Great and unconcealed rejoicing among the Boers took place; work was suspended, all heads were put together to make capital out of Great Britain's misfortunes. Notices were sent out on the 18th of March, summoning the burghers to a ma.s.s meeting to be held some thirty miles from the town. These meetings, it must here be noted, were scarcely attended by invitation. A large number of the people appeared on compulsion, brought "to the scratch" by threats. One of the menaces, a favourite one according to Mr. Rider Haggard, was that those who did not attend should be made "biltong" of when the country was given back. Biltong is meat cut into strips and hung in the sun to dry. The result of the notices, backed by threats, was a meeting of some three thousand armed Boers, who evidently meant mischief.

The threatening aspect of the Boers caused the corps known as the Pretoria Horse, a corps raised for the purpose of acting as cavalry on the Zulu border, to be retained for service in and around the capital. While matters stood thus, and the general discontent seemed to portend even further hostilities, Sir Bartle Frere went to Pretoria for the purpose of discussing affairs with the Boer leaders. These all clamoured for their independence. They had gone as far as to a.s.sert it by stopping posts, carts, and persons, and sending armed patrols about the country.

Nothing definite resulted from this att.i.tude, however, for before very long the conclusion--the successful conclusion--of the Zulu war appeared imminent, and those in revolt against British authority saw plainly that there would shortly be troops in plenty at hand to restore law and order. Consequently for the time being they subsided. The loyal inhabitants of the Transvaal entertained Sir Bartle Frere prior to his departure, and at the public dinner given on that occasion at Potchefstrom, he took the opportunity to a.s.sure them that the Transvaal would never be given back! It may be interesting to some to know, that at a public meeting on the 24th of April in Pretoria, within a week of the breaking up of the camp which had been threatening its safety, the following resolution was pa.s.sed:--

"This meeting reprobates most strongly the action of a certain section of the English and Colonial press for censuring, without sufficient knowledge of local affairs, the policy and conduct of Sir Bartle Frere, and it desires not only to express its sympathy with Sir Bartle Frere, and its confidence in his policy, but also to go so far as to congratulate most heartily her Majesty the Queen, the Home Government, and ourselves, on possessing such a true, considerate, and faithful servant as his Excellency the High Commissioner."

Having made allusion to Sir Bartle Frere's departure, it may be as well to explain that before the battle of Ulundi it was arranged that Sir Garnet Wolseley should be sent out from home to supersede Lord Chelmsford in the command of the army, Sir H. Bulwer as Governor of Natal, and Sir Bartle Frere as High Commissioner of the Transvaal, Natal, and all the eastern portion of South Africa. Sir Garnet reached Cape Town on the 28th of June, and proceeded without delay to Natal. But, as we know, before he could reach the seat of war the battle of Ulundi was won.

The fighting was now at an end; the Zulus expressed themselves beaten, and Cetchwayo, after an exciting chase, which s.p.a.ce does not permit us to describe, was taken prisoner on the 28th of August. He was afterwards removed to Cape Town, and rooms were given him in the castle. Hostilities having happily terminated in Zululand, Sir Garnet Wolseley then started for Pretoria. He there finally set up the government of a Crown Colony with a nominative Executive Council and Legislative a.s.sembly.

One of his first acts on reaching Pretoria was to issue a notable proclamation. It ran thus:----

"Whereas it appears, that notwithstanding repeated a.s.surances of contrary effect given by her Majesty's representatives in this territory, uncertainty or misapprehension exists among some of her Majesty's subjects as to the intention of her Majesty's Government regarding the maintenance of British rule and sovereignty over the territory of the Transvaal: and whereas it is expedient that all grounds for such uncertainty or misapprehension should be removed once and for all beyond doubt or question: now therefore I do hereby proclaim and make known, in the name and on behalf of her Majesty the Queen, that it is the will and determination of her Majesty's Government that this Transvaal territory shall be, and shall continue to be for ever, an integral portion of her Majesty's dominions in South Africa."

On the same subject Sir Bartle Frere, writing to England, said that he was very certain "that to give up the Transvaal is as little to be thought of as surrendering Ireland or India." In his opinion the Boer malcontents were few and inconsequential, most of the leaders and instigators being foreigners, who were personally interested in making themselves prominent, owing to the prevailing notion that the country would be given up. As to the effect of the abandonment of the Transvaal on the prospects of confederation he said: "To every colony concerned such a step would appear as a confession of weakness, of infirmity of purpose, and of disregard for solemn pledges and obligations, which would destroy all respect, all wish to belong to a Government which could so behave."

In writing to Sir M. Hicks Beach, in December 1879, Sir Bartle gave his personal impression of the feeling in Pretoria at the time of the annexation:--

"When our power of enforcing the law and upholding the authority of Government were at the lowest, in April last, ... experienced men at Pretoria gave me, through Colonel Lanyon, the following estimate of the strength of parties in the malcontent camp. The educated and intelligent men of influence, who advocated the most extreme measures, or were prepared to acquiesce in them, were reckoned at not more than eight. Three, or perhaps four, were men of property in the Transvaal; the rest foreign adventurers, with no property and little weight beyond that due to their skill as political agitators. Their unflinching and uncompromising followers in the Boer camp were not reckoned at more than eighty. The disaffected waverers who, according to circ.u.mstances, would follow the majority either to acts of overt resistance to Government and lawless violence, or to grumble and disperse, 'accepting the inevitable,'

were reckoned at about eight hundred at the outside. The rest of the camp, variously estimated as containing from sixteen hundred to four thousand in all, but probably never exceeding two thousand five hundred present at one time, were men brought to the camp by intimidation, compulsion, or curiosity, who would not willingly resist the authority of Government, and would, if a.s.sured of protection, prefer to side with it."

Viewed in the light of later events, these opinions are extremely interesting and cannot be disregarded.

[Ill.u.s.tration: OFFICER of the 16th LANCERS.

Photo by Gregory and Co., London.]

Before pa.s.sing on, it is necessary to state that during the period from 1878 to 1879, the native chief Sekukuni--Cetchwayo's dog, as the blacks called him--had become obstreperous. He had been engaged in raids into the Transvaal--raids of the same character as those which, as has been already mentioned, had helped to bring about the collapse of the Republic. Colonel Rowland's expedition, which started in November 1878 for the suppression of this ruffian, was baffled by fever and horse sickness. Colonel Lanyon in the following June returned to the attack, and was on the eve of success, when Sir Garnet Wolseley (who arrived late in that month) sent orders to cease operations. These orders he found, on reaching the Transvaal, to be a mistake. Sekukuni was not a person to be trifled with nor ignored, so the campaign began again in November, with the result that within a period of eight days the chief's stronghold was taken and himself made prisoner. About fifty Europeans and some five hundred Swazi allies were killed or wounded.

Here we see, within one year, how much was done for the protection of the Transvaal at the cost of British money and British blood.

Looking back, it is easy to perceive that, but for our intervention, the South African Republic would have been slowly but effectually swallowed up. Cetchwayo and Sekukuni between them would have made a meal of the Transvaal.

The brilliant and complete success of Sir Garnet Wolseley was highly praised, and the names of Colonel Lanyon, Captain Clark, R.A., and Captain Carrington especially mentioned as deserving a share of the credit for the accurate information they had collected during the previous months.

So much having been done for the security of the Boers and for the maintenance of British prestige, it is no marvel that Sir Garnet Wolseley thought himself justified in expressing the trend of British policy in plain terms. At the dinner given at Pretoria on the 17th of December 1879 he took the opportunity of making the British programme well understood. He declared with emphasis that there could be no question of resigning the sovereignty of the country. "There is no Government," he said, "Whig or Tory, Liberal, Conservative, or Radical, who would dare under any circ.u.mstances to give back this country. They would not dare, because the English people would not allow them!" At that time it was evident that Sir Garnet had never heard the story of the philanthropic Belarmine, an individual who gave himself to the she-bear to save her and her young ones from starvation. Or, if the tale was known to him, he probably took it for what it was worth, and never foresaw that the British Government would emulate the action of the self-sacrificing lunatic, and spend precious blood for the sole purpose of nourishing and resuscitating the powers of a languishing enemy.

MR. GLADSTONE OUT OF OFFICE AND IN OFFICE

But British speeches and proclamations had ceased to impress the Boers. They had had too many of them, and they began to think the British Government a somewhat knock-kneed inst.i.tution whose joints had ceased to hold together. Sir Garnet Wolseley, however, with characteristic energy and determination, dealt with the malcontents one by one, converting them, and causing them to sensibly consider on which side their bread was b.u.t.tered. Indeed, so diplomatically did he conduct his work, that a sop was given to the aggressive Pretorius, who, instead of being put in prison as he deserved, was offered a seat on the Executive Council, with a salary attached.

This he was inclined to jump at, but, at the time, public feeling ran too high to allow of his making a decision. The fact was that the political speeches delivered by Mr. Gladstone in the south of Scotland, during the months of November and December 1879, were putting a new complexion on affairs. They were reprinted all the world over, and they were profusely circulated among the Boers. The Boer leaders and obstructionists at once saw in this British statesman their saviour, and were convinced that, on the return of Mr. Gladstone to power, their independence would be a.s.sured. They therefore sent Messrs. Kruger and Joubert as a deputation to the Cape, and these two gentlemen persuaded the Cape Parliament to reject the Confederation Scheme then being proposed by Sir Bartle Frere. Selections from the attacks on the Government, from which the Boers then derived their encouragement and support, are here reprinted in order that the sincerity of Mr. Gladstone's att.i.tude may be examined.

Speaking in Edinburgh, he said of the Government:--

"They have annexed in Africa the Transvaal territory, inhabited by a free European, Christian, Republican community, which they have thought proper to bring within the limits of a Monarchy, although out of 8000 persons in that Republic qualified to vote upon the subject, we are told--and I have never seen the statement officially contradicted--that 6500 protested against it. These are the circ.u.mstances under which we undertake to transform Republicans into subjects of a Monarchy."

Now, Sir T. Shepstone's despatches show that the ground on which the Transvaal was annexed was because the State was drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native tribes. He said "that most thinking men in the country saw no other way out of the difficulty," and Carlyle has taught us what is the proportion between thinking men and the general public. He also said, in the fifteenth paragraph of his despatch to Lord Carnarvon of the 6th of March 1877, that pet.i.tions signed by 2500 people, representing every cla.s.s of the community, out of a total adult male population of 8000, had been presented to the Government of the Republic, setting forth its difficulties and dangers, and praying it "to treat with me for their amelioration or removal." He likewise stated, and with perfect truth, that many more would have signed had it not been for the terrorism that was exercised, and that all the towns and villages in the country desired the change.

Mr. Gladstone went on to say:--

"We have made war on the Zulus. We have thereby become responsible for their territory; and not only this, but we are now, as it appears from the latest advices, about to make war upon a chief lying to the northward of the Zulus; and Sir Bartle Frere, who was the great authority for the proceedings of the Government in Afghanistan, has announced in South Africa that it will be necessary for us to extend our dominions until we reach the Portuguese frontier to the north. So much for Africa."

At Dalkeith he remarked:--

"If we cast our eyes to South Africa, what do we behold? That a nation whom we term savages have, in defence of their own land, offered their naked bodies to the terribly improved artillery and arms of modern European science, and have been mowed down by hundreds and by thousands, having committed no offence, but having, with rude and ignorant courage, done what were for them, and done faithfully and bravely what were for them the duties of patriotism.

You may talk of glory, you may offer rewards,--and you are right to give rewards to the gallantry of your soldiers, who I think are ent.i.tled not only to our admiration for courage, but to our compa.s.sion for the nature of the duties they have been called to perform--but the grief and pain none the less remain."

At Glasgow he continued in the same strain:--

"In Africa you have before you the memory of bloodshed, of military disaster, the record of 10,000 Zulus--such is the computation of Bishop Colenso--slain for no other offence than their attempt to defend against your artillery, with their naked bodies, their hearths and homes, their wives and families. You have the invasion of a free people in the Transvaal, and you have, I fear, in one quarter or another--I will not enter into details, which might be injurious to the public interest--prospects of further disturbance and shedding of blood."

These speeches, as may be imagined, did an incalculable amount of mischief. Besides fanning the smouldering sparks of discontent, they served up catchwords wholesale for that section of the British public whose political machinery is largely fed by catchwords. But, as has been decided by axiom, "any stick will serve to beat a dog with," and the Transvaal difficulty was a convenient weapon for the attack on the Government. The real feeling of the Boer community was an outside matter, and, as we shall presently see, had nothing to do with the case, though in March 1880 Mr. Gladstone had the satisfaction of receiving a letter from a committee of Boer malcontents, wherein "he was thanked for the great sympathy shown in their fate." The thanks were a little premature. In April 1880 the elections took place, and Mr. Gladstone came into power with a large majority. Then he was asked the great question: Would he maintain his oft-repeated pledge to retain the Transvaal, or would he continue to take up the tone of his Midlothian denunciations?

The riddle was shortly to be solved. In the debate on the Queen's Speech the Prime Minister thus expressed himself: "I do not know whether there is an absolute union of opinion on this side of the House as to the policy in which the a.s.sumption of the Transvaal originated. Undoubtedly, as far as I am myself concerned, I did not approve of that a.s.sumption. I took no part in questioning it nor in the attempt to condemn it, because, in my opinion, whether the a.s.sumption was wise or unwise, it having been done, no good but only mischief was to be done by the intervention of this House. But whatever our original opinions were on that policy--and the opinions of the majority of those who sit on this side of the House were decidedly adverse to it--we had to confront a state of facts; and the main fact which met us was the existence of the large native population in the Transvaal, to whom, by the establishment of the Queen's supremacy, we hold ourselves to have given a pledge. That is the acceptance of facts, and that is the sense in which my right honourable friend, and all those who sit with him, may, if they think fit, say we accept the principles on which the late Government proceeded. It is quite possible to accept the consequences of a policy, and yet to retain the original difference of opinion with regard to the character of that policy as long as it was a matter of discussion."

And shortly after he wrote to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert:--

"It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since the annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that territory, but it is impossible to consider that question as if it were presented for the first time. We have to deal with a state of things which has existed for a considerable period, during which obligations have been contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards the native population, which cannot be set aside.

"Looking to all the circ.u.mstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is, that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal, but, consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that the white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs. We believe that this liberty may be most easily and promptly conceded to the Transvaal as a member of a South African Confederation."

THE COMMENCEMENT OF REBELLION

When the Liberal Ministry came into power, it will be observed, Mr.

Gladstone's att.i.tude changed, and that he was compelled to abandon the sympathetic tone of his Midlothian speeches. How far he really meant to be bound by the promise made that "the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish her sovereignty over the Transvaal" is not known, for later on, in June 1881, in a letter to the Transvaal loyalists, he explains that there was "no mention of the terms or date of this promise. If the reference be to my letter of the 8th of June 1880 to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, I do not think the language of that letter justifies the description given. Nor am I sure in what manner, or to what degree, the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs, which I then said her Majesty's Government desired to confer on the white population of the Transvaal, differs from the settlement now about being made in its bearing on the interests of those whom your committee represents."

This letter was a masterpiece of one whose talent for ambiguity was becoming world famous, and a stone in shape of a loaf was thus hurled at the heads of the expectant loyalists.

But to return to the events of 1880. Finding that the Premier was no longer to be the mainstay of their hopes, the Boers began to renew their agitations. These agitations, it will be remembered, during the end of the Zulu war and Sir Garnet Wolseley's arrival in the Transvaal, were merely suppressed, because at that time British ascendency throughout the country seemed to be established. An excellent opportunity for rebellion now suggested itself. The Cape Government was engaged with the Basuto war. Sir Owen Lanyon, who succeeded Sir T. Shepstone in March 1879, had supplied a body of 300 or more volunteers--mostly loyalists--to a.s.sist in the military operations, while the only regiment of cavalry had been sent elsewhere by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Big things have often small beginnings, and the Boer rebellion, that has brought so many complications in its train, commenced with a very small incident. A certain Bezeidenhout, having refused to pay his taxes, had, by order, some of his goods seized and put up to auction. This was the signal for the malcontents to attack the auctioneer and rescue the goods. So great became the uproar and confusion, the women aiding and abetting the men in their disobedience of the law, that military a.s.sistance was summoned.

Major Thornhill, with a few companies of the 21st Regiment, was sent to support the Landrost in arresting the rioters, and special constables were enrolled to a.s.sist him in restoring order. But these united exertions were unavailing. All attempts to carry out the arrests were openly set at defiance. This scene occurred on the 11th of November 1880. On the 26th Sir George Colley--who had relieved Sir Garnet Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief--was applied to for more troops. Sir George, who was daily expecting an outbreak of Pondos, and a possible appeal for help from Cape Colony, merely suggested that the "authorities should be a.s.sisted by the loyal inhabitants." This, it must be owned, was hard on the royalists, who from that time to this have had to pay dearly for their allegiance to the Crown. A ma.s.s meeting was held at Paade kraal, where Krugersdorp now stands, and the rioters unanimously decided to commit their cause to the Almighty, and to live or die in the struggle for independence. Thereupon Messrs. Kruger, Pretorius, and Joubert were elected a triumvirate to conduct the Government, and on the 16th of December 1880 (Dingaan's Day) the Republic was formally proclaimed, and its flag again hoisted. The proclamation, dealing with the events of the preceding years, and offering terms to her Majesty's Government, was forwarded to Sir Owen Lanyon. The Boer leaders therein expressed their willingness to enter into confederation and to guide their native policy by general rules adopted in concurrence "with the Colonies and States of South Africa," and at the same time declared that they had no desire for war or the spilling of blood. "It lies," they said, "in your hands to force us to appeal to arms in self-defence."

On the very day of the proclamation, however, blood was shed.

Commandant Cronje, with a party of burghers, marched into Potchefstroom for the purpose of printing the proclamation. They promptly seized the printing-office, and Major Clarke, who thought it advisable to interfere, was refused admittance. Soon after a Boer patrol fired on our mounted infantry, who returned the compliment.

That was the signal for the opening of hostilities. On this matter it may be urged that Boer reports differ from ours, but Boer veracity may be defined by the algebraic quant.i.ty _x_, and cannot be accepted. Lieutenant-Colonel Winsloe, of the 21st Regiment, who was commanding at a fort outside the village, signalled orders to Major Clarke to begin firing. This officer was fortified in the Landrost's office with a small force of some twenty soldiers and twenty civilians, while the Boers occupied positions in the surrounding houses. The siege lasted two days (during the 17th and the morning of the 18th), and then when one officer (Captain Falls) and five men had been killed and the thatched roof fired, Major Clarke deemed it best to surrender. Colonel Winsloe held the camp throughout the war, surrendering only after an armistice was declared.

A still more terrible disaster was in store. Mr Rider Haggard, who is perhaps the best authority on the subject, describes it as a "most cruel and carefully planned ma.s.sacre." Other writers, however, hold that the outrage could scarcely be called a ma.s.sacre, since Colonel Anstruther had been fully warned of the risks he ran of Boer treachery and Boer artifice. It appears that Colonel Anstruther had received orders from Sir Owen Lanyon to concentrate his forces in Pretoria. Accordingly, he marched from Lydenburg--situated about 180 miles from Pretoria--with such troops as he had at his disposal. These were two companies of the 94th Regiment. They were accompanied by three women, two children, and a ponderous train of luggage-waggons. Their progress was necessarily slow, but the Colonel, in spite of having been warned of Boer ways and Boer tactics, evinced no anxiety. Indeed, from all accounts it appears that he followed the good old British habit of under-estimating the enemy's physical, while over-estimating his moral, qualities. For this reason he probably disregarded the precautions necessary after the warnings he had received on starting. Be this as it may, on the 20th of December he and his long waggon-train were nearing a point called Bronker's Spruit, about thirty-eight miles from Pretoria, when suddenly there appeared a huge crowd of some five hundred mounted Boers. From this crowd a man was seen approaching with a white flag. The column, about half a mile in length, halted; the band ceased; Colonel Anstruther advanced to the parley. The messenger then handed a letter. It was an intimation of the establishment of the South African Republic, and declared that till Sir Owen Lanyon's reply to the proclamation was received, and they were aware whether war was or was not declared, they could not allow the progress of troops. The Colonel's reply was plain. He was ordered to proceed to Pretoria, and proceed he would.

Then, before Colonel Anstruther had rejoined his column, a volley was poured in on them by the farmers, who, emerging from the cover of rocks and trees, had gradually closed round the troops. A vigorous but short resistance followed. The Boers, skilled by long practice in marking their most cherished enemies, picked off the officers one by one. Seven out of nine dropped to their guns, while a perpetual hailstorm of bullets beat over men, women, and waggons.

In a few minutes so many were disabled that the Colonel, himself mortally wounded, had to surrender. Out of the party 56 were killed and 101 wounded. One of these was a woman.

A great deal was said at the time by British sympathisers of the kindness of the Boers to the prisoners and wounded of their antagonists; but the opinions of Mr. Rider Haggard and Sir Owen Lanyon are worth considering. The former, in writing of this engagement, says that "after the fight Conductor Egerton, with a sergeant, was allowed to walk into Pretoria to obtain medical a.s.sistance, the Boers refusing to give him a horse, or even allow him to use his own.... I may mention that a Zulu driver, who was with the rear-guard, and escaped into Natal, stated that the Boers shot all the wounded men who formed that body. His statement was to a certain extent borne out by the evidence of one of the survivors, who stated that all the bodies found in that part of the field, nearly three-quarters of a mile away from the head of the column, had a bullet-hole through the head or breast, in addition to their other wounds." The Administrator of the Transvaal in Council thus comments on the occurrence in an official minute: "The surrounding and gradual hemming in under a flag of truce of a force, and the selection of spots from which to direct their fire, as in the case of the unprovoked attack of the rebels upon Colonel Anstruther's force, is a proceeding of which very few like incidents can be mentioned in the annals of civilised warfare."

Sir Owen Lanyon, writing from the scene of action in Pretoria, says--"The Boers were very clever in being kind to our wounded soldiers, for they well knew that such action would obtain sympathy at home. But where it was impossible for their deeds to become known their conduct was far from creditable to them. Poor Clarke and Raaf were kept for two months in a dark room, and were only allowed out twice for exercise. Barlow was robbed of everything, and only left the clothes he stood in. A Hollander, who is secretary to Cronje at Potchefstrom, is still wearing the rings of poor Captain Falls, who was shot. Englishmen have been murdered, flogged, and robbed of everything. The Boers at Potchefstrom forced the prisoners of war to dig their trenches, and some were shot from the Fort while so employed. Woite and Van der Linden were shot as spies, because they had been in the Boer camp and left it some days before they proclaimed the Republic. Carolus, a Cape boy, was shot by Boer court-martial because he left the Fort when food became scarce. A white man and nine natives were similarly shot without any trial.

Explosive bullets were used, notwithstanding that Colonel Winsloe pointed out to the Boer leader in a letter that such was against the rules of war."

There is ample evidence that acts of treachery and barbarity similar to and worse than those mentioned by Colonel Lanyon were perpetrated by the insurgents.