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As simple as the kernel of the theory seems, its shoots and roots curl extensively through much of the social environment. From the garden of young love to the jungle of armed revolution to the fruits of the marketplace, impressive amounts of our behavior can be explained by examining the tendrils of psychological reactance. Before beginning such an examination, though, it would be helpful to determine when people first show the desire to fight against restrictions of their freedoms.

Child psychologists have traced the tendency back to the age of 2-a time identified as a problem by parents and widely known to them as "the terrible twos." Most parents attest to seeing more contrary behavior in their children around this period. Two-year-olds seem masters of the art of resistance to outside pressure, especially from their parents. Tell them one thing, they do the opposite; give them one toy, they want another; pick them up against their will, they wriggle and squirm to be put down; put them down against their will, they claw and struggle to be carried.

One Virginia-based study nicely captured the style of terrible twos among boys who averaged 24 months in age (S. S. Brehm & Weintraub, 1977). The boys accompanied their mothers into a room containing two equally attractive toys. The toys were always arranged so that one stood next to a transparent Plexiglas barrier and the other stood behind the barrier. For some of the boys, the Plexiglas sheet was only a foot high-forming no real barrier to the toy behind it, since the boys could easily reach over the top. For the other boys, however, the Plexiglas was 2 feet high, effectively blocking their access to one toy unless they went around the barrier. The researchers wanted to see how quickly the toddlers would make contact with the toys under these conditions. Their findings were clear. When the barrier was too short to restrict access to the toy behind it, the boys showed no special preference for either of the toys; on the average, the toy next to the barrier was touched just as quickly as the one behind it. When the barrier was high enough to be a true obstacle, however, the boys went directly to the obstructed toy, making contact with it three times faster than with the un.o.bstructed toy. In all, the boys in this study demonstrated the cla.s.sic terrible-twos response to a limitation of their freedom: outright defiance. accompanied their mothers into a room containing two equally attractive toys. The toys were always arranged so that one stood next to a transparent Plexiglas barrier and the other stood behind the barrier. For some of the boys, the Plexiglas sheet was only a foot high-forming no real barrier to the toy behind it, since the boys could easily reach over the top. For the other boys, however, the Plexiglas was 2 feet high, effectively blocking their access to one toy unless they went around the barrier. The researchers wanted to see how quickly the toddlers would make contact with the toys under these conditions. Their findings were clear. When the barrier was too short to restrict access to the toy behind it, the boys showed no special preference for either of the toys; on the average, the toy next to the barrier was touched just as quickly as the one behind it. When the barrier was high enough to be a true obstacle, however, the boys went directly to the obstructed toy, making contact with it three times faster than with the un.o.bstructed toy. In all, the boys in this study demonstrated the cla.s.sic terrible-twos response to a limitation of their freedom: outright defiance.2 2Two-year-old girls in this study did not show the same resistant response to the large barrier as did the boys. Another study suggested this to be the case not because girls don't oppose attempts to limit their freedoms. Instead, it appears that they are primarily reactant to restrictions that come from other persons rather than from physical barriers (S. S. Brehm, 1981).

Why should psychological reactance emerge at the age of 2? Perhaps the answer has to do with a crucial change that most children go through about this time. It is then that they first come to a recognition of themselves as individuals (Howe, 2003). No longer do they view themselves as mere extensions of the social milieu but rather as identifiable, singular, and separate beings. This developing concept of autonomy brings naturally with it the concept of freedom. An independent being is one with choices; a child with the newfound realization that he or she is such a being will want to explore the length and breadth of the options. Perhaps we should be neither surprised nor distressed, then, when our 2-year-olds strain incessantly against our will. They have come to a recent and exhilarating perspective of themselves: they are freestanding human ent.i.ties. Vital questions of choice, rights, and control now need to be asked and answered within their small minds. The tendency to fight for every liberty and against every restriction might be best understood, then, as a quest for information. By testing severely the limits of their freedoms (and, coincidentally, the patience of their parents), the children are discovering where in their worlds they can expect to be controlled and where to be in control. As we will see later, it is the wise parent who provides highly consistent information.

Adult Reactance: Love, Guns, and Suds Although the terrible twos may be the most noticeable age of psychological reactance, we show the strong tendency to react against restrictions on our freedoms of action throughout our lives. One other age does stand out, however, as a time when this tendency takes an especially rebellious form: the teenage years. An enlightened neighbor once advised me, "If you really want to get something done, you've got three options: do it yourself, pay top dollar, or forbid your teenagers to do it." Like the twos, this period is characterized by an emerging sense of individuality. For teenagers, the emergence is out of the role of child, with all of its attendant parental control, and toward the role of adult, with all of its attendant rights and duties. Not surprisingly, adolescents tend to focus less on the duties than on the rights they feel they have as young adults. Not surprisingly, again, imposing traditional parental authority at these times is often counterproductive; teenagers will sneak, scheme, and fight to resist such attempts at control. neighbor once advised me, "If you really want to get something done, you've got three options: do it yourself, pay top dollar, or forbid your teenagers to do it." Like the twos, this period is characterized by an emerging sense of individuality. For teenagers, the emergence is out of the role of child, with all of its attendant parental control, and toward the role of adult, with all of its attendant rights and duties. Not surprisingly, adolescents tend to focus less on the duties than on the rights they feel they have as young adults. Not surprisingly, again, imposing traditional parental authority at these times is often counterproductive; teenagers will sneak, scheme, and fight to resist such attempts at control.

Nothing ill.u.s.trates the boomerang quality of parental pressure on adolescent behavior quite so clearly as a phenomenon known as the "Romeo and Juliet effect." As we know, Romeo Montague and Juliet Capulet were the ill-fated Shakespearean characters whose love was doomed by a feud between their families. Defying all parental attempts to keep them apart, the teenagers won a lasting union in their tragic act of twin suicide, an ultimate a.s.sertion of free will.

The intensity of the couple's feelings and actions has always been a source of wonderment and puzzlement to observers of the play. How could such inordinate devotion develop so quickly in a pair so young? A romantic might suggest rare and perfect love. A social scientist, though, might point to the role of parental interference and the psychological reactance it can produce. Perhaps the pa.s.sion of Romeo and Juliet was not initially so consuming that it transcended the extensive barriers erected by the families. Perhaps, instead, it was fueled to a white heat by the placement of those barriers. Could it be that had the youngsters been left to their own devices, their inflamed devotion would have amounted to no more than a flicker of puppy love? devices, their inflamed devotion would have amounted to no more than a flicker of puppy love?

Antic.i.p.ating a Future Need(le) 2008. Reprinted Courtesy of Bunny Hoest and Parade Magazine.

Because the story is a work of fiction, such questions are, of course, hypothetical and any answer to them speculative. However, it is possible to ask and answer with more certainty similar questions about modern-day Romeos and Juliets. Do couples suffering parental interference react by committing themselves more firmly to the partnership and falling more deeply in love? According to a study done with 140 Colorado teenage couples, that is exactly what they do. The researchers in this study found that although parental interference was linked to some problems in the relationship-the partners viewed one another more critically and reported a greater number of negative behaviors in the other-that interference also made the pair feel greater love for each other and desire for marriage. During the course of the study, as parental interference intensified, so did the love experience. When the interference weakened, romantic feelings actually cooled (Driscoll, Davis, & Lipetz, 1972).3 3The occurrence of the Romeo and Juliet effect should not be interpreted as a warning to parents to be always accepting of their teenagers' romantic choices. New players at this delicate game are likely to err often and, consequently, would benefit from the direction of an adult with greater perspective and experience. In providing such direction, parents should recognize that teenagers, who see themselves as young adults, will not respond well to control attempts that are typical of parent-child relationships. Especially in the clearly adult arena of mating, adult tools of influence (preference and persuasion) will be more effective than traditional forms of parental control (prohibitions and punishments). Although the experience of the Montague and Capulet families is an extreme example, heavy-handed restrictions on a young romantic alliance may well turn it clandestine, torrid, and sad.

For twos and teens, then, psychological reactance flows across the broad surface of experience, always turbulent and forceful. For most of the rest of us, the pool of reactant energy lies quiet and covered, erupting geyserlike only on occasion (Ruback & Juieng, 1997). Still, these eruptions manifest themselves in a variety of fascinating ways that are of interest not only to the student of human behavior but to lawmakers and policymakers as well.

For instance, there's the odd case of Kennesaw, Georgia, the town that enacted a law requiring every adult resident to own a gun and ammunition, under penalty of six months in jail and a $200 fine. All the features of the Kennesaw gun law make it a prime target for psychological reactance. The freedom that the law restricts is an important, longstanding one to which most American citizens feel ent.i.tled. Furthermore, the law was pa.s.sed by the Kennesaw City Council with a minimum of public input. Reactance theory would predict that under these circ.u.mstances few of the adults in the town of 5,400 would obey. Yet, the newspaper reports testified that three to four weeks after pa.s.sage of the law, firearms sales in Kennesaw were-no pun intended-booming.

How are we to make sense of this apparent contradiction of the reactance principle? The answer is by looking a bit closer at those who were buying Kennesaw's guns. Interviews with Kennesaw store owners revealed that the gun buyers were not town residents at all, but visitors, many of them lured by publicity to purchase their initial guns in Kennesaw. Donna Green, proprietor of a shop described in one newspaper article as a virtual "grocery store of firearms," summed it up: "Business is great. But they're almost all being bought up by people from out of town. We've only had two or three local people buy a gun to comply with the law." After pa.s.sage of the law, then, gun buying had become a frequent activity in Kennesaw, but not among those it was intended to cover; they were ma.s.sively noncompliant. Only those individuals whose freedom in the matter had not been restricted by the law had the inclination to live by it.

READER'S REPORT 7.2 From a Blacksburg, Virginia, Woman

Last Christmas I met a 27-year-old man. I was 19. Although he really wasn't my type, I went out with him-probably because it was a status thing to date an older man-but I really didn't become interested in him until my folks expressed their concern about his age. The more they got on my case about it, the more in love I became. It only lasted five months, but this was about four months longer than it would have lasted if my parents hadn't said anything.

Author's note: Although Romeo and Juliet have long since pa.s.sed away, it appears that the Although Romeo and Juliet have long since pa.s.sed away, it appears that the Romeo and Juliet Romeo and Juliet effect is alive and well and making regular appearances in places like Blacksburg, Virginia. effect is alive and well and making regular appearances in places like Blacksburg, Virginia.

A similar situation arose a decade earlier several hundred miles south of Kennesaw, when, to protect the environment, Dade County (Miami), Florida, imposed an antiphosphate ordinance prohibiting the use-and possession!-of laundry or cleaning products containing phosphates. A study done to determine the social impact of the law discovered two parallel reactions on the part of Miami residents. First, in what seems a Florida tradition, many Miamians turned to smuggling. Sometimes with neighbors and friends in large "soap caravans," they drove to nearby counties to load up on phosphate detergents. h.o.a.rding quickly developed and, in the rush of obsession that frequently characterizes h.o.a.rders, families boasted of having 20-year supplies of phosphate cleaners.

The second reaction to the law was more subtle and more general than the deliberate defiance of the smugglers and h.o.a.rders. Spurred by the tendency to want what they could no longer have, the majority of Miami consumers came to see phosphate cleaners as better products than before. Compared to Tampa residents, who were not affected by the Dade County ordinance, the citizens of Miami rated phosphate detergents gentler, more effective in cold water, better whiteners and fresheners, and more powerful on stains. After pa.s.sage of the law, they had even come to believe that phosphate detergents poured more easily (Mazis, 1975; Mazis, Settle, & Leslie, 1973).

This sort of response is typical of individuals who have lost an established freedom; and recognizing that it is typical is crucial to understanding how psychological reactance and the principle of scarcity work. When something becomes less available our freedom to have it is limited, and we experience an increased desire for it. We rarely recognize, however, that psychological reactance has caused us to want the item more; all we know is that we want want it. To make sense of our heightened desire for the item, we begin to a.s.sign it positive qualities. In the case of the Dade County antiphosphate law-and in other instances of newly restricted availability-a.s.suming a cause-and-effect relationship between desire and merit is a faulty supposition. Phosphate detergents clean, whiten, and pour no better after they are banned than they do before. We just a.s.sume they do because we find that we desire them more. it. To make sense of our heightened desire for the item, we begin to a.s.sign it positive qualities. In the case of the Dade County antiphosphate law-and in other instances of newly restricted availability-a.s.suming a cause-and-effect relationship between desire and merit is a faulty supposition. Phosphate detergents clean, whiten, and pour no better after they are banned than they do before. We just a.s.sume they do because we find that we desire them more.

Censorship The tendency to want what has been banned, and, therefore, to presume that it is more worthwhile is not limited to commodities such as laundry soap; it also extends to restrictions on information. In an age when the ability to acquire, store, and manage information increasingly affects access to wealth and power, it is important to understand how we typically react to attempts to censor or otherwise constrain our access to information. Although much data exist concerning our reactions to observing various kinds of potentially censorable material-media violence, p.o.r.nography, radical political rhetoric-there is surprisingly little evidence on our reactions to the censoring of this material. Fortunately, the results of the few studies that have been done on censorship are highly consistent. Almost invariably, our response to banned information is to want to receive that information to a greater extent and to become more favorable toward it than we were before the ban. (Ashmore, Ramchandra, & Jones, 1971; Wicklund & Brehm, 1974; Worchel & Arnold, 1973; Worchel, 1992).

The intriguing finding about the effects of censored information on an audience is not that audience members want to have the information more than before; that seems natural. Rather, it is that they come to believe in the information more, even though they haven't received it. For example, when University of North Carolina students learned that a speech opposing coed dorms on campus would be banned, they became more opposed to the idea of coed dorms (Worchel, Arnold, & Baker, 1975). Thus, without ever hearing the speech, the students became more sympathetic to its argument. This raises the worrisome possibility that especially clever individuals holding a weak or unpopular position on an issue can get us to agree with that position by arranging to have their message restricted. The irony is that for such people-members of fringe political groups, for example-the most effective strategy may not be to publicize their unpopular views but to get those views officially censored and then to publicize the censorship. Perhaps the authors of this country's Const.i.tution were acting as much as sophisticated social psychologists as staunch civil libertarians when they wrote the remarkably permissive free speech provision of the First Amendment. By refusing to restrain freedom of speech, they may have been trying to minimize the chance that new political notions would win support via the irrational course of psychological reactance. speech provision of the First Amendment. By refusing to restrain freedom of speech, they may have been trying to minimize the chance that new political notions would win support via the irrational course of psychological reactance.4 4Evidence that reactance can cause people to take political action they would otherwise not have taken comes from a study by Heilman (1976). Supermarket shoppers were most likely to sign a pet.i.tion favoring federal price controls after they had been informed that a federal official had opposed the distribution of the pet.i.tion.

Of course, political ideas are not the only kind that are susceptible to restriction. Access to s.e.xually oriented material is also frequently limited. Although not as sensational as the occasional police crackdown on "adult" bookstores and theaters, regular pressure is applied by parents and citizens groups to censor the s.e.xual content of educational material ranging from s.e.x education and hygiene texts to school library books. Both sides in the struggle seem to be well intentioned and the issues are not simple, as they involve such matters as morality, art, parental control over the schools, and freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment. From a purely psychological point of view, however, those favoring strict censorship may wish to examine closely the results of a study done on Purdue University undergraduates (Zellinger, Fromkin, Speller, & Kohn, 1974). In this study, students were shown some advertis.e.m.e.nts for a novel. For half the students, the advertising copy included the statement "a book for adults only, restricted to those 21 years and over"; the other half of the students read no such age restriction on the book. When the researcher later asked the students to indicate their feelings toward the book, they discovered the same pair of reactions we have noted with other bans: Those who learned of the age restriction wanted to read the book more and believed that they would like the book more than did those who thought their access to the book was unlimited.

Those who support the official banning of s.e.xually relevant materials from school curricula have the avowed goal of reducing the orientation of the society, especially of its youth, toward eroticism. In the light of the Purdue study and in the context of other research on the effects of imposed restraints, one must wonder whether official censorship as a means may not be ant.i.thetical to the goal. If we are to believe the implications of the research, then censorship is likely to increase the desire of students for s.e.xual material and, consequently, to cause them to view themselves as the kind of individuals who like such material.

I believe something quite similar happened recently in Choteau, Montana when Kevin St. John, the local school superintendent, canceled a speech to be given to high school students by Dr. Steve Running, who shared the 2007 n.o.bel Peace Prize for his work on the dangers of climate change (Brown, 2008). Some members of the Choteau School Board pressured Mr. St. John to bring in someone with an opposing opinion because they feared that Dr. Running's views on global warming would be seen as anti-agricultural. Although the superintendent maintained that under the circ.u.mstances, choosing to cancel the speech was "the neutral option," I'm convinced that he granted a large victory to one side of the debate-the global warming position. Based on what we know about the psychological effects of official censorship, it is likely that in the aftermath the majority of Choteau High School students, and perhaps Montanans, became more favorable to Dr. Running's case . . . without ever hearing him make it. Indeed, one of those students wrote subsequently-and indignantly-that the School Board's action denied its students a unique opportunity to learn "valuable information about the future of our planet," while another equally indignant writer called it a "misguided effort to protect students from the truth" (Barhaugh, 2008). warming position. Based on what we know about the psychological effects of official censorship, it is likely that in the aftermath the majority of Choteau High School students, and perhaps Montanans, became more favorable to Dr. Running's case . . . without ever hearing him make it. Indeed, one of those students wrote subsequently-and indignantly-that the School Board's action denied its students a unique opportunity to learn "valuable information about the future of our planet," while another equally indignant writer called it a "misguided effort to protect students from the truth" (Barhaugh, 2008).

The term official censorship official censorship usually makes us think of bans on political or s.e.xually explicit material, yet there is another common sort of official censorship that we don't think of in the same way, probably because it occurs after the fact. Often in a jury trial, a piece of evidence or testimony will be introduced, only to be ruled inadmissible by the presiding judge, who may then admonish the jurors to disregard that evidence. From this perspective, the judge may be viewed as a censor, though the form of the censorship is odd. The presentation of the information to the jury is not banned-too late for that-it's the jury's use of the information that is banned. How effective are such instructions from a judge? Is it possible that, for jury members who feel it is their right to consider all the available information, declarations of inadmissibility may actually cause psychological reactance, leading the jurors to use the evidence to a greater extent? Often, this is precisely what happens (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000). usually makes us think of bans on political or s.e.xually explicit material, yet there is another common sort of official censorship that we don't think of in the same way, probably because it occurs after the fact. Often in a jury trial, a piece of evidence or testimony will be introduced, only to be ruled inadmissible by the presiding judge, who may then admonish the jurors to disregard that evidence. From this perspective, the judge may be viewed as a censor, though the form of the censorship is odd. The presentation of the information to the jury is not banned-too late for that-it's the jury's use of the information that is banned. How effective are such instructions from a judge? Is it possible that, for jury members who feel it is their right to consider all the available information, declarations of inadmissibility may actually cause psychological reactance, leading the jurors to use the evidence to a greater extent? Often, this is precisely what happens (Lieberman & Arndt, 2000).

The realization that we value limited information allows us to apply the scarcity principle to realms beyond material commodities. The principle works for messages, communications, and knowledge, too. Taking this perspective, we can see that information may not have to be censored for us to value it more; it need only be scarce information may not have to be censored for us to value it more; it need only be scarce. According to the scarcity principle, we will find a piece of information more persuasive if we think that we can't get it elsewhere. This idea-that exclusive information is more persuasive information-is central to the thinking of two psychologists, Timothy Brock and Howard Fromkin, who have developed a "commodity theory" a.n.a.lysis of persuasion (Brock, 1968; Fromkin & Brock, 1971).

The strongest support I know for Brock and Fromkin's theory comes from a small experiment done by a student of mine (Knishinsky, 1982). At the time, the student was also a successful businessman, the owner of a beef-importing company, who had returned to school to get advanced training in marketing. After we talked in my office one day about scarcity and exclusivity of information, he decided to do a study using his sales staff. The company's customers-buyers for supermarkets and other retail food outlets-were called on the phone as usual by a salesperson and asked for a purchase in one of three ways. One set of customers heard a standard sales presentation before being asked for their orders. Another set of customers heard the standard sales presentation plus information that the supply of imported beef was likely to be scarce in the upcoming months. A third group received the standard sales presentation and the information about a scarce supply of beef, too; however, they also learned that the scarce supply news was not generally available information-it had come, they were told, from certain exclusive contacts that the company had. available information-it had come, they were told, from certain exclusive contacts that the company had.5 Thus, the customers who received this last sales presentation learned that not only was the availability of the product limited, so too was the news concerning it-the scarcity double-whammy. Thus, the customers who received this last sales presentation learned that not only was the availability of the product limited, so too was the news concerning it-the scarcity double-whammy.

5For ethical reasons, the information provided to the customers was always true. There was was an impending foreign beef shortage and this news had, indeed, come to the company through its exclusive sources. an impending foreign beef shortage and this news had, indeed, come to the company through its exclusive sources.

The results of the experiment quickly became apparent when the company salespeople began to urge the owner to buy more beef because there wasn't enough in the inventory to keep up with all the orders they were receiving. Compared to the customers who got only the standard sales appeal, those who were also told about the future scarcity of beef bought more than twice as much. The real boost in sales, however, occurred among the customers who heard of the impending scarcity via "exclusive" information. They purchased six times the amount that the customers who received only the standard sales pitch did. Apparently, the fact that the news about the scarcity information was itself scarce made it especially persuasive.

Optimal Conditions Much like the other effective weapons of influence, the scarcity principle is more effective at some times than at others. An important practical defense, then, is to find out when scarcity works best on us. A great deal can be learned from an experiment devised by social psychologist Stephen Worchel and his colleagues (Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975). The basic procedure used by Worchel and his research team was simple: Partic.i.p.ants in a consumer preference study were given a chocolate chip cookie from a jar and asked to taste and rate its quality. For half of the raters, the jar contained ten cookies; for the other half, it contained just two. As we might expect from the scarcity principle, when the cookie was one of only two available, it was rated more favorably than when it was one of ten. The cookie in short supply was rated as more desirable to eat in the future, more attractive as a consumer item, and more costly than the identical cookie in abundant supply.

Although this pattern of results provides a rather striking validation of the scarcity principle, it doesn't tell us anything we don't already know. Once again, we see that a less available item is more desired and valued. The real worth of the cookie study comes from two additional findings. Let's take them one at a time, as each deserves thorough consideration.

New Scarcity: Costlier Cookies and Civil Conflict The first of these noteworthy results involved a small variation in the experiment's basic procedure. Rather than rating the cookies under conditions of constant scarcity, some partic.i.p.ants were first given a jar of ten cookies that was then replaced by a jar of two cookies. Thus, before taking a bite, certain of the partic.i.p.ants saw their abundant supply of cookies reduced to a scarce supply. Other partic.i.p.ants, however, knew only scarcity of supply from the onset, as the number of cookies in their jars was left at two. With this procedure, the researchers were seeking to answer a question about types of scarcity: Do we value more those things that have become recently less available to us or those things that have always been scarce? In the cookie experiment, the answer was plain. The drop from abundance to scarcity produced a decidedly more positive reaction to the cookies than did constant scarcity. scarcity, some partic.i.p.ants were first given a jar of ten cookies that was then replaced by a jar of two cookies. Thus, before taking a bite, certain of the partic.i.p.ants saw their abundant supply of cookies reduced to a scarce supply. Other partic.i.p.ants, however, knew only scarcity of supply from the onset, as the number of cookies in their jars was left at two. With this procedure, the researchers were seeking to answer a question about types of scarcity: Do we value more those things that have become recently less available to us or those things that have always been scarce? In the cookie experiment, the answer was plain. The drop from abundance to scarcity produced a decidedly more positive reaction to the cookies than did constant scarcity.

The idea that newly experienced scarcity is the more powerful kind applies to situations well beyond the bounds of the cookie study. For example, social scientists have determined that such scarcity is a primary cause of political turmoil and violence. Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this argument is James C. Davies (1962, 1969) who states that we are most likely to find revolutions at a time when a period of improving economic and social conditions is followed by a short, sharp reversal in those conditions. Thus, it is not the traditionally most downtrodden people-those who have come to see their deprivation as part of the natural order of things-who are especially likely to revolt. Instead, revolutionaries are more likely to be those who have been given at least some taste of a better life. When the economic and social improvements they have experienced and come to expect suddenly become less available, they desire them more than ever and often rise up violently to secure them. For instance, it is little recognized that at the time of the American Revolution, the colonists had the highest standard of living and the lowest taxes in the Western World. According to historian Thomas Fleming (1997), it wasn't until the British sought a cut of this widespread prosperity (by levying taxes) that the Americans revolted.

Davies has gathered persuasive evidence for his novel thesis from a range of revolutions, revolts, and internal wars, including the French, Russian, and Egyptian revolutions, as well as such domestic uprisings as Dorr's Rebellion in nineteenth-century Rhode Island, the American Civil War, and the urban black riots of the 1960s. In each case, a time of increasing well-being preceded a tight cl.u.s.ter of reversals that burst into violence.

The racial conflict in America's cities during the mid-1960s represents a case in point that many of us can recall. At the time, it was not uncommon to hear the question, "Why now?" It didn't seem to make sense that within their 300-year history, most of which had been spent in servitude and much of the rest in privation, American blacks would choose the socially progressive sixties as the time to revolt. Indeed, as Davies points out, the two decades after the start of World War II had brought dramatic political and economic gains to the black population. In 1940, blacks faced stringent legal restrictions in such areas as housing, transportation and education; moreover, even when the amount of education was the same, the average black family earned only a bit more than half the amount its counterpart white family earned. Fifteen years later, much had changed. Federal legislation had struck down as unacceptable formal and informal attempts to segregate blacks in schools, public places, housing, and employment settings. Economic advances had been made, too; black family income had risen from 56 to 80 percent of that of a comparably educated white family. struck down as unacceptable formal and informal attempts to segregate blacks in schools, public places, housing, and employment settings. Economic advances had been made, too; black family income had risen from 56 to 80 percent of that of a comparably educated white family.

Then, according to Davies' a.n.a.lysis of social conditions, this rapid progress was stymied by events that soured the heady optimism of previous years. First, political and legal change proved substantially easier to enact than social change. Despite all the progressive legislation of the 1940s and 1950s, blacks perceived that most neighborhoods, jobs, and schools remained segregated. Thus, the Washington-based victories came to feel like defeats at home. For example, in the four years following the Supreme Court's 1954 decision to integrate all public schools, blacks were the targets of 530 acts of violence (direct intimidation of black children and parents, bombings and burnings) designed to prevent school integration. This violence generated the perception of another sort of setback in black progress. For the first time since well before World War II, when lynchings had occurred at an average rate of 78 per year, blacks had to be concerned about the basic safety of their families. The new violence was not limited to the education issue, either. Peaceful civil rights demonstrations of the time were frequently confronted by hostile crowds-and police.

Still another type of downturn occurred within the black populace in economic progress. In 1962, the income of a black family had slid back to 74 percent of that of a similarly educated white family. By Davies' argument, the most illuminating aspect of this 74 percent figure is not that it represented a long-term increase in prosperity from prewar levels, but that it represented a short-term decline from the flush levels of the mid-1950s. In 1963 came the Birmingham riots and, in staccato succession, scores of violent demonstrations, building toward the major upheavals of Watts, Newark, and Detroit.

In keeping with a distinct historical pattern of revolution, blacks in the United States were more rebellious when their prolonged progress was somewhat curtailed than they were before it began. This pattern offers a valuable lesson for would-be rulers: When it comes to freedoms, it is more dangerous to have given for a while than never to have given at all. The problem for a government that seeks to improve the political and economic status of a traditionally oppressed group is that, in so doing, it establishes freedoms for the group where none existed before. Should these now established established freedoms become less available, there will be an especially hot variety of h.e.l.l to pay. freedoms become less available, there will be an especially hot variety of h.e.l.l to pay.

We can look to events in the former Soviet Union for evidence that this basic rule holds across cultures. After decades of repression, Mikhail Gorbachev began granting the Soviet populace new liberties, privileges, and choices via the twin polices of glasnost glasnost and and perestroika perestroika. Alarmed by the direction their nation was taking, a small group of government, military, and KGB officials staged a coup, placing Gorbachev under house arrest and announcing on August 19, 1991, that they had a.s.sumed power and were moving to reinstate the old order. Most of the world imagined that the Soviet people, known for their characteristic acquiescence to subjugation, would pa.s.sively yield as they had always done. subjugation, would pa.s.sively yield as they had always done. Time Time magazine editor, Lance Morrow, described his own reaction similarly: "At first the coup seemed to confirm the norm. The news administered a dark shock, followed immediately by a depressed sense of resignation: of course, of course, the Russians must revert to their essential selves, to their own history. Gorbachev and magazine editor, Lance Morrow, described his own reaction similarly: "At first the coup seemed to confirm the norm. The news administered a dark shock, followed immediately by a depressed sense of resignation: of course, of course, the Russians must revert to their essential selves, to their own history. Gorbachev and glasnost glasnost were an aberration; now we are back to fatal normality" (1991). were an aberration; now we are back to fatal normality" (1991).

But these were not to be normal times. For one thing, Gorbachev had not governed in the tradition of the czars or Stalin or any of the line of oppressive postWar rulers who had not allowed even a breath of freedom to the ma.s.ses. He had ceded them certain rights and choices. And when these now established freedoms were threatened, the people lashed out the way a dog would if someone tried taking a fresh bone from its mouth. Within hours of the junta's announcement, thousands were in the streets erecting barricades, confronting armed troops, surrounding tanks, and defying curfews. The uprising was so swift, so ma.s.sive, so unitary in its opposition to any retreat from the gains of glasnost glasnost that after only three riotous days, the astonished officials relented, surrendering their power and pleading for mercy from Chairman Gorbachev. Had they been students of history-or of psychology-the failed plotters would not have been so surprised by the tidal wave of popular resistance that swallowed their coup. From the vantage point of either discipline, they could have learned an invariant lesson: Freedoms once granted will not be relinquished without a fight. that after only three riotous days, the astonished officials relented, surrendering their power and pleading for mercy from Chairman Gorbachev. Had they been students of history-or of psychology-the failed plotters would not have been so surprised by the tidal wave of popular resistance that swallowed their coup. From the vantage point of either discipline, they could have learned an invariant lesson: Freedoms once granted will not be relinquished without a fight.

The lesson applies to the politics of family as well as country. The parent who grants privileges or enforces rules erratically invites rebellion by unwittingly establishing freedoms for the child. The parent who only sometimes prohibits between-meal sweets may create for the child the freedom to have such snacks. At that point, enforcing the rule becomes a much more difficult and explosive matter because the child is no longer merely lacking a never-possessed right but is losing an established one. As we have seen in the case of political freedoms and (especially pertinent to the present discussion) chocolate chip cookies, people see a thing as more desirable when it recently has become less available than when it has been scarce all along. We should not be surprised, then, that research shows that parents who enforce and discipline inconsistently produce generally rebellious children (Lytton, 1979; O'Leary, 1995).6 6To avoid this problem, parents needn't be severe or unduly rigid rulekeepers. For example, a child who unavoidably misses lunch can be given a before-dinner snack because this would not violate the normal rule against such snacks and, consequently, would not establish a general freedom. The difficulty comes when the child is capriciously allowed a treat on some days but not on others and can see no good reason for the difference. It is this arbitrary approach that can build perceived freedoms and provoke rebellion.

Tanks, but No Tanks Incensed by the news that then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had been replaced in favor of plotters planning to cancel the newly inst.i.tuted freedoms, Moscow residents confronted the tanks, defied the coup, and won the day.

READER'S REPORT 7.3 From a New York Investment Manager

I recently read a story in the Wall Street Journal Wall Street Journal that ill.u.s.trates the scarcity principle and how people want whatever is taken away from them. The article described how Procter & Gamble tried an experiment in upstate New York by eliminating all savings coupons for their products and replacing the coupons with lower everyday prices. This produced a big consumer revolt-with boycotts, and protests, and a firestorm of complaints-even though Procter & Gamble's data showed that only 2 percent of coupons are used and that, on average during the no-coupon experiment, consumers paid the same for P&G products with less inconvenience. According to the article, the revolt happened because of something that P&G didn't recognize: "Coupons, to many people, are practically an inalienable right." It is amazing how strongly people react when you try to take things away, even if they never use them. that ill.u.s.trates the scarcity principle and how people want whatever is taken away from them. The article described how Procter & Gamble tried an experiment in upstate New York by eliminating all savings coupons for their products and replacing the coupons with lower everyday prices. This produced a big consumer revolt-with boycotts, and protests, and a firestorm of complaints-even though Procter & Gamble's data showed that only 2 percent of coupons are used and that, on average during the no-coupon experiment, consumers paid the same for P&G products with less inconvenience. According to the article, the revolt happened because of something that P&G didn't recognize: "Coupons, to many people, are practically an inalienable right." It is amazing how strongly people react when you try to take things away, even if they never use them.

Author's note: Although Procter & Gamble executives may have been perplexed by this seemingly irrational consumer response, they inadvertently contributed to it. Discount coupons have been part of the American scene for over a century, and P&G had actively "couponed" its products for decades, thereby helping to establish coupons as something consumers had a right to expect. And it's always the long-established rights that people fight most ferociously to preserve. Although Procter & Gamble executives may have been perplexed by this seemingly irrational consumer response, they inadvertently contributed to it. Discount coupons have been part of the American scene for over a century, and P&G had actively "couponed" its products for decades, thereby helping to establish coupons as something consumers had a right to expect. And it's always the long-established rights that people fight most ferociously to preserve.

Compet.i.tion for Scarce Resources: Foolish Fury Let's look back to the cookie study for another insight into the way we react to scarcity. We've already seen from the results of that study that scarce cookies were rated higher than abundant cookies and that newly scarce cookies were rated higher still. Staying with the newly scarce cookies now, we find that certain cookies were the highest rated of all-those that became less available because of a demand for them. higher still. Staying with the newly scarce cookies now, we find that certain cookies were the highest rated of all-those that became less available because of a demand for them.

Remember that in the experiment the partic.i.p.ants who experienced new scarcity had been given a jar of ten cookies that was then replaced with a jar of only two cookies. Actually, the researchers created this scarcity in one of two ways. Certain partic.i.p.ants were told that some of their cookies had to be given away to other raters in order to supply the demand for cookies in the study. Another set of partic.i.p.ants was told that the number of their cookies had to be reduced because the researcher had simply made a mistake and given them the wrong jar initially. The results showed that those whose cookies became scarce through the process of social demand liked the cookies significantly more than did those whose cookies became scarce by mistake. In fact, the cookies made less available through social demand were rated the most desirable of any in the study.

This finding highlights the importance of compet.i.tion in the pursuit of limited resources. Not only do we want the same item more when it is scarce, we want it most when we are in compet.i.tion for it. Advertisers often try to exploit this tendency in us. In their ads, we learn that "popular demand" for an item is so great that we must "hurry to buy"; we see a crowd pressing against the doors of a store before the start of a sale; we watch a flock of hands quickly deplete a supermarket shelf of a product. There is more to such images than the idea of ordinary social proof. The message is not just that the product is good because other people think so, but also that we are in direct compet.i.tion with those people for it.

The feeling of being in compet.i.tion for scarce resources has powerful motivating properties. The ardor of an indifferent lover surges with the appearance of a rival. It is often for reasons of strategy, therefore, that romantic partners reveal (or invent) the attentions of a new admirer. Salespeople are taught to play the same game with indecisive customers. For example, a realtor who is trying to sell a house to a "fence-sitting" prospect sometimes will call the prospect with news of another potential buyer who has seen the house, liked it, and is scheduled to return the following day to talk about terms. When wholly fabricated, the new bidder is commonly described as an outsider with plenty of money: "an out-of-state investor buying for tax purposes" and "a physician and his wife moving into town" are favorites. The tactic, called in some circles "goosing 'em off the fence," can work devastatingly well. The thought of losing out to a rival frequently turns a buyer from hesitant to zealous.

There is something almost physical about the desire to have a contested item. Shoppers at big close-out or bargain sales report being caught up emotionally in the event. Charged by the crush of compet.i.tors, they swarm and struggle to claim merchandise they would otherwise disdain. Such behavior brings to mind the "feeding frenzy" phenomenon of wild, indiscriminate eating among animal groups. Commercial fishermen exploit the phenomenon by throwing a quant.i.ty of loose bait to large schools of certain fish. Soon the water is a roiling expanse of thrashing fins and snapping mouths competing for the food. At this point, the fishermen save time and money by dropping unbated lines into the water, since the crazed fish will bite ferociously at anything, including bare metal hooks. this point, the fishermen save time and money by dropping unbated lines into the water, since the crazed fish will bite ferociously at anything, including bare metal hooks.

Contagious Compet.i.tiveness The struggle is intense in the china department of Harrod's as shoppers compete to grab the best bargains during the famous London department store's summer sale.

There is a noticeable parallel between the ways that commercial fishermen and department stores generate a compet.i.tive fury among those they wish to hook. To attract and arouse the catch, fishermen scatter some loose bait called chum. For similar purposes, department stores holding a bargain sale toss out a few especially good deals on prominently advertised items called loss leaders. If the bait-of either form-has done its job, a large and eager crowd forms to snap it up. Soon, in the rush to score, the group becomes agitated, nearly blinded, by the adversarial nature of the situation. Human beings and fish alike lose perspective on what they want and begin striking at whatever is being contested. One wonders whether the tuna flapping on a dry deck with only a bare hook in its mouth shares the what-hit-me bewilderment of the shopper arriving home with a load of department store bilge.

Lest we believe that the compet.i.tion-for-limited-resources fever occurs only in such unsophisticated forms of life as tuna and bargain bas.e.m.e.nt shoppers, we should examine the story behind a remarkable purchase decision made in 1973 by Barry Diller, who was vice president for prime-time programming of the American Broadcasting Company and who went on to head Paramount Pictures and the Fox Television Network. He agreed to pay $3.3 million for a single television showing of the movie The Poseidon Adventure The Poseidon Adventure. The figure is noteworthy in that it greatly exceeded the highest price ever before paid for a one-time movie showing-$2 million for Patton Patton. In fact, the payment was so excessive that ABC figured to lose $1 million on the Poseidon Poseidon showing. As NBC vice president for special programs, Bill Storke, declared at the time, "There's no way they can get their money back, no way at all." showing. As NBC vice president for special programs, Bill Storke, declared at the time, "There's no way they can get their money back, no way at all."

How could an astute and experienced businessman like Diller go for a deal that would produce an expected loss of $1 million? The answer may lie in a second noteworthy aspect of the sale: It was the first time that a motion picture had been offered to the networks in an open-bid auction. Never before had the three networks been forced to battle for a scarce resource in quite this way. The novel idea of a compet.i.tive auction was the brainchild of the movie's flamboyant showman producer, Irwin Allen, and 20th Century-Fox vice president, William Self, who must have been ecstatic about the outcome. How can we be sure that it was the auction format that generated the spectacular sales price rather than the blockbl.u.s.ter quality of the movie itself?

Some comments from the auction partic.i.p.ants provide impressive evidence. First came a statement from the victor, Barry Diller, intended to set future policy for his network. In language sounding like it could have escaped only from between clenched teeth, he said, "ABC has decided regarding its policy for the future that it would never again enter into an auction situation." Even more instructive are the remarks of Diller's rival, Robert Wood, then president of CBS Television, who nearly lost his head and outbid his compet.i.tors at ABC and NBC:

We were very rational at the start. We priced the movie out, in terms of what it could bring in for us, then allowed a certain value on top of that for exploitation.

But then the bidding started. ABC opened with $2 million. I came back with $2.4. ABC went $2.8. And the fever of the thing caught us. Like a guy who had lost his mind, I kept bidding. Finally, I went to $3.2; and there came a moment when I said to myself, "Good grief, if I get it, what the heck am I going to do with it?" When ABC finally topped me, my main feeling was relief.

It's been very educational. (MacKenzie, 1974, p. 4) According to interviewer Bob MacKenzie, when Wood said, "It's been very educational," he was smiling. We can be sure that when ABC's Diller vowed "never again," he was not. Both men had clearly learned a lesson from the "Great Poseidon Poseidon Auction." The reason that both could not smile as a consequence was that, for one, Auction." The reason that both could not smile as a consequence was that, for one, there had been a $1 million tuition charge. Fortunately, there is a valuable but drastically less expensive lesson here for us, too. It is instructive to note that the smiling man was the one who had there had been a $1 million tuition charge. Fortunately, there is a valuable but drastically less expensive lesson here for us, too. It is instructive to note that the smiling man was the one who had lost lost the highly sought-after prize. As a general rule, when the dust settles and we find losers looking and speaking like winners (and vice versa), we should be especially wary of the conditions that kicked up the dust-in the present case, open compet.i.tion for a scarce resource. As the TV executives learned, extreme caution is advised whenever we encounter the devilish construction of scarcity plus rivalry. the highly sought-after prize. As a general rule, when the dust settles and we find losers looking and speaking like winners (and vice versa), we should be especially wary of the conditions that kicked up the dust-in the present case, open compet.i.tion for a scarce resource. As the TV executives learned, extreme caution is advised whenever we encounter the devilish construction of scarcity plus rivalry.

Does the Vest Come with That?

To the astonishment of all concerned, a leisure suit worn by John Travolta in the movie Sat.u.r.day Night Fever Sat.u.r.day Night Fever recently sold for $145,000. Perhaps we can help explain the astronomical price by noting two features of the sale. First, the suit is a special, one-of-a-kind item. Second, it was purchased at auction, where two buyers became locked into a compet.i.tive bidding spiral. When asked later whether he thought the final figure was excessive, the auctioneer remarked graciously, "Well, it certainly was a record for polyester." recently sold for $145,000. Perhaps we can help explain the astronomical price by noting two features of the sale. First, the suit is a special, one-of-a-kind item. Second, it was purchased at auction, where two buyers became locked into a compet.i.tive bidding spiral. When asked later whether he thought the final figure was excessive, the auctioneer remarked graciously, "Well, it certainly was a record for polyester."

Defense It is easy enough to feel properly warned against scarcity pressures, but it is substantially more difficult to act on that warning. Part of the problem is that our typical reaction to scarcity hinders our ability to think. When we watch as something we want becomes less available, a physical agitation sets in. Especially in those cases involving direct compet.i.tion, the blood comes up, the focus narrows, and emotions rise (Teuscher, 2005). As this visceral current advances, the cognitive, rational side retreats. In the rush of arousal, it is difficult to be calm and studied in our approach. As CBS-TV president Robert Wood commented in the wake of his we want becomes less available, a physical agitation sets in. Especially in those cases involving direct compet.i.tion, the blood comes up, the focus narrows, and emotions rise (Teuscher, 2005). As this visceral current advances, the cognitive, rational side retreats. In the rush of arousal, it is difficult to be calm and studied in our approach. As CBS-TV president Robert Wood commented in the wake of his Poseidon Poseidon adventure, "you get caught up in the mania of the thing, the acceleration of it. Logic goes right out the window" (MacKenzie, 1974). adventure, "you get caught up in the mania of the thing, the acceleration of it. Logic goes right out the window" (MacKenzie, 1974).

Here's our predicament, then: Knowing the causes and workings of scarcity pressures may not be sufficient to protect us from them because knowing is a cognitive act, and cognitive processes are suppressed by our emotional reaction to scarcity pressures. In fact, this may be the reason for the great effectiveness of scarcity tactics. When they are employed properly, our first line of defense against foolish behavior-a thoughtful a.n.a.lysis of the situation-becomes less likely.

If, because of brain-clouding arousal, we can't rely on our knowledge about the scarcity principle to stimulate properly cautious behavior, what can we use? Perhaps, in fine jujitsu style, we can use the arousal itself as our prime cue. In this way, we can turn the enemy's strength to our advantage. Rather than relying on a considered, cognitive a.n.a.lysis of the entire situation, we might well tune ourselves to just the internal, visceral sweep for our warning. By learning to flag the experience of heightening arousal in a compliance situation, we can alert ourselves to the possibility of scarcity tactics there and to the need for caution.

Suppose, however, we accomplish this trick of using the rising tide of arousal as a signal to calm ourselves and to proceed with care. What then? Is there any other piece of information we can use to help make a proper decision in the face of scarcity? After all, merely recognizing that we ought to move carefully doesn't tell us the direction in which to move; it only provides the necessary context for a thoughtful decision.

Fortunately there is information available on which we can base thoughtful decisions about scarce items. It comes, once again, from the chocolate chip cookie study, where the researchers uncovered something that seems strange but rings true regarding scarcity: Even though the scarce cookies were rated as significantly more desirable, they were not rated as any better-tasting than the abundant cookies. So, despite the increased yearning that scarcity caused (the raters said they wanted to have more of the scarce cookies in the future and would pay a greater price for them), it did not make the cookies taste one whit better. Therein lies an important insight. The joy is not in the experiencing of a scarce commodity but in the possessing of it. It is important that we not confuse the two. Whenever we confront the scarcity pressures surrounding some item, we must also confront the question of what it is we want from the item. If the answer is that we want the thing for the social, economic, or psychological benefits of possessing something rare, then, fine; scarcity pressures will give us a good indication of how much we would want to pay for it-the less available it is, the more valuable to us it will be. However, very often we don't want a thing for the pure sake of owning it. We want it, instead, for its utility value; we want to eat it or drink it or touch it or hear it or drive it or otherwise use it. In such cases it is vital to remember that scarce things do not taste or feel or sound or ride or work any better it. In such cases it is vital to remember that scarce things do not taste or feel or sound or ride or work any better because because of their limited availability. of their limited availability.

Although this point is simple it can often escape us when we experience the heightened desirability that scarce items naturally possess. I can cite a family example. My brother Richard supported himself through school by employing a compliance trick that cashed in handsomely on the tendency of most people to miss that simple point. In fact, his tactic was so effective in this regard that he had to work only a few hours each weekend for his money, leaving the rest of the time free for his studies.

Richard sold cars, but not in a showroom or on a car lot. He would buy a couple of used cars sold privately through the newspaper on one weekend, and adding nothing but soap and water, would sell them at a decided profit through the newspaper on the following weekend. To do this, he had to know three things. First, he had to know enough about cars to buy those that were offered for sale at the bottom of their blue book price range but that could be legitimately resold for a higher price. Second, once he got the car, he had to know how to write a newspaper ad that would stimulate substantial buyer interest. Third, once a buyer arrived, he had to know how to use the scarcity principle to generate more desire for the car than it perhaps deserved. Richard knew how to do all three. For our purposes, though, we need to examine his craft with just the third.

For a car he had purchased on the prior weekend, he would place an ad in the Sunday paper. Because he knew how to write a good ad, he usually received an array of calls from potential buyers on Sunday morning. Each prospect who was interested enough to want to see the car was given an appointment time-the same appointment time. So, if six people were scheduled, they were all scheduled for, say, 2:00 that afternoon. This little device of simultaneous scheduling paved the way for later compliance because it created an atmosphere of compet.i.tion for a limited resource.

Typically, the first prospect to arrive would begin a studied examination of the car and would engage in standard car-buying behavior, such as pointing out any blemishes or deficiencies and asking if the price were negotiable. The psychology of the situation changed radically, however, when the second buyer drove up. The availability of the car to either prospect suddenly became limited by the presence of the other. Often the earlier arrival, inadvertently stoking the sense of rivalry, would a.s.sert his right to primary consideration. "Just a minute now, I was here first." If he didn't a.s.sert that right, Richard would do it for him. Addressing the second buyer, he would say, "Excuse me, but this other gentleman was here before you. So, can I ask you to wait on the other side of the driveway for a few minutes until he's finished looking at the car? Then, if he decides he doesn't want it or if he can't make up his mind, I'll show it to you."

Richard claims it was possible to watch the agitation grow on the first buyer's face. His leisurely a.s.sessment of the car's pros and cons had suddenly become a now-or-never, limited-time-only rush to a decision over a contested resource. If he didn't decide for the car-at Richard's asking price-in the next few minutes, he might lose it for good to that . . . that . . . lurking newcomer over there. The second buyer would be equally agitated by the combination of rivalry and restricted availability. He would pace about the periphery of things, visibly straining to get at this suddenly more desirable hunk of metal. Should 2:00 appointment number one fail to buy or even fail to decide quickly enough, 2:00 appointment num