guerre sociale_, which advocated a war of cla.s.ses.]

The weakness of France predisposed Italy to forget the wrong done by French statesmen in seizing Tunis twenty years before. That wrong (as we saw on pp. 328, 329) drove Italy into the arms of Germany and Austria.

But now Crispi and other pro-German authors of the Triple Alliance had pa.s.sed away; and that compact, founded on pa.s.sing pa.s.sion against France rather than community of interest or sentiment with the Central Empires, had sensibly weakened. Time after time Italian Ministers complained of disregard of their interests by the men of Berlin and Vienna[511], whereas in 1898 France accorded to Italy a favourable commercial treaty. Victor Emmanuel III. paid his first state visit to Petrograd, not to Berlin. In December 1900 France and Italy came to an understanding respecting Tripoli and Morocco; and in May 1902 the able French Minister, Delca.s.se, then intent on his Morocco enterprise, prepared the way for it by a convention with Italy, which provided that France and Italy should thenceforth peaceably adjust their differences, mainly arising out of Mediterranean questions. Seeing that Italy and Austria were at variance respecting Albania, the Franco-Italian Entente weakened the Triple Alliance; and the old hatred of Austria appeared in the shouts of "Viva Trento," "Viva Trieste," often raised in front of the Austrian emba.s.sy at Rome. Despite the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1907 and 1912, the adhesion of Italy was open to question, unless the Allies became the object of indisputable aggression.

[Footnote 511: Crispi, _Memoirs_ (Eng. edit.) vol. ii. pp. 166, 169, 472; vol. iii. pp. 330, 347.]

Still more important was the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. That the Anglophobe outbursts of the Parisian Press and populace in 1902 should so speedily give way to a friendly understanding was the work, partly of the friends of peace in both lands, partly of the personal tact and charm of Edward VII. as manifested during his visit to Paris in May 1903, but mainly of the French and British Governments. In October 1903 they agreed by treaty to refer to arbitration before the Hague Tribunal disputes that might arise between them. This agreement (one of the greatest triumphs of the principle of arbitration[512]) naturally led to more cordial relations. During the visit of President Loubet and M.

Delca.s.se to London in July 1903, the latter discussed with Lord Lansdowne the questions that hindered a settlement, namely, our occupation of Egypt (a rankling sore in France ever since 1882); French claims to dominate Morocco both commercially and politically, "the French sh.o.r.e" of Newfoundland, the New Hebrides, the French convict-station in New Caledonia, as also the territorial integrity of Siam, championed by England, threatened by France. A more complex set of problems never confronted statesmen. Yet a solution was found simply because both of them were anxious for a solution. Their anxiety is intelligible in view of the German activities just noticed, and of the outbreak of the Russo-j.a.panese War in February 1904. True, France was allied to Russia only for European affairs; and our alliance with j.a.pan referred mainly to the Far East. Still, there was danger of a collision, which both Paris and London wished to avert. It was averted by the skill and tact of Lord Lansdowne and M. Delca.s.se, whose conversations of July 1903 pointed the way to the definitive compact of April 8, 1904.

[Footnote 512: Sir Thomas Barclay, _Anglo-French Reminiscences_ (1876-1906), ch. xviii-xxii; M. Hanotaux (_La Politique de l'equilibre_, p. 415) claims that Mr. Chamberlain was chiefly instrumental in starting the negotiations leading to the Entente with France.]

Stated briefly, France gave way on most of the questions named above, except one, that is, Morocco. There she attained her end, the recognition by us of her paramount claims. For this she conceded most of the points in dispute between the two countries in Egypt, though she maintains her Law School, hospitals, mission schools, and a few other inst.i.tutions. Thenceforth England had opposed to her in that land only German influence and the Egyptian nationalists and Pan-Islam fanatics whom it sought to encourage. France also renounced some of her fishing rights in Newfoundland in return for gains of territory on the River Gambia and near Lake Chad. In return for these concessions she secured from us the recognition of her claim to watch over the tranquillity of Morocco, together with an offer of a.s.sistance for all "the administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it needs." True, she promised not to change the political condition of Morocco, as also to maintain equality of commercial privileges. Great Britain gave a similar undertaking for Egypt[513].

[Footnote 513: A. Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de l'annee 1904, _Appendix II. England in 1914 annulled the promise respecting Egypt because of the declaration of war by Turkey and the a.s.sistance afforded her by the Khedive, Abbas II. (see Earl of Cromer, _Modern Egypt and Abbas II_.), On February 15, 1904, France settled by treaty with Siam frontier disputes of long standing.]

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 is the most important event of modern diplomacy. Together with the preceding treaty of arbitration, it removed all likelihood of war between two nations which used to be "natural enemies"; and the fact that it in no respect menaced Germany appeared in the communication of its terms to the German amba.s.sador in Paris shortly before its signature. On April 12 Bulow declared to the Reichstag his approval of the compact as likely to end disputes in several quarters, besides a.s.suring peace and order in Morocco, where Germany's interests were purely commercial. Two days later, in reply to the Pan-German leader, Count Reventlow, he said he would not embark Germany on any enterprise in Morocco. These statements were reasonable and just. The Entente lessened the friction between Great Britain and Russia during untoward incidents of the Russo-j.a.panese War. After the conclusion of the Entente the Russian amba.s.sador in Paris publicly stated the approval of his Government, and, quoting the proverb, "The friends of our friends are _our_ friends," added with a truly prophetic touch--"Who knows whether that will not be true?" The agreement also served to strengthen the position of France at a time when her internal crisis and the first Russian defeats in the Far East threatened to place her almost at the mercy of Germany. A dangerous situation would have arisen if France had not recently gained the friendship both of England and Italy.

Finally, the Anglo-French Entente induced Italy to reconsider her position. Her dependence on us for coal and iron, together with the vulnerability of her numerous coast-towns, rendered a breach with the two Powers of the Entente highly undesirable, while on sentimental grounds she could scarcely take up the gauntlet for her former oppressor, Austria, against two nations which had a.s.sisted in her liberation. As we shall see, she declared at the Conference of Algeciras her complete solidarity with Great Britain.

Even so, Germany held a commanding position owing to the completion of the first part of her naval programme, which placed her far ahead of France at sea. For reasons that have been set forth, the military and naval weakness of France was so marked as greatly to encourage German Chauvinists; but the Entente made them pause, especially when France agreed to concentrate her chief naval strength in the Mediterranean, while that of Great Britain was concentrated in the English Channel and the North Sea. It is certain that the Entente with France never amounted to an alliance; that was made perfectly clear; but it was unlikely that the British Government would tolerate an unprovoked attack upon the Republic, or look idly on while the Pan-Germans refashioned Europe and the other Continents. Besides, Great Britain was strong at sea. In 1905 she possessed thirty-five battleships mounting 12-in. guns; while the eighteen German battleships carried only 11-in. and 9.4-in. guns.

Further, in 1905-7 we began and finished the first _Dreadnought_; and the adoption of that type for the battle-fleet of the near future lessened the value of the Kiel-North Sea Ca.n.a.l, which was too small to receive _Dreadnoughts_. In these considerations may perhaps be found the reason for the caution of Germany at a time which was otherwise very favourable for aggressive action.

Meanwhile Kaiser William, pressed on by the colonials, had intervened in a highly sensational manner in the Morocco Affair, thus emphasising his earlier a.s.sertion that nothing important must take place in any part of the world without the partic.i.p.ation of Germany. Her commerce in Morocco was unimportant compared with that of France and Great Britain; but the position of that land, commanding the routes to the Mediterranean and the South Atlantic, was such as to interest all naval Powers, while the State that gained a foothold in Morocco would have a share in the Moslem questions then arising to prime importance. As we have seen, the Kaiser had in 1898 declared his resolve to befriend all Moslem peoples; and his Chancellor, Bulow, has a.s.serted that Germany's pro-Islam policy compelled her to intervene in the Moroccan Question. The German amba.s.sador at Constantinople, Baron von Marschall, said that, if after that promise Germany sacrificed Morocco, she would at once lose her position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that she had painfully acquired by the labour of many years[514].

[Footnote 514: Bulow, _Imperial Germany_, p. 83.]

On the other hand, the feuds of the Moorish tribes vitally concerned France because they led to many raids into her Algerian lands which she could not merely repel. In 1901 she adopted a more active policy, that of "pacific penetration," and, by successive compacts with Italy, Great Britain, and Spain, secured a kind of guardianship over Moroccan affairs. This policy, however, aroused deep resentment at Berlin. Though Germany was pacifically penetrating Turkey and Asia Minor, she grudged France her success in Morocco, not for commercial reasons but for others, closely connected with high diplomacy and world-policy. As the German historian, Rachfahl, declared, Morocco was to be a test of strength[515].

[Footnote 515: Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de 1904_, pp. 56-102; Rachfahl, _Kaiser und Reich_, pp. 230-241; E.D. Morel, _Morocco in Diplomacy_, chaps, i-xii.]

In one respect Germany had cause for complaint. On October 6, 1904, France signed a Convention with Spain in terms that were suspiciously vague. They were interpreted by secret articles which defined the spheres of French and Spanish influence in case the rule of the Sultan of Morocco ceased. It does not appear that Germany was aware of these secret articles at the time of her intervention[516]. But their existence, even perhaps their general tenor, was surmised. The effective causes of her intervention were, firstly, her resolve to be consulted in every matter of importance, and, secondly, the disaster that befel the Russians at Mukden early in March 1905. At the end of the month, the Kaiser landed at Tangier and announced in strident terms that he came to visit the Sultan as an independent sovereign. This challenge to French claims produced an acute crisis. Delca.s.se desired to persevere with pacific penetration; but in the debate of April 19 the deficiencies of the French military system were admitted with startling frankness; and a threat from Berlin revealed the intention of humiliating France, and, if possible, of severing the Anglo-French Entente. Here, indeed, is the inner significance of the crisis. Germany had lately declared her indifference to all but commercial questions in Morocco. But she now made use of the collapse of Russia to seek to end the Anglo-French connection which she had recently declared to be harmless. The aim obviously was to sow discord between those two Powers. In this she failed. Lord Lansdowne and Delca.s.se lent each other firm support, so much so that the Paris _Temps_ accused us of pushing France on in a dangerous affair which did not vitally concern her. The charge was not only unjust but ungenerous; for Germany had worked so as to induce England to throw over France or make France throw over England. The two Governments discerned the snare, and evaded it by holding firmly together[517].

[Footnote 516: Rachfahl, pp. 235, 238. For details, _see_ Morel, chap.

ii.]

[Footnote 517: In an interview with M. Tardieu at Baden-Baden on October 4, 1905, Bulow said that Germany intervened in Morocco because of her interests there, and also to protest against this new attempt to isolate her (Tardieu, _Questions actuelles de Politique etrangere_, p. 87). If so, her conduct increased that isolation. Probably the second Anglo-j.a.panese Treaty of August 12, 1905 (published on September 27), was due to fear of German aggression. France and Germany came to a preliminary agreement as to Morocco on September 28.]

The chief difficulty of the situation was that it committed France to two gigantic tasks, that of pacifying Morocco and also of standing up to the Kaiser in Europe. In this respect the ground for the conflict was all in his favour; and both he and she knew it. Consequently, a compromise was desirable; and the Kaiser himself, in insisting on the holding of a Conference, built a golden bridge over which France might draw back, certainly with honour, probably with success; for in the diplomatic sphere she was at least as strong as he. When, therefore, Delca.s.se objected to the Conference, his colleagues accepted his resignation (June 6). His fall was hailed at Berlin as a humiliation for France. Nevertheless, her complaisance earned general sympathy, while the bullying tone of German diplomacy, continued during the Conference held at Algeciras, hardened the opposition of nearly all the Powers, including the United States. Especially noteworthy was the declaration of Italy that her interests were identical with those of England. German proposals were supported by Austria alone, who therefore gained from the Kaiser the doubtful compliment of having played the part of "a brilliant second" to Germany.

It is needless to describe at length the Act of Algeciras (April 7, 1906). It established a police and a State Bank in Morocco, suppressed smuggling and the illicit trade in arms, reformed the taxes, and set on foot public works. Of course, little resulted from all this; but the position of France was tacitly regularised, and she was left free to proceed with pacific penetration. "We are neither victors nor vanquished," said Bulow in reviewing the Act; and M. Rouvier echoed the statement for France. In reality, Germany had suffered a check. Her chief aim was to sever the Anglo-French Entente, and she failed. She sought to rally Italy to her side, and she failed; for Italy now proclaimed her accord with France on Mediterranean questions. Finally the _North German Gazette_ paid a tribute to the loyal and peaceable aims of French policy; while other less official German papers deplored the mistakes of their Government, which had emphasised the isolation of Germany[518]. This is indeed the outstanding result of the Conference.

The threatening tone of Berlin had disgusted everybody. Above all it brought to more cordial relations the former rivals, Great Britain and Russia.

[Footnote 518: Tardieu, _La Conference d'Algeciras_, pp. 410-20.]

As has already appeared, the friction between Great Britain and Russia quickly disappeared after the j.a.panese War. During the Congress of Algeciras the former rivals worked cordially together to check the expansive policy of Germany, in which now lay the chief cause of political unrest. In fact, the Kaiser's Turcophile policy acquired a new significance owing to the spread of a Pan-Islamic propaganda which sent thrills of fanaticism through North-West Africa, Egypt, and Central Asia. At St. Helena Napoleon often declared Islam to be vastly superior to Christianity as a fighting creed; and his imitator now seemed about to marshal it against France, Russia, and Great Britain. Naturally, the three Powers drew together for mutual support. Further, Germany by herself was very powerful, the portentous growth of her manufactures and commerce endowing her with wealth which she spent lavishly on her army and navy. In May 1906 the Reichstag agreed to a new Navy Bill for further construction which was estimated to raise the total annual expenditure on the navy from 11,671,000 in 1905 to 16,492,000 in 1917; this too though Bebel had warned the House that the agitation of the_ German Navy League had for its object a war with England.

In 1906 and 1907 Edward VII. paid visits to William II., who returned the compliment in November 1907. But this interchange of courtesies could not end the distrust caused by Germany's increase of armaments.

The peace-loving Administration of Campbell-Bannerman, installed in power by the General Election of 1906, sought to come to an understanding with Berlin, especially at the second Hague Conference of 1907, with respect to a limitation of armaments. But Germany rejected all such proposals[519]. The hopelessness of framing a friendly arrangement with her threw us into the arms of Russia; and on August 31, 1907, Anglo-Russian Conventions were signed defining in a friendly way the interests of the two Powers in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet.

True, the interests of Persian reformers were sacrificed by this bargain; but it must be viewed, firstly, in the light of the Bagdad Railway scheme, which threatened soon to bring Germany to the gates of Persia and endanger the position of both Powers in that land[520]; secondly, in that of the general situation, in which Germany and Austria were rapidly forcing their way to a complete military ascendancy and refused to consider any limitation of armaments. The detailed reasons which prompted the Anglo-Russian Entente are of course unknown. But the fact that the most democratic of all British Administrations should come to terms with the Russian autocracy is the most convincing proof of the very real danger which both States discerned in the aggressive conduct of the Central Powers. The Triple Alliance, designed by Bismarck solely to safeguard peace, became, in the hands of William II., a menace to his neighbours, and led them to form tentative and conditional arrangements for defence in case of attack. This is all that was meant by the Triple Entente. It formed a loose pendant to the Dual Alliance between France and Russia, which _was_ binding and solid. With those Powers the United Kingdom formed separate agreements; but they were not alliances; they were friendly understandings on certain specific objects, and in no respect threatened the Triple Alliance so long as it remained non-aggressive[521].

[Footnote 519: See the cynical section in Reventlow, _op. cit._ (pp.

280-8), ent.i.tled "Utopien und Intrigen im Haag." For Austria's efforts to prevent the Anglo-Russian Entente, see H.W. Steed, _The Hamburg Monarchy_, p. 230.]

[Footnote 520: Rachfahl (p. 307) admits this, but accuses England of covert opposition everywhere, even at the Hague Conference.]

[Footnote 521: On December 24, 1908, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, a.s.sured the Duma that "no open or secret agreements directed against German interests existed between Russia and England."]

One question remains. When was it that the friction between Great Britain and Germany first became acute? Some have dated it from the Morocco Affair of 1905-6. The a.s.sertion is inconsistent with the facts of the case. Long before that crisis the policy of the Kaiser tended increasingly towards a collision. His patronage of the Boers early in 1896 was a threatening sign; still more so was his World-Policy, proclaimed repeatedly in the following years, when the appointments of Tirpitz and Bulow showed that the threats of capturing the trident, and so forth, were not mere bravado. The outbreak of the Boer War in 1899, followed quickly by the Kaiser's speech at Hamburg, and the adoption of accelerated naval construction in 1900, brought about serious tension, which was not relaxed by British complaisance respecting Samoa. The coquetting with the Sultan, the definite initiation of the Bagdad scheme (1902-3), and the completion of the first part of Germany's new naval programme in 1904 account for the Anglo-French Entente of that year. The chief significance of the Morocco Affair of 1905-6 lay in the Kaiser's design of severing that Entente. His failure, which was still further emphasised during the Algeciras Conference, proved that a policy which relies on menace and ever-increasing armaments arouses increasing distrust and leads the menaced States to form defensive arrangements.

That is also the outstanding lesson of the career of Napoleon I.

Nevertheless, the Kaiser, like the Corsican, persisted in forceful procedure, until Army Bills, Navy Bills, and the rejection of pacific proposals at the Hague, led to their natural result, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. This event should have made him question the wisdom of relying on armed force and threatening procedure. The Entente between the Tsar and the Campbell-Bannerman Administration formed a tacit but decisive censure of the policy of Potsdam; for it realised the fears which had haunted Bismarck like a nightmare[522]. Its effect on William II. was to induce him to increase his military and naval preparations, to reject all proposals for the subst.i.tution of arbitration in place of the reign of force, and thereby to enclose the policy of the Great Powers in a vicious circle from which the only escape was a general reduction of armaments or war.

[Footnote 522: _Bismarck, his Reflections and Recollections_, vol. ii.

pp. 252, 289. There are grounds for thinking that William II. has been pushed on to a bellicose policy by the Navy, Colonial, and Pan-German Leagues. In 1908 he seems to have sought to pause; but powerful influences (as also at the time of the crises of July 1911 and 1914) propelled him. See an article in the _Revue de Paris_ of April 15, 1913, "Guillaume II et les pangermanistes." In my narrative I speak of the Kaiser as equivalent to the German Government; for he is absolute and his Ministers are responsible solely to him.]

CHAPTER XXII

TEUTON _versus_ SLAV (1908-13)