Five battleships and ten heavy cruisers steamed in three columns at sixteen knots, without an anti-submarine screen. This was all the more astonishing since the j.a.panese intercepted the American radio transmission, and thus knew submarines were at hand. At 0632, Darter Darter fired six torpedoes at the cruiser fired six torpedoes at the cruiser Atago Atago, Kurita's flagship, from point-blank range-980 yards-then loosed her stern tubes at the cruiser Takao Takao from 1,550 yards. from 1,550 yards. Atago Atago was. .h.i.t four times, was. .h.i.t four times, Takao Takao twice. twice. Dace Dace's skipper, Bladen Claggett, whipped up his periscope to see "the sight of a lifetime": Atago Atago billowing black smoke and orange flame, sinking fast by the bow. billowing black smoke and orange flame, sinking fast by the bow. Takao Takao, though hit hard in the stern, remained afloat. Claggett heard two huge explosions. "I have never heard anything like it," wrote the submarine skipper. "The soundmen reported that it sounded as if the bottom of the ocean was blowing up...Heard tremendous breaking-up noises. This was the most gruesome sound I have ever heard." The diving officer said: "We'd better get the h.e.l.l out of here."

Admiral Kurita and his staff swam from the stricken Atago Atago to the destroyer to the destroyer Kishinami Kishinami, and thence transferred to the great battleship Yamato Yamato. Some 360 of Atago Atago's crew drowned, including almost all the admiral's communications staff. If Kurita's conduct thereafter was clumsy, no fifty-five-year-old could have found it easy to exercise command after suffering such a personal trauma. Darter Darter's sister boat Dace Dace launched four torpedoes at the cruiser launched four torpedoes at the cruiser Maya Maya and heard huge explosions, signalling her end. Belated j.a.panese destroyer attacks prevented either submarine from firing again. Kurita's ships increased speed to twenty-four knots to escape the killing ground. The first action of Leyte Gulf had inflicted substantial damage on the j.a.panese before they fired a shot. Some officers of "Centre Force," as Kurita's squadron was designated, expressed rueful admiration for the American submarines' achievement: "Why can't our people and heard huge explosions, signalling her end. Belated j.a.panese destroyer attacks prevented either submarine from firing again. Kurita's ships increased speed to twenty-four knots to escape the killing ground. The first action of Leyte Gulf had inflicted substantial damage on the j.a.panese before they fired a shot. Some officers of "Centre Force," as Kurita's squadron was designated, expressed rueful admiration for the American submarines' achievement: "Why can't our people267 pull off a stunt like that?" Why not, indeed? This first American success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness, which would characterise almost every j.a.panese action in those days. However gloomy were Kurita and his officers about the operation they had undertaken, it is extraordinary that they spurned elementary precautions. j.a.panese behaviour suggested a resignation to death much stronger than the will to fight. In this t.i.tanic clash, a once-great navy was to conduct itself in a fashion that would have invited ridicule, were not such great issues and so many lives at stake. pull off a stunt like that?" Why not, indeed? This first American success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to recklessness, which would characterise almost every j.a.panese action in those days. However gloomy were Kurita and his officers about the operation they had undertaken, it is extraordinary that they spurned elementary precautions. j.a.panese behaviour suggested a resignation to death much stronger than the will to fight. In this t.i.tanic clash, a once-great navy was to conduct itself in a fashion that would have invited ridicule, were not such great issues and so many lives at stake.

It was now plain to the Americans that Kurita's ships were headed for the San Bernardino Strait, at the north end of Samar Island. On reaching its eastern exit, they intended to turn south for the seven-hour run to Leyte Gulf, and MacArthur's invasion anchorage. The second j.a.panese squadron, under Admiral Shoji Nishimura, had also been spotted, steaming towards the same objective from the south, past Mindanao. Halsey dared not lead his own battleships into San Bernardino, which had been heavily mined by the j.a.panese. Instead, he ordered three fast carrier groups to close the range and launch air strikes. The j.a.panese, however, moved first. Three groups of fifty aircraft apiece, flying from Luzon, attacked the carriers of Sherman's Task Group 3. A long, bitter battle ensued. One h.e.l.lcat pilot, the famous Cmdr. David McCampbell, shot down nine j.a.panese planes, his wingman six; five other pilots claimed two each. McCampbell had initially been rejected for flight training back in 1933, because of poor eyesight. Yet the aggression indispensable to all fighter pilots made him one of the most successful of the navy's war. "It's compet.i.tive all the way268 through," he said wryly. On 24 October 1944, nearly all the prizes were won by the Americans. The j.a.panese attacking force was almost wiped out. through," he said wryly. On 24 October 1944, nearly all the prizes were won by the Americans. The j.a.panese attacking force was almost wiped out.

Just one Judy dive-bomber penetrated the American screen and landed a 550-pound bomb on the light carrier Princeton Princeton, crowded with planes preparing for take-off. Fuel caught fire, torpedoes exploded, hundreds of desperate men crowded the flight deck. At 1010, half an hour after the initial explosion, all crewmen save damage-control parties abandoned ship. The cruiser Birmingham Birmingham steamed close alongside to help fight steamed close alongside to help fight Princeton Princeton's fires, sending thirty-eight volunteers aboard the stricken carrier. A jeep and a tractor slid from Princeton Princeton's lofty deck onto the destroyer Morrison Morrison, which was taking off men while using machine guns to ward off sharks from survivors in the water. Princeton Princeton's agony continued for 21/2 hours, until a new j.a.panese air raid was signalled. Birmingham Birmingham temporarily stood off. After temporarily stood off. After Lexington Lexington's h.e.l.lcats broke up the attackers, however, the heroic cruiser closed in once more, and tried to take Princeton Princeton in tow. in tow.

A huge explosion in the carrier's torpedo stowage put an end to the salvage attempt, and inflicted shocking damage on Birmingham Birmingham. The ship's war diary recorded: "Dead, dying and wounded, many of them b.l.o.o.d.y and horrible, covered the decks...Blood ran freely down the waterways." The hulk of Princeton Princeton was sunk by American torpedoes. was sunk by American torpedoes. Birmingham Birmingham retired from the fleet, "a dockyard case." Amazingly, thanks to the courage and skill displayed aboard all the ships involved, only 108 men died and 190 were wounded. If this was a bitter morning for Halsey's TG3, it was also a time for pride. retired from the fleet, "a dockyard case." Amazingly, thanks to the courage and skill displayed aboard all the ships involved, only 108 men died and 190 were wounded. If this was a bitter morning for Halsey's TG3, it was also a time for pride.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 2325 October 1944

Third Fleet's first air strike fell upon Kurita's ships at 1026, followed by a second wave at 1245, another at 1550. Aboard a nearby American submarine, sailors eavesdropped on the airmen's radio chatter. One pilot interrupted his controller's instructions impatiently: "Let's get this over with269." Then there was a clamour of yells: "Yippee! I've got a battleship!" followed by: "All right, let the battleship alone. Line up on the cruiser." Kurita was now flying his flag in Yamato Yamato, in uneasy concourse with Ugaki, who commanded the battleship element from the same ship, and despised his superior. The admiral pleaded in vain with sh.o.r.e command for air support. This was refused, on the absurd grounds that fighters were more profitably engaged in attacking U.S. carriers. Here, once again, was the j.a.panese obsession with the inherent virtue of offensive action, matched by impatience with the humdrum requirements of defence. Kurita was obliged to watch, almost impotent, as American aircraft struck his ships again and again.

Avenger gunner Sherwin Goodman was quietly contemplating the sky amidst a huge formation of American aircraft when his thoughts were interrupted: "It was a beautiful day270...My goodness, what have we got here?" It was the Yamato Yamato group, far below them. The torpedo-carriers dropped and circled, to reach firing positions. Goodman rotated his turret forward, and could see only gun flashes from the enemy ships: "It looked like a tunnel of fire." At a thousand yards, they released their torpedo, the plane lifted, and Goodman cried at his pilot, "Break left! Break left!" Gazing down as they swung away, he exclaimed triumphantly: "We hit him!" Their victim was the light cruiser group, far below them. The torpedo-carriers dropped and circled, to reach firing positions. Goodman rotated his turret forward, and could see only gun flashes from the enemy ships: "It looked like a tunnel of fire." At a thousand yards, they released their torpedo, the plane lifted, and Goodman cried at his pilot, "Break left! Break left!" Gazing down as they swung away, he exclaimed triumphantly: "We hit him!" Their victim was the light cruiser Noshiro Noshiro, which sank almost immediately. Two American bombs caused slight damage to Yamato Yamato, giving Kurita another bad fright. His chief of staff was wounded by splinters.

Every gun in the j.a.panese fleet fired on the incoming Americans, yet achieved small success. Since 1942, U.S. ships had made great strides in countering air attack by radio fighter direction, radar-controlled gunnery and radio-guided proximity sh.e.l.l fuses. The j.a.panese had not begun to match such advances. Their anti-aircraft defences were woefully inadequate. "Our captain was a271 great gunnery enthusiast," said Petty Officer Kisao Ebisawa, who served on a warship through many U.S. air attacks. "He was always telling us that we could shoot the Americans out of the sky. After innumerable raids in which our guns did not even scratch their wings, he was left looking pretty silly. When air attacks came in, there was nothing much we could do but pray." great gunnery enthusiast," said Petty Officer Kisao Ebisawa, who served on a warship through many U.S. air attacks. "He was always telling us that we could shoot the Americans out of the sky. After innumerable raids in which our guns did not even scratch their wings, he was left looking pretty silly. When air attacks came in, there was nothing much we could do but pray."

On 24 October, huge "beehive" sh.e.l.ls from the battleships' main armament did more damage to their own gun barrels than to American planes, but pilots were shaken by the spectacle. "It's nerve-racking," said one, "because you see the guns on the ships go off. And then you wonder what in h.e.l.l you are going to do for the next ten or fifteen seconds while the sh.e.l.l gets there." Amid the erupting black puffb.a.l.l.s in the sky, again and again American torpedo-and bomb-carrying aircraft got through unscathed.

The j.a.panese navy's Lt. Cmdr. Haruki Iki commanded a squadron of Jill torpedo-bombers, based at Clark Field on Luzon. On the twenty-fourth, entirely ignorant of Shogo, they were ordered to launch a "maximum effort" mission in search of the American carriers. They could carry sufficient fuel only to reach Third Fleet. Early afternoon found Iki leading his formation of eighteen aircraft north-east over the sea. They received their first intimation of the desperate drama of the Combined Fleet when they saw far below the battleship Musashi Musashi, under American attack. They had scarcely absorbed what was happening when h.e.l.lcats fell on them. A ma.s.sacre followed. As inexperienced pilots strove to jink out of American sights, within a matter of minutes fifteen j.a.panese planes were shot down. Two aircraft escaped back to Clark. Iki himself found refuge in cloud.

By the time he emerged, sky and sea were empty, his fuel exhausted. He turned south-east and ditched in shallow water a few hundred yards off the north sh.o.r.e of Leyte Island. He and his gunner stood on a wing waving at figures on the beach, who were plainly j.a.panese. Iki fired flares to attract attention. Eventually, a small boat approached. "We're navy!" cried Iki. "We're army," the occupants of the boat responded dourly. Familiar animosity between the two services a.s.serted itself. The soldiers were alarmed to perceive that the plane's torpedo had fallen from the fuselage, and lay menacingly on the bottom, a few feet below. They pointed: "Can't you do something about that thing?" "Like what?" demanded Iki crossly. Eventually the soldiers were persuaded to close in and rescue the airmen. Once ash.o.r.e, Iki begged the local commander to signal his base, report his survival, and provide him with transport to get back. No message was sent, and it was a week before he reached Clark. He arrived to find that a memorial parade had just been held for himself and the rest of his unit. His commander embraced him, back from the dead. "Somehow, I knew we hadn't seen the last of you," said the officer emotionally. With no planes and no crews, there was nothing more for them to do on Luzon. Iki was evacuated to Kyushu to organise a new squadron.

THE J j.a.pANESE PILOT was by no means the only airman to land "in the drink" that day. There was also, for instance, twenty-two-year-old Joseph Tropp from Cheltenham, Pennsylvania, gunner of a flak-stricken h.e.l.ldiver. As his air group faded away to the east after making its attack on Kurita's ships, Tropp was left bobbing alone in a dinghy-his pilot had been fatally injured when their plane ditched. He found himself in the path of the entire j.a.panese fleet. Their battleships did not deign to notice him, but when a destroyer pa.s.sed within fifty feet "a j.a.p sailor yelled was by no means the only airman to land "in the drink" that day. There was also, for instance, twenty-two-year-old Joseph Tropp from Cheltenham, Pennsylvania, gunner of a flak-stricken h.e.l.ldiver. As his air group faded away to the east after making its attack on Kurita's ships, Tropp was left bobbing alone in a dinghy-his pilot had been fatally injured when their plane ditched. He found himself in the path of the entire j.a.panese fleet. Their battleships did not deign to notice him, but when a destroyer pa.s.sed within fifty feet "a j.a.p sailor yelled272 and I could see others pouring out of their hatches talking, gesticulating. They lined up at the rail shaking their fists, yelling and laughing. One of them disappeared and came back with a rifle, and I was sure he intended to strafe me, but I could see and hear them yelling about something else that distracted their attention." More American aircraft were approaching, and Tropp was left to his own devices. After two days in the dinghy he landed on Samar, met guerrillas who delivered him to the Americans, and eventually returned to his carrier. and I could see others pouring out of their hatches talking, gesticulating. They lined up at the rail shaking their fists, yelling and laughing. One of them disappeared and came back with a rifle, and I was sure he intended to strafe me, but I could see and hear them yelling about something else that distracted their attention." More American aircraft were approaching, and Tropp was left to his own devices. After two days in the dinghy he landed on Samar, met guerrillas who delivered him to the Americans, and eventually returned to his carrier.

Far graver misfortunes now overtook Kurita. Cmdr. James McCauley, directing Third Fleet's torpedo-bombers, divided his planes between the three biggest j.a.panese ships. Musashi Musashi was struck nineteen times by torpedoes, seventeen times by bombs. This attack, declared pilot David Smith, was "absolutely beautiful was struck nineteen times by torpedoes, seventeen times by bombs. This attack, declared pilot David Smith, was "absolutely beautiful273. I've never seen anything like it...no bombs missed. The torpedo planes came in on a hammerhead attack, four on each bow, and you could see the wakes headed right for the bow. They all ran hot straight and normal, and exploded. Well, she stopped and burned like h.e.l.l, and when I left her about thirty minutes later the bow was flush with the water."

Yamato and and Nagato Nagato were also slightly hit. The heavy cruiser were also slightly hit. The heavy cruiser Myoko Myoko was obliged to turn for home with shaft damage. At 1930, the 67,123-ton behemoth was obliged to turn for home with shaft damage. At 1930, the 67,123-ton behemoth Musashi Musashi, each of its main turrets heavier than a destroyer, the huge gold imperial chrysanthemum still adorning its prow, rolled over and sank. Some 984 of its 2,287 crew perished-it was four hours before j.a.panese escorts addressed themselves to seeking survivors. Ugaki afterwards composed a haiku about the death of Musashi Musashi's captain, Rear-Admiral Toshihira Inoguchi. This ended winsomely: "Who can read the heart274 of an admiral brooding?" The weather-"Fair"-was the only aspect of 24 October about which Ugaki could bring himself to comment favourably in his diary. On this, "the first day of the decisive battle," he lamented how few American planes had been shot down. Anti-aircraft fire from Kurita's ships had accounted for only eighteen attackers. Inoguchi's last testament, scribbled as his ship foundered, recorded regret that he and his comrades had placed exaggerated faith in big ships and big guns. of an admiral brooding?" The weather-"Fair"-was the only aspect of 24 October about which Ugaki could bring himself to comment favourably in his diary. On this, "the first day of the decisive battle," he lamented how few American planes had been shot down. Anti-aircraft fire from Kurita's ships had accounted for only eighteen attackers. Inoguchi's last testament, scribbled as his ship foundered, recorded regret that he and his comrades had placed exaggerated faith in big ships and big guns.

Yet given the fact that Halsey's aircraft had been able to strike all day without interference from j.a.panese fighters, the results were far less comprehensive than the Americans might have expected, and than their pilots claimed. Halsey wrote after the war: "The most conspicuous lesson learnt from this action is the practical difficulty of crippling by air strikes alone a task force of heavy ships at sea and free to maneuver." This is wholly unconvincing. Far more relevant was the fact that the American fliers started their battle tired, desperately tired, after days of intensive action. The carrier Bunker Hill Bunker Hill had already been detached to Ulithi because of the exhaustion of its air group, and other ships' pilots were in little better case. Fatigue diminished accuracy. A h.e.l.lcat commander, Lamade of had already been detached to Ulithi because of the exhaustion of its air group, and other ships' pilots were in little better case. Fatigue diminished accuracy. A h.e.l.lcat commander, Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k, was especially critical of the h.e.l.ldivers' performance during this period: "The dive-bombers are not hitting275 what they're aiming at-I don't think they're aiming at all." An a.n.a.lysis of one air group's operations on 24 October concluded: "Too many targets were attacked what they're aiming at-I don't think they're aiming at all." An a.n.a.lysis of one air group's operations on 24 October concluded: "Too many targets were attacked276 scattering light damage to many ships...radio discipline must be improved." That day, only around 45 of 259 U.S. strike aircraft achieved hits. This fell far short of the best performances by carrier pilots in the autumn of 1944. Despite the sinking of scattering light damage to many ships...radio discipline must be improved." That day, only around 45 of 259 U.S. strike aircraft achieved hits. This fell far short of the best performances by carrier pilots in the autumn of 1944. Despite the sinking of Musashi Musashi, American sorties on 24 October were relatively unsuccessful.

Yet they were enough to shake Kurita. At 1400 that afternoon, the j.a.panese force reversed course away from the San Bernardino Strait. The admiral signalled to naval headquarters: "It is...considered advisable to retire temporarily beyond range of enemy air attack, and resume our operation when the actions of [other] friendly units permit." Whatever Kurita did thereafter, his force could no longer achieve its scheduled dawn rendezvous off Leyte Gulf with the southern j.a.panese squadron. Ash.o.r.e, the j.a.panese mood was already grim. One of the day's luckier men was Maj. Shoji Takahashi in Manila. When the Shogo squadrons sailed, the navy requested the presence of an army liaison officer, to sail aboard Musashi Musashi. Takahashi volunteered. He thought the trip sounded rather fun. That night, when South Asia Area Army learned that the great battleship and many of her crew lay on the sea bottom, the intelligence officer's colonel wagged a grim finger at him: "Lucky I wouldn't let you go277, isn't it?" Admiral Halsey, hearing his pilots' reports, was convinced that Third Fleet had achieved a decisive victory, that Kurita's force was broken and in retreat.

NISHIMURA'S "C" Force, comprising two old battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers, was absurdly weak for independent action. A further element of the Combined Fleet, Shima's small squadron, was pursuing the same route as Nishimura, but lagging hours behind him. It was as if the j.a.panese high command was offering its enemies a feast in successive courses, each scaled to fit American appet.i.tes, with convenient pauses for the cleansing of palates. As "C" Force began its long approach to Leyte Gulf from the south on the morning of the twenty-fourth, it suffered one ineffectual American air attack before Halsey's carriers moved north to address Kurita. Thereafter, it was plain to Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, commanding Seventh Fleet, screening the Leyte beachhead, that it would be up to his ships to dispose of Nishimura; and that the j.a.panese would traverse the Surigao Strait during darkness. "C" Force, comprising two old battleships, a heavy cruiser and four destroyers, was absurdly weak for independent action. A further element of the Combined Fleet, Shima's small squadron, was pursuing the same route as Nishimura, but lagging hours behind him. It was as if the j.a.panese high command was offering its enemies a feast in successive courses, each scaled to fit American appet.i.tes, with convenient pauses for the cleansing of palates. As "C" Force began its long approach to Leyte Gulf from the south on the morning of the twenty-fourth, it suffered one ineffectual American air attack before Halsey's carriers moved north to address Kurita. Thereafter, it was plain to Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, commanding Seventh Fleet, screening the Leyte beachhead, that it would be up to his ships to dispose of Nishimura; and that the j.a.panese would traverse the Surigao Strait during darkness.

Kinkaid was a fifty-six-year-old New Hampshireman who had spent much of his early service in battleships. He nursed some resentment that he had been removed by Halsey from a carrier group command earlier in the war, and was generally deemed a competent rather than an inspired officer. At 1215, he ordered every ship to prepare for a night engagement, signalling: "General situation: enemy aircraft278 and naval forces seem to be a.s.sembling...for an offensive strike against Leyte area...attack tonight by enemy striking group may occur after 1900. General plan: this force will destroy [by] gunfire at moderate ranges and by torpedo attack enemy surface forces attempting to enter Leyte Gulf through...Surigao Strait." and naval forces seem to be a.s.sembling...for an offensive strike against Leyte area...attack tonight by enemy striking group may occur after 1900. General plan: this force will destroy [by] gunfire at moderate ranges and by torpedo attack enemy surface forces attempting to enter Leyte Gulf through...Surigao Strait."

MacArthur demanded to be allowed to stay aboard the cruiser Nashville Nashville for the battle, and only under protest transferred his headquarters ash.o.r.e. The twenty-eight supply and command ships in San Pedro Bay were left to be screened by destroyers. Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, commanding the force of old battleships and cruisers providing bombardment support for Leyte, deployed these in line across the mouth of the strait to await the enemy. The five destroyers of Captain Jesse Coward's Squadron 54 took station ahead as a skirmishing force, supported by six further destroyers of Desron 24 and nine of Desron 56, in readiness to launch successive torpedo attacks. A swarm of little PT-boats patrolled still further forward, riding easily on the gla.s.sy sea. The PTs' first, unfortunate engagement involved an American plane: they shot down a night-flying "Black Cat" Catalina which was searching for Nishimura. for the battle, and only under protest transferred his headquarters ash.o.r.e. The twenty-eight supply and command ships in San Pedro Bay were left to be screened by destroyers. Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, commanding the force of old battleships and cruisers providing bombardment support for Leyte, deployed these in line across the mouth of the strait to await the enemy. The five destroyers of Captain Jesse Coward's Squadron 54 took station ahead as a skirmishing force, supported by six further destroyers of Desron 24 and nine of Desron 56, in readiness to launch successive torpedo attacks. A swarm of little PT-boats patrolled still further forward, riding easily on the gla.s.sy sea. The PTs' first, unfortunate engagement involved an American plane: they shot down a night-flying "Black Cat" Catalina which was searching for Nishimura.

The night was full of apprehension. Kinkaid, on his command ship Wasatch Wasatch in San Pedro anchorage, was dismayed to hear of a j.a.panese bombing raid on Tacloban, which detonated a fuel dump. The American battleships at the entrance to Surigao heavily outgunned Nishimura's squadron. Because they did not expect to engage enemy warships, however, they carried little armour-piercing ammunition. A night action was always chancy, especially against the j.a.panese. It was most unlikely that Nishimura's feeble force could break through Seventh Fleet, but a few lucky j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls might wreak havoc. in San Pedro anchorage, was dismayed to hear of a j.a.panese bombing raid on Tacloban, which detonated a fuel dump. The American battleships at the entrance to Surigao heavily outgunned Nishimura's squadron. Because they did not expect to engage enemy warships, however, they carried little armour-piercing ammunition. A night action was always chancy, especially against the j.a.panese. It was most unlikely that Nishimura's feeble force could break through Seventh Fleet, but a few lucky j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls might wreak havoc.

The battle began at 2236, as the little jungle-green-painted wooden PT-boats raced at twenty-four knots to launch the first attacks. One after another, amid foaming wakes and flickering j.a.panese searchlights, they strove to close the columns of advancing ships. Nishimura's secondary armament fired repeated salvoes at the fragile craft. In the course of skirmishes that lasted almost four hours, thirty boats fired torpedoes-and all missed. The PTs were the navy's special forces, chiefly employed for reconnaissance and rescue duty. Their torpedo training had been neglected. One craft was lost, three men killed. Nishimura's squadron surged on northwards.

The American destroyers fared better. These were almost new Fletcher Fletcher-cla.s.s ships, displacing 2,000 tons apiece. Their five-inch guns were irrelevant to a contest with capital ships. Coward ordered his turret crews to hold their fire, for muzzle flashes would only pinpoint them for the j.a.panese. It was the destroyers' torpedoes that mattered, launched from much stabler aiming platforms than the PT-boats, and capable of sinking anything. Even in darkness after the moon set just past midnight, visibility was better than two miles. The temperature on deck was eighty degrees, the heat below stifling. In combat information centres, anti-submarine sonars pinged monotonously. Five or six men crowded into the dark, sweaty s.p.a.ce behind or below each ship's bridge, dominated by an illuminated, gla.s.s-covered plot on which a pinpoint of light showed the ship's position. On American radar screens, the sea slugs that represented Nishimura's ships were closing fast.

As those with a view watched the PT-boat actions, the captain of one destroyer, Monssen Monssen, broadcast to his ship's company at general quarters: "To all hands. This is the captain. We are going into battle. I know each of you will do your duty. I promise that I will do my duty to you and for our country. Good luck to you, and may G.o.d be with us." The harshest predicament was not now that of men manning the upper decks, but that of hundreds more sweating in their flashproof denims and anti-flash hoods at switchboards and ammunition hoists, machinery controls and casualty stations below, where they could see nothing of events until a ghastly moment when explosives might rip through thin plate, blood and water mingle with twisted steel. Such images were vivid in the imaginations of most sailors, as they drank coffee and ate sandwiches through the interminable wait to engage.

Nishimura's column was led by four destroyers. His own flagship, the old battleship Yamashiro Yamashiro, followed, with Fuso Fuso and and Mogami Mogami at thousand-yard intervals behind. At 0240 at thousand-yard intervals behind. At 0240 McGowan McGowan reported "Skunk 184 degrees distant fifteen miles." Fifteen minutes later, j.a.panese lookouts glimpsed the distant enemy, but their huge searchlights failed to illuminate Coward's ships. Now the American destroyers began to close, thrashing down the twelve-mile-wide strait at thirty knots. Even with the j.a.panese slowed by an adverse current, Nishimura's ships and the Americans were approaching each other at better than fifty miles an hour. At 0258, with the j.a.panese in plain sight, Coward's squadron made protective smoke. He ordered the three ships in his own division: "Fire when ready." A few seconds after 0300, the Americans began loosing torpedoes at a range just short of 9,000 yards. To have gone closer, the destroyer leader believed, would have invited devastation from Nishimura's gunfire. A j.a.panese searchlight suddenly fixed reported "Skunk 184 degrees distant fifteen miles." Fifteen minutes later, j.a.panese lookouts glimpsed the distant enemy, but their huge searchlights failed to illuminate Coward's ships. Now the American destroyers began to close, thrashing down the twelve-mile-wide strait at thirty knots. Even with the j.a.panese slowed by an adverse current, Nishimura's ships and the Americans were approaching each other at better than fifty miles an hour. At 0258, with the j.a.panese in plain sight, Coward's squadron made protective smoke. He ordered the three ships in his own division: "Fire when ready." A few seconds after 0300, the Americans began loosing torpedoes at a range just short of 9,000 yards. To have gone closer, the destroyer leader believed, would have invited devastation from Nishimura's gunfire. A j.a.panese searchlight suddenly fixed Remey Remey in its dazzling glare, making its crew feel "like animals in a cage." The battleships began lighting the sky with star sh.e.l.ls, while striving in vain to hit American destroyers making a land speed approaching forty mph. In seventy-five seconds, twenty-seven torpedoes left their tubes. Coward swung hard to port, then zigzagged through their eight minutes of running time. At 0308, they heard a single explosion aboard a j.a.panese ship, probably in its dazzling glare, making its crew feel "like animals in a cage." The battleships began lighting the sky with star sh.e.l.ls, while striving in vain to hit American destroyers making a land speed approaching forty mph. In seventy-five seconds, twenty-seven torpedoes left their tubes. Coward swung hard to port, then zigzagged through their eight minutes of running time. At 0308, they heard a single explosion aboard a j.a.panese ship, probably Yamashiro Yamashiro.

The two ships of Coward's western group were much more successful. They fired at 0311, just as Nishimura ordered his ships to take evasive action, which turned them smartly into the tracks of the incoming torpedoes. McDermut McDermut achieved a remarkable feat, hitting three j.a.panese destroyers with a single salvo. One blew up immediately, a second began to sink, a third retired with the loss of her bow. Lt. Tokichi Ishii, forty-four-year-old achieved a remarkable feat, hitting three j.a.panese destroyers with a single salvo. One blew up immediately, a second began to sink, a third retired with the loss of her bow. Lt. Tokichi Ishii, forty-four-year-old279 engineer officer of engineer officer of Asugumo Asugumo, suddenly found paint peeling from the deckplates above his head, in the heat from fires. A series of explosions rocked the ship as American gunfire detonated their own torpedoes. He saw pressure gauges crack, telephone wires burn. Smoke poured into the engine room. As the men coughed and choked, they strove in vain to close hatches and shut off ventilators. Finally, as conditions became intolerable, Ishii ordered his men topside. On deck, they worked frantically to douse the fires-and at last succeeded. Returning to the engine room, at 0345 he reported to the bridge that the ship had regained power. He was just descending the ladder to return to his post when another American torpedo hit the ship. The blast catapulted him into the sea. He clung to a plank, watching the ship settle by the stern under renewed American sh.e.l.lfire. Ishii swam to a raft with difficulty, for his leg had been gashed wide open in the torpedo explosion. Hours later he was washed ash.o.r.e on Leyte, seized by guerrillas, and to his embarra.s.sment delivered alive to an American PT-boat.

A torpedo from Monssen Monssen hit hit Yamashiro Yamashiro, now crippled. The next American destroyer attack, by Squadron 24, probably achieved two hits. It is still disputed whether battleship gunfire or torpedoes were responsible, but what is certain is that the battleship Fuso Fuso, laid down in 1912, caught fire and broke in two after a huge explosion. Bewilderment persists about how readily such a huge ship succ.u.mbed, but senility plainly rendered it vulnerable. At 0335 the last American destroyer squadron engaged, urged to "Get the big boys!," of which only two were left, one damaged. The "tin cans'" moment had pa.s.sed, however. All Desron 56's torpedoes missed. Sh.e.l.ls from the American battleships and cruisers began to straddle the j.a.panese. One of Desron 24's torpedoes may have hit Yamashiro Yamashiro, but she was already racked by the fire of American fourteen-and sixteen-inch guns. Some naval officers later criticised the destroyers' performance in the Surigao Strait, a.s.serting that they erred in launching torpedoes 3,000 yards beyond optimum range. Technically, such strictures are valid. Torpedo-guidance technology was relatively unsophisticated. It required extraordinary luck and skill to score hits at distances of four or five miles, in the strong currents of the strait. But this was not a situation in which suicidal courage was needed. A close engagement would almost certainly have resulted in gratuitous American destroyer losses, when Nishimura's squadron was anyway doomed.

The American big ships sounded general quarters only at 0230, shortly before the flares of explosions from the destroyer actions became visible. A small black mess attendant who served belowdecks in Maryland Maryland's ammunition supply pleaded emotionally for a post where he could do some shooting: "I want to be on the guns-I know I can hit them good. I know I can I know I can." With a nice touch of human sympathy, he was posted to a 20mm mount. In the sh.e.l.l decks below the turrets, men shifted charges for the ships' slender supply of armour-piercing ammunition-the battleships carried mostly high-explosive projectiles for sh.o.r.e bombardment. Warrant gunners checked temperatures: precision was indispensable to accurate fire. "We didn't know too much, but like all sailors, we could sure speculate," said Lt. Howard Sauer, in the main battery plot high in the foretop of Maryland Maryland.

All the odds were with the Americans, but in Sauer's words, "We remembered the Hood Hood"-a 42,000-ton British battle cruiser which blew up in consequence of a single hit from the German Bismarck Bismarck in May 1941. They watched red tracers converging on the skyline, then heard the order to Oldendorf's battleships: "All bulldogs, execute turn three." Barely maintaining steerageway at five knots, they thus presented their flanks and full broadsides to the enemy. As Nishimura's ships closed within range, the vast turrets traversed. Gunners pleaded for the order to fire: "Shoot, shoot, shoot." One by one, main batteries reported readiness: "Right gun turret 2, loaded and laid," and so on. On the command "Commence firing," the chief fire controller in each turret touched his left trigger to sound a warning buzzer, prompting upper-deck crewmen to close eyes and m.u.f.fle ears. Then a right finger pressure prompted brilliant flashes, thunderous detonations: "On the way." Amid the concussions, Howard Sauer recalled, "we rode the mast in May 1941. They watched red tracers converging on the skyline, then heard the order to Oldendorf's battleships: "All bulldogs, execute turn three." Barely maintaining steerageway at five knots, they thus presented their flanks and full broadsides to the enemy. As Nishimura's ships closed within range, the vast turrets traversed. Gunners pleaded for the order to fire: "Shoot, shoot, shoot." One by one, main batteries reported readiness: "Right gun turret 2, loaded and laid," and so on. On the command "Commence firing," the chief fire controller in each turret touched his left trigger to sound a warning buzzer, prompting upper-deck crewmen to close eyes and m.u.f.fle ears. Then a right finger pressure prompted brilliant flashes, thunderous detonations: "On the way." Amid the concussions, Howard Sauer recalled, "we rode the mast280 as it lashed to and fro, just as a tree moves in a strong gale." as it lashed to and fro, just as a tree moves in a strong gale."

Jesse Oldendorf's flagship Louisville Louisville was so impatient to fire that the gunners failed to press the warning buzzer, causing the admiral to be temporarily blinded by muzzle flashes. He slipped into the cruiser's flag plot and gazed at the blips on the screen indicating Nishimura's ships. Soon, however, he became distracted by incessant voices echoing through the broadcast system, and returned to the flag bridge. The battleships fired their first rounds at 26,000 yards, the cruisers at 15,600. By an exquisite chance, four of the six capital ships under Oldendorf's command had been salvaged from the bottom of Pearl Harbor in the years following the "Day of Infamy." They were now deemed too old and slow to sail with Halsey, but three- was so impatient to fire that the gunners failed to press the warning buzzer, causing the admiral to be temporarily blinded by muzzle flashes. He slipped into the cruiser's flag plot and gazed at the blips on the screen indicating Nishimura's ships. Soon, however, he became distracted by incessant voices echoing through the broadcast system, and returned to the flag bridge. The battleships fired their first rounds at 26,000 yards, the cruisers at 15,600. By an exquisite chance, four of the six capital ships under Oldendorf's command had been salvaged from the bottom of Pearl Harbor in the years following the "Day of Infamy." They were now deemed too old and slow to sail with Halsey, but three-Tennessee, California California and and West Virginia West Virginia-were equipped with the latest fire-control radar, infinitely superior to anything the j.a.panese possessed. These monsters, taking their last bow in a contest between "ships of the line," fired sixty-nine, sixty-three and ninety-three rounds respectively from their main armament. The j.a.panese Vice-Admiral Ugaki281 once enquired sourly why, if battleships had become redundant as some people claimed, the Americans used so many. This night, they wreaked havoc. once enquired sourly why, if battleships had become redundant as some people claimed, the Americans used so many. This night, they wreaked havoc. Yamashiro Yamashiro, flying Nishimura's flag, was soon blazing brilliantly. The heavy cruiser Mogami Mogami turned to flee. At 0402 a hit on the bridge killed all her senior officers. She continued to steam, heavily on fire. Seven minutes later turned to flee. At 0402 a hit on the bridge killed all her senior officers. She continued to steam, heavily on fire. Seven minutes later Yamashiro Yamashiro capsized and sank, with the loss of the admiral and almost her entire crew. A cruiser and a destroyer, both badly hit, thus became the only survivors to escape. By contrast, three U.S. cruisers were straddled by j.a.panese fire, but no American heavy unit was. .h.i.t. At 0405, after just fourteen minutes, Oldendorf ordered his battleships to cease firing. He knew that the j.a.panese squadron was devastated, and was alarmed by reports of American destroyers in the target zone. capsized and sank, with the loss of the admiral and almost her entire crew. A cruiser and a destroyer, both badly hit, thus became the only survivors to escape. By contrast, three U.S. cruisers were straddled by j.a.panese fire, but no American heavy unit was. .h.i.t. At 0405, after just fourteen minutes, Oldendorf ordered his battleships to cease firing. He knew that the j.a.panese squadron was devastated, and was alarmed by reports of American destroyers in the target zone.

The night actions were not yet ended, however. Twenty miles behind the main j.a.panese force, Vice-Admiral Kiyohide Shima led a further squadron of three heavy cruisers and escorts. Its first casualty was the light cruiser Akub.u.ma Akub.u.ma, hit by a PT-boat torpedo aimed at a destroyer. At 0420, j.a.panese radar detected enemy ships, and Shima ordered his own captains to launch torpedoes. These were fired against the nearby Hibuson Islands, which survived undamaged, a nonsense that highlighted the pitiful limitations of j.a.panese radar. Shima then approached the two blazing parts of Fuso Fuso, and mistook them for separate ships. He was in no doubt, however, that disaster had befallen Nishimura. Turning south once more, he signalled naval headquarters: "This force has concluded its attack and is retiring from the battle area to plan subsequent action." Retreat merely presaged further humiliations. The cruiser Nachi Nachi collided with a fugitive from Nishimura's squadron, the burning collided with a fugitive from Nishimura's squadron, the burning Mogami Mogami. The two somehow limped away southwards. Mogami Mogami later suffered an American air attack, and was finished off with a j.a.panese torpedo. Another j.a.panese destroyer was sunk by land-based U.S. aircraft. later suffered an American air attack, and was finished off with a j.a.panese torpedo. Another j.a.panese destroyer was sunk by land-based U.S. aircraft.

As Oldendorf's force advanced slowly down the Surigao Strait, the Americans saw only two burning j.a.panese ships, together with survivors in the water, most of whom declined rescue. By dawn, the stem of Fuso Fuso was the sole visible relic of Nishimura's squadron. was the sole visible relic of Nishimura's squadron. Louisville Louisville catapulted a floatplane aloft, which reported no sign of enemy activity. It had been a ruthless slaughter, but this did not trouble Oldendorf. "Never give a sucker catapulted a floatplane aloft, which reported no sign of enemy activity. It had been a ruthless slaughter, but this did not trouble Oldendorf. "Never give a sucker282 an even break," he said laconically. Hiroshi Tanaka, a bedraggled aircraft mechanic from an even break," he said laconically. Hiroshi Tanaka, a bedraggled aircraft mechanic from Yamashiro Yamashiro who fell into American hands, observed bitterly that Nishimura had handled his squadron "more like a petty officer who fell into American hands, observed bitterly that Nishimura had handled his squadron "more like a petty officer283 than an admiral." It is hard to disagree, and even harder to conceive of any other outcome of such an ill-matched encounter. Oldendorf made no attempt to pursue the surviving j.a.panese, urging Kinkaid to put carrier aircraft on the case. He had fulfilled his own executioner's role. Just one j.a.panese heavy cruiser, together with five destroyers, reached home. The Leyte anchorage seemed safe. American casualties from the Surigao Strait action numbered 39 killed and 114 wounded, almost all of these inflicted by "friendly fire" on the destroyer than an admiral." It is hard to disagree, and even harder to conceive of any other outcome of such an ill-matched encounter. Oldendorf made no attempt to pursue the surviving j.a.panese, urging Kinkaid to put carrier aircraft on the case. He had fulfilled his own executioner's role. Just one j.a.panese heavy cruiser, together with five destroyers, reached home. The Leyte anchorage seemed safe. American casualties from the Surigao Strait action numbered 39 killed and 114 wounded, almost all of these inflicted by "friendly fire" on the destroyer Grant Grant, which had disobeyed orders to hug the sh.o.r.e when the American heavy guns opened fire.

What else could the j.a.panese conceivably have expected? The action's outcome reflected strategic folly, technological weakness and tactical incompetence. The Americans deployed overwhelming firepower under almost ideal circ.u.mstances. They were able to array their big ships broadside so that every gun could bear. The obliging enemy, who could use only his forward turrets, headed into the crossbar of Oldendorf's T. As dawn came on 25 October, America's veteran battleships could retire from the history of fleet warfare, having written a last memorable page. Yet the most bizarre action of Leyte Gulf was still to come.

2. The Ordeal of Taffy

JUST BEFORE sunset on the previous evening of the twenty-fourth, Admiral Kurita's fleet had turned once more towards the San Bernardino Strait, goaded by a signal from commander-in-chief Admiral Soemu Toyoda: "All forces will resume the attack sunset on the previous evening of the twenty-fourth, Admiral Kurita's fleet had turned once more towards the San Bernardino Strait, goaded by a signal from commander-in-chief Admiral Soemu Toyoda: "All forces will resume the attack284, having faith in divine providence." A staff officer muttered cynically: "All forces will resume the attack, having faith in annihilation." Through the darkness, the j.a.panese pressed on eastwards, at every moment expecting to encounter American submarines. At first light, as they pa.s.sed into open sea east of the Philippines, they waited grimly for a sighting of planes or ships from Halsey's Third Fleet, which would signal their doom. After intercepting a signal from a surviving destroyer, they knew that Nishimura's squadron had been destroyed: "All ships except Shigure Shigure lost to gunfire and torpedoes." Yet the minutes pa.s.sed, and the horizon ahead of Kurita remained empty. Halsey's ships, the greatest a.s.sembly of naval might in the world, were not there. The American admiral had committed one of the most astonishing blunders of the war at sea. lost to gunfire and torpedoes." Yet the minutes pa.s.sed, and the horizon ahead of Kurita remained empty. Halsey's ships, the greatest a.s.sembly of naval might in the world, were not there. The American admiral had committed one of the most astonishing blunders of the war at sea.

Kurita has been so fiercely criticised for faintheartedness on the afternoon of 24 October, when he turned back, that the obvious point is sometimes missed: had the j.a.panese admiral maintained his course into the San Bernardino Strait, Halsey's aircraft would have renewed their a.s.saults at dawn. American battleships would have awaited him as he approached the eastern exit. His fleet's destruction would have been inevitable. As it was, luck and American rashness offered Kurita a remarkable opportunity.

William "Bull" Halsey was the sixty-one-year-old son of a naval officer, a man of fierce pa.s.sions whom wartime propaganda, a talent for quotable bombast and an unfailing eagerness to engage the enemy had made a national hero. Cla.s.smates at Annapolis used to say that he looked like a figurehead of Neptune, with his big head, heavy jaw and customary scowl. Single-mindedly devoted to the sea, he had no hobbies and no apparent interest in personal matters. Though he was obsessively neat and immaculately dressed afloat, ash.o.r.e his wife found him clumsy: "If a man has a nervous wife285 he wants to get rid of, all he has to do is send for you. Five minutes after you've come in, b.u.mping into sofas and knocking over chairs, she'll be dead of heart failure." His domestic life was notably dysfunctional. Like MacArthur, though in a very different, cruder fashion, Halsey acted and talked the warrior's part: "I never trust a fighting man who doesn't drink or smoke!" He cherished in his cabin a magnificent western saddle presented by an admirer, to a.s.sist fulfilment of the admiral's promise that he would one day ride Hirohito's white horse through Tokyo. Nimitz remarked that when he sent Spruance out with the fleet, "he was always sure he wants to get rid of, all he has to do is send for you. Five minutes after you've come in, b.u.mping into sofas and knocking over chairs, she'll be dead of heart failure." His domestic life was notably dysfunctional. Like MacArthur, though in a very different, cruder fashion, Halsey acted and talked the warrior's part: "I never trust a fighting man who doesn't drink or smoke!" He cherished in his cabin a magnificent western saddle presented by an admirer, to a.s.sist fulfilment of the admiral's promise that he would one day ride Hirohito's white horse through Tokyo. Nimitz remarked that when he sent Spruance out with the fleet, "he was always sure286 he would bring it home; when he sent Halsey out, he did not know precisely what was going to happen." Halsey's boldness was in doubt seldom, his judgement and intellect often. he would bring it home; when he sent Halsey out, he did not know precisely what was going to happen." Halsey's boldness was in doubt seldom, his judgement and intellect often.

For four days, Vice-Admiral Jizaburo Ozawa had been flaunting his presence more than two hundred miles north of the U.S. Third Fleet. His carriers had only 116 aircraft, half their complement. On the morning of the twenty-fourth he launched seventy-six of these on a notably ineffectual strike against Halsey's ships. The surviving planes landed on Luzon, having achieved their only serious purpose, that of attracting American attention. Late in the afternoon, a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft at last sighted Ozawa's squadron. Halsey's reaction perfectly fulfilled j.a.panese hopes. He turned north to engage the empty carriers with every unit at his disposal. "As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait," he told Nimitz and MacArthur afterwards, attempting to justify his decision, "I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the North Force at dawn. I believed that [Kurita's] Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet."

To the day of his death, Halsey never acknowledged that he had allowed himself to be fooled. On the map of the Leyte Gulf battle in his post-war memoirs, Ozawa's carriers are unequivocally identified as "j.a.panese main force." Halsey considered that Kurita's squadron had been crippled and repulsed by his aircraft on the twenty-fourth. American pilots' reports suggested that four battleships were sailing with Ozawa's carriers. Halsey chose wilfully to ignore overnight reports that Kurita was once again heading into San Bernardino. He wrote later, in self-exculpation: "It was not my job to protect287 the Seventh Fleet. My job was offensive, and we were even then rushing to intercept a force which gravely threatened not only Kinkaid and myself, but the whole Pacific strategy." Rear-Admiral Robert Carney, Halsey's chief of staff, said: "With the conviction that Center Force the Seventh Fleet. My job was offensive, and we were even then rushing to intercept a force which gravely threatened not only Kinkaid and myself, but the whole Pacific strategy." Rear-Admiral Robert Carney, Halsey's chief of staff, said: "With the conviction that Center Force288 had been so heavily damaged that although they could still steam and float they could not fight to best advantage, it was decided to turn full attention to the still untouched and very dangerous carrier force to the north." had been so heavily damaged that although they could still steam and float they could not fight to best advantage, it was decided to turn full attention to the still untouched and very dangerous carrier force to the north."

Halsey could argue that some intelligence a.s.sessments still credited the j.a.panese carrier force with far more formidable air capability than it possessed. Yet this does not explain his most culpable error of all: failure to ensure that Kinkaid and Nimitz understood that he was steaming away from Leyte with everything he had, soon putting the Philippines battlefield beyond range of his aircraft or battleship guns. Claims have been made that he believed a signal had been sent to San Pedro and Pearl, and that fault for its non-transmission lay with his staff. This is unconvincing. It is much easier to believe that Halsey simply acted recklessly, in pursuit of glory and a decisive victory. In almost three years of war, both sides had become obsessed with the importance of carriers, decisive units of Pacific combat. Shrewd intelligence a.n.a.lysts at Pearl had reported that, almost stripped of aircraft and deck-qualified pilots, Ozawa's ships were now mere hulks. They even suggested that these might be sacrificed as decoys.

Halsey spurned such a.s.sessments. He displayed a hubris unsurprising, perhaps, in a navy that now dominated the Pacific theatre. He ignored the fact that Kurita's ships, wherever they were, represented the most formidable naval force left to the enemy. Victory at Midway in 1942 had been achieved when Halsey was sick, and the much more measured Spruance commanded the U.S. fleet. Now, Spruance was ash.o.r.e, and Halsey enjoyed full scope to blunder. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, essentially an amphibious support force, was left unshielded and oblivious in the path of Kurita. Even had Oldendorf's old battleships been in sight east of Leyte, rather than in the Surigao Strait, Seventh Fleet would have been dangerously outgunned by the j.a.panese.

The morning of 25 October found Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague's sixteen escort carriers, mustered in three task groups designated as Task Forces-"Taffies"-1, 2 and 3, cruising in their usual operating areas, some forty miles apart and about the same distance east of Leyte. For the ships' crews, service with Seventh Fleet offered none of the glamour of offensive action under Halsey or Spruance. When one of the carriers' escorting destroyers, Johnston Johnston, was commissioned twelve months earlier, only 7 of its 331 officers and men had previous sea experience. The crew had since learned much about working their ship, but enjoyed precious little glory. "Well, Hagen," sighed Ernest Evans, Johnston Johnston's captain, to his gunnery officer, "it's been an uneventful year." He was bitterly disappointed to have missed the Surigao Strait action, which his excited radio operators had eavesdropped on.

Escort carriers, workhorses of the war at sea, were crude floating runways, most converted from tankers and merchantmen. Their cla.s.s acronym, CVE, was alleged by cynics to stand for "Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable." They lacked the defensive armament, aircraft capacity and speed of purpose-built fleet carriers four times their tonnage. They were intended only to provide local air support, in this case for the Leyte Gulf amphibious armada and MacArthur's soldiers ash.o.r.e. Each carried twelve to eighteen obsolescent Wildcat fighters and eleven or twelve Avenger torpedo and bomber aircraft. The previous day, the fighters had accounted for some twenty-four j.a.panese aircraft over Leyte.

That morning, Taffy 3's five carriers, three destroyers and four destroyer escorts had just secured from routine pre-dawn general quarters. It was the midst of the most unpopular watch of the day, 4 to 8 a.m., when, in the words of a jaundiced Pacific sailor, "the morning sun289 would be looking like a b.l.o.o.d.y bubble in a peepot." Most crews had gone to breakfast as the ships turned into the north-east wind and prepared to fly off the first sorties of the day. Lookouts suddenly reported anti-aircraft fire north-westwards, and radio rooms a gabble of j.a.panese voices flooding the ether. At 0647, in what one captain called "a rather frantic voice transmission," an anti-submarine-patrol pilot announced that four j.a.panese battleships, eight cruisers and accompanying destroyers were just twenty miles from Taffy 3. Momentarily, its commander, Rear-Admiral Clifton "Ziggy" Sprague-confusingly, two unrelated Admiral Spragues were off Leyte that day-believed these must be Halsey's ships. Then the Americans saw paG.o.da masts, and at 0658 the j.a.panese opened fire. would be looking like a b.l.o.o.d.y bubble in a peepot." Most crews had gone to breakfast as the ships turned into the north-east wind and prepared to fly off the first sorties of the day. Lookouts suddenly reported anti-aircraft fire north-westwards, and radio rooms a gabble of j.a.panese voices flooding the ether. At 0647, in what one captain called "a rather frantic voice transmission," an anti-submarine-patrol pilot announced that four j.a.panese battleships, eight cruisers and accompanying destroyers were just twenty miles from Taffy 3. Momentarily, its commander, Rear-Admiral Clifton "Ziggy" Sprague-confusingly, two unrelated Admiral Spragues were off Leyte that day-believed these must be Halsey's ships. Then the Americans saw paG.o.da masts, and at 0658 the j.a.panese opened fire.

It was one of the great surprise attacks of the war. Despite all the technological might of the U.S. Navy, Kurita's ships had been able to sail almost 150 miles in seven hours, unnoticed by the Americans. Human eyes detected them before radar did. Admiral King, in Washington, blamed Kinkaid for failing to watch Kurita's movements. It can certainly be suggested that the admiral could have spared a few search planes of his own to monitor Kurita's movements alongside Halsey's aircraft. Richard Frank persuasively argues that, with the j.a.panese known to be at sea, Kinkaid should also have moved his Taffies further from San Bernardino.

Yet it seems impossible to dispute the fundamental point, that dealing with Kurita was Halsey's responsibility. Seventh Fleet was nicknamed, somewhat derisively, "MacArthur's private navy." Kinkaid's mission was to support Sixth Army. "Halsey's job290," said Kinkaid later, "was to keep the j.a.panese fleet off of our necks while we were doing this." Halsey had already engaged Kurita, and possessed overwhelming firepower for the purpose. Kinkaid knew that Halsey had gone in pursuit of Ozawa, but it never occurred to him that he had taken his entire force. Given the strength of Third Fleet, there were ample heavy units for some to have guarded against the j.a.panese battle squadron-yet none was left behind. This, although on the night of the twenty-fourth Halsey was told that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardino. Here were the painful consequences of divided command. Halsey was answerable to Nimitz, Kinkaid to MacArthur. At Leyte Gulf, failure to appoint an overall supreme commander for the Pacific theatre came closer than at any other time to inflicting a disaster on American arms.

Sprague and his officers, confronted by an array of impossibly mighty enemy ships, almost twice as fast as their own carriers, believed they faced a ma.s.sacre as surely as any wagon train surprised by Sioux: "That sonofab.i.t.c.h Halsey has left us bare-a.s.sed!" exclaimed the admiral. "Our captain announced291 on the PA that the whole j.a.panese fleet was attacking Taffy 3," wrote Walter Burrell, a medical officer on on the PA that the whole j.a.panese fleet was attacking Taffy 3," wrote Walter Burrell, a medical officer on Suwanee Suwanee with Taffy 1. "I looked out on the forecastle and sure enough it looked like there were a hundred ships on the horizon." The nearest American heavy units were those of Jesse Oldendorf, sixty-five miles south. This represented almost three hours' steaming, an eternity in such circ.u.mstances. It was vividly apparent that the fate of Taffy 3 would be settled long before American big ships could reach the scene. with Taffy 1. "I looked out on the forecastle and sure enough it looked like there were a hundred ships on the horizon." The nearest American heavy units were those of Jesse Oldendorf, sixty-five miles south. This represented almost three hours' steaming, an eternity in such circ.u.mstances. It was vividly apparent that the fate of Taffy 3 would be settled long before American big ships could reach the scene.

Yet Kurita, in his turn, was shocked-and wildly deceived. He had supposed that no significant American naval force lay between himself and Leyte Gulf, that his course was open to ravage Kinkaid's amphibious armada. A first glimpse of Sprague's ships persuaded him that he faced Halsey's Third Fleet and its huge carriers. Rather than organise a concerted movement led by his destroyers, he ordered a general attack, every j.a.panese ship for itself. In four columns, Kurita's squadron began to close on Sprague's task group, firing as they came. A cl.u.s.ter of pilots in a carrier ready room was broken up by the entry of an officer who said: "The j.a.p fleet's after us." This was received with disbelief. "Everybody was laughing and joking, couldn't believe it," said an aviator whose plane was unserviceable. "We went up on the flightdeck292 and about half an hour later, we began to hear things whistling and dropping astern of us, which turned out to be sixteen-inch sh.e.l.ls. It was a kind of funny feeling to be on deck when you're under attack and don't have anything to fly." and about half an hour later, we began to hear things whistling and dropping astern of us, which turned out to be sixteen-inch sh.e.l.ls. It was a kind of funny feeling to be on deck when you're under attack and don't have anything to fly."

Sprague's ships laboured to increase speed to 171/2 knots and open the range, making smoke while sustaining an easterly course so that they could fly off aircraft. Rear-Admiral Felix Stump of Taffy 2 tried to rea.s.sure Sprague on voice radio: "Don't be alarmed, Ziggy-remember, we're back of you-don't get excited-don't do anything rash!" Yet Stump's tone conveyed his own dismay, and his words were unconvincing. Taffy 2 possessed no more firepower than Taffy 3. Sprague's six carriers were arrayed in a rough circle, with the destroyers beyond. In the first four minutes of action, knots and open the range, making smoke while sustaining an easterly course so that they could fly off aircraft. Rear-Admiral Felix Stump of Taffy 2 tried to rea.s.sure Sprague on voice radio: "Don't be alarmed, Ziggy-remember, we're back of you-don't get excited-don't do anything rash!" Yet Stump's tone conveyed his own dismay, and his words were unconvincing. Taffy 2 possessed no more firepower than Taffy 3. Sprague's six carriers were arrayed in a rough circle, with the destroyers beyond. In the first four minutes of action, White Plains White Plains was straddled four times by fifteen-inch gunfire. Her crew were fascinated by the vari-dyed water plumes, designed to enable j.a.panese gunners to distinguish each ship's salvoes: "They're shooting at us in Technicolor!" By a twist of fortune, a heavy rain squall now swept across the sea. For fifteen important minutes this masked the American ships from the j.a.panese, who were obliged to resort to radar-directed fire. Kurita signalled triumphantly home that his squadron had sunk a heavy cruiser. Yet so poor was j.a.panese fire control that at this stage their guns had hit nothing at