THE MEN who fought for j.a.pan displayed a courage and capacity for suffering which bewildered and sometimes terrified their opponents. The British general Sir William Slim called the j.a.panese soldier "the most formidable fighting insect who fought for j.a.pan displayed a courage and capacity for suffering which bewildered and sometimes terrified their opponents. The British general Sir William Slim called the j.a.panese soldier "the most formidable fighting insect71 in history," a phrase characteristic of the mood of his period. A British officer who thought better of j.a.panese rankers than of their commanders called them "first-cla.s.s soldiers in history," a phrase characteristic of the mood of his period. A British officer who thought better of j.a.panese rankers than of their commanders called them "first-cla.s.s soldiers72 in a third-cla.s.s army," which seems fair. Their virtues owed something to national culture, and even more to an ethos ruthlessly promoted from the top. Like the Waffen SS, many j.a.panese army officers were recruited from lower-middle-cla.s.s backgrounds. They achieved in uniform a social status denied to them in civilian life, and paraded this in similar fashion. in a third-cla.s.s army," which seems fair. Their virtues owed something to national culture, and even more to an ethos ruthlessly promoted from the top. Like the Waffen SS, many j.a.panese army officers were recruited from lower-middle-cla.s.s backgrounds. They achieved in uniform a social status denied to them in civilian life, and paraded this in similar fashion.

From the day that a man joined the j.a.panese army or navy, he was subjected to conditioning more brutal even than that of the Russians. Physical punishment was fundamental. When Souhei Nakamura set off to report to his recruit depot in Manchuria, he carried a big flask of sake sake which his girlfriend had given him as a parting present. In a train otherwise crowded with Chinese, he fell into conversation with two j.a.panese soldiers. He told them about his which his girlfriend had given him as a parting present. In a train otherwise crowded with Chinese, he fell into conversation with two j.a.panese soldiers. He told them about his sake sake. "You'd better not turn up at the barracks with that," they said knowingly, "or you'll be in real trouble." The three of them drained the flask. The soldiers slumped into happy unconsciousness, the boy stumbled out to seek fresh air at a window. He returned to find his baggage stolen by Chinese pa.s.sengers. Reporting to his barracks, he was foolish enough to relate his experience to an NCO, who thrashed him on the spot. From that day, Nakamura hated military life. His view is a useful corrective for those who suppose that every j.a.panese recruit was eager to die for the emperor. "I thought of joining the army73 simply as a one-way ticket to the Yasukuni Shrine," he said laconically. Yasukuni is dedicated to those who fall in the service of the emperor. simply as a one-way ticket to the Yasukuni Shrine," he said laconically. Yasukuni is dedicated to those who fall in the service of the emperor.

The first year of military service was notoriously dreadful. "Personality ceased to exist74, there was only rank," said Masaichi Kikuchi. "You became the lowest of the low, condemned to cook, clean, drill and run from dawn to dusk. You could be beaten for anything-being too short or too tall, even because somebody didn't like the way you drank coffee. This was done to make each man respond instantly to orders, and it produced results. If you want soldiers who fight hard, they must train hard. This was the system which made the j.a.panese army so formidable-each man was schooled to accept unquestioningly the orders of his group leader-and then took over a new recruit intake to boss around himself. Isn't that the way it is in every army?" Lt. Hayashi Inoue said: "The first year as a recruit75 was a terrible time for everyone. It was just something you had to get through, and accept. Most of our men were very simple, innocent, poorly educated fishermen, peasants and suchlike. They had to be taught the meaning of discipline." On border duty in Manchuria, Private Shintaro Hiratsuka was. .h.i.t in the face by a sergeant for losing his overcoat. This caused him to become disaffected, and to embark on a career of petty theft. Caught and beaten again, he deserted, was arrested and executed. was a terrible time for everyone. It was just something you had to get through, and accept. Most of our men were very simple, innocent, poorly educated fishermen, peasants and suchlike. They had to be taught the meaning of discipline." On border duty in Manchuria, Private Shintaro Hiratsuka was. .h.i.t in the face by a sergeant for losing his overcoat. This caused him to become disaffected, and to embark on a career of petty theft. Caught and beaten again, he deserted, was arrested and executed.

The NCO commanding Iwao Ajiro's recruit detail disliked bruising his hand by beating offenders himself, and thus ordered them to beat each other. At first they did so without enthusiasm, causing the sergeant to shout in fury: "You are soldiers76 of the Imperial j.a.panese Army! When you hit a man, do it as if you mean it!" Once, after Ajiro missed a meal because he was running round the parade ground to atone for some crime, he crept into the cookhouse to claw a few mouthfuls of rice by hand from the pan-and was caught by his NCO. "You're a pig!" the man roared. "Get down on your knees and behave like one!" Ajiro was obliged to crawl across the messroom floor, snorting and snuffling. On another occasion, clearing his rifle in darkness in the midst of a Manchurian winter wilderness, he dropped a bullet. When he reported to the guardroom, his sergeant screamed: "You have lost valuable army property! You will stay out there until you find that bullet!" If such behaviour reflected a psyche common to most armies, the j.a.panese carried it to extremes unknown elsewhere. of the Imperial j.a.panese Army! When you hit a man, do it as if you mean it!" Once, after Ajiro missed a meal because he was running round the parade ground to atone for some crime, he crept into the cookhouse to claw a few mouthfuls of rice by hand from the pan-and was caught by his NCO. "You're a pig!" the man roared. "Get down on your knees and behave like one!" Ajiro was obliged to crawl across the messroom floor, snorting and snuffling. On another occasion, clearing his rifle in darkness in the midst of a Manchurian winter wilderness, he dropped a bullet. When he reported to the guardroom, his sergeant screamed: "You have lost valuable army property! You will stay out there until you find that bullet!" If such behaviour reflected a psyche common to most armies, the j.a.panese carried it to extremes unknown elsewhere.

During j.a.pan's war in China, the practices of conducting bayonet training on live prisoners, and of beheading them, became inst.i.tutionalised. Such experiences were designed to harden men's hearts, and they achieved their purpose. A South African prisoner of the j.a.panese on Java wrote: "I saw innumerable ways of killing people77, but, most significantly, never by just shooting them. I say 'significantly' because this for me was the most striking evidence of the remote and archaic nature of the forces which had invaded the j.a.panese spirit, blocking out completely the light of the twentieth-century day."

Naval discipline was little less brutal. On the seaplane carrier Akitsushima Akitsushima, Leading Seaman Kisao Ebisawa was a senior rating charged with administering punishment at the weekly disciplinary muster. He beat the backsides of green seamen with a heavy stave employed throughout the service for this purpose, "to sharpen them up." Five strokes were customary. "After dealing with a score or two78 of men," said Ebisawa ruefully, "one's wrist got pretty stiff." When a destroyer's cutter of men," said Ebisawa ruefully, "one's wrist got pretty stiff." When a destroyer's cutter79 rescuing survivors from a sunken battleship threatened to be swamped by struggling figures seeking to clamber aboard, those in the boat simply drew their swords and hacked off the hands of would-be intruders, j.a.panese like themselves. rescuing survivors from a sunken battleship threatened to be swamped by struggling figures seeking to clamber aboard, those in the boat simply drew their swords and hacked off the hands of would-be intruders, j.a.panese like themselves.

Twenty-three-year-old Lt. Kunio Iwas.h.i.ta hailed from the mountain area of Nagano, where his father rather implausibly kept a French restaurant. To become naval officers, he and his brother had to overcome official doubts about whether scions of such a trade were socially eligible. The Iwas.h.i.tas defeated prejudice by pa.s.sing out at the top of their courses, including flight school. Kunio's adored sibling died in 1942 at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, shot down after bombing the American carrier Hornet Hornet. His own entry into combat was delayed by a long stint as an instructor, which probably contributed much to his survival. Iwas.h.i.ta had flown over four hundred hours before he was posted to Iwo Jima, where he experienced a savage initiation. The first nine Zeroes of his unit, 301 Squadron, flew the 750 miles from their mainland base at the beginning of July 1944. By the time Iwas.h.i.ta arrived next day, three pilots including the squadron commander had already been shot down.

Next day, though suffering acute stomach pains which were afterwards diagnosed as appendicitis, he was scrambled with his squadron to meet a new American strike, from which bombs were already cascading down on the airstrip. Airborne, Iwas.h.i.ta found himself behind a flight of four h.e.l.lcats, and poured fire into the rear plane. Its wing broke off. The j.a.panese saw the American pilot, wearing a white scarf, meet his own glance for an instant before the h.e.l.lcat plunged towards Mount Suribachi. The other Americans swung in pursuit of the Zero. Iwas.h.i.ta's plane was badly hit before he escaped. After killing his first enemy, his reactions were those of novice warriors of every nationality. He found himself speculating about the American's girlfriend, mother, last thoughts.

Just as the army possessed many reluctant soldiers, the air force had its share of pilots who flinched from combat. Iwas.h.i.ta acknowledged that every squadron was familiar with the odd man whose aircraft suffered chronic technical problems, or who found reasons to turn back before completing sorties. One such pilot on Iwo Jima was summarily transferred to an anti-aircraft battery, where he was killed by American strafing. Awareness swiftly dawned of the shortcomings of their own weapons and technology. Iwas.h.i.ta said: "When I became a pilot, I didn't think anything could be better than the Zero. I was confident that I was flying the best fighter in the world. In combat, however, I came to understand that it was not as simple as that. American pilots were very good, and had a lot of kit we didn't, like radio intercommunication." On one sortie over Iwo Jima, thirty-one Zeroes took off and only seventeen came back. Four such battles reduced Iwas.h.i.ta's Zero wing from thirty-eight pilots to ten. Soon afterwards, with no planes left for them to fly, the survivors returned to j.a.pan in a transport aircraft.

The life of a j.a.panese soldier was wretched enough before he entered combat. Many officers were shameless in allocating food to themselves even when their men were starving. A British historian has observed that the Imperial Army's frequent resort to rape reflected the fact that the status of women in j.a.pan was low, while those of subject peoples possessed no status at all: "Right was what a soldier80 was ordered to do; to disobey was to do wrong. There was no moral absolute to set this against...For the ordinary soldier, rape was one of the few pleasures in a comfortless and deprived life in which he could expect to reap very few of the spoils of war." was ordered to do; to disobey was to do wrong. There was no moral absolute to set this against...For the ordinary soldier, rape was one of the few pleasures in a comfortless and deprived life in which he could expect to reap very few of the spoils of war."

Hayashi Inoue's closest friend was a fellow company commander in the 55th Regiment named Kazue Nakamura. When Nakamura was killed in northern Burma, his second-in-command withdrew without having retrieved the body, a grievous offence against the military code. Instead of facing court-martial, however, the delinquent was simply a.s.signed missions on which he could expect to die. Inoue afterwards laughed at the memory: "It took ages for that man to get killed. Again and again, he was sent out-and came back. He got his deserts in the end, though." Inoue was a colonial administrator's son, drafted into the army in 1938 and commissioned in 1941. He accepted obedience without question: "If we were told to defend this position81 or that one, we did it. To fall back without orders was a crime. It was as simple as that. We were trained to fight to the end, and n.o.body ever discussed doing anything else. Looking back later, we could see that the military code was unreasonable. But at that time, we regarded dying for our country as our duty. If men had been allowed to surrender honourably, everybody would have been doing it." or that one, we did it. To fall back without orders was a crime. It was as simple as that. We were trained to fight to the end, and n.o.body ever discussed doing anything else. Looking back later, we could see that the military code was unreasonable. But at that time, we regarded dying for our country as our duty. If men had been allowed to surrender honourably, everybody would have been doing it."

If obedience was fundamental to the samurai spirit, the conduct of the j.a.panese high command was confused by the power and influence wielded by some younger staff officers of violently aggressive enthusiasms, empowered by political links to the top of the military hierarchy. These promoted the doctrine of "gekokujo"-initiative from below. The most notorious exponent was Col. Masan.o.bu Tsuji, a fanatic repeatedly wounded in action and repeatedly transferred by generals exasperated by his insubordination. Tsuji once burned down a geisha house to highlight his disgust at the moral frailty of the officers inside it. His excesses were responsible for some of the worst j.a.panese blunders on Guadalca.n.a.l. He was directly responsible for brutalities to prisoners and civilians in every part of the j.a.panese empire in which he served. In northern Burma, he dined off the liver of a dead Allied pilot, castigating as cowards those who refused to share his meal: "The more we eat, the brighter will burn the fire of our hatred for the enemy."

Gen. Sosaku Suzuki, who commanded the defence of Leyte, wrote bitterly: "It is the Ishiwara-Tsuji clique82-the personification of gekokujo gekokujo-that has brought the j.a.panese army to its present deplorable situation...I tell you, so long as they exert influence...it can only lead to ruin." Paradoxically, in a culture dominated by obedience, some militant junior army officers exercised political influence out of all proportion to their ranks. It was unacceptable for subordinates to display intelligent scepticism. They were constantly indulged, however, in excesses of aggression.

For every four tons of supplies the United States shipped to its ground forces in the Pacific, j.a.pan was able to transport to its own men just two pounds. A j.a.panese infantryman carried barely half the load of his American counterpart, because he lacked all but the most basic equipment. It is extraordinary to contemplate what j.a.panese troops achieved with so little. It became normal for them to fight in a condition of semi-starvation. Their wounded were chronically vulnerable to gangrene, because they possessed no anti-teta.n.u.s drugs. Signals equipment was never adequate, making it hard for units to communicate. Whereas U.S. and British armies were organised in balanced formations, composed of purpose-trained specialists-infantry, gunners, engineers and so on-in 194445 many j.a.panese positions were defended by improvised battle groups made up of whatever men could be provided with rifles and grenades. Service units, cooks, clerks were alike thrust into the line. In the circ.u.mstances, no great tactical skills were demanded of them. They were simply expected to fire their weapons, and die where they stood. The achievements of these patchwork j.a.panese forces matched or even surpa.s.sed those of Germany's battlegroups in Europe.

There were human similarities between Allied warriors and Hirohito's men which should not be neglected. A desperately wounded j.a.panese was as likely to cry out for his mother as any Marine or GI. It was a commonplace for j.a.panese soldiers starting an a.s.sault to say to each other: "See you at the Yasukuni Shrine." If this reflected genuine fatalism, most were no more enthusiastic than their Allied counterparts about meeting death. They had simply been conditioned to accept a different norm of sacrifice. Above all, a chasm existed between the two sides' att.i.tudes to captivity. American and British soldiers, sailors and airmen belonged to a culture in which it was considered natural and proper to surrender when armed resistance was no longer rationally sustainable. By contrast, it was driven into the psyche not only of every j.a.panese soldier, but of every citizen, that death must always be preferred. Gen. Hideki Tojo's Instructions for Servicemen Instructions for Servicemen proclaimed: "The man who would not disgrace himself must be strong. He must remember always the honour of his family and community, and strive to justify their faith in him. Do not survive in shame as a prisoner. Die, to ensure that you do not leave ignominy behind you!" proclaimed: "The man who would not disgrace himself must be strong. He must remember always the honour of his family and community, and strive to justify their faith in him. Do not survive in shame as a prisoner. Die, to ensure that you do not leave ignominy behind you!"

Among Tojo's people, surrender was deemed the most shameful act a man could commit, even if he was struggling in the sea after his ship had been sunk. Staff officer Maj. Shigeru Funaki a.s.serted that this culture was rooted in the experience of the 19045 Russo-j.a.panese War. "A lot of our men in that conflict83 surrendered when their positions seemed hopeless. The army became determined that such things should never happen again. If it was acknowledged as honourable to be taken prisoner, then many men would make that choice." A j.a.panese POW named Shiniki Saiki surrendered when their positions seemed hopeless. The army became determined that such things should never happen again. If it was acknowledged as honourable to be taken prisoner, then many men would make that choice." A j.a.panese POW named Shiniki Saiki84 told his American captors in the Pacific in September 1944, weeks before the word "kamikaze" was first heard: "All units are now considered to be suicide units." told his American captors in the Pacific in September 1944, weeks before the word "kamikaze" was first heard: "All units are now considered to be suicide units."

When American and British troops became familiar with the j.a.panese preference for self-immolation, by means often designed to encompa.s.s Allied deaths also, they grew unwilling to accept risk or trouble to take an enemy alive. "The understandable reluctance85 of our troops to trust any j.a.p no doubt contributes to the difficulty of inducing the enemy to surrender," wrote an Australian officer on New Guinea. It is sometimes alleged that Western barbarism thus matched that of their foes. Yet it is hard to see why an Allied soldier should have risked a grenade from a j.a.panese soldier who, even when he made gestures of surrender, rejected the Western code whereby a prisoner contracted to receive humane treatment in return for forswearing further homicidal intent. After episodes in which j.a.panese taken aboard American submarines sought to sabotage their captors' highly vulnerable craft, such rescues were abandoned. This was prudent. of our troops to trust any j.a.p no doubt contributes to the difficulty of inducing the enemy to surrender," wrote an Australian officer on New Guinea. It is sometimes alleged that Western barbarism thus matched that of their foes. Yet it is hard to see why an Allied soldier should have risked a grenade from a j.a.panese soldier who, even when he made gestures of surrender, rejected the Western code whereby a prisoner contracted to receive humane treatment in return for forswearing further homicidal intent. After episodes in which j.a.panese taken aboard American submarines sought to sabotage their captors' highly vulnerable craft, such rescues were abandoned. This was prudent.

Until j.a.panese began to give themselves up in substantial numbers in the summer of 1945, their surrenders were likely to be accepted only by units which needed sample prisoners for intelligence purposes. Those who reached POW camps, by choosing survival, showed themselves unrepresentative. They were nonetheless the Allies' best sources of information about the mood in the ranks of the enemy. "We poor soldiers have to sacrifice our lives and fight with Type-38 rifles against Boeings, Consolidated B24s, North Americans and Lightning P38s," said an embittered private soldier who surrendered to the Americans. In the safety of a POW camp in Australia, he described himself as a Christian and a Communist, and offered to a.s.sist his captors by writing "a Formal Examination of Myself86 as a j.a.panese...I wish to sound the alarm to awaken the j.a.panese people." Private Sanemori Saito, taken on Bougainville, a.s.serted that his commanding officer had gone mad, forcing the sick to report for duty, and sometimes calling parades at midnight. A construction unit officer captured while delirious with fever told his interrogators that "the j.a.panese possessed as a j.a.panese...I wish to sound the alarm to awaken the j.a.panese people." Private Sanemori Saito, taken on Bougainville, a.s.serted that his commanding officer had gone mad, forcing the sick to report for duty, and sometimes calling parades at midnight. A construction unit officer captured while delirious with fever told his interrogators that "the j.a.panese possessed87 a blind faith in their leaders. Even though the military clique started war, the people were wholeheartedly behind it...PW thought the nearer hostilities came to j.a.pan, the harder the people would fight." a blind faith in their leaders. Even though the military clique started war, the people were wholeheartedly behind it...PW thought the nearer hostilities came to j.a.pan, the harder the people would fight."

One strange figure whom Americans plucked from the sea proved to be a mixed-race soldier, only a quarter j.a.panese, christened Andrew Robb by his parents, Shigeru Sakai by the army into which he found himself conscripted. Robb hailed from Kobe, where he had been educated at the English mission school. When captured, he was on pa.s.sage to garrison duty as a sergeant interpreter in the Philippines. As an "impure j.a.panese" he claimed to have been victimised during recruit training, and was thus heartily grateful to be posted overseas. "His own reaction88 to j.a.pan's chances had varied. Originally he had not thought her capable of overcoming the industrial power of the British and Americans combined, but j.a.pan's earlier successes had led him to think that the Allies might be too involved in Europe to handle the situation in the Pacific." Robb said that he would like to inform his mother of his survival, but was fearful of "adverse public opinion" at home if his captivity became known. to j.a.pan's chances had varied. Originally he had not thought her capable of overcoming the industrial power of the British and Americans combined, but j.a.pan's earlier successes had led him to think that the Allies might be too involved in Europe to handle the situation in the Pacific." Robb said that he would like to inform his mother of his survival, but was fearful of "adverse public opinion" at home if his captivity became known.

This was a familiar sentiment among j.a.panese POWs. One suggested to his captors that the best means of encouraging defections would be, first, to avoid mention in Allied propaganda of the dreadful word "surrender" and, second, to offer those who quit post-war resettlement in Australia or Brazil. An aircrew lieutenant captured89 while foraging in New Guinea in July 1944 found himself the only officer prisoner among five hundred other ranks. Aboard the ship taking them to a camp in Australia, he told interrogators, some of his fellow captives proclaimed that they had a duty to kill themselves. The lieutenant, who disagreed, responded contemptuously that anyone who wanted to jump overboard was free to do so. He would promise to deliver farewell messages to their families. No one jumped. But the stigma of captivity hung over every j.a.panese who succ.u.mbed, often long after eventual return to their own country. In this respect, the military code served j.a.pan's rulers well. Without while foraging in New Guinea in July 1944 found himself the only officer prisoner among five hundred other ranks. Aboard the ship taking them to a camp in Australia, he told interrogators, some of his fellow captives proclaimed that they had a duty to kill themselves. The lieutenant, who disagreed, responded contemptuously that anyone who wanted to jump overboard was free to do so. He would promise to deliver farewell messages to their families. No one jumped. But the stigma of captivity hung over every j.a.panese who succ.u.mbed, often long after eventual return to their own country. In this respect, the military code served j.a.pan's rulers well. Without bushido bushido's terrible sanction of dishonour, in 194445 a host of j.a.panese would otherwise have given themselves up, rather than perish to prolong futile resistance. Refusal to face the logic of surrender was perhaps the most potent weapon j.a.panese forces possessed.

j.a.pan's military commanders varied as widely in character and competence as their Allied counterparts. Gen. Tokutaro Sakurai, for instance, conformed to every caricature of Allied imagination. He was a China veteran notorious for ruthlessness and brutality. As an accessory to his uniform, he affected around his neck a string of pearls. His off-duty party piece was to perform a Chinese dance naked, with lighted cigarettes flaring from his nostrils. Some other officers, however, were both rational and humane. Masaki Honda, who commanded 33rd Army against Stilwell in Burma, was a pa.s.sionate fisherman who often carried his rods in the field. A conscientious rather than gifted officer, he was among the few to show interest in the welfare of his men. He was fond of telling dirty stories to soldiers of all ranks. "Have you heard this one?" he would demand, already chuckling. He resisted a.s.signment to Burma on the grounds that supplies of his beloved sake sake would be precarious. would be precarious.

The Allies sometimes supposed that j.a.panese readily embraced jungle warfare. In truth most hated it, none more so than Honda. Like many of Tokyo's generals, he was personally brave and tactically competent, but displayed little imagination. He once bewildered the Chinese and Americans by dispatching a personal message to Chiang Kai-shek, expressing regret that their two countries were at war, and commiserating on China's casualties: "I have witnessed with admiration for six months the conduct of your brave soldiers in north Burma, and am very gratified to feel that they, like us, are Orientals. I would like to congratulate you on their loyalty and commitment."

Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi had managed a prison camp holding Germans in the First World War, and prided himself on its civilised standards. In May 1942 he formally protested at the executions of senior Philippine officials. Once on Guadalca.n.a.l, where his forces were starving, he had to dispatch a man on a dangerous reconnaissance mission. Kawaguchi pressed into the soldier's hand the only pathetic consolation he could offer, a tin of sardines which he himself had brought from j.a.pan. He was subsequently relieved of command, for denouncing the futility of sacrificing lives in impossible operations.

Dismissal was a common fate for senior officers who had either opposed starting the war against the Western Allies, or grown sceptical about the value of protracting it. Many thoughtful soldiers opposed j.a.pan's long, debilitating campaign in China. "We felt that it was a mistake90 to be there at all, that j.a.panese strategy was ill-considered," said Maj. Kouichi Ito, "but senior officers who expressed this view were overruled." Maj.-Gen. Masafumi Yamauchi commanded 15th Division in Burma, without disguising a predilection for Western life acquired during a posting in Washington. Yamauchi was a frail, gentle soul. A tuberculosis sufferer, he subsisted on a diet of milk, oatmeal and newly baked bread until dismissed shortly before his death. His last recorded p.r.o.nouncement about the war was "The whole thing's so silly to be there at all, that j.a.panese strategy was ill-considered," said Maj. Kouichi Ito, "but senior officers who expressed this view were overruled." Maj.-Gen. Masafumi Yamauchi commanded 15th Division in Burma, without disguising a predilection for Western life acquired during a posting in Washington. Yamauchi was a frail, gentle soul. A tuberculosis sufferer, he subsisted on a diet of milk, oatmeal and newly baked bread until dismissed shortly before his death. His last recorded p.r.o.nouncement about the war was "The whole thing's so silly91..."

Masaharu Homma, son of a wealthy landowner, was recognised as a brilliant soldier, notable for his eccentricities. A romantic, impulsive, pa.s.sionate man, in his off-duty hours he composed military songs and poems and was a familiar figure at Tokyo's smartest parties. As a young officer he made a disastrous marriage to a geisha's daughter named Toshiko, with whom he had two children. In 1919, while on an attachment in England, he received a cable from his mother announcing that his wife had become a professional courtesan. Consumed with misery, Homma invited a comrade, Hitoshi Imamura, to discuss his plight at the Sunrise restaurant high above London's West End. Inspired by liberal injections of whiskey, Homma suddenly said: "I don't want to go on living," and attempted to throw himself out of a window. Imamura restrained him. The story of two future j.a.panese army commanders wrestling in a London restaurant pa.s.sed into legend. Imamura told Homma he must get a divorce, but instead the general wrote to Toshiko pleading for a reconciliation. A senior officer wrote scathingly to the heartsick young man: "What a sorry spectacle92 you are making of yourself! Are you really a j.a.panese officer? If you take back your wife, everyone will laugh at you." Homma replied miserably: "I don't mind being laughed at. I just want her with me again." It was at Toshiko's insistence that the couple parted. The general subsequently married a much younger woman, Fujiko, whom he also came to adore. you are making of yourself! Are you really a j.a.panese officer? If you take back your wife, everyone will laugh at you." Homma replied miserably: "I don't mind being laughed at. I just want her with me again." It was at Toshiko's insistence that the couple parted. The general subsequently married a much younger woman, Fujiko, whom he also came to adore.

Homma led the 1942 a.s.sault on the Philippines. Despite j.a.pan's victory, he was deemed to have bungled the campaign. Most significant, and reflecting a chronic weakness of the j.a.panese army, he was castigated for exercising excessive initiative, and disobeying orders which he considered unrealistic. In consequence, he never received another field command, and in 194445 his considerable abilities were denied to his country. The 1942 conqueror of Malaya, Tomoyuki Yamas.h.i.ta, likewise languished in Manchuria until October 1944, because his freethinking found no favour with successive governments. Less able men, willing to obey without question even the most absurd instructions, held key postings. The indispensable qualification for high command was a willingness to fight heedless of circ.u.mstances, and to avow absolute faith in victory. The result was that by the summer of 1944, many of those charged with saving j.a.pan by their military endeavours possessed the hearts of lions, but the brains of sheep.

CHAPTER THREE.

The British in Burma

1. Imphal and Kohima

THE B BRITISH and j.a.panese fought each other on the Burman front for forty-six months. Burma thus became the longest single campaign of the Second World War. It cost the j.a.panese only 2,000 lives to seize this British possession in 1942, but a further 104,000 dead to stay there until 1945. The largest country on the South-East Asian mainland, rich in oil, teak and rubber, Burma had been ruled by a British governor, with only token democratic inst.i.tutions. Its population of eighteen million included a million Indians, who played a prominent part in commerce and administration. A host of Indian fugitives died in ghastly circ.u.mstances during the 1942 British retreat. Burmans had always been hostile to colonial rule. Many acquiesced willingly in occupation by fellow Asians, until they discovered that their new masters were far more brutal than their former ones. By 1944, they had learned to hate the j.a.panese. They craved independence and, ironically, now looked to the British to secure it for them. Yet Winston Churchill's government, and its servants in Asia, were confused about political purposes as well as military means. The poems of Kipling, the glories of the Indian Raj, the wealth and prestige which her eastern possessions had brought to Britain imbued old imperialists, the prime minister notable among them, with pa.s.sionate sentiment. They yearned to restore the old dispensation. Some younger men recognised that the changes wrought by the war, and especially by j.a.panese triumphs in 194142, were irreversible. They perceived that most Indians were indifferent, or worse, to Britain's war. The enlightened, however, were not in charge. and j.a.panese fought each other on the Burman front for forty-six months. Burma thus became the longest single campaign of the Second World War. It cost the j.a.panese only 2,000 lives to seize this British possession in 1942, but a further 104,000 dead to stay there until 1945. The largest country on the South-East Asian mainland, rich in oil, teak and rubber, Burma had been ruled by a British governor, with only token democratic inst.i.tutions. Its population of eighteen million included a million Indians, who played a prominent part in commerce and administration. A host of Indian fugitives died in ghastly circ.u.mstances during the 1942 British retreat. Burmans had always been hostile to colonial rule. Many acquiesced willingly in occupation by fellow Asians, until they discovered that their new masters were far more brutal than their former ones. By 1944, they had learned to hate the j.a.panese. They craved independence and, ironically, now looked to the British to secure it for them. Yet Winston Churchill's government, and its servants in Asia, were confused about political purposes as well as military means. The poems of Kipling, the glories of the Indian Raj, the wealth and prestige which her eastern possessions had brought to Britain imbued old imperialists, the prime minister notable among them, with pa.s.sionate sentiment. They yearned to restore the old dispensation. Some younger men recognised that the changes wrought by the war, and especially by j.a.panese triumphs in 194142, were irreversible. They perceived that most Indians were indifferent, or worse, to Britain's war. The enlightened, however, were not in charge.

The situation was rendered more complex by the involvement of the United States. The war with j.a.pan exposed differences between London and Washington more profound than any which afflicted policy in Europe. Americans, from their president to soldiers and airmen who served in the China-Burma-India theatre, were almost universally antipathetic to the British Empire, and resented committing their country's resources to its resurrection. Where the British regarded Siam as an enemy, an ally of the j.a.panese, from 1942 the U.S. chose to see it merely as an occupied, victim country. This was partly because Washington harboured a conviction, which persisted through 1945, that London cherished imperialistic designs there. Americans shared with the British a commitment to undoing j.a.panese aggression, but would greatly have preferred not to restore the European powers' lost possessions to their former owners. So strong was this sentiment that most Americans, including the nation's leaders, would happily have forsworn British aid to defeat the j.a.panese, if they could thus have distanced themselves from the cause of imperialism. Only the most compelling global political imperatives persuaded the U.S. to cooperate with the British in the j.a.panese war. It is hard to overstate the mutual suspicion and indeed antagonism which prevailed between the Western Allies in Asia in 194445.

"I have noted a regrettable93 lack of any spirit of camaraderie between British and American sections," wrote a U.S. diplomat in India, "or any evidence of mutual frankness and trust." A British diplomat likewise reported: "The majority of American officers lack of any spirit of camaraderie between British and American sections," wrote a U.S. diplomat in India, "or any evidence of mutual frankness and trust." A British diplomat likewise reported: "The majority of American officers94 in this theatre...are pessimistic about the chance of any real Allied cooperation being achieved here, suspicious of British intentions, bitter over many real or fancied grievances, and convinced of the essential bad will and hopeless inefficiency of the Indian administration." If the British government was less troubled than it should have been by the deaths of three million Indians in the 1943 Bengal famine, precipitated by the loss of Burma's rice, those Americans aware of it were appalled. A growing proportion of British signal traffic on Asian matters was marked in this theatre...are pessimistic about the chance of any real Allied cooperation being achieved here, suspicious of British intentions, bitter over many real or fancied grievances, and convinced of the essential bad will and hopeless inefficiency of the Indian administration." If the British government was less troubled than it should have been by the deaths of three million Indians in the 1943 Bengal famine, precipitated by the loss of Burma's rice, those Americans aware of it were appalled. A growing proportion of British signal traffic on Asian matters was marked GUARD GUARD-not to be shown to allies.

"The Americans[in India]...have rather behaved95 as an Army of Occupation," wrote a senior British officer in December 1943, "or if that is too strong, much as we comport ourselves in Egypt as an Army of Occupation," wrote a senior British officer in December 1943, "or if that is too strong, much as we comport ourselves in Egypt vis a vis vis a vis the Egyptian Army and Government." A British officer of the Indian Army wrote of the distaste for Roosevelt's people which pervaded his mess: "Our anti-Americanism the Egyptian Army and Government." A British officer of the Indian Army wrote of the distaste for Roosevelt's people which pervaded his mess: "Our anti-Americanism96 probably stemmed from their reluctance to enter the war against Germany until 1941, their scornful att.i.tude to any other Allied nations' efforts, and their ability to create huge material and ma.s.sive air support for their war in the Pacific, while almost grudgingly offering us similar backing. Stories of men losing their wives and girlfriends to American forces in Britain, and films of gum-chewing, jiving, laconic groups of American soldiers and airmen, no doubt led us to the wrong message...We should have understood these things better, but we were young and often intolerant." probably stemmed from their reluctance to enter the war against Germany until 1941, their scornful att.i.tude to any other Allied nations' efforts, and their ability to create huge material and ma.s.sive air support for their war in the Pacific, while almost grudgingly offering us similar backing. Stories of men losing their wives and girlfriends to American forces in Britain, and films of gum-chewing, jiving, laconic groups of American soldiers and airmen, no doubt led us to the wrong message...We should have understood these things better, but we were young and often intolerant."

Such feelings were reciprocated. A sheaf of contemporary97 War Office reports complained of the reluctance of British and U.S. personnel to salute each other. Pollsters put a proposition to Americans at home: "The English have often been called oppressors because of the unfair advantage some people think they have taken of their colonial possessions. Do you think there is any truth in this charge?" Fifty-six percent of respondents answered: "Yes." The Office of Strategic Services, the American covert operations organisation whose missions operated out of India into South-East Asia, was rabidly anti-colonialist. OSS officers reported to Washington, entirely accurately, that many Indians thought well of Subhas Chandra Bose, the nationalist leader a.s.sisting the j.a.panese to raise an "Indian National Army" from the ranks of POWs to fight against the British. Even the governor of Bengal, Richard Casey, wrote in 1944 that he perceived no enthusiasm for the war among its people: "It would be a brave man War Office reports complained of the reluctance of British and U.S. personnel to salute each other. Pollsters put a proposition to Americans at home: "The English have often been called oppressors because of the unfair advantage some people think they have taken of their colonial possessions. Do you think there is any truth in this charge?" Fifty-six percent of respondents answered: "Yes." The Office of Strategic Services, the American covert operations organisation whose missions operated out of India into South-East Asia, was rabidly anti-colonialist. OSS officers reported to Washington, entirely accurately, that many Indians thought well of Subhas Chandra Bose, the nationalist leader a.s.sisting the j.a.panese to raise an "Indian National Army" from the ranks of POWs to fight against the British. Even the governor of Bengal, Richard Casey, wrote in 1944 that he perceived no enthusiasm for the war among its people: "It would be a brave man98 who would say that the majority of Indians want to remain within the British Commonwealth." who would say that the majority of Indians want to remain within the British Commonwealth."

Some 23,000 young Chinese Nationalists were "back-hauled" by air to India over the Himalayas for American training. They too were bemused and dismayed by their encounters with imperialism. Wen Shan, for instance, walked into Annie's Bar in Calcutta with a group of comrades, looking for a drink. British soldiers shouted: "Out! Out!" Wen remembered later: "We tried to say99, 'We're just soldiers like you,' but they would not listen. Once, I saw a British soldier on a Hooghly bridge beating an Indian. This was the way I had seen j.a.panese soldiers treat Chinese people."

Wu Guoqing, a twenty-one-year-old interpreter from Chongqing, was thrilled to find that in India he had enough to eat, as he had never done in China. Indeed, he was translated overnight from a poor student into a privileged person with Indian "bearers" to clean his shoes and make his bed, like all Americans in the theatre. Wu recoiled from the poverty, however, which seemed to him worse than that of China, and from British behaviour towards Indians: "Some British people even hit them100," he said wonderingly. "They treated them like animals." A British tank crewman from London's east end, John Leyin, was disgusted by the spectacle of two Tommies dangling strips of bacon fat from a train window, to taunt starving Indian pa.s.sers-by. If such behaviour did not represent the entire reality of the Raj, it reflected the impression which it made upon many outsiders, especially American and Chinese, who saw India for the first time in those days.

For months following the expulsion of British forces from Burma in May 1942, they were merely deployed in north-east India to meet the threat of a j.a.panese invasion. As this peril receded, however, it was replaced by a dilemma about future strategy. Winston Churchill admitted to the British cabinet in April 1943: "It could not be said that the [re]conquest of Burma [is] an essential step in the defeat of j.a.pan." Yet if this was acknowledged, what were British and Indian forces to do for the rest of the war? After the humiliations inflicted on them in 194142, the London government was stubbornly determined to restore by force of arms the prestige of white men in general, and of themselves in particular. If the Asian empire was not to be restored to its former glory, why should British soldiers sacrifice their lives to regain it? Herein lay uncertainties which afflicted strategy throughout the second half of the war, once the initial j.a.panese tide began to recede. What was Britain's Far East campaign for for? And what would follow victory? No more convincingly than the French or Dutch-the other major colonial powers in Asia, though they contributed nothing significant to the war effort-did the British answer these questions.

In the latter part of 1942 and throughout 1943, Britain's operations against the j.a.panese were desultory, even pathetic. Led by feeble commanders against an unflaggingly effective enemy, and with scant support from the government at home, troops failed in a thrust into the Burman coastal region of the Arakan, and were obliged merely to hold their ground in north-east India. Embarra.s.singly, in the winter of 1943 the operations of six and a half British and Indian divisions were frustrated by just one j.a.panese formation. Americans like Lt.-Gen. Joseph Stilwell, senior U.S. officer in China, became persuaded that the British were no more willing energetically to grapple with the j.a.panese than were the Chinese armies of Chiang Kai-shek.

The only marginal success that year owed more to propaganda than substance: Orde Wingate's "Chindit" guerrilla columns, operating behind the j.a.panese lines and supplied by air, caught the imagination of the British public and especially of the prime minister, at the cost of losing a third of their number. At one rash moment, Churchill considered making the messianic, unbalanced Wingate C-in-C of Britain's entire eastern army. Deflected from this notion, instead he promoted the Chindit leader to major-general and authorised resources for him to mount large-scale operations behind the j.a.panese front in northern Burma.

Wingate was killed in a crash during the March 1944 fly-in. The Chindits' subsequent operations, like those of so many World War II special forces, cost much blood and produced notable feats of heroism, but achieved little. Wingate's death came as a relief to many senior officers, not least Slim, commander of the British Fourteenth Army, who regarded the Chindits as a distraction. Beyond such theatricals, more than two years were allowed to elapse between the ejection of the British from Burma in 1942 and their return across the Chindwin River. Stilwell's scorn for British pusillanimity was justified, insofar as Churchill opposed an overland campaign to regain Burma. The prime minister had seen British and Indian forces worsted in jungle fighting in 1942. He dreaded another torrid slogging match on terrain that seemed unfavourable to Western armies.

Against the implacable opposition of his chiefs of staff, who were prepared to resign on the issue, Churchill pressed for an amphibious a.s.sault on the great Dutch island of Sumatra, a concept which he rashly compared with his disastrous 1915 Dardanelles campaign "in its promise of decisive consequences." As late as March 1944 he revived the Sumatran scheme, causing the exasperated Alan Brooke, chief of the imperial general staff, to write: "I began to wonder101 whether I was in Alice in Wonderland." If a Sumatran operation was not feasible, the prime minister urged landing troops from the sea below Rangoon. whether I was in Alice in Wonderland." If a Sumatran operation was not feasible, the prime minister urged landing troops from the sea below Rangoon.

Churchill's lobbying for a grand South-East Asian amphibious adventure was futile, because Americans owned all the relevant shipping. They would commit their a.s.sets only to objectives favoured in Washington, which emphatically did not include Sumatra or Rangoon. Churchill fumed, on 5 May 1944: "The American method102 of trying to force particular policies, of the withholding or giving of certain weapons, such as carrying airplanes or LSTs [Landing Ships, Tank], in theatres where the command belongs by right of overwhelming numbers to us, must be...strongly protested against." By this stage of the war, however, Washington's control of Western Allied strategy had become almost absolute. "The hard fact is of trying to force particular policies, of the withholding or giving of certain weapons, such as carrying airplanes or LSTs [Landing Ships, Tank], in theatres where the command belongs by right of overwhelming numbers to us, must be...strongly protested against." By this stage of the war, however, Washington's control of Western Allied strategy had become almost absolute. "The hard fact is103 that the Americans have got us by the short hairs," wrote a senior British officer. "We can't do anything in this theatre, amphibious or otherwise, without material a.s.sistance from them...So if they don't approve, they don't provide." that the Americans have got us by the short hairs," wrote a senior British officer. "We can't do anything in this theatre, amphibious or otherwise, without material a.s.sistance from them...So if they don't approve, they don't provide."

Washington dismissed a British request for two U.S. divisions to join operations in Burma. The Canberra government likewise rejected a proposal that two Australian divisions in New Guinea should be transferred to British command in South-East Asia. If the British wanted to recapture Burma, they must do so with their own resources. "If our operations formed merely104 a part of the great American advance," cabinet minister Oliver Lyttelton warned the British chiefs of staff in March 1944, "we should be swamped. It [is] essential that we should be able to say to our own possessions in the Far East that we had liberated them by our own efforts." a part of the great American advance," cabinet minister Oliver Lyttelton warned the British chiefs of staff in March 1944, "we should be swamped. It [is] essential that we should be able to say to our own possessions in the Far East that we had liberated them by our own efforts."

Thus, the British government knew that a campaign to retake Burma would be difficult, and would not bring the defeat of j.a.pan a day closer. But an army must march, British and Indian soldiers must die, so that Churchill's people were seen to pay their share of the price for victory in the Far East. Burma would be attacked overland from the north, because only the north interested Washington. Through its jungles and mountains ran a long, tenuous thread, the only land route by which American supplies could be shipped to China from India. j.a.panese troops occupied a vital section of this "Burma Road." If they could be dispossessed, northern Burma liberated, then the U.S. could pursue its fantastically ambitious plans to provide Chiang Kai-shek's armies with the means to become major partic.i.p.ants in the war. At huge cost and despite chronic British scepticism, the road was being driven seven hundred miles north from India and south from China by 17,000 American engineers led by the brilliant U.S. Maj.-Gen. Lewis Pike.

From Churchill downwards, the British rejected the notion that China could ever play a part in the war remotely commensurate with the resources which the U.S. lavished upon her. When Roosevelt urged that a nation of 425 million people could not be ignored, the prime minister snorted famously and contemptuously: "Four hundred and twenty-five million pigtails!" Slim, commanding Britain's Fourteenth Army, deployed in north-east India, had some respect for Stilwell but never shared the American's belief that the Chinese could decisively influence the war against j.a.pan. "I did not hold two articles105 of his faith," the British general wrote later. "I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road and...I believed the American amphibious strategy in the Pacific...would bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed." of his faith," the British general wrote later. "I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road and...I believed the American amphibious strategy in the Pacific...would bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed."

If Britain could withhold respect for China, however, it could not deny this to the U.S. Some 240,000 American engineer and air force personnel were labouring in northern India and southern China to create and sustain the air and land links to which the U.S. government attached such importance. Washington indulged Britain's commitment to retake Burma only in pursuit of its own China ambitions. A million Indian labourers were deployed to create road, rail and airfield facilities to support a full-scale British offensive. Churchill still railed against what he perceived as the waste of it all. How could India, with more than two million soldiers, deploy as few as ten divisions against nine j.a.panese on the Burma frontier? "It is indeed a disgrace106, that so feeble an army is the most that can be produced from the enormous expense entailed." In truth, an embarra.s.sing number of Indian Army units were deployed on internal security duties. Churchill wanted Britain's eastern army to be profitably employed, but deplored the fact that "we are about to plunge about in the jungles of Burma, engaging the j.a.panese under conditions...still unfavourable to us, with the objective of building a pipeline or increasing the discharge over the 'hump' [the Himalayan air route to China]."

Allied operations in South East Asia were nominally subordinate to the supreme commander of South East Asia Command (SEAC), Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. "The interests in this theatre are overwhelmingly British," growled Churchill to the combined chiefs of staff when he imposed his protege's appointment in September 1943. Mountbatten's meteoric elevation, from destroyer flotilla commander in 1941 to British chief of combined operations and then to SEAC at the age of forty-two, reflected the prime minister's enthusiasm for officers who looked the part of heroes. "A remarkable and complex character107," Gen. Henry Pownall, Mountbatten's chief of staff, wrote of his boss. "There are so many paradoxes...his charm of manner...is one of his greatest a.s.sets; many is the time that I have gone in to him to have a really good showdown...he would apologise, promise to mend his ways-and then soon afterwards go and do the same thing again! [He] has great drive and initiative...He is however apt to leap before he looks...His meetings are overlong because he likes talking...And he likes a good big audience to hear what he has to say."

Mountbatten's many critics, who included Britain's service chiefs, regarded him as a poseur with a streak of vulgarity, promoted far beyond his talents on the strength of fluency, film-star good looks, and his relationship to the royal family. He was King George VI's cousin, and never for long allowed anyone to be unaware of it. Famously thick-skinned save where his own interests were at stake, of boundless ambition and limited intellect, his grand t.i.tle as supreme commander meant little, for he was denied executive direction of either armies or fleets. The extravagant staffing of his headquarters in the sublime setting of the botanical gardens at Kandy, Ceylon, promoted derision.

Mountbatten was p.r.o.ne to follies. There was a 1943 episode in Quebec, where he fired a revolver at a chiefs of staffs' meeting to demonstrate the strength of "pycrete" as a material for a fanciful plan to build artificial iceberg aircraft carriers. The bullet ricocheted, narrowly missing the top bra.s.s of the Grand Alliance. Brooke fumed when Mountbatten solicited each of the commanders present for a souvenir tunic b.u.t.ton: "I only quote this story108, as an example of the trivial matters...that were apt to occupy d.i.c.ky's thoughts at times when the heart of the problem facing him should have absorbed him entirely." Mountbatten, however, endured endless disappointments and changes of strategy without losing heart. Once, when a scheme which he favoured was briefly approved, though it was evident to his staff that it would never be executed, Pownall wrote pityingly: "Mountbatten is in the seventh heaven109 of delight. He is so very simpleminded." "d.i.c.ky" was not a great man, but like many prominent actors in the dramas of the Second World War, he strove manfully to do his part in great events. He possessed two virtues which justified his appointment. First, he was a considerable diplomat. He liked Americans, as so many British officers did not, and had a sincere respect for Asians and their aspirations. And the glamour of his presence, in a theatre where so many British soldiers felt neglected by their own nation, did wonders for morale. Almost every man who saw Mountbatten descend from a plane to visit them, in dazzling naval whites or jungle greens, was cheered by the experience. of delight. He is so very simpleminded." "d.i.c.ky" was not a great man, but like many prominent actors in the dramas of the Second World War, he strove manfully to do his part in great events. He possessed two virtues which justified his appointment. First, he was a considerable diplomat. He liked Americans, as so many British officers did not, and had a sincere respect for Asians and their aspirations. And the glamour of his presence, in a theatre where so many British soldiers felt neglected by their own nation, did wonders for morale. Almost every man who saw Mountbatten descend from a plane to visit them, in dazzling naval whites or jungle greens, was cheered by the experience.

As supreme commander, Mountbatten floundered when he sought to exercise authority, but distinguished himself as an amba.s.sador and figurehead. Both he and his wife, Edwina, had a gift for regal informality. Peter d'Cunha of the Royal Indian Navy was once at his post in the wireless office of a patrol boat anch.o.r.ed in a creek off the Arakan, immersed in music from Radio Ceylon. Suddenly a pair of hands removed his headset. He turned in astonishment to perceive Mountbatten, who held it to his own ears for a moment. He then asked the operator's name, and said: "You seem to be very fond of English music." The supreme commander replaced the phones on d'Cunha's head and departed, saying: "Enjoy yourself110; but just be a little bit alert. You never know who's coming!" The young man loved it, of course.

Yet Mountbatten could do nothing to undo his command's absolute dependence upon an American vision. Pownall wrote bitterly in his diary in February 1944: "If...we are relegated111 to mucking about in Burma, they may as well wind up this unlucky SE Asia Command, leave here if you like a few figureheads, a good deception staff and plenty of press men to write it up." If we recall Slim's scepticism about Stilwell's hopes for the Chinese-the British general's declared belief that the American advance across the Pacific would defeat j.a.pan without an Asian land campaign-these strictures applied with equal force to anything which a British army might do in South-East Asia. Britain's field commander understood as clearly as her prime minister that the new Burma campaign would be launched to restore imperial prestige and to indulge American fantasies about China, not because British action could contribute substantially to victory over j.a.pan. to mucking about in Burma, they may as well wind up this unlucky SE Asia Command, leave here if you like a few figureheads, a good deception staff and plenty of press men to write it up." If we recall Slim's scepticism about Stilwell's hopes for the Chinese-the British general's declared belief that the American advance across the Pacific would defeat j.a.pan without an Asian land campaign-these strictures applied with equal force to anything which a British army might do in South-East Asia. Britain's field commander understood as clearly as her prime minister that the new Burma campaign would be launched to restore imperial prestige and to indulge American fantasies about China, not because British action could contribute substantially to victory over j.a.pan.

In 1944, however, before the British could launch their grand offensive, the j.a.panese had one more throw to make. With extraordinary boldness, Tokyo's commanders embarked on an operation to seize the positions of Imphal and Kohima in north-east India. Even the j.a.panese at their most optimistic did not at this juncture suppose that they could conquer the country. Rather, they sought to frustrate the British advance into Burma. More fancifully, they hoped to precipitate a popular revolt against the Raj by showcasing during their advance units of the so-called Indian National Army, recruited from prisoners of war.

The j.a.panese high command's approach to the Imphal a.s.sault was recklessly insouciant. Gen. Renya Mutaguchi of 15th Army, whose concept it was, sacked his chief of staff for suggesting that the operation was impossible, mainly because of the difficulties of moving men and supplies in a.s.sam, the wettest place on earth, with an annual rainfall that sometimes attained eight hundred inches. Mutaguchi, fifty-six years old, was a scion of an old but now somewhat diminished southern family. Like many j.a.panese generals self-consciously virile, he never wearied of proclaiming his enthusiasm for women and combat. He was an ambitious political soldier, prominent among those who had precipitated war in China. Belligerence, together with connections in high places, won him promotion to army command.

Mutaguchi found himself largely dependent on bullocks to move stores and munitions across some of the worst terrain in the world. Experiment showed that a laden beast could travel just eight miles a day. The j.a.panese army's supply line into a.s.sam would be extraordinarily tenuous. A staff colonel was dispatched to Tokyo to secure endors.e.m.e.nt for the operation from Prime Minister Tojo. A preposterous discussion took place while Tojo splashed in his bath. "Imphal...yes112," said the prime minister, who had never displayed much interest in Mutaguchi's front. j.a.panese generals had a droll saying: "I've upset Tojo-it's probably Burma for me." They called the place "jigoku"-"h.e.l.l." Now, the prime minister demanded: "How about communications? Have they been properly thought out? Eh? Eh? It's difficult country towards India, you know. What about air cover? We can't help him much. Does he realise that? Are you sure it will make things better rather than worse? What'll happen if the Allies land on the Arakan coast? Has anyone thought of that? Eh? Eh?" Mutaguchi's staff colonel outlined the plan while Tojo stood naked before him. At last, the prime minister said: "Tell Kawabe"-commander of the Burma Area Army and Mutaguchi's superior-"not to be too ambitious." Then he signed the Imphal operation order.

The battle which ensued became one of the British and Indian armies' proudest memories of the war, and decided the fate of j.a.panese arms in South-East Asia. Slim had expected an attack, but was caught off balance by its speed and energy. j.a.panese forces first hit the British in the Arakan coastal belt in February 1944, then moved the following month against Imphal and Kohima. The early weeks of the struggle were touch and go. "The whole time113 I had been in the theatre," wrote a cynical British officer, "the campaign had been conducted in an extremely leisurely manner by both sides. The only time I [saw] either protagonist hurry [was] when the j.a.ps were heading for Imphal." Mutaguchi risked everything to move men fast through heavy country to gain surprise, and almost cut off an Indian division. The j.a.panese were successful in breaking land li