Perplexed and exasperated, his doctors moved him to another city and placed him in a veterans' hospital where he remained for 30 years, never breaking his self-imposed silence and sinking into a life of social isolation. Then one day, a radio in his ward happened to be tuned to a soccer match between his hometown team and a traditional rival. When at a crucial point of play the referee called a foul against a player from the mute veteran's home team, he jumped from his chair, glared at the radio, and spoke his first words in more than three decades: "You dumb a.s.s!" he cried. "Are you trying to give give them the match?" With that, he returned to his chair and to a silence he never again violated. them the match?" With that, he returned to his chair and to a silence he never again violated.

There are two important lessons to be derived from this true story. The first concerns the sheer power of the phenomenon. The veteran's desire to have his hometown team succeed was so strong that it alone produced a deviation from his solidly entrenched way of life. The second lesson reveals much about the nature of the union of sports and sports fans, something crucial to its basic character: It is a personal thing. Whatever fragment of an ident.i.ty that ravaged, mute man still possessed was engaged by soccer play. No matter how weakened his ego may have become after 30 years of wordless stagnation in a hospital ward, it was involved in the outcome of the match. Why? Because he, personally, would be diminished by a hometown defeat, and he, personally, would be enhanced by a hometown victory. How? Through the principle of a.s.sociation. The mere connection of birthplace hooked him, wrapped him, tied him to the approaching triumph or failure.

As distinguished author Isaac Asimov (1975) put it in describing our reactions to the contests we view, "All things being equal, you root for your own s.e.x, your own culture, your own locality . . . and what you want to prove is that you you are better than the other person. Whomever you root for represents are better than the other person. Whomever you root for represents you you; and when he [or she] wins, you you win." When viewed in this light, the pa.s.sion of a sports fan begins to make sense. The game is no light diversion to be enjoyed for its inherent form and artistry. The self is at stake. That is why hometown crowds are so adoring and, more tellingly, so grateful toward those regularly responsible for home-team victories. That is also why the same crowds are often ferocious in their treatment of players, coaches, and officials implicated in athletic failures. win." When viewed in this light, the pa.s.sion of a sports fan begins to make sense. The game is no light diversion to be enjoyed for its inherent form and artistry. The self is at stake. That is why hometown crowds are so adoring and, more tellingly, so grateful toward those regularly responsible for home-team victories. That is also why the same crowds are often ferocious in their treatment of players, coaches, and officials implicated in athletic failures.9 9Take, for example, the case of Andres Escobar who, as a member of the Colombian national team, accidentally tipped a ball into his own team's net during a World Cup soccer match in 1994. The "auto-goal" led to a U.S. team victory and to the elimination of the favored Colombians from the compet.i.tion. Back home two weeks later, Escobar was executed in a restaurant by two gunmen, who shot him 12 times for his mistake.

So we want our affiliated sports teams to win to prove our own superiority, but to whom are we trying to prove it? Ourselves, certainly, but to everyone else, too. According to the a.s.sociation principle, if we can surround ourselves with success that we are connected with in even a superficial way (for example, place of residence), our public prestige will rise.

All this tells me is that we purposefully manipulate the visibility of our connections with winners and losers in order to make ourselves look good to anyone who views these connections. By showcasing the positive a.s.sociations and burying the negative ones, we are trying to get observers to think more highly of us and to like us more. There are many ways we go about this, but one of the simplest and most pervasive is in the p.r.o.nouns we use. Have you noticed for example, how often after a home-team victory fans crowd into the range of a TV camera, thrust their index fingers high, and shout, "We're number one! We're number one!" Note that the call is not "They're number one" or even "Our team is number one." The p.r.o.noun is we we, designed to imply the closest possible ident.i.ty with the team.

Sports Fan(atic)s Team spirit goes a step beyond wearing the school sweatshirt as these Alabama students wear their school letters a different way and cheer their team to victory.

Note also that nothing similar occurs in the case of failure. No television viewer will ever hear the chant, "We're in last place! We're in last place!" Home-team defeats are the times for distancing oneself. Here we we is not nearly as preferred as the insulating p.r.o.noun is not nearly as preferred as the insulating p.r.o.noun they they. To prove the point, I once did a small experiment in which students at Arizona State University were phoned and asked to describe the outcome of a football game their school team had played a few weeks earlier (Cialdini et al., 1976). Some of the students were asked the outcome of a certain game their team had lost; the other students were asked the outcome of a different game-one their team had won. My fellow researcher, Avril Thorne, and I simply listened to what was said and recorded the percentage of students who used the word we we in their descriptions. When the results were tabulated, it was obvious that the students had tried to connect themselves to success by using the p.r.o.noun in their descriptions. When the results were tabulated, it was obvious that the students had tried to connect themselves to success by using the p.r.o.noun we we to describe their school-team victory-"We beat Houston, 17 to 14," or "We won." In the case of the lost game, however, to describe their school-team victory-"We beat Houston, 17 to 14," or "We won." In the case of the lost game, however, we we was rarely used. Instead, the students used terms designed to keep themselves separate from their defeated team-"They lost to Missouri, 30 to 20," or "I don't know the score, but Arizona State got beat." Perhaps the twin desires to connect ourselves to winners and to distance ourselves from losers were combined consummately in the remarks of one particular student. After dryly recounting the score of the home-team defeat-"Arizona State lost it, 30 to 20"-he blurted in anguish, " was rarely used. Instead, the students used terms designed to keep themselves separate from their defeated team-"They lost to Missouri, 30 to 20," or "I don't know the score, but Arizona State got beat." Perhaps the twin desires to connect ourselves to winners and to distance ourselves from losers were combined consummately in the remarks of one particular student. After dryly recounting the score of the home-team defeat-"Arizona State lost it, 30 to 20"-he blurted in anguish, "They threw away threw away our our chance for a national championship!" chance for a national championship!"

The tendency to trumpet one's links to victors is not unique to the sports arena. After general elections in Belgium, researchers looked to see how long it took homeowners to remove their lawn-signs favoring one or another political party. The better the election result for a party, the longer homeowners wallowed in the positive connection by leaving the signs up (Boen et al., 2002).

Although the desire to bask in reflected glory exists to a degree in all of us, there seems to be something special about people who would take this normal tendency too far. Just what kind of people are they? Unless I miss my guess, they are not merely great sports aficionados; they are individuals with hidden personality flaws: poor self-concepts. Deep inside is a sense of low personal worth that directs them to seek prestige not from the generation or promotion of their own attainments but from the generation or promotion of their a.s.sociations with others' attainments. There are several varieties of this species that bloom throughout our culture. The persistent name-dropper is a cla.s.sic example. So, too, is the rock-music groupie, who trades s.e.xual favors for the right to tell friends that she or he was "with" a famous musician for a time. No matter which form it takes, the behavior of such individuals shares a similar theme-the rather tragic view of accomplishment as deriving from outside the self.

READER'S REPORT 5.3 From a Los Angeles Movie Studio Employee

Because I work in the industry, I'm a huge film buff. The biggest night of the year for me is the night of the Academy Awards. I even tape the shows so I can replay the acceptance speeches of the artists I really admire. One of my favorite speeches was what Kevin Costner said after his film Dances with Wolves Dances with Wolves won best picture in 1991. I liked it because he was responding to critics who say that the movies aren't important. In fact, I liked it so much that I copied it down. But there is one thing about the speech that I never understood before. Here's what he said about winning the best picture award: won best picture in 1991. I liked it because he was responding to critics who say that the movies aren't important. In fact, I liked it so much that I copied it down. But there is one thing about the speech that I never understood before. Here's what he said about winning the best picture award: "While it may not be as important as the rest of the world situation, it will always be important to us. My family will never forget what happened here; my Native American brothers and sisters, especially the Lakota Sioux, will never forget, and the people I went to high school with will never forget."

OK, I get why Kevin Costner would never forget this enormous honor. And I also get why his family would never forget it. And I even get why Native Americans would remember it, since the film is about them. But I never understood why he mentioned the people he went to high school with. Then, I read about how sports fans think they can "bask in the reflected glory" of their hometown stars and teams. And, I realized that it's the same thing. Everyone who went to school with Kevin Costner would be telling everyone about their connection the day after he won the Oscar, thinking that they would get some prestige out of it even though they had zero to do with the film. They would be right, too, because that's how it works. You don't have to be a star to get the glory. Sometimes you only have to be a.s.sociated with the star somehow. How interesting.

Author's note: I've seen this sort of thing work in my own life when I've told architect friends that I was born in the same place as the great Frank Lloyd Wright. Please understand, I can't even draw a straight line; but I can see the favorable reaction in my friends' eyes. "Wow," they seem to say, "You and Frank Lloyd Wright?" I've seen this sort of thing work in my own life when I've told architect friends that I was born in the same place as the great Frank Lloyd Wright. Please understand, I can't even draw a straight line; but I can see the favorable reaction in my friends' eyes. "Wow," they seem to say, "You and Frank Lloyd Wright?"

Certain of these people work the a.s.sociation principle in a slightly different way. Instead of striving to inflate their visible connections to others of success, they strive to inflate the success of others they are visibly connected to. The clearest ill.u.s.tration is the notorious "stage mother," obsessed with securing stardom for her child. Of course, women are not alone in this regard. A few years ago, a Davenport, Iowa, obstetrician cut off service to the wives of three school officials, reportedly because his son had not been given enough playing time in school basketball games. One of the wives was eight months pregnant at the time.

Defense Because liking can be increased by many means, a list of the defenses against compliance professionals who employ the liking rule must, oddly enough, be a short one. It would be pointless to construct a horde of specific countertactics to combat each of the countless versions of the various ways to influence liking. There are simply too many routes to be blocked effectively with such a one-on-one strategy. Besides, several of the factors leading to liking-physical attractiveness, familiarity, a.s.sociation-have been shown to work unconsciously to produce their effects on us, making it unlikely that we could muster a timely protection against them anyway.

Instead we need to consider a general approach, one that can be applied to any of the liking-related factors to neutralize their unwelcome influence on our compliance decisions. The secret to such an approach may lie in its timing. Rather than trying to recognize and prevent the action of liking factors before they have a chance to work on us, we might be well advised to let them work. Our vigilance should be directed not toward the things that may produce undue liking for a compliance pract.i.tioner but toward the fact that undue liking has been produced produced. The time to call out the defense is when we feel ourselves liking the pract.i.tioner more than we should under the circ.u.mstances.

By concentrating our attention on the effects rather than the causes, we can avoid the laborious, nearly impossible task of trying to detect and deflect the many psychological influences on liking. Instead, we have to be sensitive to only one thing related to liking in our contacts with compliance pract.i.tioners: the feeling that we have come to like the pract.i.tioner more quickly or more deeply than we would have expected. Once we notice notice this feeling, we will have been tipped off that there is probably some tactic being used, and we can start taking the necessary countermeasures. Note that the strategy I am suggesting borrows much from the jujitsu style favored by the compliance professionals themselves. We don't attempt to restrain the influence of the factors that cause liking. Quite the contrary. We allow those factors to exert their force, and then we use that force in our campaign against those who would profit by them. The stronger the force, the more conspicuous it becomes and, consequently, the more subject to our alerted defenses. this feeling, we will have been tipped off that there is probably some tactic being used, and we can start taking the necessary countermeasures. Note that the strategy I am suggesting borrows much from the jujitsu style favored by the compliance professionals themselves. We don't attempt to restrain the influence of the factors that cause liking. Quite the contrary. We allow those factors to exert their force, and then we use that force in our campaign against those who would profit by them. The stronger the force, the more conspicuous it becomes and, consequently, the more subject to our alerted defenses.

Suppose, for example, we find ourselves bargaining on the price of a new car with Dealin' Dan, a candidate for Joe Girard's vacated "Greatest Car Salesman" t.i.tle. After talking a while and negotiating a bit, Dan wants to close the deal: he wants us to decide to buy the car. Before any such decision is made, we should ask ourselves the crucial question, "In the 25 minutes I've known this guy, have I come to like him more than I would have expected?" If the answer is yes, we might want to reflect on the ways Dan behaved during those few minutes. We might recall that he has fed us (coffee and doughnuts), complimented us on our choice of options and color combinations, made us laugh, and cooperated with us against the sales manager to get us a better deal.

Although such a review of events might be informative, it is not a necessary step in protecting ourselves from the liking rule. Once we discover that we have come to like Dan more than we would have expected, we don't have to know why. The simple recognition of unwarranted liking should be enough to get us to react against it. One possible reaction would be to reverse the process and actively dislike Dan, but that might be unfair to him and contrary to our own interests. After all, some individuals are naturally likeable, and Dan might just be one of them. It wouldn't be right to turn automatically against those compliance professionals who happen to be most likeable. Besides, for our own sakes, we wouldn't want to shut ourselves off from business interactions with such nice people, especially when they may be offering us the best available deal.

I recommend a different reaction. If our answer to the crucial question is "Yes, under the circ.u.mstances, I like this guy peculiarly well," this should be the signal that the time has come for a quick countermaneuver: Mentally separate Dan from that Chevy or Toyota he's trying to sell. It is vital to remember at this point that, should we choose Dan's car, we will be driving it it, not him, off the dealership lot. It is irrelevant to a wise automobile purchase that we find Dan likeable because he is good-looking, claims an interest in our favorite hobby, is funny, or has relatives living where we grew up.

Our proper response, then, is a conscious effort to concentrate exclusively on the merits of the deal and the car Dan has for us. Of course, when we make a compliance decision, it is always a good idea to separate our feelings about the requester from the request. Once immersed in even a brief personal and sociable contact with a requester, however, we may easily forget that distinction. In those instances when we don't care one way or the other about a requester, forgetting to make the distinction won't steer us very far wrong. The big mistakes are likely to come when we like the person making the request.

That's why it is so important to be alert to a sense of undue liking for a compliance pract.i.tioner. The recognition of that feeling can serve as our reminder to separate the dealer from the merits of the deal and to make our decision based on considerations related only to the latter. Were we all to follow this procedure, I am certain we would be much more pleased with the results of our exchanges with compliance professionals-though I suspect that Dealin' Dan would not.

Summary [image]People prefer to say yes to individuals they know and like. Recognizing this rule, compliance professionals commonly increase their effectiveness by emphasizing several factors that increase their overall attractiveness and likeability. Recognizing this rule, compliance professionals commonly increase their effectiveness by emphasizing several factors that increase their overall attractiveness and likeability.

[image]One feature of a person that influences overall liking is physical attractiveness. Although it has long been suspected that physical beauty provides an advantage in social interaction, research indicates that the advantage may be greater than supposed. Physical attractiveness seems to engender a halo effect that extends to favorable impressions of other traits such as talent, kindness, and intelligence. As a result, attractive people are more persuasive both in terms of getting what they request and in changing others' att.i.tudes.

[image]A second factor that influences liking and compliance is similarity. We like people who are like us, and we are more willing to say yes to their requests, often in an unthinking manner. Another factor that produces liking is praise. Although they can sometimes backfire when crudely transparent, compliments generally enhance liking and, thus, compliance.

[image]Increased familiarity through repeated contact with a person or thing is yet another factor that normally facilitates liking. This relationship holds true princ.i.p.ally when the contact takes place under positive rather than negative circ.u.mstances. One positive circ.u.mstance that works especially well is mutual and successful cooperation. A fifth factor linked to liking is a.s.sociation. By connecting themselves or their products with positive things, advertisers, politicians, and merchandisers frequently seek to share in the positivity through the process of a.s.sociation. Other individuals as well (sports fans, for example) appear to recognize the effect of simple connections and try to a.s.sociate themselves with favorable events and distance themselves from unfavorable events in the eyes of observers.

[image]A potentially effective strategy for reducing the unwanted influence of liking on compliance decisions requires a special sensitivity to the experience of undue liking for a requester. Upon recognizing that we like a requester inordinately well under the circ.u.mstances, we should step back from the social interaction, mentally separate the requester from his or her offer, and make any compliance decision based solely on the merits of the offer.

Study Questions Content Mastery 1. To what does the term halo effect halo effect refer? How can it help explain the relationship between a person's physical attractiveness and that person's general attractiveness in the eyes of others? refer? How can it help explain the relationship between a person's physical attractiveness and that person's general attractiveness in the eyes of others?

2. We tend to like people who say they like us (that is, who give us compliments). We also tend to like people who say they are are like us (that is, similar to us). In the latter case, what is the evidence that we tend to say yes to similar others in an automatic fashion? like us (that is, similar to us). In the latter case, what is the evidence that we tend to say yes to similar others in an automatic fashion?

3. A series of studies on the creation and reduction of hostility between groups was conducted at boys' summer camps. After hostility was generated, which procedures successfully reduced the hostility? Which were unsuccessful?

4. To what does the tendency to bask in reflected glory refer? Under which conditions and for which kind of person is this tendency most likely to appear?

Critical Thinking 1. In a letter to her sister, Jane Austen wrote, "I do not want people to be very agreeable, as it saves me the trouble of liking them a great deal." To which trouble a.s.sociated with liking people could she have been referring?

2. Will Rogers, who boasted, "I never met a man I didn't like," obviously felt differently than Austen about the advantages of liking others. What would be the consequences of Rogers' more expansive approach to interpersonal relations? Think about your own interpersonal style. Is it closer to Rogers' or Austen's? Why?

3. What parallels can you see between the findings of the boys' camp studies and those of studies on the effects of (a) school desegregation and (b) cooperative learning in the cla.s.sroom?

4. Suppose you wanted the person sitting next to you in cla.s.s to like you more. Using the factors discussed in this chapter, describe how you would arrange your next encounter to accomplish your goal.

5. How does the photograph that opens this chapter reflect the topic of the chapter?

Chapter 6.

Authority.

Directed Deference Follow an expert.

-Virgil.

SUPPOSE WHILE LEAFING THROUGH YOUR LOCAL NEWSPAPER, you notice an ad for volunteers to take part in a "study of memory" being done in the psychology department of a nearby university. Suppose further that, finding the idea of such an experiment intriguing, you contact the director of the study, Professor Stanley Milgram, and make arrangements to partic.i.p.ate in an hour-long session. When you arrive at the laboratory suite, you meet two men. One is the researcher in charge of the experiment, clearly evidenced by the grey lab coat he wears and the clipboard he carries. The other is a volunteer like yourself who seems quite average in all respects.

After initial greetings and pleasantries are exchanged, the researcher begins to explain the procedures to be followed. He says that the experiment is a study of how punishment affects learning and memory. Therefore, one partic.i.p.ant will have the task of learning pairs of words in a long list until each pair can be recalled perfectly; this person is to be called the Learner. The other partic.i.p.ant's job will be to test the Learner's memory and to deliver increasingly strong electric shocks for every mistake; this person will be designated the Teacher.

Naturally, you get a bit nervous at this news. Your apprehension increases when, after drawing lots with your partner, you find that you are a.s.signed the Learner role. You hadn't expected the possibility of pain as part of the study, so you briefly consider leaving. But no, you think, there's plenty of time for that if need be and, besides how strong a shock could it be?

After you have had a chance to study the list of word pairs, the researcher straps you into a chair and, with the Teacher looking on, attaches electrodes to your arm. More worried now about the effect of the shock, you inquire into its severity. The researcher's response is hardly comforting. He says that although the shocks can be extremely painful, they will cause you "no permanent tissue damage." With that, the researcher and Teacher leave you alone and go to the next room where the Teacher asks you the test questions through an intercom system and delivers electric punishment for every wrong response.

As the test proceeds, you quickly recognize the pattern that the Teacher follows: He asks the question and waits for your answer over the intercom. Whenever you err, he announces the voltage of the shock you are about to receive and pulls a lever to deliver the punishment. The most troubling thing is that, with each error you make, the shock increases by 15 volts.

The first part of the test progresses smoothly. The shocks are annoying but tolerable. Later on, though, as you make more mistakes and the shock voltages climb, the punishment begins to hurt enough to disrupt your concentration, which leads to more errors and ever more disruptive shocks. At the 75-, 90-, and 105-volt levels, the pain makes you grunt audibly. At 120 volts, you exclaim into the intercom that the shocks are really really starting to hurt. You take one more punishment with a groan and decide that you can't take much more pain. After the Teacher delivers the 150-volt shock, you shout back into the intercom "That's all. Get me out of here. Get me out of here, please. Let me out." starting to hurt. You take one more punishment with a groan and decide that you can't take much more pain. After the Teacher delivers the 150-volt shock, you shout back into the intercom "That's all. Get me out of here. Get me out of here, please. Let me out."

Instead of the a.s.surance you expect from the Teacher, that he and the researcher are coming to release you, he merely gives you the next test question to answer. Surprised and confused you mumble the first answer to come into your head. It's wrong, of course, and the Teacher delivers a 165-volt shock. You scream at the Teacher to stop, to let you out. He responds only with the next test question-and with the next slashing shock, when your frenzied answer is incorrect. You can't hold down the panic any longer, the shocks are so strong now they make you writhe and shriek. You kick the wall, demand to be released, and beg the Teacher to help you. However, the test questions continue as before and so do the dreaded shocks-in searing jolts of 195, 210, 225, 240, 255, 270, 285, and 300 volts. You realize that you can't possibly answer the questions correctly now, so you shout to the Teacher that you won't answer his questions anymore. Nothing changes; the Teacher interprets your failure to respond as an incorrect response and sends another bolt. The ordeal continues in this way until, finally, the power of the shocks stuns you into near-paralysis. You can no longer cry out, no longer struggle. You can only feel each terrible electric bite. Perhaps, you think, this total inactivity will cause the Teacher to stop. There can be no reason to continue this experiment, but he proceeds relentlessly, calling out the test questions, announcing the horrid shock levels (above 400 volts now), and pulling the levers. What must this man be like, you wonder in confusion. Why doesn't he help me? Why won't he stop?

The Power of Authority Pressure For most of us, the previous scenario reads like a bad dream. To recognize how nightmarish it is, though, we should understand that, in most respects, it is real. There was such an experiment-actually, a whole series-run by a psychology professor named Milgram (1974) in which partic.i.p.ants in the Teacher role were willing to deliver continued, intense, and dangerous levels of shock to a kicking, screeching, pleading Learner. Only one major aspect of the experiment was not genuine. No real shock was delivered; the Learner, who repeatedly cried out in agony for mercy and release, was not a true subject but an actor who only pretended to be shocked. The actual purpose of Milgram's study, then, had nothing to do with the effects of punishment on learning and memory. Rather, it involved an entirely different question: When it is their job, how much suffering will ordinary people be willing to inflict on an entirely innocent other person?

The answer is most unsettling. Under circ.u.mstances mirroring precisely the features of the "bad dream," the typical Teacher was willing to deliver as much pain as was available to give. Rather than yield to the pleas of the victim, about two-thirds of the subjects in Milgram's experiment pulled every one of the 30 shock switches in front of them and continued to engage the last switch (450 volts) until the researcher ended the experiment. More alarming still, almost none of the 40 subjects in this study quit his job as Teacher when the victim first began to demand his release, nor later when he began to beg for it, nor even later when his reaction to each shock had become, in Milgram's words, "definitely an agonized scream."

These results surprised everyone a.s.sociated with the project, Milgram included. In fact, before the study began, he asked groups of colleagues, graduate students, and psychology majors at Yale University (where the experiment was performed) to read a copy of the experimental procedures and estimate how many subjects would go all the way to the last (450-volt) shock. Invariably, the answers fell in the 1-2 percent range. A separate group of 39 psychiatrists predicted that only about one person in a thousand would be willing to continue to the end. No one, then, was prepared for the behavior pattern that the experiment actually produced.

How can we explain that alarming pattern? Perhaps, as some have argued, it has to do with the fact that the subjects were all males who are known as a group for their aggressive tendencies, or that the subjects didn't recognize the potential harm that such high shock voltages could cause, or that the subjects were a freakish collection of moral cretins who enjoyed the chance to inflict misery. There is good evidence against each of these possibilities. First, a later experiment showed that the subjects' s.e.x was irrelevant to their willingness to give all the shocks to the victim; female Teachers were just as likely to do so as were the males in Milgram's initial study.

Another experiment investigated the explanation that subjects weren't aware of the potential physical danger to the victim. In this experiment the victim was instructed to announce that he had a heart condition and to declare that his heart was being affected by the shock: "That's all. Get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart's starting to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out." Once again the results were the same; 65 percent of the subjects carried out their duties faithfully through to the maximum shock.

Finally, the explanation that Milgram's subjects were a twisted, s.a.d.i.s.tic bunch not at all representative of average citizens has proven unsatisfactory as well. The people who answered Milgram's newspaper ad to partic.i.p.ate in his "memory" experiment represented a standard cross section of ages, occupations, and educational levels within our society. What's more, later on, a battery of personality scales showed these people to be quite normal psychologically, with not a hint of psychosis as a group. They were, in fact, just like you and me; or, as Milgram likes to term it, they people who answered Milgram's newspaper ad to partic.i.p.ate in his "memory" experiment represented a standard cross section of ages, occupations, and educational levels within our society. What's more, later on, a battery of personality scales showed these people to be quite normal psychologically, with not a hint of psychosis as a group. They were, in fact, just like you and me; or, as Milgram likes to term it, they are are you and me. If he is right that his studies implicate us in their grisly findings, the unanswered question becomes an uncomfortably personal one, "What could make you and me. If he is right that his studies implicate us in their grisly findings, the unanswered question becomes an uncomfortably personal one, "What could make us us do such things?" do such things?"

The Milgram Study The picture shows the Learner (victim) being strapped into a chair and fitted with electrodes by the lab-coated experimenter and the true subject.

Milgram is sure he knows the answer. It has to do, he says, with a deep-seated sense of duty to authority. According to Milgram, the real culprit in the experiments was his subjects' inability to defy the wishes of the boss, the lab-coated researcher who urged and, if necessary, directed the subjects to perform their duties, despite the emotional and physical mayhem they were causing.

The evidence supporting Milgram's obedience-to-authority explanation is strong. First, it is clear that, without the researcher's directives to continue, the subjects would have ended the experiment quickly. They hated what they were doing and agonized over their victim's anguish. They implored the researcher to let them stop. When he refused, they went on, but in the process they trembled, they perspired, they shook, they stammered protests and additional pleas for the victim's release. Their fingernails dug into their own flesh; they bit their lips until they bled; they held their heads in their hands; some fell into fits of uncontrollable nervous laughter. An outside observer to Milgram's initial experiment described one subject.

I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe and twisted his hands. At one point he pushed his fist into his forehead and muttered: "Oh, G.o.d, let's stop it." And yet he continued to respond to every word of the experimenter and obeyed to the end. (Milgram, 1963, p. 377) In addition to these observations, Milgram has provided even more convincing evidence for the obedience-to-authority interpretation of his subjects' behavior. In a later experiment, for instance, he had the researcher and the victim switch scripts so that the researcher told the Teacher to stop delivering shocks to the victim, while the victim insisted bravely that the Teacher continue. The result couldn't have been clearer; 100 percent of the subjects refused to give one additional shock when it was merely the fellow subject who demanded it. The identical finding appeared in another version of the experiment in which the researcher and fellow subject switched roles so that it was the researcher who was strapped into the chair and the fellow subject who ordered the Teacher to continue-over the protests of the researcher. Again, not one subject touched another shock lever.

The extreme degree to which subjects in Milgram's studies obeyed the orders of authority was doc.u.mented in yet another variation of the basic experiments. In this case, the Teacher faced two researchers who issued contradictory orders; one ordered the Teacher to terminate the shocks when the victim cried out for release, while the other maintained that the experiment should go on. These conflicting instructions reliably produced what may have been the project's only humor: In tragicomic befuddlement and with eyes darting from one researcher to another, subjects would beseech the pair to agree on a single command to follow, "Wait, wait. Which is it going to be? One says stop, one says go. . . . Which is it!?" When the researchers remained at loggerheads, the subjects tried frantically to determine who was the bigger boss. Failing this route to obedience with this case, the Teacher faced two researchers who issued contradictory orders; one ordered the Teacher to terminate the shocks when the victim cried out for release, while the other maintained that the experiment should go on. These conflicting instructions reliably produced what may have been the project's only humor: In tragicomic befuddlement and with eyes darting from one researcher to another, subjects would beseech the pair to agree on a single command to follow, "Wait, wait. Which is it going to be? One says stop, one says go. . . . Which is it!?" When the researchers remained at loggerheads, the subjects tried frantically to determine who was the bigger boss. Failing this route to obedience with the the authority, every subject finally followed his better instincts and ended the shocks. As in the other experimental variations, such a result would hardly be expected had the subjects' motivations involved some form of sadism or neurotic aggressiveness. authority, every subject finally followed his better instincts and ended the shocks. As in the other experimental variations, such a result would hardly be expected had the subjects' motivations involved some form of sadism or neurotic aggressiveness.1 1The basic experiment, as well as all these and other variations on it, is presented in Milgram's highly readable Obedience to Authority Obedience to Authority, 1974. A review of much of the subsequent research on obedience can be found in Bla.s.s (2004).

To Milgram's mind, evidence of a chilling phenomenon emerges repeatedly from his acc.u.mulated data. "It is the extreme willingness of adults to go to almost any lengths on the command of an authority that const.i.tutes the chief finding of the study" (Milgram, 1974). There are sobering implications of this finding for those concerned about the ability of another form of authority-government-to extract frightening levels of obedience from ordinary citizens.2 Furthermore, the finding tells us something about the sheer strength of authority pressures in controlling our behavior. After witnessing Milgram's subjects squirming and sweating and suffering at their task, could anyone doubt the power of the force that held them there? Furthermore, the finding tells us something about the sheer strength of authority pressures in controlling our behavior. After witnessing Milgram's subjects squirming and sweating and suffering at their task, could anyone doubt the power of the force that held them there?

2In fact, Milgram first began his investigations in an attempt to understand how the German citizenry could have partic.i.p.ated in the concentration camp destruction of millions of innocents during the years of n.a.z.i ascendancy. After testing his experimental procedures in the United States, he had planned to take them to Germany, a country whose populace he was sure would provide enough obedience for a full-flown scientific a.n.a.lysis of the concept. The first eye-opening experiment in New Haven, Connecticut, however, make it clear that he could save his money and stay close to home. "I found so much obedience," he said, "I hardly saw the need of taking the experiment to Germany."

But Americans have no monopoly on the need to obey authority. When Milgram's basic procedure was eventually repeated in Holland, Germany, Spain, Italy, Australia, and Jordan, the results were similar (see Meeus & Raaijmakers, 1986, for a review). Nor has the pa.s.sage of decades diminished the applicability of Milgram's results. A recent study that replicated several of his experimental features found no significant differences between Milgram's subjects and a modern day sample (Burger, in press).

For those whose doubts remain, the story of S. Brian Willson might prove instructive. On September 1, 1987, to protest U.S. shipments of military equipment to Nicaragua, Mr. Willson and two other men stretched their bodies across the railroad tracks leading out of the Naval Weapons Station in Concord, California. The protesters were confident that their act would halt the scheduled train's progress that day, as they had notified navy and railroad officials of their intent three days before. But the civilian crew, which had been given orders not to stop, never even slowed the train, despite being able to see the protesters 600 feet ahead. Although two of the men managed to scramble out of harm's way, Mr. Willson was not quick enough to avoid being struck and having both legs severed below the knee. Because navy medical corpsmen at the scene refused to treat him or allow him to be taken to the hospital in their ambulance, onlookers-including Mr. Willson's wife and son-were left to try to staunch the flow of blood for 45 minutes until a private ambulance arrived. slowed the train, despite being able to see the protesters 600 feet ahead. Although two of the men managed to scramble out of harm's way, Mr. Willson was not quick enough to avoid being struck and having both legs severed below the knee. Because navy medical corpsmen at the scene refused to treat him or allow him to be taken to the hospital in their ambulance, onlookers-including Mr. Willson's wife and son-were left to try to staunch the flow of blood for 45 minutes until a private ambulance arrived.

Amazingly, Mr. Willson, who served four years in Vietnam, does not blame either the crewmen or the corpsmen for his misfortune; he points his finger, instead, at a system that constrained their actions through the pressure to obey. "They were just doing what I did in 'Nam. They were following orders that are part of an insane policy. They're the fall guys." Although the crew members shared Mr. Willson's a.s.sessment of them as victims, they did not share his magnanimity. In what is perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the incident, the train crew filed suit against him him, requesting punitive damages for the "humiliation, mental anguish, and physical stress" they suffered because he hadn't allowed them to carry out their orders without cutting off his legs.

The Allures and Dangers of Blind Obedience Whenever we are faced with a potent motivator of human action, it is natural to expect that good reasons exist for the motivation. In the case of obedience to authority, even a brief consideration of human social organization offers justification aplenty. A multilayered and widely accepted system of authority confers an immense advantage upon a society. It allows the development of sophisticated structures for production of resources, trade, defense, expansion, and social control that would otherwise be impossible. At the opposite end, the alternative is anarchy, a state hardly known for its beneficial effects on cultural groups and one that the social philosopher Thomas Hobbes a.s.sures us would render life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Consequently, we are trained from birth to believe that obedience to proper authority is right and disobedience is wrong. This message fills the parental lessons, the schoolhouse rhymes, stories, and songs of our childhood and is carried forward in the legal, military, and political systems we encounter as adults. Notions of submission and loyalty to legitimate rule are accorded much value in each.

Religious instruction contributes as well. The very first book of the Bible, for example, describes how failure to obey the ultimate authority resulted in the loss of paradise for Adam, Eve, and the rest of the human race. Should that particular metaphor prove too subtle, just a bit further into the Old Testament, we can read-in what might be the closest biblical representation of the Milgram experiment-the respectful account of Abraham's willingness to plunge a dagger through the heart of his young son because G.o.d, without any explanation, ordered it. We learn in this story that the correctness of an action was not judged by such considerations as apparent senselessness, harmfulness, injustice, or usual moral standards, but by the mere command of a higher authority. Abraham's tormented ordeal was a test of obedience, and he-like Milgram's subjects, who perhaps had learned an early lesson from him-pa.s.sed. but by the mere command of a higher authority. Abraham's tormented ordeal was a test of obedience, and he-like Milgram's subjects, who perhaps had learned an early lesson from him-pa.s.sed.

Stories like those of Abraham and Milgram's subjects can tell us a great deal about obedience's power and value in our culture. In another sense, however, the stories may be misleading. We rarely agonize to such a degree over the pros and cons of authority demands. In fact, our obedience frequently takes place in a click click, whirr whirr fashion with little or no conscious deliberation. Information from a recognized authority can provide us a valuable shortcut for deciding how to act in a situation. fashion with little or no conscious deliberation. Information from a recognized authority can provide us a valuable shortcut for deciding how to act in a situation.

After all, as Milgram suggests, conforming to the dictates of authority figures has always had genuine practical advantages for us. Early on, these people (parents, teachers) knew more than we did, and we found that taking their advice proved beneficial-partly because of their greater wisdom and partly because they controlled our rewards and punishments. As adults, the same benefits persist for the same reasons, though the authority figures are now employers, judges, and government leaders. Because their positions speak of greater access to information and power, it makes sense to comply with the wishes of properly const.i.tuted authorities. It makes so much sense, in fact, that we often do so when it makes no sense at all.

This paradox is, of course, the same one that attends all major weapons of influence. In this instance, once we realize that obedience to authority is mostly rewarding, it is easy to allow ourselves the convenience of automatic obedience. The simultaneous blessing and curse of such blind obedience is its mechanical character. We don't have to think, therefore we don't. Although such mindless obedience leads us to appropriate action most of the time, there will be conspicuous exceptions because we are reacting, not thinking.

Let's take an example from one facet of our lives in which authority pressures are visible and strong: medicine. Health is enormously important to us. Thus, physicians, who possess great knowledge and influence in this vital area, hold the position of respected authorities. In addition, the medical establishment has a clearly terraced power and prestige structure. The various kinds of health workers well understand the level of their jobs in this structure, and they well understand, too, that M.D.s sit at the top. No one may overrule a doctor's judgment in a case, except, perhaps, another doctor of higher rank. Consequently, a long-established tradition of automatic obedience to doctors' orders has developed among health care staffs.

The worrisome possibility arises, then, that when a physician makes a clear error, no one lower in the hierarchy will think think to question it-precisely because, once a legitimate authority has given an order, subordinates stop to question it-precisely because, once a legitimate authority has given an order, subordinates stop thinking thinking in the situation and start reacting. Mix this kind of in the situation and start reacting. Mix this kind of click, whirr click, whirr response into a complex hospital environment and mistakes are inevitable. Indeed, according to the Inst.i.tute of Medicine, which advises the U.S. Congress on health policy, hospitalized patients can expect to experience at least one medication error per day (Szabo, 2007). response into a complex hospital environment and mistakes are inevitable. Indeed, according to the Inst.i.tute of Medicine, which advises the U.S. Congress on health policy, hospitalized patients can expect to experience at least one medication error per day (Szabo, 2007).

Errors in the medicine patients receive can occur for a variety of reasons. However, in their book Medication Errors: Causes and Prevention Medication Errors: Causes and Prevention, Temple University professors of pharmacy Michael Cohen and Neil Davis attribute much of the problem to the mindless deference given to the "boss" of a patient's case: the attending physician. According to Cohen, "in case after case, patients, nurses, pharmacists, and other physicians do not question the prescription." Take, for example, the strange case of the "rectal earache" reported by Cohen and Davis. A physician ordered ear drops to be administered to the right ear of a patient suffering pain and infection there. Instead of writing out completely the location "Right ear" on the prescription, the doctor abbreviated it so that the instructions read "place in R ear." Upon receiving the prescription, the duty nurse promptly put the required number of ear drops into the patient's a.n.u.s.

Obviously, rectal treatment of an earache made no sense, but neither the patient nor the nurse questioned it. The important lesson of this story is that in many situations in which a legitimate authority has spoken, what would otherwise make sense is irrelevant. In these instances, we don't consider the situation as a whole but attend and respond to only one aspect of it.

Who's Really the King?

Communication researchers have learned that, in conversations, people unconsciously shift their voice and speech styles toward the styles of individuals in positions of power and authority. One study explored this phenomenon by a.n.a.lyzing interviews on the Larry King Live Larry King Live television show. When King interviewed guests having great social standing and prestige (for instance, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barbara Streisand), his voice style changed to match theirs. But when he interviewed guests of lower status (for instance, Dan Quayle, Spike Lee, and Julie Andrews), he remained unmoved, and their voice styles shifted to match his (Gregory & Webster, 1996). television show. When King interviewed guests having great social standing and prestige (for instance, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Barbara Streisand), his voice style changed to match theirs. But when he interviewed guests of lower status (for instance, Dan Quayle, Spike Lee, and Julie Andrews), he remained unmoved, and their voice styles shifted to match his (Gregory & Webster, 1996).

READER'S REPORT 6.1 From a Texas-Based University Professor

I grew up in an Italian ghetto in Warren, Pennsylvania. I occasionally return home to visit family and the like. As in most places these days, most of the small Italian specialty stores are gone, having been replaced by larger supermarkets. My mother sent me supermarket shopping during a visit for a load of canned tomatoes, and I noticed that nearly all the cans of Furmano Italian diced tomatoes were sold out. Searching a bit on the shelf immediately beneath the almost empty shelf, I found a full shelf (loaded, even!) of Furman brand diced tomatoes. Looking closely at the labels, I realized that Furmano is Furman. The company had just added an "o" to its name when distributing some of its products. I guess it must be because, when selling Italian-style foods, you're perceived as more of an authority if your name ends in a vowel.

Author's note: The man who wrote this report also commented that the added letter "o" was doing double duty as an influence trigger in that store. Not only did it lend authority to the manufacturer, in an "Italian ghetto," it made the company appear similar to its customers. The man who wrote this report also commented that the added letter "o" was doing double duty as an influence trigger in that store. Not only did it lend authority to the manufacturer, in an "Italian ghetto," it made the company appear similar to its customers.

Whenever our behaviors are governed in such an unthinking manner, we can be confident that there will be compliance professionals trying to take advantage. Returning to the field of medicine, we can see that advertisers have frequently commissioned the respect accorded doctors in our culture by hiring actors to play the roles of doctors speaking on behalf of the product. My favorite example was a TV commercial featuring the actor Robert Young warning people against the dangers of caffeine and recommending caffeine-free Sanka brand coffee. The commercial was highly successful, selling so much Sanka that it was played for years in several versions. Why should this commercial prove so effective? Why on earth would we take Robert Young's word for the health consequences of decaffeinated coffee? Because-as the advertising agency that hired him knew perfectly well-he was a.s.sociated in the minds of the American public with Marcus Welby, M.D., the role he played in an earlier long-running television series. Objectively, it doesn't make sense to be swayed by the comments of a man we know to be just an actor who used to play a doctor; but, practically, that man sold the Sanka.

Not long ago, with comparable intent, the credit card purveyor MasterCard initiated a "Family Holiday Traditions" promotion that allowed women to chat on-line with authorities on how they, as mothers, could prepare their homes for the holidays, establish family traditions, and purchase perfect holiday gifts (using their MasterCards, of course). Who were the experts chosen to provide the informed counsel? They were the actresses Florence Henderson and Jane Kaczmarek, whose authority credentials in these regards appeared to come solely from their roles as "TV Moms" on the television shows credentials in these regards appeared to come solely from their roles as "TV Moms" on the television shows The Brady Bunch The Brady Bunch and and Malcolm in the Middle Malcolm in the Middle.3 3Instructive of the reach of the authority principle is evidence that ersatz experts are given credence in domains beyond medicine and homemaking. For instance, in a January 24, 2001 TV interview with actor Martin Sheen, host Brian Williams pursued a line of questions regarding Mr. Sheen's views of the appropriateness of presidential decisions to accept gifts and to pardon criminals just before leaving office. Mr. Sheen dutifully offered his opinions even though his relevant experience to that point was limited to playing the role of a U.S. president on the TV series West Wing West Wing.

Connotation Not Content From the first time I saw it, I found the most intriguing feature of Robert Young's Sanka commercial to be its ability to use the influence of the authority principle without ever providing a real authority. The appearance of authority was enough. This tells us something important about unthinking reactions to authority figures. When in a click, whirr click, whirr mode, we are often as vulnerable to the symbols of authority as to the substance. mode, we are often as vulnerable to the symbols of authority as to the substance.

Several of these symbols can reliably trigger our compliance in the absence of the genuine substance of authority. Consequently, these symbols are employed extensively by those compliance professionals who are short on substance. Con artists, for example, drape themselves with the t.i.tles, the clothes, and the trappings of authority. They love nothing more than to emerge elegantly dressed from a fine automobile and to introduce themselves to their prospective "marks" as Doctor or Judge or Professor or Commissioner Someone. They understand that when they are so adorned their chances for compliance are greatly increased. Each of these three types of symbols of authority-t.i.tles, clothes, and trappings-has its own story and is worth a separate look.

t.i.tles t.i.tles are simultaneously the most difficult and the easiest symbols of authority to acquire. To earn a t.i.tle normally takes years of work and achievement. Yet, it is possible for somebody who has put in none of this effort to adopt the mere label and receive a kind of automatic deference. As we have seen, actors in TV commercials and con artists do it successfully all the time.

I recently talked with a friend-a faculty member at a well-known eastern university-who provided a telling ill.u.s.tration of the way our actions are frequently more influenced by a t.i.tle than by the nature of the person claiming it. My friend travels quite a bit and often finds himself chatting with strangers in bars, restaurants, and airports. He says that he has learned through much experience during these conversations never to use his t.i.tle of professor. When he does, he finds that the tenor of the interaction changes immediately. People who have been spontaneous and interesting conversation partners for the previous half hour become respectful, accepting, and dull. His opinions that before may have produced a lively exchange now generate extended (and highly grammatical) statements of accord. Annoyed and slightly bewildered by the phenomenon-because as he says, "I'm still the same guy they've been talking to for the last 30 minutes, right?"-my friend now regularly lies about his occupation in such situations. and interesting conversation partners for the previous half hour become respectful, accepting, and dull. His opinions that before may have produced a lively exchange now generate extended (and highly grammatical) statements of accord. Annoyed and slightly bewildered by the phenomenon-because as he says, "I'm still the same guy they've been talking to for the last 30 minutes, right?"-my friend now regularly lies about his occupation in such situations.

What an eccentric shift from the more typical pattern in which certain compliance pract.i.tioners lie about t.i.tles they don't don't truly have. Either way, however, such practiced dishonesty makes the same point about the ability of a symbol of authority to influence behavior. truly have. Either way, however, such practiced dishonesty makes the same point about the ability of a symbol of authority to influence behavior.

I wonder whether my professor friend-who is somewhat short-would be so eager to hide his t.i.tle if he knew that, besides making strangers more accommodating, it also makes them see him as taller. Studies investigating the way in which authority status affects perceptions of size have found that prestigious t.i.tles lead to height distortions. In one experiment conducted on five cla.s.ses of Australian college students, a man was introduced as a visitor from Cambridge University in England. However, his status at Cambridge was represented differently in each of the cla.s.ses. To one cla.s.s, he was presented as a student; to a second cla.s.s, a demonstrator; to another, a lecturer; to yet another, a senior lecturer; to a fifth, a professor. After he left the room, the cla.s.s was asked to estimate his height. It was found that with each increase in status, the same man grew in perceived height by an average of a half-inch, so that as the "professor" he was seen as 2 inches taller than as the "student" (P. R. Wilson, 1968). Another study found that after winning an election, politicians become taller in the eyes of the citizenry (Higham & Carment, 1992).

Because we see size and status as related, it is possible for certain individuals to benefit by subst.i.tuting the former for the latter. In some animal societies, in which the status of an animal is a.s.signed on the basis of dominance, size is an important factor in determining which animal will achieve which status level in the group.4 4Subhumans are not alone in this regard, even in modern times. For example, since 1900 the U.S. presidency has been won by the taller of the major party candidates in nearly 90 percent of the elections. Research suggests that the height advantage may also apply to candidates for affection in contests of the heart: women are significantly more likely to respond to a man's published personal ad when he describes himself as tall. Interestingly for female ad-runners, size works in the opposite direction. Women who report being short and weighing less get more male/mail action (Lynn & Shurgot, 1984; Shepperd & Strathman, 1989).