[Footnote 687: Connelley, _Quantrill and the Border Wars_, 335-420.]

[Footnote 688: "I arrived here last night from Leroy, after having succeeded in effecting a treaty with the Osage Indians by which the Govt. obtain of them by purchase thirty miles in extent off the East end of their reserve (at a cost of 300,000$ to remain on interest _forever_ at _5 pr ct_--which gives them an annuity of 15000$ annually)--They also cede to the U.S. _in trust_ twenty miles off the North side of the Bal. of their reserve the full extent east and west--to be disposed of as the Sec. Int. shall direct for their benefit--with the usual reserves to half breeds--provision for schools etc.--I have been all this afternoon in Council with the Delewares who have to the No. of 30 or 40 followed me out here for the purpose of again talking over (cont.)]

it was not a conclusive thing; for, in October, the Osage chiefs were still making propositions[689] and

[Footnote 688: (cont.) the proposed treaty with them. They had trouble after I left them at Leavenworth, but our council today has done good and they have just left for home with the agreement to call a council and send a delegation to the Cherokees to look up a new home--When will Jno. Ross leave for his people. I wish he could be there when the Delaware delegation goes down--as I am exceedingly anxious that they get a home of the Cherokees.

"I think there is but little doubt but I shall make a treaty with the Sac and Foxes as they say they are _satisfied_ to remove to a part of the Land I have purchased of the Osages--on the line next the Cherokees--I can make a treaty with the Creeks and may do so but I think I will make it _conditional_ upon the signatures of some of the Chiefs now in the army--Those here are very anxious to treat and sell us a large tract of the country The trouble with the Southern Indians is their claims for losses by the war I will have to put in a clause of some kind to satisfy them on that subject--That they are ent.i.tled to it I have no doubt--but what view Congress will take of it--or the Senate in ratifying the treaty of course I cannot tell--Some of the Wyandots are here--

"I have just closed a Council with the Sac and Foxes and have heard many fine speeches. We meet again day after tomorrow--as tomorrow must be appropriated to the Creeks--I think I shall have a success here--The Sack and Foxes to the No of say two hundred have a dance out on the green They are dressed and painted for the occasion and as it is in honor of my visit I must go out and witness it * * * Well we have had an extensive dance which cost me a beef and while waiting for a Chipaway Chief who comes as I learn to complain of his agent I go on with my Letter--The New York Indians are tolerably well represented and I shall talk with them tonight--This is a grand jubilee amongst the Indians here. So many tribes and parts of tribes or their Chiefs gathered here to see the Comr. Paint and feathers are in great demand and singing, whooping--and the Drum is constantly ringing in my ears. I am satisfied that it is a good arrangement to have them here together it is cheaper and better and saves much time.

"I made a great mistake that I did not bring maps of the reserves and especially of the Indian Territory--I do the best I can from the Treaties.

"I have had no mail for Eight Days as my mail is at Leavenworth. I expect my letters day after tomorrow when I hope to have a late letter from you as well as one from the Sec.--Will you please send Hutchinson some money he must have funds to pay for surveying and alloting the Ottawa reserve The survey is finished and pay demanded."

[Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, D 198 of 1863].]

[Footnote 689: The propositions were in the form of a memorandum, drawn up by White Hair, princ.i.p.al chief of the Great and Little Osages, and Little Bear, princ.i.p.al chief of the Little Osages, who, in conjunction with Charles Mograin, a.s.sistant head chief of the Great and Little Osages, had been (cont.)]

making them after the fashion of the Creeks long before at Indian Springs.[690] Dole had finally to be told that the rank and file of the Osages would not allow their chiefs to confer with him except in general council.[691] As a matter of fact, not one of the Dole treaties could run the gauntlet of criticism and, consequently, the whole project of treaty-making in 1862 and 1863 accomplished nothing beneficial. It only served to complicate a situation already serious and to forecast that when the great test should come, as come it surely would, the government would be found wanting, lacking in magnanimity, lacking in justice, and all too willing to sacrifice its honor for big interests and transient causes.

[Footnote 689: (cont.) solicited by their people, when in council at Humboldt, July 4, to proceed to Washington and interview their Great Father [Coffin to Dole, July 16, 1863, Indian Office Consolidated Files, _Neosho_, C 365 of 1863]. The propositions were to the effect that the Osages would gladly sell thirty miles by twenty miles off the southeast corner of their Reserve and one-half of the Reserve on the north for $1,350,000, which should draw six per cent interest until paid [Ibid., D 239 of 1863]. John Schoenmaker of the Osage Mission was apprehensive that the Roman Catholic interests would be disregarded as in the Potawatomi Treaty. See letter to Coffin, June 25th.]

[Footnote 690: Abel, _Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi_.]

[Footnote 691: Charles Mograin warned Dole of this.]

XI. INDIAN TERRITORY IN 1863, JANUARY TO JUNE INCLUSIVE

As with the war as a whole, so with that part of it waged on the Arkansas frontier, the year 1863 proved critical. Its midsummer season saw the turning-point in the respective fortunes of the North and the South, both in the east and in the west. The beginning of 1863 was a time for recording great depletion of resources in Indian Territory, as elsewhere, great disorganization within Southern Indian ranks, and much privation, suffering, and resultant dissatisfaction among the tribes generally. The moment called for more or less sweeping changes in western commands. Those most nearly affecting the Arkansas frontier were the establishment of Indian Territory as a separate military ent.i.ty[692] and the detachment of western Louisiana

[Footnote 692: The establishment of a separate command for Indian Territory was not accomplished all at once. In December, 1862, Steele had been ordered to report to Holmes for duty and, in the first week of January, he was given the Indian Territory post, subject to Hindman. On or about the eighth, he a.s.sumed command [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 28] at Fort Smith. In less than a week thereafter, his command was separated from that of Hindman [Ibid., part ii, 771]. The following doc.u.ment shows exactly what had been the previous relation between the two:

Head Qrs. Dept. Indn. Terry.

Ft. Smith, Jan. 31st, 1863.

COLONEL: Your special No. 22, par. viii has been recd. I would respectfully suggest that when a.s.signed to this command by Maj. Gen'l Hindman the command was styled in orders, "1st Div'n 1st Corps Trans.

Miss. Army." The special order referred to, it is respectfully suggested, may be susceptible of misconstruction as there are under my command two separate Brigades, one under the command (cont.)]

and Texas from the Trans-Mississippi Department.[693] Both were accomplished in January and both were directly due to a somewhat tardy realization of the vast strategic importance of the Indian country.

Unwieldy, geographically, the Trans-Mississippi Department had long since shown itself to be. Moreover, it was no longer even pa.s.sably safe to leave the interests of Indian Territory subordinated to those of Arkansas.[694]

The man chosen, after others, his seniors in rank, had declined the dubious honor,[695] for the command of Indian Territory was William Steele, brigadier-general, northern born, of southern sympathies. Thus was ignored whatever claim Douglas H. Cooper might have been thought to have by reason of his intimate and long acquaintance with Indian affairs and his influence, surpa.s.singly great, with certain of the tribes. Cooper's unfortunate weakness, addiction to intemperance, had stood more or less in the way of his promotion right along just as it had decreased his military efficiency on at least one memorable occasion and had hindered the confirmation of his appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs in the Arkansas and Red River const.i.tuency. In this narrative, as events are divulged, it will be seen that the preference for Steele exasperated Cooper, who was not a big enough man to put love of country before the gratification of his own

[Footnote 692: (cont.) of Gen'l D.H. Cooper and one under command of Col. J.W. Speight.

I am, Col., Very Res'py W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_., Col. S.S. Anderson, A.A.G.

P.S. Please find enclosed printed Gen. Order, no. 4, which I have a.s.sumed the responsibility of issuing on receipt of Lt. Gen'l Holmes'

order declaring my command in the Ind'n country independent.

(Sd) W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_.

[A.G.O., _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 65].]

[Footnote 693: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 771-772.]

[Footnote 694:--Ibid., 771.]

[Footnote 695:--Ibid., 843; _Confederate Records_, chap.

2, no. 270, pp. 25-27.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: FACSIMILE OF MONTHLY INSPECTION REPORT OF THE SECOND CREEK REGIMENT OF MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS.]

ambition, consequently friction developed between him and his rival highly detrimental to the service to which each owed his best thought, his best endeavor.[696]

Conditions in Indian Territory, at the time Steele took command, were conceivably the worst that could by any possibility be imagined. The land had been stripped of its supplies, the troops were scarcely worthy of the name.[697] Around Fort Smith, in Arkansas, things were equally bad.[698] People were clamoring for protection against marauders, some were wanting only the opportunity to move themselves and their effects far away out of the reach of danger, others were demanding that the unionists be cleaned out just as secessionists had, in some cases, been. Confusion worse confounded prevailed. Hindman had resorted to a system of almost wholesale furloughing to save expense.[699] Most of the Indians had taken advantage of it and were off duty when Steele arrived. Many had preferred to subsist at government cost.[700] There was so little in their own homes for them to get. Forage was practically non-existent and Steele soon had it impressed [701] upon him that troops in the Indian Territory ought, as Hindman had come to think months before,[702] to be all unmounted.

Although fully realizing that it was inc.u.mbent upon him to hold Fort Smith as a sort of key to his entire command, Steele knew it would be impossible to

[Footnote 696: It might as well be said, at the outset, that Cooper was not the ranking officer of Steele. He claimed that he was [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1037-1038]; but the government disallowed the contention [Ibid., 1038].]

[Footnote 697:--Ibid., part i, 28; part ii, 862, 883, 909.]

[Footnote 698: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp.

29-30.]

[Footnote 699: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 895, 909.]

[Footnote 700:--Ibid., part i, 30.]

[Footnote 701: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 31.]

[Footnote 702: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 51.]

maintain any considerable force there. He, therefore, resolved to take big chances and to attempt to hold it with as few men as his commissary justified, trusting that he would be shielded from attack "by the inclemency of the season and the waters of the Arkansas."[703]

The larger portion of his army[704] was sent southward, in the direction of Red River.[705] But lack of food and forage was, by no manner of means, the only difficulty that confronted Steele. He was short of guns, particularly of good guns,[706] and distressingly short of money.[707] The soldiers had not been paid for months.

The opening of 1863 saw changes, equally momentous, in Federal commands. Somewhat captiously, General Schofield discounted recent achievements of Blunt and advised that Blunt's District of Kansas should be completely disa.s.sociated from the Division of the Army of the Frontier,[708] which he had, at Schofield's own earlier request, been commanding. It was another instance of personal jealousy, interstate rivalry, and local

[Footnote 703: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 30.]

[Footnote 704: Perhaps the word, _army_, is inapplicable here.

Steele himself was in doubt as to whether he was in command of an army or of a department [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p.

54].]