In support of this interpretation, news stories began appearing regularly in which various kinds of public apathy were detailed. Also supporting such an interpretation were the remarks of a range of armchair social commentators, who, as a breed, seem never to admit to bafflement when speaking to the press. They, too, saw the Genovese case as having large-scale social significance. All used the word apathy apathy, which, it is interesting to note, had been in the headline of the Times' Times' front-page story, although they accounted for the apathy differently. One attributed it to the effects of TV violence, another to repressed aggressiveness, but most implicated the "depersonalization" of urban life with its "megalopolitan societies" and its "alienation of the individual from the group." Even Rosenthal, the newsman who first broke the story and who ultimately made it the subject of a book, subscribed to the city-caused apathy theory. front-page story, although they accounted for the apathy differently. One attributed it to the effects of TV violence, another to repressed aggressiveness, but most implicated the "depersonalization" of urban life with its "megalopolitan societies" and its "alienation of the individual from the group." Even Rosenthal, the newsman who first broke the story and who ultimately made it the subject of a book, subscribed to the city-caused apathy theory.

n.o.body can say why the 38 did not lift the phone while Miss Genovese was being attacked, since they cannot say themselves. It can be a.s.sumed, however, that their apathy was indeed one of the big-city variety. It is almost a matter of psychological survival, if one is surrounded and pressed by millions of people, to prevent them from constantly impinging on you, and the only way to do this is to ignore them as often as possible. Indifference to one's neighbor and his troubles is a conditioned reflex in life in New York as it is in other big cities. (A. M. Rosenthal, 1964, pp. 8283) As the Genovese story grew-aside from Rosenthal's book, it became the focus of numerous newspaper and magazine pieces, several television news doc.u.mentaries, and an off-Broadway play-it attracted the professional attention of a pair of New York-based psychology professors, Bibb Latane and John Darley (1968b). They examined the reports of the Genovese incident and, on the basis of their knowledge of social psychology, hit on what had seemed like the most unlikely explanation of all-the fact that 38 witnesses were present. Previous accounts of the story had invariably emphasized that no action was taken, even though even though 38 individuals had looked on. Latane and Darley suggested that no one had helped precisely 38 individuals had looked on. Latane and Darley suggested that no one had helped precisely because because there were so many observers. there were so many observers.

The psychologists speculated that, for at least two reasons, a bystander to an emergency will be unlikely to help when there are a number of other bystanders present. The first reason is fairly straightforward. With several potential helpers around, the personal responsibility of each individual is reduced With several potential helpers around, the personal responsibility of each individual is reduced: "Perhaps someone else will give or call for aid, perhaps someone else already has." So with everyone thinking that someone else will help or has helped, no one does. The second reason is the more psychologically intriguing one; it is founded on the principle of social proof and involves the pluralistic ignorance effect. Very often an emergency is not obviously an emergency. Is the man lying in the alley a heart-attack victim or a drunk sleeping one off? Is the commotion next door an a.s.sault requiring the police or an especially loud marital spat where intervention would be inappropriate and unwelcome? What is going on? In times of such uncertainty, the natural tendency is to look around at the actions of others for clues. We can learn from the way the other witnesses are reacting whether the event is or is not an emergency.

What is easy to forget, though, is that everybody else observing the event is likely to be looking for social evidence, too. Because we all prefer to appear poised and unfl.u.s.tered among others, we are likely to search for that evidence placidly, with brief, camouflaged glances at those around us. Therefore everyone is likely to see everyone else looking unruffled and failing to act. As a result, and by the principle of social proof, the event will be roundly interpreted as a nonemergency. This, according to Latane and Darley (1968b) is the state of pluralistic ignorance "in which each person decided that since n.o.body is concerned, nothing is wrong. Meanwhile, the danger may be mounting to the point where a single individual, uninfluenced by the seeming calm of others, would would react." react."5 5The potentially tragic consequences of the pluralistic ignorance phenomenon are starkly ill.u.s.trated in a UPI news release from Chicago:

A university coed was beaten and strangled in daylight hours near one of the most popular tourist attractions in the city, police said Sat.u.r.day.

The nude body of Lee Alexis Wilson, 23, was found Friday in dense shrubbery alongside the wall of the Art Inst.i.tute by a 12-year-old boy playing in the bushes.

Police theorized she may have been sitting or standing by a fountain in the Art Inst.i.tute's south plaza when she was attacked. The a.s.sailant apparently then dragged her into the bushes. She apparently was s.e.xually a.s.saulted, police said.

Police said thousands of persons must have pa.s.sed the site and one man told them he heard a scream about 2 P P.M. but did not investigate because no one else seemed to be paying attention.

A Scientific Approach The fascinating upshot of Latane and Darley's reasoning is that, for an emergency victim, the idea of "safety in numbers" may often be completely wrong. It might be that someone in need of emergency aid would have a better chance of survival if a single bystander, rather than a crowd, were present. To test this unusual thesis, Darley, Latane, their students, and colleagues performed a systematic and impressive program of research that produced a clear set of findings (for a review, see Latane & Nida, 1981). Their basic procedure was to stage emergency events that were observed by a single individual or by a group of people. They then recorded the number of times the emergency victim received help under those circ.u.mstances. In their first experiment (Darley & Latane, 1968), a New York college student who appeared to be having an epileptic seizure received help 85 percent of the time when there was a single bystander present but only 31 percent of time with five bystanders present. With almost all the single bystanders helping, it becomes difficult to argue that ours is "The Cold Society" where no one cares for suffering others. Obviously it was something about the presence of other bystanders that reduced helping to shameful levels.

Victim?

At times like this one, when the need for emergency aid is unclear, even genuine victims are unlikely to be helped in a crowd. Think how, if you were a second pa.s.serby in this situation, you might be influenced by the first pa.s.serby to believe that no aid was called for.

Other studies have examined the importance of social proof in causing widespread witness "apathy." They have done so by planting within a group of witnesses to a possible emergency people who are rehea.r.s.ed to act as if no emergency were occurring. For instance, in another New York-based experiment (Latane & Darley, 1968a), 75 percent of lone individuals who observed smoke seeping from under a door reported the leak; however, when similar leaks were observed by three-person groups, the smoke was reported only 38 percent of the time. The smallest number of bystanders took action, though, when the three-person groups included two individuals who had been coached to ignore the smoke; under those conditions, the leaks were reported only 10 percent of time. In a similar study conducted in Toronto (A. S. Ross, 1971), single bystanders provided emergency aid 90 percent of the time, whereas such aid occurred in only 16 percent of the cases when a bystander was in the presence of two pa.s.sive bystanders.

Social scientists now have a good idea of when bystanders will offer emergency aid. First, and contrary to the view that we have become a society of callous, uncaring people, once witnesses are convinced that an emergency situation exists, aid is very likely. Under these conditions, the number of bystanders who either intervene themselves or summon help is quite comforting. For example, in four separate experiments done in Florida (R. D. Clark & Word, 1972, 1974), accident scenes involving a maintenance man were staged. When it was clear that the man was hurt and required a.s.sistance, he was helped 100 percent of the time in two of the experiments. In the other two experiments, where helping involved contact with potentially dangerous electric wires, the victim still received bystander aid in 90 percent of the instances. In addition, these extremely high levels of a.s.sistance occurred whether the witnesses observed the event singly or in groups.

The situation becomes very different when, as in many cases, bystanders cannot be sure that the event they are witnessing is an emergency. Then a victim is much more likely to be helped by a lone bystander than by a group, especially if the people in the group are strangers to one another (Latane & Rodin, 1969). It seems that the pluralistic ignorance effect is strongest among strangers: Because we like to look graceful and sophisticated in public and because we are unfamiliar with the reactions of those we do not know, we are unlikely to give off or correctly read expressions of concern when in a group of strangers. Therefore, a possible emergency is viewed as a nonemergency and a victim suffers.

A close look at this set of research findings reveals an enlightening pattern. All the conditions that decrease an emergency victim's chances for bystander aid exist normally and innocently in the city, in contrast to rural areas: 1. Cities are more clamorous, distracting, rapidly changing places where it is difficult to be certain of the nature of the events one encounters.

2. Urban environments are more populous; consequently, people are more likely to be with others when witnessing a potential emergency situation.

3. City dwellers know a much smaller percentage of fellow residents than do people who live in small towns; therefore, city dwellers are more likely to find themselves in a group of strangers when observing an emergency.

These three natural characteristics of urban environments-their confusion, their populousness, and their low levels of acquaintanceship-fit in very well with the factors shown by research to decrease bystander aid. Without ever having to resort to such sinister concepts as "urban depersonalization" and "megalopolitan alienation," then, we can explain why so many instances of bystander inaction occur in our cities.

I am not optimistic, though, that commentators will typically engage in such an explanation. For example, after a British Internet news service described yet another "bystander apathy" case (a woman collapsed by the side of a London street and drivers failed to stop), almost all of the email responses blamed the coa.r.s.eness of modern life, especially urban life, in which onlookers blithely determine themselves too busy to get involved (Roadside Victim Emails, 2004). The possibility appears not to have occurred to the emailers that perhaps no one helped because of the natural environmental features of cities rather than the sinister psychological features of city dwellers. To explain a lack of victim a.s.sistance, it means something very different to say that bystanders failed to help because they they were busy versus because the were busy versus because the street street on which the incident occurred was busy. However, an understanding of the difference gives us a great advantage should we ever find ourselves in need of such aid. on which the incident occurred was busy. However, an understanding of the difference gives us a great advantage should we ever find ourselves in need of such aid.

Devictimizing Yourself Explaining the dangers of modern urban life in less ominous terms does not dispel them. Furthermore, as the world's populations move increasingly to the cities-half of all humanity will be city dwellers within a decade-there will be a growing need to reduce those dangers. Fortunately, our newfound understanding of the bystander "apathy" process offers real hope. Armed with this scientific knowledge, an emergency victim can increase enormously the chances of receiving aid from others. The key is the realization that groups of bystanders fail to help because the bystanders are unsure rather than unkind. They don't help because they are unsure an emergency actually exists and whether they are responsible for taking action. When they are sure of their responsibilities for intervening in a clear emergency, people are exceedingly responsive!

Once it is understood that the enemy is the simple state of uncertainty, it becomes possible for emergency victims to reduce this uncertainty, thereby protecting themselves. Imagine, for example, you are spending a summer afternoon at a music concert in a park. As the concert ends and people begin leaving, you notice a slight numbness in one arm but dismiss it as nothing to be alarmed about. Yet, while moving with the crowd to the distant parking areas, you feel the numbness spreading down to your hand and up one side of your face. Feeling disoriented, you decide to sit against a tree for a moment to rest. Soon you realize that something is drastically wrong. Sitting down has not helped; in fact, the control and coordination of your muscles has worsened, and you are starting to have difficulty moving your mouth and tongue to speak. You try to get up but can't. A terrifying thought rushes to mind: "Oh, G.o.d, I'm having a stroke!" Groups of people are pa.s.sing by and most are paying no attention. The few who notice the odd way you are slumped against the tree or the strange look on your face check the social evidence around them and, seeing that no one else is reacting with concern, walk on convinced that nothing is wrong.

Were you to find yourself in such a predicament, what could you do to overcome the odds against receiving help? Because your physical abilities would be deteriorating, time would be crucial. If, before you could summon aid, you lost your speech or mobility or consciousness, your chances for a.s.sistance and for recovery would plunge drastically. It would be essential to try to request help quickly. What would be the most effective form of that request? Moans, groans, or outcries probably would not do. They might bring you some attention, but they would not provide enough information to a.s.sure pa.s.sersby that a true emergency existed.

If mere outcries are unlikely to produce help from the pa.s.sing crowd, perhaps you should be more specific. Indeed, you need to do more than try to gain attention; you should call out clearly your need for a.s.sistance. You must not allow bystanders to define your situation as a nonemergency. Use the word "Help" to show your need for emergency aid, and don't worry about being wrong. Embarra.s.sment is a villain to be crushed. If you think you are having a stroke, you cannot afford to be worried about the possibility of overestimating your problem. The difference is that between a moment of embarra.s.sment and possible death or lifelong paralysis.

Even a resounding call for help is not your most effective tactic. Although it may reduce bystanders' doubts that a real emergency exists, it will not remove several other important uncertainties within each onlooker's mind: What kind of aid is required? Should I be the one to provide the aid, or should someone more qualified do it? Has someone else already gone to get professional help, or is it my responsibility? While the bystanders stand gawking at you and grappling with these questions, time vital to your survival could he slipping away.

Clearly, then, as a victim you must do more than alert bystanders to your need for emergency a.s.sistance; you must also remove their uncertainties about how that a.s.sistance should be provided and who should provide it. What would be the most efficient and reliable way to do so?

Based on the research findings we have seen, my advice would be to isolate one individual from the crowd: Stare, speak, and point directly at that person and no one else: "You, sir, in the blue jacket, I need help. Call an ambulance." With that one utterance you would dispel all the uncertainties that might prevent or delay help. With that one statement you will have put the man in the blue jacket in the role of "rescuer." He should now understand that emergency aid is needed; he should understand that he, not someone else, is responsible for providing the aid; and, finally, he should understand exactly how to provide it. All the scientific evidence indicates that the result should be quick, effective a.s.sistance.

READER'S REPORT 4.1 From a Woman Living in Wroclaw, Poland

I was going through a well-lighted road crossing when I thought I saw somebody fall into a ditch left by workers. The ditch was well protected, and I was not sure if I really saw it-maybe it was just imagination. One year ago, I would continue on my way, believing that people who had been closer saw better. But I had read your book. So, I stopped and returned to check if it was true. And it was. A man fell into this hole and was lying there shocked. The ditch was quite deep, so people walking nearby couldn't see anything. When I tried to do something, two guys walking on this street stopped to help me pull the man out.

Today, the newspapers wrote that during the last three weeks of winter, 120 people died in Poland, frozen. This guy could have been 121-that night the temperature was 21C.

He should be grateful to your book that he is alive.

Author's note: Several years ago, I was involved in a rather serious automobile accident that occurred at an intersection. Both I and the other driver were hurt: He was slumped, unconscious, over his steering wheel while I had staggered, b.l.o.o.d.y, from behind mine. Cars began to roll slowly past us; their drivers gawked but did not stop. Like the Polish woman, I had read the book, too; so, I knew what to do. I pointed directly at the driver of one car: "Call the police." To a second and third driver: "Pull over, we need help." Not only was their aid rapid, it was infectious. More drivers began stopping-spontaneously-to tend to the other victim. The principle of social proof was working for us now. The trick had been to get the ball rolling in the direction of help. Once that was accomplished, social proof's natural momentum did the rest. Several years ago, I was involved in a rather serious automobile accident that occurred at an intersection. Both I and the other driver were hurt: He was slumped, unconscious, over his steering wheel while I had staggered, b.l.o.o.d.y, from behind mine. Cars began to roll slowly past us; their drivers gawked but did not stop. Like the Polish woman, I had read the book, too; so, I knew what to do. I pointed directly at the driver of one car: "Call the police." To a second and third driver: "Pull over, we need help." Not only was their aid rapid, it was infectious. More drivers began stopping-spontaneously-to tend to the other victim. The principle of social proof was working for us now. The trick had been to get the ball rolling in the direction of help. Once that was accomplished, social proof's natural momentum did the rest.

In general, then, your best strategy when in need of emergency help is to reduce the uncertainties of those around you concerning your condition and their responsibilities. Be as precise as possible about your need for aid. Do not allow bystanders to come to their own conclusions because, especially in a crowd, the principle of social proof and the consequent pluralistic ignorance effect might well cause them to view your situation as a nonemergency. Of all the techniques in this book designed to produce compliance with a request, this one is the most important to remember. After all, the failure of your request for emergency aid could mean your life.

Monkey Me, Monkey Do A bit earlier I stated that the principle of social proof, like all other weapons of influence, works better under some conditions than under others. We have already explored one of those conditions: uncertainty. Without question, when people are uncertain, they are more likely to use others' actions to decide how they themselves should act. In addition, there is another important working condition: similarity. The principle of social proof operates most powerfully when we are observing the behavior of people just like us (Festinger, 1954; Platow et al., 2005). It is the conduct of such people that gives us the greatest insight into what const.i.tutes correct behavior for ourselves. Therefore, we are more inclined to follow the lead of a similar individual than a dissimilar one (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Burn, 1991; Schultz, 1999).

That is why I believe we are seeing an increasing number of average-person-on-the-street testimonials on TV these days. Advertisers now know that one successful way to sell a product to ordinary viewers (who compose the largest potential market) is to demonstrate that other "ordinary" people like and use it. Whether the product is a brand of soft drink or a pain reliever or a laundry detergent, we hear volleys of praise from John or Mary Everyperson.

More compelling evidence for the importance of similarity in determining whether we will imitate another's behavior comes from scientific research. An especially apt ill.u.s.tration can be found in a study of a fund-raising effort conducted on a college campus (Aune & Basil, 1994). Donations to charity more than doubled when the requester claimed to be similar to the donation targets, saying "I'm a student here, too," and implying that, therefore, they should want to support the same cause. These results suggest an important qualification of the principle of social proof. We will use the actions of others to decide on proper behavior for ourselves, especially when we view those others to be similar to ourselves especially when we view those others to be similar to ourselves (Park, 2001; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). (Park, 2001; Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001).

This tendency applies not only to adults but to children as well. Health researchers have found, for example, that a school-based antismoking program had lasting effects only when it used same-age peer leaders as teachers (Murray, Leupker, Johnson, & Mittlemark, 1984). Another study found that children who saw a film depicting a child's positive visit to the dentist lowered their own dental anxieties princ.i.p.ally when they were the same age as the child in the film (Melamed, Yurcheson, Fleece, Hutcherson, & Hawes, 1978). I wish I had known about this second study when, a few years before it was published, I was trying to reduce a different kind of anxiety in my son, Chris.

I live in Arizona where backyard swimming pools abound. Regrettably, each year, several young children drown after falling into an unattended pool. I was determined, therefore, to teach Chris how to swim at an early age. The problem was not that he was afraid of the water; he loved it, but he would not get into the pool without wearing his inflatable inner tube, no matter how I tried to coax, talk, or shame him out of it. After getting nowhere for two months, I hired a graduate student of mine to help. Despite his background as a lifeguard and swimming instructor, he failed as I had. He couldn't persuade Chris to attempt even a stroke outside of his plastic ring.

About this time, Chris was attending a day camp that provided a number of activities to its group, including the use of a large pool, which he scrupulously avoided. One day, shortly after the graduate student incident, I went to get Chris from camp and, with my mouth agape, watched him run down the diving board and jump into the deepest part of the pool. Panicked, I began pulling off my shoes to jump in to his rescue when I saw him bob to the surface and paddle safely to the side of the pool-where I dashed, shoes in hand, to meet him.

READER'S REPORT 4.2 From a University Teacher in Arkansas

During the summers of my college years, I sold Bible reference books door to door in Tennessee, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Kansas. Of interest was how my sales improved when I finally came up with the idea of using names/testimonials from female customers with female prospects, males with males, and couples with couples. After a total of 15 weeks on the job, I was averaging a respectable $550.80 per week by closely following the canned sales talk the company had taught us, which emphasized the features of the books.

But, a new sales manager began teaching us to sprinkle our presentations with the names of previous customers-for example, "Sue Johnson wanted to get the set so she could read Bible stories to her kids." I began following this approach in week 16, and I found that during weeks 1619 my weekly sales average jumped to $893, a 62.13% increase! There is more to the story, however. I explicitly remember that during my 19th week, it dawned on me that while using the names had increased my sales overall, it had also made me lose some sales. The key event happened when I was presenting one day to a housewife. She seemed interested in the books but couldn't decide if she should order or not. At this point, I mentioned some married friends of hers who had bought. She then said something like, "Mary and Bill bought . . . ? Well, I had better talk to Harold before deciding. It would be better if we decided together."

Thinking about this incident over the next day or so, everything began to make sense. If I told a housewife about another couple couple who had bought, I was inadvertently supplying her with a good reason not to buy right then-she would need to talk with her husband first. However, if many other housewives like her were buying, it must be okay for her to buy too. From that point on, I resolved that I would use only the names of other housewives when presenting to a housewife. My sales the next week shot up to $1506. I soon extended this strategy to husbands and couples, using only the names of males when presenting to males and only the names of couples when presenting to couples. During the next (and last) 20 weeks of my sales career, I averaged $1209.15. The reason my sales dropped off a bit toward the end was that I was making so much money, I found it difficult to motivate myself to go out and work very hard. who had bought, I was inadvertently supplying her with a good reason not to buy right then-she would need to talk with her husband first. However, if many other housewives like her were buying, it must be okay for her to buy too. From that point on, I resolved that I would use only the names of other housewives when presenting to a housewife. My sales the next week shot up to $1506. I soon extended this strategy to husbands and couples, using only the names of males when presenting to males and only the names of couples when presenting to couples. During the next (and last) 20 weeks of my sales career, I averaged $1209.15. The reason my sales dropped off a bit toward the end was that I was making so much money, I found it difficult to motivate myself to go out and work very hard.

A word of qualification is in order. There is no doubt that I was learning other things all the time that helped improve my sales. However, having experienced the speed of these changes firsthand, there is no doubt in my mind that no other single factor came close to "social proof from similar others" as the #1 reason for my 119.67% improvement.

Author's note: When the reader, who is a personal friend, first told me this stunning story during a face-to-face conversation, I think he could sense my skepticism. So, by way of supportive evidence, he has since sent me monthly records of his sales figures during the four summers he described-figures he had carefully recorded at the time and kept for decades. It should probably come as no surprise, then, that he teaches statistics cla.s.ses at his home university. When the reader, who is a personal friend, first told me this stunning story during a face-to-face conversation, I think he could sense my skepticism. So, by way of supportive evidence, he has since sent me monthly records of his sales figures during the four summers he described-figures he had carefully recorded at the time and kept for decades. It should probably come as no surprise, then, that he teaches statistics cla.s.ses at his home university.

"Chris, you can swim!" I said excitedly. "You can swim!"

"Yes," he responded casually, "I learned how today."

"This is terrific! This is just terrific," I burbled, gesturing expansively to convey my enthusiasm. "But, how come you didn't need your plastic ring today?"

"Well, I'm 3 years old, and Tommy is 3 years old. And Tommy can swim without a ring, so that means I can, too."

I could have kicked myself. Of course it would be to little Tommy to little Tommy, not to a 62 graduate student, that Chris would look for the most relevant information about what he could or should do. Had I been more thoughtful about solving Chris' swimming problem, I could have employed Tommy's good example earlier and, perhaps, saved myself a couple of frustrating months. I could have simply noted at the day camp that Tommy was a swimmer and then arranged with his parents for the boys to spend a weekend afternoon swimming in our pool. My guess is that Chris' plastic ring would have been abandoned by the end of the day.

Monkey Die Although we have already seen the powerful impact that social proof can have on human decision-making, to my mind, the most telling ill.u.s.tration of this impact starts with a seemingly nonsensical statistic: After a suicide has made front-page news, airplanes-private planes, corporate jets, airliners-begin falling out of the sky at an alarming rate.

For example, it has been shown (Phillips, 1979) that immediately following certain kinds of highly publicized suicide stories, the number of people who die in commercial-airline crashes increases by 1,000 percent! Even more alarming: The increase is not limited to airplane deaths. The number of automobile fatalities shoots up as well (Phillips, 1980). What could possibly be responsible?

One explanation suggests itself immediately: The same social conditions that cause some people to commit suicide cause others to die accidentally. For instance, certain individuals, the suicide-p.r.o.ne, may react to stressful societal events (economic downturns, rising crime rates, international tensions) by ending it all. Others will react differently to these same events; they might become angry, impatient, nervous, or distracted. To the degree that such people operate or maintain the cars and planes of our society, the vehicles will be less safe, and consequently, we will see a sharp increase in the number of automobile and air fatalities.

According to this "social conditions" interpretation, then, some of the same societal factors that cause intentional deaths also cause accidental ones, and that is why we find so strong a connection between suicide stories and fatal crashes. Another fascinating statistic indicates that this is not the correct explanation: Fatal crashes increase dramatically only in those regions where the suicide has been highly publicized. Other places, existing under similar social conditions, whose newspapers have not not publicized the story, have shown no comparable jump in such fatalities. Furthermore, within those areas where newspaper s.p.a.ce has been allotted, the wider the publicity given the suicide, the greater has been the rise in subsequent crashes. Thus, it is not some set of common societal events that stimulates suicides on the one hand and fatal accidents on the other. Instead, it is the publicized suicide story itself that produces the car and plane wrecks. publicized the story, have shown no comparable jump in such fatalities. Furthermore, within those areas where newspaper s.p.a.ce has been allotted, the wider the publicity given the suicide, the greater has been the rise in subsequent crashes. Thus, it is not some set of common societal events that stimulates suicides on the one hand and fatal accidents on the other. Instead, it is the publicized suicide story itself that produces the car and plane wrecks.

To explain the strong a.s.sociation between suicide-story publicity and subsequent crashes, a "bereavement" account has been suggested. Because, it has been argued, front-page suicides often involve well-known and respected public figures, perhaps their highly publicized deaths throw many people into states of shocked sadness. Stunned and preoccupied, these individuals become careless around cars and planes. The consequence is the sharp increase in deadly accidents involving such vehicles that we see after front-page suicide stories. Although the bereavement theory can account for the connection between the degree of publicity given a story and subsequent crash fatalities-the more people who learn of the suicide, the larger will be the number of bereaved and careless individuals-it cannot cannot explain another startling fact: Newspaper stories reporting suicide victims who died alone produce an increase in the frequency of single-fatality wrecks only, whereas stories reporting suicide-plus-murder incidents produce an increase in multiple-fatality wrecks only. Simple bereavement could not cause such a pattern. explain another startling fact: Newspaper stories reporting suicide victims who died alone produce an increase in the frequency of single-fatality wrecks only, whereas stories reporting suicide-plus-murder incidents produce an increase in multiple-fatality wrecks only. Simple bereavement could not cause such a pattern.

The influence of suicide stories on car and plane crashes, then, is fantastically specific. Stories of pure suicides, in which only one person dies, generate wrecks in which only one person dies; stories of suicide-murder combination, in which there are multiple deaths, generate wrecks in which there are multiple deaths. If neither "social conditions" nor "bereavement" can make sense of this bewildering array of facts, what can? There is a sociologist at the University of California in San Diego who thinks he has found the answer. His name is David Phillips, and he points a convincing finger at something called the "Werther effect."

Free-Thinking Youth We frequently think of teenagers as rebellious and independent-minded. It is important to recognize, however, that typically that is true only with respect to their parents. Among similar others, they conform ma.s.sively to what social proof tells them is proper.

LUANN: GEC Inc. Distributed by United Feature Syndicate, Inc. GEC Inc. Distributed by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

The story of the Werther effect is both chilling and intriguing. More than two centuries ago, the great man of German literature, Johann von Goethe, published a novel ent.i.tled Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The Sorrows of Young Werther) Die Leiden des jungen Werthers (The Sorrows of Young Werther). The book, in which the hero, named Werther, commits suicide, had a remarkable impact. Not only did it provide Goethe with immediate fame, but it also sparked a wave of emulative suicides across Europe. So powerful was this effect that authorities in several countries banned the novel.

Phillips' own work has traced the Werther effect to modern times (Phillips, 1974). His research has demonstrated that, immediately following a front-page suicide story, the suicide rate increases dramatically in those geographical areas where the story has been highly publicized. It is Phillips' argument that certain troubled people who read of another's self-inflicted death kill themselves in imitation. In a morbid ill.u.s.tration of the principle of social proof, these people decide how they should act on the basis of how some other troubled person has acted.

Phillips derived his evidence for the modern-day Werther effect from examining the suicide statistics in the United States between 1947 and 1968. He found that, within two months after every front-page suicide story, an average of 58 more people than usual killed themselves. In a sense, each suicide story killed 58 people who otherwise would have gone on living. Phillips also found that this tendency for suicides to beget suicides occurred princ.i.p.ally in those parts of the country where the first suicide was highly publicized. He observed that the wider the publicity given the first suicide, the greater the number of later suicides (see Figure 4.1 Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Fluctuation in Number of Suicides before, during, and after Month of Suicide Story Fluctuation in Number of Suicides before, during, and after Month of Suicide Story This evidence raises an important ethical issue. The suicides that follow these stories are excess excess deaths. After the initial spurt, the suicide rates do not drop below traditional levels but only return to those levels. Statistics like these might well give pause to newspaper editors inclined to sensationalize suicide accounts, as those accounts are likely to lead to the deaths of scores of people. More recent data indicate that in addition to newspaper editors, television broadcasters have cause for concern about the effects of the suicide stories they present. Whether they appear as news reports, information features, or fictional movies, these stories create an immediate cl.u.s.ter of self-inflicted deaths, with impressionable, imitation-p.r.o.ne teenagers being the most frequent victims (Bollen & Phillips, 1982; Gould & Shaffer, 1986; Phillips & Cartensen, 1986, 1988; Schmidtke & Hafner, 1988). deaths. After the initial spurt, the suicide rates do not drop below traditional levels but only return to those levels. Statistics like these might well give pause to newspaper editors inclined to sensationalize suicide accounts, as those accounts are likely to lead to the deaths of scores of people. More recent data indicate that in addition to newspaper editors, television broadcasters have cause for concern about the effects of the suicide stories they present. Whether they appear as news reports, information features, or fictional movies, these stories create an immediate cl.u.s.ter of self-inflicted deaths, with impressionable, imitation-p.r.o.ne teenagers being the most frequent victims (Bollen & Phillips, 1982; Gould & Shaffer, 1986; Phillips & Cartensen, 1986, 1988; Schmidtke & Hafner, 1988).

If the facts surrounding the Werther effect seem to you suspiciously like those surrounding the influence of suicide stories on air and traffic fatalities, the similarities have not been lost on Phillips, either. In fact, he contends that all the excess deaths following a front-page suicide incident can be explained as the same thing: copycat suicides. Upon learning of another's suicide, an uncomfortably large number of people decide that suicide is an appropriate action for themselves as well. Some of these individuals then proceed to commit the act in a straightforward, no-bones-about-it fashion, causing the suicide rate to jump.

Others, however, are less direct. For any of several reasons-to protect their reputations, to spare their families the shame and hurt, to allow their dependents to collect on insurance policies-they do not want to appear to have killed themselves. They would rather seem to have died accidentally. So, purposively but furtively, they cause the wreck of a car or a plane they are operating or are simply riding in. This can be accomplished in a variety of all-too-familiar-sounding ways. A commercial airline pilot can dip the nose of the aircraft at a crucial point of takeoff or can inexplicably land on an already occupied runway against the instructions from the control tower; the driver of a car can suddenly swerve into a tree or into oncoming traffic; a pa.s.senger in an automobile or corporate jet can incapacitate the operator, causing the deadly crash; the pilot of a private plane can, despite all radio warnings, plow into another aircraft. Thus, the alarming climb in crash fatalities that we find following front-page suicides is, according to Phillips, most likely due to the Werther effect secretly applied.

I consider this insight brilliant. First, it explains all of the data beautifully. If these wrecks really are hidden instances of imitative suicide, it makes sense that we should see an increase in the wrecks after suicide stories appear. It makes sense that the greatest rise in wrecks should occur after the suicide stories that have been most widely publicized and have, consequently, reached the most people. It also makes sense that the number of crashes should jump appreciably only in those geographical areas where the suicide stories were publicized. It even makes sense that single-victim suicides should lead only to single-victim crashes, whereas multiple-victim suicide incidents should lead only to multiple-victim crashes. Imitation is the key.

In addition, there is a second valuable feature of Phillips' insight. Not only does it allow us to explain the existing facts, it also allows us to predict new facts that had never been uncovered before. For example, if the abnormally frequent crashes following publicized suicides are genuinely the result of imitative rather than accidental actions, they should be more deadly as a result. That is, people trying to kill themselves will likely arrange (with a foot on the accelerator instead of the brake, with the nose of the plane down instead of up) for the impact to be as lethal as possible. The consequence should be quick and sure death. When Phillips examined the records to check on this prediction, he found that the average number of people killed in a fatal crash of a commercial airliner is more than three times greater if the crash happened one week after a front-page suicide story than if it happened one week before. A similar phenomenon can be found in traffic statistics, where there is evidence for the deadly efficiency of post-suicide-story auto crashes. Victims of fatal car wrecks that follow front-page suicide stories die four times more quickly than normal (Phillips, 1980).

Still another fascinating prediction flows from Phillips' idea. If the increase in wrecks following suicide stories truly represents a set of copycat deaths, then the imitators should be most likely to copy the suicides of people who are similar to them. The principle of social proof states that we use information about the way others have behaved to help us determine proper conduct for ourselves. As the campus-charity-request experiment showed, we are most influenced in this fashion by the actions of people who are like us.

Therefore, Phillips reasoned, if the principle of social proof is behind the phenomenon, there should be some clear similarity between the victim of the highly publicized suicide and those who cause subsequent wrecks. Realizing that the clearest test of this possibility would come from the records of automobile crashes involving a single car and a lone driver, Phillips compared the age of the suicide-story victim with the ages of the lone drivers killed in single-car crashes immediately after the story appeared in print. Once again the predictions were strikingly accurate: When the newspaper detailed the suicide of a young person, it was young drivers who then piled their cars into trees, poles, and embankments with fatal results; but when the news story concerned an older person's suicide, older drivers died in such crashes (Phillips, 1980).

This last statistic is the clincher for me. I am left wholly convinced and, simultaneously, wholly amazed by it. Evidently, the principle of social proof is so wide-ranging and powerful that its domain extends to the fundamental decision for life or death. Phillips' findings ill.u.s.trate a distressing tendency for suicide publicity to motivate certain people who are similar to the victim to kill themselves-because they now find the idea of suicide more legitimate. Truly frightening are the data indicating that many innocent people die in the bargain (see Figure 4.2 Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Daily Fluctuation in Number of Accident Fatalities before, on, and after Suicide Story Date Daily Fluctuation in Number of Accident Fatalities before, on, and after Suicide Story Date As is apparent from these graphs, the greatest danger exists three to four days following the news story's publication. After a brief drop-off, there comes another peak approximately one week later. By the eleventh day, there is no hint of an effect. This pattern across various types of data indicates something noteworthy about secret suicides. Those who try to disguise their imitative self-destruction as accidents wait a few days before committing the act-perhaps to build their courage, to plan the incident, or to put their affairs in order. Whatever the reason for the regularity of this pattern, we know that travelers' safety is most severely jeopardized three to four days after a suicide-murder story and then again, but to a lesser degree, a few days later. We would be well advised, then, to take special care in our travels at these times.

As if the frightening features of Phillips' suicide data weren't enough, his additional research (Phillips, 1983) brings more cause for alarm: Homicides in this country have a simulated, copycat character after highly publicized acts of violence. Heavyweight championship prize fights that receive coverage on network evening news appear to produce measurable increases in the United States homicide rate. This a.n.a.lysis of heavyweight championship fights (between 1973 and 1978) is perhaps most compelling in its demonstration of the remarkably specific nature of the imitative aggression that is generated. When such a match was lost by a black fighter, the homicide rate during the following 10 days rose significantly for young black male victims but not young white males. On the other hand, when a white fighter lost a match, it was young white men, but not young black men, who were killed more frequently in the next 10 days. When these results are combined with the parallel findings in Phillips' suicide data, it is clear that widely publicized aggression has the nasty tendency to spread to similar victims, no matter whether the aggression is inflicted on the self or on another.

Perhaps nowhere are we brought into more dramatic contact with the unsettling side of the principle of social proof than in the realm of copycat crime. Back in the 1970s, our attention was brought to the phenomenon in the form of airplane hijackings, which seemed to spread like airborne viruses. In the 1980s, our focus shifted to product tamperings, such as the famous cases of Tylenol capsules injected with cyanide and Gerber baby food products laced with gla.s.s. According to FBI forensic experts, each nationally publicized incident of this sort sp.a.w.ned an average of 30 more incidents (Toufexis, 1993). More recently, we've been jolted by the specter of contagious ma.s.s murders, occurring first in workplace settings and then, incredibly, in the schools of our nation. For instance, immediately following the b.l.o.o.d.y rampage by two Littleton, Colorado, high-school students on April 20, 1999, police responded to scores of similar threats, plots, and attempts by troubled students. Two of those attempts proved "successful": A 14-year-old in Taber, Alberta, and a 15-year-old in Conyers, Georgia, killed or wounded a total of eight cla.s.smates within 10 days of the Littleton ma.s.sacre. In the week following the horrendous murder-suicide attack at Virginia Tech University in April of 2007, newspapers across the country reported more murder-suicide incidents of their own, including 3 in Houston alone (Ruiz, Glenn, & Crowe, 2007). It is instructive that after the Virginia Tech ma.s.sacre, the next such event of similar magnitude occurred not at a high school, but also at a university, Northern Illinois.

Events of this magnitude demand a.n.a.lysis and explanation. Some common thread needs to be identified to make sense of it all. In the case of the workplace murders, observers noticed how often the killing fields were the backrooms of U.S. post offices. So, the finger of blame was pointed at the "intolerable strains" of the U.S. postal environment. As for the school-based slaughter, commentators remarked on an odd commonality: All the affected schools were located in rural or suburban communities rather than in the ever-simmering cauldrons of inner-city neighborhoods. So, the media instructed us as to the "intolerable strains" of growing up in small town or suburban America. By these accounts, the stressors of U.S. post office environments and of small town American life created the explosive reactions of those who worked and lived there. The explanation is straightforward: Similar social conditions beget similar responses.

Malfunctioning Copier Five minutes before the start of school on May 20, 1999, 15-year-old Thomas ("TJ") Solomon opened fire on his cla.s.smates, shooting six of them before he was stopped by a heroic teacher. In struggling to comprehend the underlying causes, we must recognize the effect on him of the publicity surrounding a year-long string of similar incidents-first in Jonesboro, Arkansas, then in Springfield Oregon, then in Littleton, Colorado, and then, just two days earlier, in Taber, Alberta. As one of his friends declared in response to the question of why distraught students were suddenly turning murderous at school, "Kids like TJ are seeing it and hearing it all the time now. It's like the new way out for them" (Cohen, 1999).

But you and I have been down the "similar social conditions" road before in trying to understand anomalous patterns of fatalities. Recall how Phillips (1979) considered the possibility that a set of common social conditions in a particular environment might explain a rash of suicides there? It wasn't a satisfactory explanation for the suicides; and I don't think it is a satisfactory account for the murder sprees, either. Let's see if we can locate a better alternative by first trying to regain contact with reality: The "intolerable strains" of working at the post office or of living in rural/suburban America!? Compared to working in the coal mines or compared to living on the gang-ruled, mean streets of inner cities? Come on. Certainly the environments where the ma.s.s slaying occurred have their tensions. But they appear no more severe (and often appear less severe) than many other environments where such incidents have not taken place. No, the similar social conditions theory doesn't offer a plausible account.

Then what does? I'd nod right at the principle of social proof, which a.s.serts that people, especially when they are unsure of themselves, follow the lead of similar others. Who is more similar to a disgruntled postal employee than another disgruntled postal employee? And who is more similar to troubled small town American teenagers than other troubled small town American teenagers? It is a regrettable constant of modern life that many people live their lives in psychological pain. How they deal with the pain depends on numerous factors, one of which is a recognition of how others just like them just like them have chosen to deal with it. As we saw in Phillips' data, a highly publicized suicide prompts copycat suicides from similar others-from have chosen to deal with it. As we saw in Phillips' data, a highly publicized suicide prompts copycat suicides from similar others-from copies copies of the cat. I believe the same can be said for a highly publicized multiple murder. As is the case for suicide stories, media officials need to think deeply about how and how prominently to present reports of killing sprees. Such reports are not only riveting, sensational, and newsworthy, they are malignant. of the cat. I believe the same can be said for a highly publicized multiple murder. As is the case for suicide stories, media officials need to think deeply about how and how prominently to present reports of killing sprees. Such reports are not only riveting, sensational, and newsworthy, they are malignant.

Monkey Island Work like Phillips' helps us appreciate the awesome influence of the behavior of similar others. Once the enormity of that force is recognized, it becomes possible to understand perhaps the most spectacular act of compliance of our time-the ma.s.s suicide at Jonestown, Guyana. Certain crucial features of the event deserve review.

The People's Temple was a cultlike organization that was based in San Francisco and drew its recruits from the poor of that city. In 1977, the Reverend Jim Jones-who was the group's undisputed political, social, and spiritual leader-moved the bulk of the membership with him to a jungle settlement in Guyana, South America. There, the People's Temple existed in relative obscurity until November 18, 1978, when Congressmen Leo R. Ryan of California (who had gone to Guyana to investigate the cult), three members of Ryan's fact-finding party, and a cult defector were murdered as they tried to leave Jonestown by plane. Convinced that he would be arrested and implicated in the killings and that the demise of the People's Temple would result, Jones sought to control the end of the Temple in his own way. He gathered the entire community around him and issued a call for each person's death to be done in a unified act of self-destruction.

The first response was that of a young woman who calmly approached the now famous vat of strawberry-flavored poison, administered one dose to her baby, one to herself, and then sat down in a field, where she and her child died in convulsions within four minutes. Others followed steadily in turn. Although a handful of Jonestowners escaped and a few others are reported to have resisted, the survivors claim that the great majority of the 910 people who died did so in an orderly, willful fashion.

News of the event shocked the world. The broadcast media and the papers provided a barrage of reports, updates, and a.n.a.lyses. For days, conversations were full of the topic, "How many have they found dead now?" "A guy who escaped said they were drinking the poison like they were hypnotized or something.""What were they doing down in South America, anyway?" "It's so hard to believe. What caused it?"

Yes, "What caused it?"-the critical question. How are we to account for this most astounding of compliant acts? Various explanations have been offered. Some have focused on the charisma of Jim Jones, a man whose style allowed him to be loved like a savior, trusted like a father, and treated like an emperor. Other explanations have pointed to the kind of people who were attracted to the People's Temple. They were mostly poor and uneducated individuals who were willing to give up their freedoms of thought and action for the safety of a place where all decisions would be made for them. Still other explanations have emphasized the quasi-religious nature of the People's Temple, in which unquestioned faith in the cult's leader was a.s.signed highest priority.

No doubt each of these features of Jonestown has merit in explaining what happened there, but I do not find them sufficient. After all, the world abounds with cults populated by dependent people who are led by a charismatic figure. What's more, there has never been a shortage of this combination of circ.u.mstances in the past. Yet virtually nowhere do we find evidence of an event even approximating the Jonestown incident among such groups. There must be something else that was critical.

One especially revealing question gives us a clue: "If the community had remained in San Francisco, would Reverend Jones' suicide command have been obeyed?" A highly speculative question to be sure, but the expert most familiar with the People's Temple had no doubt about the answer. Dr. Louis Jolyon West, then chairman of psychiatry and biobehavioral sciences at UCLA and director of its neuropsychiatric unit, was an authority on cults who had observed the People's Temple for eight years prior to the Jonestown deaths. When interviewed in the immediate aftermath, he made what strikes me as an inordinately instructive statement: "This wouldn't have happened in California. But they lived in total alienation from the rest of the world in a jungle situation in a hostile country."

Although lost in the welter of commentary following the tragedy, West's observation, together with what we know about the principle of social proof, seems to me quite important to a satisfactory understanding of the compliant suicides. To my mind, the single act in the history of the People's Temple that most contributed to the members' mindless compliance that day occurred a year earlier with the relocation of the Temple to a jungled country of unfamiliar customs and people. If we are to believe the stories of Jim Jones' malevolent genius, he realized fully the ma.s.sive psychological impact such a move would have on his followers. All at once, they found themselves in a place they knew nothing about. South America, and the rain forests of Guyana, especially, were unlike anything they had experienced in San Francisco. The environment-both physical and social-into which they were dropped must have seemed dreadfully uncertain.

Ah, uncertainty-the right-hand man of the principle of social proof. We have already seen that when people are uncertain, they look to the actions of others to guide their own actions. In the alien, Guyanese environment, then, Temple members were very ready to follow the lead of others. As we have also seen, it is others of a special kind whose behavior will be most unquestioningly followed: similar others. Therein lies the awful beauty of Reverend Jones' relocation strategy. In a country like Guyana, there were no similar others for a Jonestown resident but the people of Jonestown itself.