[Footnote 361: Mr. Morley says (_Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii. p. 73) that Arabi's movement "was in truth national as well as military; it was anti-European, and above all, it was in its objects anti-Turk."--In view of the evidence collected by Sir D.M. Wallace, and by Lord Milner (_England in Egypt_), I venture to question these statements. The movement clearly was military and anti-Turk in its beginning. Later on it sought support in the people, and became anti-European and to some extent national; but to that extent it ceased to be anti-Turk. Besides, why should the Sultan have encouraged it? How far it genuinely relied on the populace must for the present remain in doubt; but the evidence collected by Mr. Broadley, _How We Defended Arabi_ (1884), seems to show that Arabi and his supporters were inspired by thoroughly patriotic and enlightened motives.]

The Khedive's Ministers, hearing of the intrigues of the discontented officers, resolved to arrest their chiefs; but on the secret leaking out, the offenders turned the tables on the authorities, and with soldiers at their back demanded the dismissal of the Minister of War and the redress of their chief grievance--the undue promotion of Turks and Circa.s.sians.

The Khedive felt constrained to yield, and agreed to the appointment of a Minister of War who was a secret friend of the plotters. They next ventured on a military demonstration in front of the Khedive's palace, with a view to extorting the dismissal of the able and energetic Prime Minister, Riaz Pasha. Again Tewfik yielded, and consented to the appointment of the weak and indolent Sherif Pasha. To consolidate their triumph the mutineers now proposed measures which would please the populace. Chief among them was a plan for inst.i.tuting a consultative National a.s.sembly. This would serve as a check on the Dual Control and on the young Khedive, whom it had placed in his present ambiguous position.

A Chamber of Notables met in the closing days of 1881, and awakened great hopes, not only in Egypt, but among all who saw hope in the feeling of nationality and in a genuine wish for reform among a Moslem people. What would have happened had the Notables been free to work out the future of Egypt, it is impossible to say. The fate of the Young Turkish party and of Midhat's const.i.tution of December 1877 formed by no means a hopeful augury. In the abstract there is much to be said for the two chief demands of the Notables--that the Khedive's Ministers should be responsible to the people's representatives, and that the Dual Control of Great Britain and France should be limited to the control of the revenues set apart for the purposes of the Egyptian public debt. The pet.i.tioners, however, ignored the fact that democracy could scarcely be expected to work successfully in a land where not one man in a hundred had the least notion what it meant, and, further, that the Western Powers would not give up their coign of vantage at the bidding of Notables who really represented little more than the dominant military party. Besides, the acts of this party stamped it as oriental even while it masqueraded in the garb of western democracy. Having grasped the reins of government, the fellahin colonels proceeded to relegate their Turkish and Circa.s.sian rivals to service at Khartum--an ingenious form of banishment. Against this and other despotic acts the representatives of Great Britain and France energetically protested, and, seeing that the Khedive was helpless, they brought up ships of war to make a demonstration against the _de facto_ governors of Egypt.

It should be noted that these steps were taken by the Gladstone and Gambetta Cabinets, which were not likely to intervene against a genuinely democratic movement merely in the interests of British and French bondholders. On January 7, 1882, the two Cabinets sent a Joint Note to the Khedive a.s.suring him of their support and of their desire to remove all grievances, external and internal alike, that threatened the existing order[362].

[Footnote 362: For Gambetta's despatches see de Freycinet, _op. cit._ pp. 209 _et seq_.]

While, however, the Western Powers sided with the Khedive, the other European States, including Turkey, began to show signs of impatience and annoyance at any intervention on their part. Russia saw the chance of revenge on England for the events of 1878, and Bismarck sought to gain the favour of the Sultan. As for that potentate, his conduct was as tortuous as usual. From the outset he gave secret support to Arabi's party, probably with the view of undermining the Dual Control and the Khedive's dynasty alike. He doubtless saw that Turkish interests might ultimately be furthered even by the men who had imprisoned or disgraced Turkish officers and Ministers.

Possibly the whole question might have been peaceably solved had Gambetta remained in power; for he was strongly in favour of a joint Anglo-French intervention in case the disorders continued. The Gladstone Government at that time demurred to such intervention, and claimed that it would come more legally from Turkey, or, if this were undesirable, from all the Powers; but this divergence of view did not prevent the two Governments from acting together on several matters. Gambetta, however, fell from power at the end of January 1882, and his far weaker successor, de Freycinet, having to face a most complex parliamentary situation in France and the possible hostility of the other Powers, drew back from the leading position which Gambetta's bolder policy had accorded to France. The vacillations at Paris tended alike to weaken Anglo-French action and to encourage the Arabi party and the Sultan. As matters went from bad to worse in Egypt, the British Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, proposed on May 24 that the Powers should sanction an occupation of Egypt by Turkish troops. To this M. de Freycinet demurred, and, while declaring that France would not send an expedition, proposed that a European Conference should be held on the Egyptian Question.

The Gladstone Cabinet at once agreed to this, and the Conference met for a short time at the close of June, but without the partic.i.p.ation of Turkey[363]. For the Sultan, hoping that the divisions of the Powers would enable him to restore Turkish influence in Egypt, now set his emissaries to work to arouse there the Moslem fanaticism which he has so profitably exploited in all parts of his Empire. A Turkish Commission had been sent to inquire into matters--with the sole result of enriching the chief commissioner. In brief, thanks to the perplexities and hesitations of the Western Powers and the ill-humour manifested by Germany and Russia, Europe was helpless, and the Arabi party felt that they had the game in their own hands. Bismarck said to his secretary, Busch, on June 8: "They [the British] set about the affair in an awkward way, and have got on a wrong track by sending their ironclads to Alexandria, and now, finding that there is nothing to be done, they want the rest of Europe to help them out of their difficulty by means of a Conference[364]."

[Footnote 363: Morley, _Life of Gladstone_, iii. p. 79.]

[Footnote 364: _Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History_, vol. iii.

p. 51.]

Already, on May 27, the Egyptian malcontents had ventured on a great military demonstration against the Khedive, which led to Arabi being appointed Minister of War. His followers also sought to inflame the hatred to foreigners for which the greed of Greek and Jewish usurers was so largely responsible. The results perhaps surpa.s.sed the hopes of the Egyptian nationalists. Moslem fanaticism suddenly flashed into flame.

On the nth of June a street brawl between a Moslem and a Maltese led to a fierce rising. The "true believers" attacked the houses of the Europeans, secured a great quant.i.ty of loot, and killed about fifty of them, including men from the British squadron. The English party that always calls out for non-intervention made vigorous efforts at that time, and subsequently, to represent this riot and ma.s.sacre as a mere pa.s.sing event which did not seriously compromise the welfare of Egypt; but Sir Alfred Milner in his calm and judicial survey of the whole question states that the fears then entertained by Europeans in Egypt "so far from being exaggerated, . . . perhaps even fell short of the danger which was actually impending[365]."

[Footnote 365: _England in Egypt_, p. 16. For details of the ma.s.sacre and its preconcerted character, sec Parl. Papers, Egypt, No. 4 (1884).]

The events at Alexandria and Tantah made armed intervention inevitable.

Nothing could be hoped for from Turkey. The Sultan's special envoy, Dervish Pasha, had arrived in Egypt only a few days before the outbreak; and after that occurrence Abdul Hamid thought fit to send a decoration to Arabi. Encouraged by the support of Turkey and by the well-known jealousies of the Powers, the military party now openly prepared to defy Europe. They had some grounds for hope. Every one knew that France was in a very cautious mood, having enough on her hands in Tunis and Algeria, while her relations to England had rapidly cooled[366].

Germany, Russia, and Austria seemed to be acting together according to an understanding arrived at by the three Emperors after their meeting at Danzig in 1881; and Germany had begun that work of favouring the Sultan which enabled her to supplant British influence at Constantinople.

Accordingly, few persons, least of all Arabi, believed that the Gladstone Cabinet would dare to act alone and strike a decisive blow.

But they counted wrongly. Gladstone's toleration in regard to foreign affairs was large-hearted, but it had its limits. He now declared in Parliament that Arabi had thrown off the mask and was evidently working to depose the Khedive and oust all Europeans from Egypt; England would intervene to prevent this--if possible with the authority of Europe, with the support of France, and the co-operation of Turkey; but, if necessary, alone[367].

[Footnote 366: For the reasons of de Freycinet's caution, see his work, ch. iii., especially pp. 236 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 367: See, too, Gladstone's speech of July 25, 1882, in which he a.s.serted that there was not a shred of evidence to support Arabi's claim to be the leader of a national party; also, his letter of July 14 to John Bright, quoted by Mr. Morley, _Life of Gladstone_, vol. iii. pp.

84-85. Probably Gladstone was misinformed.]

Even this clear warning was lost on Arabi and his following. Believing that Britain was too weak, and her Ministry too vacillating, to make good these threats, they proceeded to arm the populace and strengthen the forts of Alexandria. Sir Beauchamp Seymour, now at the head of a strong squadron, reported to London that these works were going on in a threatening manner, and on July 6 sent a demand to Arabi that the operations should cease at once. To this Arabi at once acceded.

Nevertheless, the searchlight, when suddenly turned on, showed that work was going on at night. A report of an Egyptian officer was afterwards found in one of the forts, in which he complained of the use of the electric light by the English as distinctly discourteous. It may here be noted that M. de Freycinet, in his jaundiced survey of British action at this time, seeks to throw doubt on the resumption of work by Arabi's men. But Admiral Seymour's reports leave no loophole for doubt. Finally, on July 10, the admiral demanded, not only the cessation of hostile preparations, but the surrender of some of the forts into British hands.

The French fleet now left the harbour and steamed for Port Said. Most of the Europeans of Alexandria had withdrawn to ships provided for them; and on the morrow, when the last of the twenty-four hours of grace brought no submission, the British fleet opened fire at 7 A.M.

The ensuing action is of great interest as being one of the very few cases in modern warfare where ships have successfully encountered modern forts. The seeming helplessness of the British unarmoured ships before Cronstadt during the Crimean War, their failure before the forts of Sevastopol, and the uselessness of the French navy during the war of 1870, had spread the notion that warships could not overpower modern fortifications. Probably this impression lay at the root of Arabi's defiance. He had some grounds for confidence. The British fleet consisted of eight battleships (of which only the _Inflexible_ and _Alexandra_ were of great fighting power), along with five unarmoured vessels. The forts mounted 33 rifled muzzle-loading guns, 3 rifled breech-loaders, and 120 old smooth-bores. The advantage in gun-power lay with the ships, especially as the sailors were by far the better marksmen. Yet so great is the superiority of forts over ships that the engagement lasted five hours or more (7 A.M. till noon) before most of the forts were silenced more or less completely. Fort Pharos continued to fire till 4 P.M. On the whole, the Egyptian gunners stood manfully to their guns. Considering the weight of metal thrown against the forts, namely, 1741 heavy projectiles and 1457 light, the damage done to them was not great, only 27 cannon being silenced completely, and 5 temporarily. On the other hand, the ships were hit only 75 times and lost only 6 killed and 27 wounded. The results show that the comparatively distant cannonades of to-day, even with great guns, are far less deadly than the old sea-fights when ships were locked yard-arm to yard-arm.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF ALEXANDRIA (BOMBARDMENT OF, 1882).]

Had Admiral Seymour at once landed a force of marines and bluejackets, all the forts would probably have been surrendered at once. For some reason not fully known, this was not done. Spasmodic firing began again in the morning, but a truce was before long arranged, which proved to be only a device for enabling Arabi and his troops to escape. The city, meanwhile, was the scene of a furious outbreak against Europeans, in which some 400 or 500 persons perished. Damage, afterwards a.s.sessed at 7,000,000, was done by fire and pillage. It was not till the 14th that the admiral, after receiving reinforcements, felt able to send troops into the city, when a few severe examples cowed the plunderers and restored order. The Khedive, who had shut himself up in his palace at Ramleh, now came back to the seaport under the escort of a British force, and thenceforth remained virtually, though not in name, under British protection.

The bombardment of Alexandria brought about the resignation of that st.u.r.dy Quaker, and friend of peace, Mr. John Bright from the Gladstone Ministry; but everything tends to show (as even M. de Freycinet admits) that the crisis took Ministers by surprise. Nothing was ready at home for an important campaign; and it would seem that hostilities resulted, firstly, from the violence of Arabi's supporters in Alexandria, and, secondly, from their persistence in warlike preparations which might have endangered the safety of Admiral Seymour's fleet. The situation was becoming like that of 1807 at the Dardanelles, when the Turks gave smooth promises to Admiral Duckworth, all the time strengthening their forts, with very disagreeable results. Probably the a.n.a.logy of 1807, together with the proven perfidy of Arabi's men, brought on hostilities, which the British Ministers up to the end were anxious to avoid.

In any case, the die was now cast, and England entered questioningly on a task, the magnitude and difficulty of which no one could then foresee.

She entered on it alone, and that, too, though the Gladstone Ministry had made pressing overtures for the help of France, at any rate as regarded the protection of the Suez Ca.n.a.l. To this extent, de Freycinet and his colleagues were prepared to lend their a.s.sistance; but, despite Gambetta's urgent appeal for common action with England at that point, the Chamber of Deputies still remained in a cautiously negative mood, and to that frame of mind M. Clemenceau added strength by a speech ending with a glorification of prudence. "Europe," he said, "is covered with soldiers; every one is in a state of expectation; all the Power are reserving their future liberty of action; do you reserve the liberty of action of France." The restricted co-operation with England which the Cabinet recommended found favour with only seventy-five deputies; and, when face to face with a large hostile majority, de Freycinet and his colleagues resigned (July 29, 1882)[368]. Prudence, fear of the newly-formed Triple Alliance, or jealousy of England, drew France aside from the path to which her greatest captains, thinkers, and engineers had beckoned her in time past. Whatever the predominant motive may have been, it altered the course of history in the valley of the Nile.

[Footnote 368: De Freycinet, _op, cit._ pp. 311-312.]

After the refusal of France to co-operate with England even to the smallest extent, the Conference of the Powers became a nullity, and its sessions ceased despite the lack of any formal adjournment[369]. Here, as on so many other occasions, the Concert of the Powers displayed its weakness; and there can be no doubt that the Sultan and Arabi counted on that weakness in playing the dangerous game which brought matters to the test of the sword. The jealousies of the Powers now stood fully revealed. Russia entered a vigorous protest against England's action at Alexandria; Italy evinced great annoyance, and at once repelled a British proposal for her co-operation; Germany also showed much resentment, and turned the situation to profitable account by subst.i.tuting her influence for that of Britain in the counsels of the Porte. The Sultan, thwarted in the midst of his tortuous intrigues for a great Moslem revival, showed his spleen and his diplomatic skill by loftily protesting against Britain's violation of international law, and thereafter by refusing (August 1) to proclaim Arabi a rebel against the Khedive's authority. The essential timidity of Abdul Hamid's nature in presence of superior force was shown by a subsequent change of front. On hearing of British successes, he placed Arabi under the ban (September 8).

[Footnote 369: For its proceedings, see Parl. Papers, Egypt, 1882 (Conference on Egyptian Affairs).]

Meanwhile, the British expedition of some 10,000 men, despatched to Egypt under the command of Sir Garnet Wolseley made as though it would attack Arabi from Alexandria as a base. But on nearing that port at nightfall it steered about and occupied Port Said (August 15). Kantara and Ismailia, on the ca.n.a.l, were speedily seized; and the Seaforth Highlanders by a rapid march occupied Chalouf and prevented the cutting of the freshwater ca.n.a.l by the rebels. Thenceforth the little army had the advantage of marching near fresh water, and by a route on which Arabi was not at first expecting them. Sir Garnet Wolseley's movements were of that quick and decisive order which counts for so much against orientals. A sharp action at Tel-el-Mahuta obliged Arabi's forces, some 10,000 strong, to abandon entrenchments thrown up at that point (August 24).

Four days later there was desperate fighting at Ka.s.sa.s.sin Lock on the freshwater ca.n.a.l. There the Egyptians flung themselves in large numbers against a small force sent forward under General Graham to guard that important point. The a.s.sailants fought with the recklessness begotten by the proclamation of a holy war against infidels, and for some time the issue remained in doubt. At length, about sundown, three squadrons of the Household Cavalry, and the 7th Dragoon Guards, together with four light guns, were hastily sent forward from the main body in the rear to clinch the affair. General Drury Lowe wheeled this little force round the left flank of the enemy, and, coming up unperceived in the gathering darkness, charged with such fury as to scatter the hostile array in instant rout[370]. The enemy fell back on the entrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir, while the whole British force (including a division from India) concentrated at Ka.s.sa.s.sin, 17,400 strong, with 61 guns and 6 Gatlings.

[Footnote 370: _History of the Campaign in Egypt_ (War Office), by Col.

J.F. Maurice, pp. 62-65.]

The final action took place on September 13, at Tel-el-Kebir. There Arabi had thrown up a double line of earthworks of some strength, covering about four miles, and lay with a force that has been estimated at 20,000 to 25,000 regulars and 7000 irregulars. Had the a.s.sailants marched across the desert and attacked these works by day, they must have sustained heavy losses. Sir Garnet therefore determined to try the effect of a surprise at dawn, and moved his men forward after sunset of the 12th until they came within striking distance of the works. After a short rest they resumed their advance shortly before the time when the first streaks of dawn would appear on the eastern sky. At about 500 yards from the works, the advance was dimly silhouetted against the paling orient. Shortly before five o'clock, an Egyptian rifle rang out a sharp warning, and forthwith the entrenchments spurted forth smoke and flame. At once the British answered by a cheer and a rush over the intervening ground, each regiment eager to be the first to ply the bayonet. The Highlanders, under the command of General Graham, were leading on the left, and therefore won in this race for glory; but on all sides the invaders poured almost simultaneously over the works. For several minutes there was sharp fighting on the parapet; but the British were not to be denied, and drove before them the defenders as a kind of living screen against the fire that came from the second entrenchments; these they carried also, and thrust the whole ma.s.s out into the desert[371]. There hundreds of them fell under the sabres of the British cavalry which swept down from the northern end of the lines; but the pursuit was neither prolonged nor sanguinary. Sir Garnet Wolseley was satisfied with the feat of dissolving Arabi's army into an armed or unarmed rabble by a single sharp blow, and now kept horses and men for further eventualities.

[Footnote 371: _Life, Letters, and Diaries of General Sir Gerald Graham_ (1901). J.F. Maurice, _op. cit._ pp. 84-95.]

By one of those flashes of intuition that mark the born leader of men, the British commander perceived that the whole war might be ended if a force of cavalry pushed on to Cairo and demanded the surrender of its citadel at the moment when the news of the disaster at Tel-el-Kebir unmanned its defenders. The conception must rank as one of the most daring recorded in the annals of war. In the ancient capital of Egypt there were more than 300,000 Moslems, lately aroused to dangerous heights of fanaticism by the proclamation of a "holy war" against infidels. Its great citadel, towering some 250 feet above the city, might seem to bid defiance to all the hors.e.m.e.n of the British army.

Finally, Arabi had repaired thither in order to inspire vigour into a garrison numbering some 10,000 men. Nevertheless, Wolseley counted on the moral effect of his victory to level the ramparts of the citadel and to abase the mushroom growth of Arabi's pride.

His surmise was more than justified by events. While his Indian contingent pushed on to occupy Zagazig, Sir Drury Lowe, with a force mustering fewer than 500 sabres, pressed towards Cairo by a desert road in order to summon it on the morrow. After halting at Belbes the troopers gave rein to their steeds; and a ride of nearly 40 miles brought them to the city about sundown. Rumour magnified their numbers; while the fatalism that used to nerve the Moslem in his great days now predisposed him to bow the knee and mutter _Kismet_ at the advent of the seemingly predestined masters of Egypt. To this small, wearied, but lordly band Cairo surrendered, and Arabi himself handed over his sword.

On the following day the infantry came up and made good this precarious conquest.

In presence of this startling triumph the Press of the Continent sought to find grounds for the belief that Arabi, and Cairo as well, had been secretly bought over by British gold. It is somewhat surprising to find M. de Freycinet[372] repeating to-day this piece of spiteful silliness, which might with as much reason be used to explain away the victories of Clive and Coote, Outram and Havelock. The slanders of continental writers themselves stand in need of explanation. It is to be found in their annoyance at discovering that England had an army which could carry through a difficult campaign to a speedy and triumphant conclusion. Their typical att.i.tude had been that of Bismarck, namely, of exultation at her difficulties and of hope of her discomfiture. Now their tone changed to one of righteous indignation at the irregularity of her conduct in acting on behalf of Europe without any mandate from the Powers, and in using the Suez Ca.n.a.l as a base of operations.

[Footnote 372: _Op. cit._ p. 316.]

In this latter respect Britain's conduct was certainly open to criticism[373]. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether Arabi would have provoked her to action had he not been tacitly encouraged by the other Powers, which, while professing their wish to see order restored in Egypt, in most cases secretly sought to increase her difficulties in undertaking that task. As for the Sultan, he had now trimmed his sails by declaring Arabi a rebel to the Khedive's authority; and in due course that officer was tried, found guilty, and exiled to Ceylon early in 1883. The conduct of France, Germany, and Russia, if we may judge by the tone of their officially inspired Press, was scarcely more straightforward, and was certainly less discreet. On all sides there were diatribes against Britain's high-handed and lawless behaviour, and some German papers affected to believe that Hamburg might next be chosen for bombardment by the British fleet. These outbursts, in the case of Germany, may have been due to Bismarck's desire to please Russia, and secondarily France, in all possible ways. It is doubtful whether he gained this end. Certainly he and his underlings in the Press widened the gulf that now separated the two great Teutonic peoples.

[Footnote 373: It is said, however, that Arabi had warned M. de Lesseps that "the defence of Egypt requires the temporary destruction of the Ca.n.a.l" (Traill, _England, Egypt, and the Sudan_, p. 57). The status of the Ca.n.a.l was defined in 1885. _Ibid_. p. 59.]

The annoyance of France was more natural. She had made the Suez Ca.n.a.l, and had partic.i.p.ated in the Dual Control; but her mistake in not sharing in the work of restoring order was irreparable. Every one in Egypt saw that the control of that country must rest with the Power which had swept away Arabi's Government and re-established the fallen authority of the Khedive. A few persons in England, even including one member of the Gladstone Administration, Mr. Courtney, urged a speedy withdrawal; but the Cabinet, which had been unwillingly but irresistibly drawn thus far by the force of circ.u.mstances, could not leave Egypt a prey to anarchy; and, clearly, the hand that repressed anarchy ruled the country for the time being. It is significant that on April 4, 1883, more than 2600 Europeans in Egypt presented a pet.i.tion begging that the British occupation might be permanent[374].

[Footnote 374: Sir A. Milner, _England in Egypt_, p. 31.]

Mr. Gladstone, however, and others of his Cabinet, had declared that it would be only temporary, and would, in fact, last only so long as to enable order and prosperity to grow up under the shadow of new and better inst.i.tutions. These pledges were given with all sincerity, and the Prime Minister and his colleagues evidently wished to be relieved from what was to them a disagreeable burden. The French in Egypt, of course, fastened on these promises, and one of their newspapers, the _Journal Egyptien_, printed them every day at the head of its front columns[375]. Mr. Gladstone, who sought above all things for a friendly understanding with France, keenly felt, even to the end of his career, that the continued occupation of Egypt hindered that most desirable consummation. He was undoubtedly right. The irregularity of England's action in Egypt hampered her international relations at many points; and it may be a.s.signed as one of the causes that brought France into alliance with Russia.

[Footnote 375: H.F. Wood, _Egypt under the British_, p. 59 (1896).]

What, then, hindered the fulfilment of Mr. Gladstone's pledges? In the first place, the dog-in-the-manger policy of French officials and publicists increased the difficulties of the British administrators who now, in the character of advisers of the Khedive, really guided him and controlled his Ministers. The scheme of administration adopted was in the main that advised by Lord Dufferin in his capacity of Special Envoy. The details, however, are too wide and complex to be set forth here. So also are those of the disputes between our officials and those of France. Suffice it to say that by shutting up the funds of the "Caisse de la Dette," the French administrators of that great reserve fund hoped to make Britain's position untenable and hasten her evacuation. In point of fact, these and countless other pin-p.r.i.c.ks delayed Egypt's recovery and furnished a good reason why Britain should not withdraw[376].

[Footnote 376: The reader should consult for full details Sir A. Milner, _England in Egypt_ (1892); Sir D.M. Wallace, _The Egyptian Question_ (1883), especially chaps, xi.-xiii.; and A. Silva White, _The Expansion of Egypt_ (1899), the best account of the Anglo-Egyptian administration, with valuable Appendices on the "Caisse," etc.

A far more favourable light is thrown on the conduct of Arabi and his partisans by Mr. A.M. Broadley in his work _How We Defended Arabi_ (1884).]

But above and beyond these administrative details, there was one all-compelling cause, the war-cloud that now threatened the land of the Pharaohs from that home of savagery and fanaticism, the Sudan.