The Type VIIB U-47 U-47 patrolled Area I, 300 miles west of Bordeaux, France. Barely nine months old, patrolled Area I, 300 miles west of Bordeaux, France. Barely nine months old, U-47 U-47 was commanded by thirty-one-year-old Gunther Prien, who was destined to become the most famous submariner of all time. Prien was one of hundreds of German merchant marine officers who had been recruited into the rapidly expanding was commanded by thirty-one-year-old Gunther Prien, who was destined to become the most famous submariner of all time. Prien was one of hundreds of German merchant marine officers who had been recruited into the rapidly expanding Reichsmarine Reichsmarine. His background was typical of that group, upon which Donitz had drawn for U-boat skippers.

Born in 1908 in the Baltic seaport of Lubeck, Prien was one of three children of a judge. He obtained a basic education at the Katharineum Katharineum prep school. When his parents divorced, his mother moved with the children to Leipzig. By 1923, when Prien was fifteen, the economic chaos in Germany had reduced his mother to pauperhood. To help ease her burden-and fulfill a boyhood longing-Prien abandoned his education and left home to join the merchant marine, spending a last few hoarded marks on a three-month course at the Seaman's College in Finkenwarder. prep school. When his parents divorced, his mother moved with the children to Leipzig. By 1923, when Prien was fifteen, the economic chaos in Germany had reduced his mother to pauperhood. To help ease her burden-and fulfill a boyhood longing-Prien abandoned his education and left home to join the merchant marine, spending a last few hoarded marks on a three-month course at the Seaman's College in Finkenwarder.

Prien's career in the German merchant marine spanned eight years. Beginning as a lowly cabin boy on a full-rigged sailing ship, he was a good seaman, a staunch ally in forecastle and barroom brawls, and an apt pupil. Cruising to every corner of the world on a variety of merchant ships, he learned telegraphy, navigation, laws of the sea, ship handling, and the art of leadership. Rising steadily through the ranks, by 1931 he was a first mate and qualified for captain's school. But when he graduated from there in January 1932 with his master's certificate, the German merchant marine was in the grip of the Great Depression and there were no jobs for aspiring captains.

Unwillingly beached at this climactic moment in his chosen career, Prien had a tough year in 1932. He worked at odd jobs ashore, but when those ran out, he was forced to join the Labor Service (a German precursor of Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps), digging ditches and draining fields. Upon learning that the expanding Reichsmarine Reichsmarine had opened its officer-candidate program to merchant marine officers, Prien jumped at this opportunity and in January 1933, age twenty-five, he joined the Navy. He thus became a member of the crew of 1933, but in age and maritime experience he was the equal of the men in the crew of 1926. had opened its officer-candidate program to merchant marine officers, Prien jumped at this opportunity and in January 1933, age twenty-five, he joined the Navy. He thus became a member of the crew of 1933, but in age and maritime experience he was the equal of the men in the crew of 1926.

After an apprenticeship especially tailored for experienced merchant marine officers, he was commissioned and moved ahead at an accelerated pace, married, had a daughter, and volunteered for U-boat duty. Upon graduation from the submarine school in 1935, he served as a watch officer on the big experimental Type I boat, U-26 U-26, making the showboat voyages to Spain. Rated as one of the half-dozen best U-boat officers in the force, Prien became the third and most junior officer (by crew) selected to command a new VIIB. In the Atlantic war games of May 1939, he had been the most aggressive, had "shot" from the closest range, and had "scored" highest.

For days Prien had been dodging and hiding from all ships and aircraft. On the first day of the war, September 3, he saw no ships. On September 4 he received the news of the Athenia Athenia sinking over radio broadcasts. Later that day came the direct order from the Fuhrer barring attacks on passenger vessels of any kind. Still later that day a pointed reminder to observe the Submarine Protocol arrived from Donitz: "Operation orders Para Via remain in force for the war against merchant shipping." Prien responded accordingly. He stopped a Greek neutral and let her pass unmolested. He closed on two other ships, a Swede and a Norwegian, but when he saw their markings and flags, he did not even bother to stop them. sinking over radio broadcasts. Later that day came the direct order from the Fuhrer barring attacks on passenger vessels of any kind. Still later that day a pointed reminder to observe the Submarine Protocol arrived from Donitz: "Operation orders Para Via remain in force for the war against merchant shipping." Prien responded accordingly. He stopped a Greek neutral and let her pass unmolested. He closed on two other ships, a Swede and a Norwegian, but when he saw their markings and flags, he did not even bother to stop them.

Near daybreak on September 5, the first watch officer of U-47 U-47, Engelbert En-drass, age twenty-eight, who like Prien was a onetime merchant marine officer, spotted a darkened ship that was zigzagging. Prien dived and sent the gun crew to battle stations. When he closed the track, Prien surfaced and fired a shot from his 88 mm (3.4") deck gun. Instead of stopping, the ship put on steam and turned tail, radioing the U-boat alarm, SSS SSS, the position, and its name: Bosnia Bosnia. She was a small British freighter of 2,407 tons, with a cargo of sulphur. Upon hearing the radio signals, Prien fired four more rounds from the deck gun directly at the ship. Three hit. The crew abandoned ship in panic, capsizing a lifeboat. Survivors floundered in the water.

Prien cruised among the panicky survivors, hauling them on board U-47 U-47. His men righted the overturned lifeboat and bailed it out. In the midst of the rescue, a Norwegian ship came up and stopped. Prien instructed the Norwegians to assist. In response, they lowered a boat and, in due course, collected all the British survivors. After the Norwegian ship was well out of the way, Prien fired one torpedo at Bosnia Bosnia. The ship buckled and sank in seconds. She was the second British ship to be torpedoed after Athenia Athenia-and the first freighter.

At dawn the next day, September 6, Prien found another British freighter, Rio Claro Rio Claro, 4,086 tons, outbound from London with a mixed cargo. Prien surfaced, gun manned. The ship stopped but began radioing the U-boat alarm, SSS SSS. Prien fired a shot, but when this failed to silence the radio, he put three shells on the bridge. The radio went dead; the crew abandoned ship in lifeboats. Prien sank the ship with a torpedo, then inspected the lifeboats. All had food, water, compasses, sails, and signal flares. While he was debating whether or not to fetch a neutral ship to take the survivors on board, an aircraft appeared-perhaps in response to the SSS SSS-and he dived. That apparent hostile act decided it for him: The survivors were on their own.

In the early afternoon of the next day, September 7, Prien came upon another small British freighter, Gartavon Gartavon, 1,777 tons, carrying a cargo of iron ore. When she sighted U-47 U-47, she signaled SSS SSS and tried to run off. A lucky hit from the deck gun brought down a goalpost mast and the radio antenna, and the ship hove to. Prien watched as the crew lowered a single boat, which pulled off in a hurry. Then, suddenly, the unmanned ship got under way and headed directly for and tried to run off. A lucky hit from the deck gun brought down a goalpost mast and the radio antenna, and the ship hove to. Prien watched as the crew lowered a single boat, which pulled off in a hurry. Then, suddenly, the unmanned ship got under way and headed directly for U-47 U-47. Before abandoning ship, the crew had somehow rigged the ship to ram U-47 U-47. Prien put on emergency speed-gun blazing-and maneuvered out of the way just in time, passing so close to Gartavon Gartavon that her wash slewed that her wash slewed U-47 U-47 half around. half around.

Prien left the abandoned ship circling and approached the single, crowded lifeboat. He was chagrined at having been tricked, but nonetheless he offered the captain an opportunity to return to his ship to launch a second lifeboat. When that offer was refused, Prien made certain the one lifeboat was adequately provisioned. He told the captain that he would send a neutral to help if he came across one, but in view of the hostile act taken against U-47 U-47 he would not radio for help. He then returned to he would not radio for help. He then returned to Gartavon Gartavon and fired a single torpedo, but it malfunctioned-zigging wildly off course. Deciding to husband his torpedoes, Prien sank the ship with the deck gun. and fired a single torpedo, but it malfunctioned-zigging wildly off course. Deciding to husband his torpedoes, Prien sank the ship with the deck gun.

Due west of Prien, Herbert Schultze, age thirty, another former merchant marine officer, patrolled Area H in U-48 U-48, a sister ship of U-47 U-47. On September 5, Schultze ran across a big freighter inbound to the British Isles, but a shot from his deck gun failed to stop her. She bent on steam and hauled off, emitting clouds of soot, radioing SSS SSS. In an attempt to silence the radio, Schultze directed gun fire at the bridge. The ship stopped and all the crew-save the radio operator-took to the lifeboats. While they did so, Schultze withheld fire, even though the SSS SSS signals continued. After the crew had pulled off, Schultze closed on the ship and took off the radio operator. Then he fired a single torpedo, which ran true. Down went Royal Sceptre, a British ship of 4,853 tons, loaded with grain. signals continued. After the crew had pulled off, Schultze closed on the ship and took off the radio operator. Then he fired a single torpedo, which ran true. Down went Royal Sceptre, a British ship of 4,853 tons, loaded with grain.

Approaching the lifeboats, Schultze asked if there were any wounded. There were none. All else was in order. He handed the radio operator over to a lifeboat, saluting his courage, then told the survivors to stand by. He had seen smoke on the horizon-an unidentified freighter coming up. Schultze made a beeline for the other ship, which turned out to be another big British freighter, S.S. Browning Browning, 5,332 tons, outbound to Latin America. Schultze fired his deck gun to stop her, intending to direct her captain to rescue Royal Sceptre Royal Sceptre's crew. But before he could make known his intent, the freighter crew lowered boats and abandoned ship in a panic.

Exasperated, Schultze closed on the lifeboats. He instructed the crew to return to Browning Browning and to go pick up the and to go pick up the Royal Sceptre Royal Sceptre's crew. Naturally leery, the Britishers made no move to comply. Angrily waving his arms, Schultze finally got his point across. The crew returned to the ship, steamed off and picked up the Royal Sceptre Royal Sceptre's crew, and carried the men on to the ship's destination in Brazil.* Over the next two days, September 6 and 7, Schultze stopped and searched several more neutrals and let them pass unmolested. Early in the morning of September 8, he found a 5,000-ton British freighter, Over the next two days, September 6 and 7, Schultze stopped and searched several more neutrals and let them pass unmolested. Early in the morning of September 8, he found a 5,000-ton British freighter, Winkleigh Winkleigh. After the crew had abandoned ship, Schultze sank her with a torpedo.

The five large, long-range Type IX boats of the Hundius Flotilla, U-37 U-37 to to U-41 U-41, patrolled the most distant waters: the coast of the Iberian Peninsula and the western approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar.

Designed for extended cruising, the Type IXs were a bit roomier and less uncomfortable than the Type VIIs. Measuring 251 feet overall, the IXs were 40 feet longer than the VIIs and 33 feet longer than the VIIBs. The compartmentation inside the pressure hull of the IXs was similar to that of the VIIs except that the petty-officer quarters and galley, inconveniently located on the VIIs between the control room and engine room, had been eliminated. The eight bunks in that compartment were relocated aft, in a greatly enlarged stern room, which had two internal torpedo tubes; the galley was moved forward to the officers' compartment. The motor-generators, located in the stern room of the VIIs, were moved forward into the diesel-engine compartment. The five resulting fore-to-aft compartments were thus larger than the six compartments of the VIIs, as was the conning tower and bridge above.

All the numbers of the Type IXs were substantially greater than those of the Types VII and VIIB. Diesel horsepower: 4,000 versus 2,320 to 2,800. Motor-generators: 1,000 horsepower versus 750. Surface speed: 18.2 knots versus 16 to 17.2. Fuel storage: 154 tons versus 67 to 108. Range (at 12 knots): 8,000 versus 4,300 to 6,500. Torpedo capacity: 22 versus 11 and 14. Deck gun 105mm (4.1") versus 88mm (3.4"). Crew: 48 versus 44. versus 11 and 14. Deck gun 105mm (4.1") versus 88mm (3.4"). Crew: 48 versus 44.

The Type IX was not the boat Donitz preferred. His reasons were several. He envisioned a U-boat war fought primarily close in to the British Isles, where all torpedoes were to be expended quickly, and therefore the endurance (or range) advantage of the IX was more or less superfluous. The added torpedo capacity of the IX-twenty-two versus fourteen for the VIIB-was not all it appeared to be. Eight of the twenty-two torpedoes, all air propelled, were stored topside, where they could not be serviced and could only be brought below in calm weather. What counted most with Donitz was the internal internal torpedo capacity. The Type IX had fourteen internal torpedoes, versus twelve on the VIIB, not sufficiently advantageous to justify the threefold investment in time and materiel for the larger boat. Moreover, the IXs were slow in diving, had a greater turning circle, were clumsy submerged, lacked the rapid submerged acceleration of the VIIs, and presented the enemy a larger sonar target. torpedo capacity. The Type IX had fourteen internal torpedoes, versus twelve on the VIIB, not sufficiently advantageous to justify the threefold investment in time and materiel for the larger boat. Moreover, the IXs were slow in diving, had a greater turning circle, were clumsy submerged, lacked the rapid submerged acceleration of the VIIs, and presented the enemy a larger sonar target.

Donitz had hopes that the five Type IXs in southern waters might operate as a pack against a convoy, tactically directed by Flotilla Commander Werner Hart-mann, on board U-37 U-37. But for various reasons, the boats were unable to operate as a group. All patrolled independently over widely spaced areas that appeared to be virtually empty of shipping.

Heinrich Liebe, a thirty-one-year-old lieutenant, commanded U-38 U-38. Like Lemp in U-30 U-30, Liebe was the son of an Army officer. Like Lemp, Liebe had joined the Reichsmarine Reichsmarine at age eighteen. After submarine school and command of the duck at age eighteen. After submarine school and command of the duck U-2 U-2, Liebe had commissioned U-38 U-38 in December 1938. in December 1938.

Liebe patrolled close off the coast of Lisbon, Portugal, where traffic was densest. On September 5 he sighted a freighter, surfaced, and forced her to heave to for inspection. Awkwardly, she turned out to be the French vessel Pluvoise Pluvoise. After examining her papers, Liebe let her pass, but her captain broadcast a submarine alarm, which was picked up in Berlin. This prompted a rebuke and further tightening of the U-boat rules: "Merchantmen identified as being French are not to be stopped. Incidents with France are to be avoided at all costs."

The next day, September 6, still off Lisbon, Liebe put a warning shot across the bow of the 7,242-ton British freighter S.S. Manaar Manaar with his 4.1" deck gun. As it turned out, with his 4.1" deck gun. As it turned out, Manaar Manaar was armed with a gun almost as large (3.94") mounted on the stern. As was armed with a gun almost as large (3.94") mounted on the stern. As U-38 U-38 approached, approached, Manaar's Manaar's gun crew opened fire. Stunned by this unexpected and hot reception- gun crew opened fire. Stunned by this unexpected and hot reception-Manaar was the first British merchantman to fire a gun at a U-boat-Liebe dived and without further ado, sank was the first British merchantman to fire a gun at a U-boat-Liebe dived and without further ado, sank Manaar Manaar with torpedoes. In view of Manaar's hostile military action against him, Liebe judged with torpedoes. In view of Manaar's hostile military action against him, Liebe judged Manaar Manaar to be excluded from the protection of the Submarine Protocol and made no effort to assist her survivors. to be excluded from the protection of the Submarine Protocol and made no effort to assist her survivors.

Liebe hauled out of the area and that night broke radio silence to give Donitz an account of this battle and to warn other U-boats of similar dangers. In Berlin, the naval staff released the details to foreign naval attaches and to the media, stressing that Manaar Manaar had fired at had fired at U-38 U-38 on sight on sight. Donitz was incensed. It seemed completely unfair that his crews should be required to adhere strictly to the Submarine Protocol in the face of an enemy that was arming its merchant ships, in effect, turning them into warships. But, given the "political situation," as he put it, he could do nothing more than to warn all U-boats to exercise extreme caution.

The U-boat assigned to the most hazardous mission in the Atlantic, the unsteady U-26 U-26, was loaded with mines. She was commanded by a reliable and conservative skipper, thirty-two-year-old Klaus Ewerth. He was a star graduate of the first class (1933) at the secret submarine school, had commissioned the first duck, U-1 U-1, in 1935, and had commanded the Type VII, U-35 U-35 for two years. In peacetime drills, he had mastered the art of minelaying. for two years. In peacetime drills, he had mastered the art of minelaying.

The U-26 U-26 mission had been conceived by the OKM. The objective was to foul the British naval base at Portland to prevent the embarkation of British Army troops to France across the English Channel. From its inception, Donitz had opposed the mission. Sonar-equipped ASW forces were certain to be patrolling the channel approaches to Portland. It was also the home base of the Royal Navy's sonar school! They could hardly miss big, clumsy mission had been conceived by the OKM. The objective was to foul the British naval base at Portland to prevent the embarkation of British Army troops to France across the English Channel. From its inception, Donitz had opposed the mission. Sonar-equipped ASW forces were certain to be patrolling the channel approaches to Portland. It was also the home base of the Royal Navy's sonar school! They could hardly miss big, clumsy U-26 U-26.

Ewerth commenced a careful submerged run-in on September 4. As expected, he encountered intense ASW patrols. After playing hide-and-seek for several hours, he aborted the first attempt and returned to deep water. A second attempt also failed. Finally, on the third run-in, Ewerth reached a likely spot off the Portland harbor, the Shambles, undetected, on the night of September 8.

During the years between the wars, the German Navy had developed in secrecy a wide array of mines, vastly superior to those employed in World War I. The U-26 U-26 was loaded with one type, the TMB, designed especially to be laid by submarines. The TMB was an untethered "seabed" (or "ground") mine, with a magnetic pistol, to be laid on the bottom in fairly shallow water (about sixty-five feet). It was 7 feet long and had a 1,276-pound warhead (twice the explosive power of a German torpedo). When a big ship passed overhead, its magnetic field would actuate the mine's pistol, exploding the mine directly beneath the keel of the ship with devastating force. was loaded with one type, the TMB, designed especially to be laid by submarines. The TMB was an untethered "seabed" (or "ground") mine, with a magnetic pistol, to be laid on the bottom in fairly shallow water (about sixty-five feet). It was 7 feet long and had a 1,276-pound warhead (twice the explosive power of a German torpedo). When a big ship passed overhead, its magnetic field would actuate the mine's pistol, exploding the mine directly beneath the keel of the ship with devastating force.

Submarine minelaying was a tedious, exacting, and hazardous business. The mines had to be laid precisely in the selected sea channel, otherwise they would be useless. This required positioning the boat within a few feet feet of the selected site. Furthermore, by international law, minefields had to be exactly charted so they could be swept after hostilities. The charting was useful as well to the Germans. Should they decide to augment the field, they would know exactly where the first mines had been planted and these could be avoided. of the selected site. Furthermore, by international law, minefields had to be exactly charted so they could be swept after hostilities. The charting was useful as well to the Germans. Should they decide to augment the field, they would know exactly where the first mines had been planted and these could be avoided.

The U-26 U-26 carried her mines in the four forward and two stern torpedo tubes, with others stored in the bow and stern compartments. One by one Ewerth booted the mines out of the tubes with compressed air, charting the exact location by means of the navigational lights burning on shore and in the channel. There was no danger to the boat; the mines had delayed-action arming devices, which would not actuate until carried her mines in the four forward and two stern torpedo tubes, with others stored in the bow and stern compartments. One by one Ewerth booted the mines out of the tubes with compressed air, charting the exact location by means of the navigational lights burning on shore and in the channel. There was no danger to the boat; the mines had delayed-action arming devices, which would not actuate until U-26 U-26 was well clear. When all the mines had been laid-and charted-Ewerth eased away submerged to deep water and put the boat on the bottom. After the crew rested, the torpedomen loaded all six tubes with torpedoes, manhandled from the storage spaces below the deck plates. was well clear. When all the mines had been laid-and charted-Ewerth eased away submerged to deep water and put the boat on the bottom. After the crew rested, the torpedomen loaded all six tubes with torpedoes, manhandled from the storage spaces below the deck plates.

Submariners of all nations disliked minelaying. It had to be done close to shore in shallow water where if detected, the boat became dangerously exposed to enemy attack. Putting the mines overboard and then reloading the tubes with torpedoes was dangerous and hard physical work. There was no immediate damage to shipping (as in firing torpedoes), and thus no satisfaction and seldom any credit. Besides that, many regarded minelaying as sneaky and underhanded-somehow not quite fair.

While withdrawing westward from the English Channel, the U-26 U-26 was again detected by British ASW forces and compelled to engage in prolonged evasion. That and the long delays in planting the field put Ewerth days behind schedule and he was unable to report to Donitz. When, on September 8, the Admiralty announced that British naval forces had sunk a U-boat that was attempting to lay mines in the English Channel, Donitz assumed that it was was again detected by British ASW forces and compelled to engage in prolonged evasion. That and the long delays in planting the field put Ewerth days behind schedule and he was unable to report to Donitz. When, on September 8, the Admiralty announced that British naval forces had sunk a U-boat that was attempting to lay mines in the English Channel, Donitz assumed that it was U-26 U-26. As a check he radioed Ewerth to report his position. Receiving no reply, Donitz was convinced U-26 U-26 was gone. was gone.

Apart from all else, the probable loss of U-26 U-26 caused a tremendous flap at the OKM. She had a naval Enigma and documents for it on board. If, as was assumed, caused a tremendous flap at the OKM. She had a naval Enigma and documents for it on board. If, as was assumed, U-26 U-26 went down in shallow water, the British might salvage her or send down divers and recover the Enigma with its operating instructions and current keys. As a result, the OKM ordered that Enigma settings throughout the entire went down in shallow water, the British might salvage her or send down divers and recover the Enigma with its operating instructions and current keys. As a result, the OKM ordered that Enigma settings throughout the entire Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine be changed and that henceforth no minelaying U-boat should carry an Enigma. It was a useless precaution; be changed and that henceforth no minelaying U-boat should carry an Enigma. It was a useless precaution; U-26 U-26 was safe and sound and finally spoke up after Ewerth shook his pursuers and reached the open Atlantic. was safe and sound and finally spoke up after Ewerth shook his pursuers and reached the open Atlantic.

Much later it was learned the U-26 U-26 minefield paid off. The Admiralty announced that three big "neutral" freighters (a Greek, a Dutch, and a Belgian) triggered mines and sank. These ships displaced a total of 17,414 tons. It was believed that a British patrol sloop, Kittiwake, was badly damaged by a minefield paid off. The Admiralty announced that three big "neutral" freighters (a Greek, a Dutch, and a Belgian) triggered mines and sank. These ships displaced a total of 17,414 tons. It was believed that a British patrol sloop, Kittiwake, was badly damaged by a U-26 U-26 mine, but, in fact, she hit a British mine. mine, but, in fact, she hit a British mine.

ENCOUNTERS WITH A ARK ROYAL ROYAL.

Merely five days into the war, on September 8, Donitz ordered a sweeping redeployment of the Atlantic U-boats. The main reason for the change was to amass oceangoing boats at home to deploy in a "second wave" in October, so there would be no lull or gap in the U-boat offensive. Accordingly, he ordered ten of the eighteen boats in the Atlantic (five of the six VIIBs and all five IXs) to return to Germany. The unsteady U-26 U-26, which found no targets for her six torpedoes, developed mechanical problems and soon joined the homeward trek, leaving only seven of the original group, all Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla, to carry on the war. To augment these, Donitz committed the reserve force of three Type VIIs. One, U-32 U-32, was to go northabout the British Isles and lay a TMB minefield off the British naval base at Portsmouth, in the English Channel east of Portland. In order to save time, the other two, U-31 U-31 and and U-35 U-35, loaded with torpedoes, were to go directly to the Atlantic via the English Channel. The U-31 U-31 made it through the channel safely, but made it through the channel safely, but U-35 U-35, attacked by aircraft and the British submarine Ursula, was forced to abort the channel passage and go northabout like U-32 U-32.

The ten boats recalled to Germany stayed well to the westward of the British Isles, where the remaining U-boats were patrolling. It was not a happy homebound procession. The five IXs of the Hundius Flotilla had sunk one ship-the Manaar Manaar by Liebe in by Liebe in U-38 U-38. The five VIIBs of the Wegener Flotilla had sunk only five ships-three by Prien in U-47 U-47 and two by Herbert Schultze in and two by Herbert Schultze in U-48 U-48. However, Liebe and Schultze had further success on the way home. On September 11, Liebe torpedoed the fully loaded 9,456-ton British tanker Inverliffey Inverliffey, which blew up in a fireball. At considerable risk to U-38 U-38, Liebe saved the crew by towing the lifeboats from the blazing inferno. Further north that same day, Schultze sank the 4,869-ton British freighter Firby Firby with his deck gun and a torpedo. Schultze provided medical care for several wounded Firby crewmen, provisioned the lifeboats, then radioed in the clear: "TRANSMIT TO MR. CHURCHILL. I HAVE SUNK THE BRITISH STEAMER FIRBY. POSIT FIFTY-NINE DEGREES FORTY MINUTES NORTH, THIRTEEN DEGREES FIFTY MINUTES WEST. SAVE THE CREW IF YOU PLEASE. GERMAN SUBMARINE." with his deck gun and a torpedo. Schultze provided medical care for several wounded Firby crewmen, provisioned the lifeboats, then radioed in the clear: "TRANSMIT TO MR. CHURCHILL. I HAVE SUNK THE BRITISH STEAMER FIRBY. POSIT FIFTY-NINE DEGREES FORTY MINUTES NORTH, THIRTEEN DEGREES FIFTY MINUTES WEST. SAVE THE CREW IF YOU PLEASE. GERMAN SUBMARINE."

The returning boats passed near Rockall, where Lemp in U-30 U-30 was patrolling. But not happily. Since sinking was patrolling. But not happily. Since sinking Athenia Athenia on September 3, the on September 3, the U-30 U-30 had been dogged by foul weather and a dearth of traffic. He had found and sunk by gunfire only one other ship: the 4,500-ton British freighter Blairlogie. Adhering strictly to the rules, Lemp gave the survivors whisky and cigarettes and stood by the lifeboats until a neutral ship rescued them. had been dogged by foul weather and a dearth of traffic. He had found and sunk by gunfire only one other ship: the 4,500-ton British freighter Blairlogie. Adhering strictly to the rules, Lemp gave the survivors whisky and cigarettes and stood by the lifeboats until a neutral ship rescued them.

Near Rockall on the morning of September 14, Lemp found another British freighter, the 5,200-ton Fanad Head Fanad Head. He stopped her with his deck gun, but not before she had radioed SSS SSS and her position. After the crew had abandoned ship, Lemp decided to send a two-man team across in a rubber dinghy and blow her up with a demolition charge. This would save torpedoes, which were in short supply. The demolition team, led by Adolph Schmidt, could also ransack and her position. After the crew had abandoned ship, Lemp decided to send a two-man team across in a rubber dinghy and blow her up with a demolition charge. This would save torpedoes, which were in short supply. The demolition team, led by Adolph Schmidt, could also ransack Fanad Head Fanad Head for fresh bread and other booty. for fresh bread and other booty.

British shore stations and ships picked up Fanad Head Fanad Head's distress call. The ships included the Royal Navy's newest and most formidable carrier, Ark Royal Ark Royal, which was about 180 miles to the northeast on ASW patrol, escorted by six destroyers. Three of the destroyers peeled off and proceeded southwest to Fanad Head Fanad Head at top speed. Shortly afterward at top speed. Shortly afterward Ark Royal Ark Royal launched three Skua monoplanes armed with ASW bombs. launched three Skua monoplanes armed with ASW bombs.* The planes arrived at the scene in the midst of The planes arrived at the scene in the midst of U-30 U-30's demolition operation, forcing Lemp to break off and dive, leaving Schmidt and his assistant stranded on Fanad Head Fanad Head. In the rush to get under, Lemp's men forgot to cut the line to the dinghy, which, unknown to Lemp, trailed over U-30 U-30 like a marker buoy. like a marker buoy.

The three Skua pilots saw a "black object" (the dinghy) and attacked it with bombs, some of which rattled U-30 U-30. Unfortunately, the British pilots did not know the bombs were scandalously ill designed. Some bombs struck the water and "skipped" back into the air. The impact triggered the fuses, exploding the bombs, spewing fragments into the path of the oncoming aircraft. Severely damaged by the bomb fragments, two of the Skuas were forced to ditch. Looking on in amazement, Adolph Schmidt and his assistant on Fanad Head Fanad Head swam out and rescued both British pilots, one of whom was badly burned. Although one plane was still overhead, Lemp surfaced to recover Schmidt, his assistant-and the two British pilots-and to cut loose the dinghy. During the recovery, the surviving aircraft raked swam out and rescued both British pilots, one of whom was badly burned. Although one plane was still overhead, Lemp surfaced to recover Schmidt, his assistant-and the two British pilots-and to cut loose the dinghy. During the recovery, the surviving aircraft raked U-30 U-30 with machine-gun fire, wounding Schmidt, who was helping the injured British pilot get below. with machine-gun fire, wounding Schmidt, who was helping the injured British pilot get below.

While U-30 U-30's medic attended to Schmidt and the British pilots, Lemp set up and fired four bow torpedoes at Fanad Head. All malfunctioned or missed. A fifth torpedo from the external stern tube struck home and the ship blew up and sank. At that moment-it was now 1830-a second wave of Ark Royal aircraft comprised of six older Swordfish biplanes, each armed with six 100-pound bombs, arrived over the scene. The pilots could clearly see the submerged shadow of U-30 U-30. They attacked, dropping a total of eleven bombs, some of which exploded very close to the boat. Lemp went deep to evade.

Later the three fleet destroyers arrived, having traveled the 180 miles in about seven hours. All were equipped with the latest sonar manned by skilled operators. One destroyer went in search of the Fanad Head Fanad Head crew, the other two hunted-and found- crew, the other two hunted-and found-U-30. Sonar conditions were good; the operators knew exactly what to do.

Working as a team, the two destroyers fixed U-30 U-30 and delivered a series of devastating depth-charge attacks. and delivered a series of devastating depth-charge attacks.* The explosions shattered glass dials-and men's nerves-damaged two torpedo bow caps, and cracked open a valve in the engine room, partially flooding that space. Before the crew could stop the leak and organize a bucket brigade to shift the water to the control-room bilges, where it could be pumped overboard, The explosions shattered glass dials-and men's nerves-damaged two torpedo bow caps, and cracked open a valve in the engine room, partially flooding that space. Before the crew could stop the leak and organize a bucket brigade to shift the water to the control-room bilges, where it could be pumped overboard, U-30 U-30 sank to a greater depth than any U-boat had ever gone-472 feet. Throughout this punishing ordeal, Lemp remained absolute master of his boat-"even-tempered, very determined, and possessed of unshakable calm." After six hours, Lemp eluded his pursuers, surfaced, and escaped in the darkness. sank to a greater depth than any U-boat had ever gone-472 feet. Throughout this punishing ordeal, Lemp remained absolute master of his boat-"even-tempered, very determined, and possessed of unshakable calm." After six hours, Lemp eluded his pursuers, surfaced, and escaped in the darkness.

Lemp broke radio silence to report the fight and his damage and to request permission to land the wounded Schmidt and the two Ark Royal Ark Royal pilots in neutral Iceland for medical care. Donitz authorized the diversion, after which Lemp was to return directly to Germany. Monitoring this radio exchange, the OKM gained the impression that pilots in neutral Iceland for medical care. Donitz authorized the diversion, after which Lemp was to return directly to Germany. Monitoring this radio exchange, the OKM gained the impression that U-30 U-30 had shot down the two aircraft and on the following day, Berlin propagandists gloatingly announced a "victory" over had shot down the two aircraft and on the following day, Berlin propagandists gloatingly announced a "victory" over Ark Royal Ark Royal.

That day, September 14, while Ark Royal was launching its first flight of aircraft to attack U-30 U-30, one of the homebound IXs of the Hundius Flotilla, U-39 U-39, commanded by Gerhard Glattes, age thirty, happened upon the carrier. The view from U-39 U-39's periscope was a submariner's dream: the majestic Ark Royal Ark Royal steaming alone. She had turned into the wind to launch the Skuas and, as a result, she had fallen four miles astern of the three remaining destroyers of her screen, steaming alone. She had turned into the wind to launch the Skuas and, as a result, she had fallen four miles astern of the three remaining destroyers of her screen, Faulkner Faulkner, Foxhound Foxhound, and Firedrake Firedrake.

The excitement on U-39 U-39 could not have been greater. After twenty-six days of luckless patrolling, Glattes now had the pride of the Royal Navy in his crosshairs. Carefully, competently, coolly, Glattes ordered the bow tubes made ready arid the outer doors opened. Then, at 1507, he fired a fan of three electric torpedoes with magnetic pistols. Timing the torpedo runs with a stopwatch, the crew tensely waited. Then, finally, explosions! A hit! could not have been greater. After twenty-six days of luckless patrolling, Glattes now had the pride of the Royal Navy in his crosshairs. Carefully, competently, coolly, Glattes ordered the bow tubes made ready arid the outer doors opened. Then, at 1507, he fired a fan of three electric torpedoes with magnetic pistols. Timing the torpedo runs with a stopwatch, the crew tensely waited. Then, finally, explosions! A hit!

Or so it seemed. Actually, the torpedoes had been misaimed or had malfunctioned. None hit Ark Royal Ark Royal. Men on one of the destroyers saw Ark Royal Ark Royal swing rapidly to port, then a "high white splash" on her port side, followed by "a flash and black smoke to starboard." The British believed Glattes had underestimated swing rapidly to port, then a "high white splash" on her port side, followed by "a flash and black smoke to starboard." The British believed Glattes had underestimated Ark Royal Ark Royal's speed (20 knots versus actual speed of 26 knots). They reported that the torpedoes had exploded harmlessly "in the wake." In his postwar memoir, Donitz wrote that the magnetic pistols of the torpedoes had not worked properly and that all had "exploded prematurely underwater, close to the ship, but before they had reached a position below her."

Upon receiving a signal from Ark Royal Ark Royal reporting a submarine attack, the three destroyers reversed course and launched a hunt, line abreast, making 15 knots and maintaining a distance of one mile between them. Sonar conditions were good; the operators were among the best in the fleet. Within eighteen minutes, both reporting a submarine attack, the three destroyers reversed course and launched a hunt, line abreast, making 15 knots and maintaining a distance of one mile between them. Sonar conditions were good; the operators were among the best in the fleet. Within eighteen minutes, both Foxhound Foxhound and and Faulkner Faulkner had sonar contact. had sonar contact. Foxhound Foxhound attacked immediately, dropping two depth charges, one set for 250 feet, one for 300 feet. attacked immediately, dropping two depth charges, one set for 250 feet, one for 300 feet. Faulkner Faulkner followed with five more depth charges set for 100 and 150 feet. In the noise of exploding depth charges, both of these destroyers lost contact, but followed with five more depth charges set for 100 and 150 feet. In the noise of exploding depth charges, both of these destroyers lost contact, but Firedrake Firedrake did not, and she moved in to drop five more charges set for 250 feet and 500 feet. did not, and she moved in to drop five more charges set for 250 feet and 500 feet.

These twelve depth charges exploded close and rocked U-39 U-39 violently. The first batch caused arcing flames in the battery and knocked out all lighting. Glattes took violently. The first batch caused arcing flames in the battery and knocked out all lighting. Glattes took U-39 U-39 "deep" (to about 230 feet) but the second salvo caught her and cracked sea valves and flanges. Salt water flooded into the battery, generating deadly chlorine gas. Then the electric motors shut down and "deep" (to about 230 feet) but the second salvo caught her and cracked sea valves and flanges. Salt water flooded into the battery, generating deadly chlorine gas. Then the electric motors shut down and U-39 U-39, unable to maneuver submerged, went out of control.

No one on U-39 U-39 had ever experienced noise and terror on this scale. After twenty minutes of it, a shaken Glattes concluded the boat was fatally damaged, and he commanded the crew to prepare to abandon ship and blew all main ballast tanks. At 1546-thirty-nine minutes after firing the torpedoes- had ever experienced noise and terror on this scale. After twenty minutes of it, a shaken Glattes concluded the boat was fatally damaged, and he commanded the crew to prepare to abandon ship and blew all main ballast tanks. At 1546-thirty-nine minutes after firing the torpedoes-U-39 broke surface, bow up, in broad daylight, surrounded by the three destroyers. All three vessels opened fire with guns, but when it was seen that the broke surface, bow up, in broad daylight, surrounded by the three destroyers. All three vessels opened fire with guns, but when it was seen that the U-39 U-39 crew was jumping overboard, the destroyers checked fire. Glattes's men had set a scuttling charge and opened the forward torpedo-room hatch. The charge exploded as designed and crew was jumping overboard, the destroyers checked fire. Glattes's men had set a scuttling charge and opened the forward torpedo-room hatch. The charge exploded as designed and U-39 U-39, fatally holed, went down bow first-the first U-boat to be lost in the war. The three destroyers launched boats and fished forty-three bearded, shocked U-39 U-39 survivors from the water. There were no casualties. survivors from the water. There were no casualties.

The Ark Royal Ark Royal hunter-killer grqup. had good reason to celebrate. Until Berlin announced the capture of the two hunter-killer grqup. had good reason to celebrate. Until Berlin announced the capture of the two Ark Royal Ark Royal pilots and they appeared in Iceland, the group believed it had sunk two U-boats in a single day with the loss of only two Skuas. Wrongly believing that pilots and they appeared in Iceland, the group believed it had sunk two U-boats in a single day with the loss of only two Skuas. Wrongly believing that U-39 U-39 had earlier sunk had earlier sunk Firby Firby-and sent the personal message to Churchill to pick up her survivors-Churchill boasted in a public speech that the culprit had been captured. Offsetting these supposed successes, however, was U-59 U-59's near hit on Ark Royal Ark Royal. That chilling experience provided a telling argument for those who opposed using fleet carriers-and wearing out precious aircraft-in an ASW role.

Nine of the ten recalled boats reached Germany September 15 to 17. Inbound in the North Sea, one of the IXs, U-41 U-41, commanded by Gustav-Adolf Mugler, age twenty-six, captured two small (1,000-ton) Finnish freighters deemed to be transporting contraband and escorted them into Germany. Discounting these insignificant "prizes," the ten boats of the Wegener and Hundius flotillas had sunk only eight ships-three each by Prien and Schultze, two by Liebe. Seven of the ten skippers had sunk no ships. Moreover, one of these ten boats, U-39 U-39, was missing. It was not an auspicious beginning.

"A WONDERFUL S SUCCESS"

The recall of the ten boats of the Wegener and Hundius flotillas, the abort of U-26 U-26, and the diversion of the damaged U-30 U-30 to Iceland to land the wounded, left nine Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla to carry on the war against British shipping. Of these, five were low on fuel. Three Type VIIs of the reserve were newly arrived, but one of these, to Iceland to land the wounded, left nine Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla to carry on the war against British shipping. Of these, five were low on fuel. Three Type VIIs of the reserve were newly arrived, but one of these, U-32 U-32, had been assigned to a minelaying mission* and carried only a few torpedoes. and carried only a few torpedoes.

Seven of the nine boats were deployed in abutting patrol zones due west of the English Channel, an area the British called the Western Approaches. The sea-lanes to and from the British Isles converged there and the area was dense with shipping of all kinds. To provide all these ships some protection, the Admiralty had deployed the old aircraft carrier Courageous Courageous* with a destroyer screen to mount ASW patrols. with a destroyer screen to mount ASW patrols.

Three Salzwedel boats in the Western Approaches had achieved successes against British shipping in the early days of the war. On September 7, Hans-Wilhelm von Dresky, age thirty-one, in U-33 U-33 had sunk a 4,000-ton freighter. That day and the next, Wilhelm Rollmann, age thirty-two, in had sunk a 4,000-ton freighter. That day and the next, Wilhelm Rollmann, age thirty-two, in U-34 U-34 had sunk a 5,500-ton freighter and wrecked a 5,500-ton tanker, Kennebec, put down by British warships. Otto Schuhart, age thirty, in had sunk a 5,500-ton freighter and wrecked a 5,500-ton tanker, Kennebec, put down by British warships. Otto Schuhart, age thirty, in U-29 U-29 got the biggest and most important ship, the 10,000-ton tanker got the biggest and most important ship, the 10,000-ton tanker Regent Tiger Regent Tiger, sunk on September 8. Then a lull had set in, broken only by Schuhart's sinking of an 800-ton seagoing tugboat on September 13.

The killing picked up again on September 14, the day Lemp and Glattes tangled with Ark Royal Ark Royal farther north. Gunter Kuhnke, age twenty-seven, in farther north. Gunter Kuhnke, age twenty-seven, in U-28 U-28 patrolling into the mouth of St. George's Channel, sank a 5,000-ton freighter. To the west, Schuhart in patrolling into the mouth of St. George's Channel, sank a 5,000-ton freighter. To the west, Schuhart in U-29 U-29 found and attacked another big tanker, the spanking-new found and attacked another big tanker, the spanking-new British Influence British Influence, 8,500 tons.

During his attack on the British Influence British Influence, Schuhart had a bizarre and troubling experience, similar to that of Glattes when he shot at Ark Royal Ark Royal. Schuhart's first two torpedoes, fitted with magnetic pistols, spontaneously "prematured," or blew up before reaching the target, shaking the boat and forcing him to shoot again. Believing that something might be drastically wrong with the magnetic pistols, Schuhart later broke radio silence to report these "prematures." When Donitz, in turn, reported the malfunctions to the Torpedo Directorate, the experts there were also deeply puzzled. Pending further investigation, the experts recommended that the magnetic pistols be set back or down "two zones" to "reduce sensitivity," an order Donitz relayed to all boats. The reduced-sensitivity settings meant that to sink a ship of 3,000 tons or less, which had a weaker magnetic field, only contact (or impact) pistols were to be used, imposing on the skippers the need to ascertain target tonnage of medium-sized ships with a high degree of accuracy.

On September 15, U-31 U-31, commanded by Johannes Habekost, age thirty-two, a reserve boat which had just completed the hazardous voyage through the English Channel, picked up an outbound convoy. Per prior instructions, Habekost broke radio silence to report its course and speed to Donitz. This was the first "clear" contact with a convoy by any U-boat in British waters and it caused tremendous excitement. Donitz ordered all boats in the Western Approaches, including Schuhart in U-29 U-29 and Ernst-Gunther Heinicke, age thirty-one, in the late-sailing VIIB and Ernst-Gunther Heinicke, age thirty-one, in the late-sailing VIIB U-53 U-53, to converge on the convoy. During the night Habekost in U-31 U-31 hauled around the convoy and gained position to shoot early on the morning of September 16. He thought he sank two big ships, but apparently he also experienced torpedo malfunctions. Only one ship, the 4,000-ton British freighter hauled around the convoy and gained position to shoot early on the morning of September 16. He thought he sank two big ships, but apparently he also experienced torpedo malfunctions. Only one ship, the 4,000-ton British freighter Aviemore Aviemore, went down.

Both Heinicke in U-53 U-53 and Schuhart in and Schuhart in U-29 U-29 responded to the contact. Hunting for the convoy on September 17, Heinicke ran across a 5,000-ton inbound British freighter, responded to the contact. Hunting for the convoy on September 17, Heinicke ran across a 5,000-ton inbound British freighter, Kafiristan Kafiristan, and put her under with gunfire and torpedoes. While he was attempting to assist the panicky survivors, a flight of Swordfish biplanes from Courageous Courageous attacked attacked U-53 U-53 with bombs and machine-gun fire, forcing Heinicke to crash dive-and to leave some gunners topside. They perished in the sea. with bombs and machine-gun fire, forcing Heinicke to crash dive-and to leave some gunners topside. They perished in the sea.

To the east of U-53 U-53, that same day, while he was running submerged, Schuhart in U-29 U-29 saw a Swordfish biplane. A Swordfish 300 miles west of England over open water meant that an aircraft carrier had to be close by. Schuhart remained submerged, keeping a sharp periscope watch. At about 1800, the watch sighted a puff of smoke on the horizon. It was the carrier saw a Swordfish biplane. A Swordfish 300 miles west of England over open water meant that an aircraft carrier had to be close by. Schuhart remained submerged, keeping a sharp periscope watch. At about 1800, the watch sighted a puff of smoke on the horizon. It was the carrier Courageous Courageous! Schuhart adjusted his own course to improve his position and went to battle stations. During quick periscope observations, he saw aircraft circling the carrier but only two fleet destroyers. The other two destroyers of her screen had gone west to the scene of the Kafiristan Kafiristan sinking to hunt Heinicke's sinking to hunt Heinicke's U-53 U-53.

Try as he might, Schuhart could not close the range to Courageous Courageous. Later he wrote in his log: "At the time it looked like a hopeless operation. Because of the aircraft I could not surface and my underwater speed was less than 8 knots while the carrier could do 26. But we were told during our training to always stay close and that is exactly what I did, following him submerged...."

Schuhart hung on doggedly for an hour and a half. Then suddenly, at 1930, Courageous Courageous abruptly altered course, turning into the wind to take on aircraft. The turn brought her directly toward abruptly altered course, turning into the wind to take on aircraft. The turn brought her directly toward U-29 U-29. Schuhart gave orders to open the bow caps on three forward torpedo tubes. He had to shoot by guesswork because, as he wrote in his log, "the vast size of the target upset all normal calculations and in any case I was looking straight into the sun."

At 1940, Schuhart fired a fan of three torpedoes at a range of 3,000 yards. While they were running, one of the destroyers, still unaware of U-29 U-29, passed by at 500 yards. To avoid detection, Schuhart took the boat deep. Going down, the crew heard and felt two hits. "The explosions were so heavy," Schuhart wrote, "that I thought the boat had been damaged. There was jubilation among the crew, although we were all wondering what would happen to us next." He leveled the boat at 180 feet-deeper by thirty feet than he had ever dived-then cautiously eased deeper.

Two torpedoes hit Courageous Courageous. As it happened, a Dutch passenger liner, Veendamn Veendamn, was passing nearby. The passengers saw a huge white cloud engulf Courageous Courageous. At first they believed the cloud was a smoke screen, but seconds later they heard two tremendous explosions and saw flames shooting through the cloud, then pieces of steel and dismembered aircraft hurtling skyward. They watched in horror as Courageous Courageous rolled slowly to port and sank, fifteen minutes after the torpedoes struck. Of her 1,260-man crew, 519 perished. rolled slowly to port and sank, fifteen minutes after the torpedoes struck. Of her 1,260-man crew, 519 perished. Veendamn Veendamn and a British freighter, and a British freighter, Collingworth Collingworth, which responded to the distress call, rescued the survivors from the oily waters.

The two destroyers found U-29 U-29 on sonar and attacked with a vengeance. The U-boat reeled under the impact of the depth charges. During one attack, Schuhart remembered, he thought the conning tower would implode. But it held. The intermittent pounding went on for four hours-to 2340-until both destroyers had expended all depth charges. Easing away silently, on sonar and attacked with a vengeance. The U-boat reeled under the impact of the depth charges. During one attack, Schuhart remembered, he thought the conning tower would implode. But it held. The intermittent pounding went on for four hours-to 2340-until both destroyers had expended all depth charges. Easing away silently, U-29 U-29 surfaced and Schuhart radioed Donitz: " surfaced and Schuhart radioed Donitz: "Courageous destroyed. destroyed. U-29 U-29 homebound." homebound."

By the morning of September 18, the news of Schuhart's victory had been broadcast worldwide. The Admiralty promptly withdrew the remaining three Home Fleet carriers from ASW missions. Although Hitler (as Raeder remembered) had not wished to humiliate the British by sinking a capital ship, no specific order had been issued to U-boats prohibiting attacks on such ships. In fact, the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine was ecstatic, as was Karl Donitz. Schuhart's feat was the crowning blow of the psychological impact Donitz had hoped to achieve in the first U-boat offensive. "A wonderful success," he noted gleefully in his headquarters diary. Raeder directed Donitz to award Schuhart the Iron Cross First Class, and every member of the was ecstatic, as was Karl Donitz. Schuhart's feat was the crowning blow of the psychological impact Donitz had hoped to achieve in the first U-boat offensive. "A wonderful success," he noted gleefully in his headquarters diary. Raeder directed Donitz to award Schuhart the Iron Cross First Class, and every member of the U-29 U-29 crew the Iron Cross Second Class. crew the Iron Cross Second Class.

Running low on fuel, food, and torpedoes, six of the nine Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla, including the U-30 U-30 setting out from Iceland, soon commenced the homeward voyage to Germany. The exodus left four boats to carry on the naval war in British waters: the newly arrived Type VII boats of the Salzwedel reserve, setting out from Iceland, soon commenced the homeward voyage to Germany. The exodus left four boats to carry on the naval war in British waters: the newly arrived Type VII boats of the Salzwedel reserve, U-31 U-31, U-32 U-32, and U-35 U-35, plus Heinicke's VIIB, U-53 U-53, which still had a good supply of fuel and torpedoes. After laying a minefield in Bristol Channel during the night of September 17, the U-32 U-32, commanded by Paul Buchel, age thirty-two, joined the other three boats for torpedo attacks. But, following the sinking of a 4,900-ton freighter on September 18, Buchel had a mechanical breakdown and U-32 U-32 was forced to abort the patrol, leaving only two VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla and was forced to abort the patrol, leaving only two VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla and U-53 U-53 in British waters. in British waters.

Of the seven homebound Type VII Salzwedel boats, only one, U-27 U-27, commanded by Johannes Franz, age thirty-two, had not torpedoed and sunk a ship. It was not from want of trying. Deployed to an area near the mouth of North Channel, separating Scotland and Ireland, Franz had conducted a relentlessly aggressive patrol. He had stopped a total of eleven big freighters, fired torpedoes at two freighters, and sunk two trawlers, one by gunfire, one by demolition. On September 18, he saw the inbound Ark Royal Ark Royal, recalled from ASW missions, but she was too far off to attack. Like Glattes and Schuhart, Franz had experienced baffling-and scary-torpedo problems. On September 17, two of the torpedoes he fired at a British freighter had "prematured" after a run of merely 273 yards, badly shaking and damaging the boat. Like Schuhart, Franz had broken radio silence to report the mishap to Donitz. His report had led to another modification in torpedo-firing procedure.

Homebound on the night of September 19, a few minutes before midnight U-27 U-27's bridge watch sighted "six shapes" on the horizon and urgently summoned Franz to the bridge. Believing the ships to be cruisers, Franz could scarcely credit his luck. He ordered battle stations, night surface, and unhesitatingly maneuvered to attack. Setting three torpedoes with magnetic pistols to run at a depth of twelve to thirteen feet, Franz fired at the overlapping line of ships, hoping to sink at least three cruisers with this one salvo, thereby duplicating the legendary feat of Otto Weddigen in World War I.

In actuality, Franz had fired at a line of seven destroyers. Two of the three torpedoes exploded prematurely about thirty seconds after leaving the tube; the third missed. Alerted by the two explosions, the destroyer Fortune Fortune sighted sighted U-27 U-27 and instantly turned toward her to attack. Shaken by the premature torpedo explosions and seeing the oncoming and instantly turned toward her to attack. Shaken by the premature torpedo explosions and seeing the oncoming Fortune Fortune-now correctly identified as a destroyer-Franz crash-dived and went deep. Fortune Fortune flung out five depth charges "by eye," but they were very wide of the mark. Settling down for a proper attack, flung out five depth charges "by eye," but they were very wide of the mark. Settling down for a proper attack, Fortune Fortune gained sonar contact and moved in slowly for another run, dropping five more charges set for 100 and 150 feet. These exploded close to gained sonar contact and moved in slowly for another run, dropping five more charges set for 100 and 150 feet. These exploded close to U-27 U-27, bending a propeller shaft and causing a serious leak in the packing gland of the shaft.

In the noise of exploding depth charges, Fortune Fortune lost sonar contact. All seven destroyers then reformed line abreast for a meticulous search. Meanwhile, Franz came to periscope depth for a look at his attackers. Seeing four destroyers, all close, sweeping the seas with searchlights, Franz went very deep-to 393 feet-and ordered silent running. lost sonar contact. All seven destroyers then reformed line abreast for a meticulous search. Meanwhile, Franz came to periscope depth for a look at his attackers. Seeing four destroyers, all close, sweeping the seas with searchlights, Franz went very deep-to 393 feet-and ordered silent running.

The destroyers pressed the hunt. At 0127, Forester Forester got a sonar contact and attacked, dropping depth charges set for 100 and 150 feet. These shallow charges caused no damage and got a sonar contact and attacked, dropping depth charges set for 100 and 150 feet. These shallow charges caused no damage and Forester Forester lost contact in the noise. For a time Franz believed he might escape, but at 0212, lost contact in the noise. For a time Franz believed he might escape, but at 0212, Fortune Fortune regained sonar contact and mounted two consecutive, punishing attacks with depth charges set to explode between 100 and 250 feet. Some of these went off very close to regained sonar contact and mounted two consecutive, punishing attacks with depth charges set to explode between 100 and 250 feet. Some of these went off very close to U-27 U-27, causing severe flooding. Assessing the damage, Franz decided to surface, hoping to escape in the dark. At 0241, three hours and forty-eight minutes after launching her torpedo attack, U-27 U-27 came up in the vicinity of seven destroyers, some burning searchlights. Franz put on emergency speed and ran. came up in the vicinity of seven destroyers, some burning searchlights. Franz put on emergency speed and ran.

Fortune saw the surfaced U-boat first. She turned to ram and opened fire with her guns. In the face of this fire, Franz, two officers, the quartermaster, and sixteen others dived over the side of the fast-moving boat. They were later fished out by saw the surfaced U-boat first. She turned to ram and opened fire with her guns. In the face of this fire, Franz, two officers, the quartermaster, and sixteen others dived over the side of the fast-moving boat. They were later fished out by Faulkner Faulkner. Seeing them jump and other men clustered on the deck, Fortune Fortune ceased firing after four rounds and swerved to avoid ramming, now planning to capture the men and boat intact. When ceased firing after four rounds and swerved to avoid ramming, now planning to capture the men and boat intact. When U-27 U-27 finally halted her futile attempt to escape on the surface, finally halted her futile attempt to escape on the surface, Fortune Fortune sent over a salvage party. But by then sent over a salvage party. But by then U-27 U-27's engineer had set scuttling procedures in motion and the boat was sinking. Fortune Fortune's engineer courageously went inside the boat in an attempt to close the sea cocks and ballast-tank vents (and grab whatever papers he could find), but it was too late. The boat was flooding fast and full of chlorine gas. She sank stern first and vertically at 0350. Fortune Fortune rescued the remaining eighteen men of the rescued the remaining eighteen men of the U-27 U-27 crew. There were no casualties. crew. There were no casualties.

The remaining six Type VIIs of the Salzwedel Flotilla in the homebound procession escaped detection. Buchel in U-32 U-32 added a minor scalp to his belt by sinking an 875-ton Norwegian ship with demolitions, as did von Dresky in added a minor scalp to his belt by sinking an 875-ton Norwegian ship with demolitions, as did von Dresky in U-33 U-33, who sank a trawler with his gun. Rollmann in U-34 U-34 captured a 2,500-ton Estonian freighter in the North Sea and escorted it to Germany. The six boats reached Wilhelmshaven between September 26 and 30, five with barely more than cupsful of fuel left in the tanks. captured a 2,500-ton Estonian freighter in the North Sea and escorted it to Germany. The six boats reached Wilhelmshaven between September 26 and 30, five with barely more than cupsful of fuel left in the tanks.

Fritz-Julius Lemp in U-30 U-30 arrived from Iceland on September 27. The boat was in terrible condition. One diesel was out, the other barely turning over. Donitz sent out a minesweeper to tow her in, but Lemp proudly refused help and arrived from Iceland on September 27. The boat was in terrible condition. One diesel was out, the other barely turning over. Donitz sent out a minesweeper to tow her in, but Lemp proudly refused help and U-30 U-30 limped into the Jade under her own power. Parading on deck with the begrimed, bearded crew was a live turkey, Alfonso, bought in Iceland to augment rations but adopted as a mascot. limped into the Jade under her own power. Parading on deck with the begrimed, bearded crew was a live turkey, Alfonso, bought in Iceland to augment rations but adopted as a mascot.

Donitz-indeed, the whole U-boat arm-knew, of course, that Lemp had sunk Athenia Athenia. Berlin was still denying that a U-boat had done it, so Lemp and the U-30 U-30 crew (as well as the whole U-boat force) had to be enjoined to keep the secret, and the crew (as well as the whole U-boat force) had to be enjoined to keep the secret, and the U-30 U-30 logbook was altered to hide any hint of the sinking. But one worry remained: The wounded crewman, Adolph Schmidt, who had been landed in Iceland, might reveal the truth. Lemp assured Donitz that Schmidt was completely dependable. logbook was altered to hide any hint of the sinking. But one worry remained: The wounded crewman, Adolph Schmidt, who had been landed in Iceland, might reveal the truth. Lemp assured Donitz that Schmidt was completely dependable.*

Legend has it that Lemp was in hot water for sinking Athenia Athenia and that the OKM threatened him with a court-martial, but this is unlikely. Although the and that the OKM threatened him with a court-martial, but this is unlikely. Although the Athenia Athenia sinking had been a mistake, it had done a great deal to sow terror, the psychological blow Donitz and the sinking had been a mistake, it had done a great deal to sow terror, the psychological blow Donitz and the Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine had sought. Moreover, Lemp had conducted an outstanding patrol. He had sunk three ships (including had sought. Moreover, Lemp had conducted an outstanding patrol. He had sunk three ships (including Athenia Athenia) in a marginal patrol area and foul weather, "shot down" (the propaganda version) two aircraft from the Ark Royal Ark Royal, demonstrated commendable chivalry and humanity by rescuing the British pilots and taking them to Iceland for medical care, survived the worst depth charging of any of the Atlantic boats with "unshakable calm," dived U-30 U-30 to an unprecedented depth of 472 feet, and brought his boat home in spite of severe battle damage and engine defects. To have court-martialed Lemp would have sent a wrong signal to the U-boat force (punishing brash aggressiveness) and run the risk of the proceedings leaking to the Allies, thereby exposing Berlin's lies. to an unprecedented depth of 472 feet, and brought his boat home in spite of severe battle damage and engine defects. To have court-martialed Lemp would have sent a wrong signal to the U-boat force (punishing brash aggressiveness) and run the risk of the proceedings leaking to the Allies, thereby exposing Berlin's lies.

The scores of the first seven Salzwedel Flotilla Type VII boats, including the lost U-27 U-27, were otherwise disappointing. In about seventeen days of combat in the Atlantic-September 3 to September 20-they had sunk only fourteen ships and three trawlers by torpedo, gun, and demolition, and captured one prize. Discounting the trawlers, the statistical return was only two ships sunk per boat, or one ship per eight patrol days. Moreover, U-32 U-32's minefield was not productive. It damaged two big freighters-and forced the British to close Bristol temporarily-but it produced no sinkings.

Even so, the skippers and crews returned to a hero's welcome. Hitler and Raeder paid brief visits to Wilhelmshaven to hand out praise and medals. The man of the hour was Otto Schuhart in U-29 U-29, who had accounted for four of the fourteen sinkings, including Courageous Courageous and two important tankers. In tonnage sunk, his total was 41,905, a record for a single patrol that was to stand for a long time. The runner-up was Lemp in and two important tankers. In tonnage sunk, his total was 41,905, a record for a single patrol that was to stand for a long time. The runner-up was Lemp in U-30 U-30, with three ships for 23,206 tons, but since Athenia Athenia could not even be mentioned, let alone credited, second place went to Wilhelm Rollmann in could not even be mentioned, let alone credited, second place went to Wilhelm Rollmann in U-34 U-34, who had sunk two ships for 11,400 tons and had taken a 2,500-ton prize. Buchel in U-32 U-32 sank two ships and von Dresky in sank two ships and von Dresky in U-33 U-33 sank three, but their individual tonnage scores were only about half that of Rollmann. Kuhnke in sank three, but their individual tonnage scores were only about half that of Rollmann. Kuhnke in U-28 U-28 sank one ship. sank one ship.

Three boats of the first wave were still in the Atlantic: the Salzwedel reserve U-31 U-31 and and U-35 U-35, and the VIIB of the Wegener Flotilla, U-53 U-53. The last returned first. Having sunk two ships-a freighter and the 8,826-ton tanker Cheyenne-U-53 raised the total score of the six Wegener Flotilla boats to eight. The reserve raised the total score of the six Wegener Flotilla boats to eight. The reserve U-31 U-31 sank two ships, and the reserve sank two ships, and the reserve U-35 U-35 sank four ships. Including the three trawlers, these six kills raised the total sinkings of the nine Salzwedel boats deployed to the Atlantic to twenty-four, and the average of sinkings per boat per patrol from 2 to 2.6. sank four ships. Including the three trawlers, these six kills raised the total sinkings of the nine Salzwedel boats deployed to the Atlantic to twenty-four, and the average of sinkings per boat per patrol from 2 to 2.6.

The aggregate confirmed kills by all twenty-one oceangoing boats of the first wave were thus as follows: NORTH S SEA P PATROLS.

When hostilities commenced on September 3, there were seventeen ducks and one Type VII oceangoing boat, U-36 U-36, deployed in the North Sea for offensive and defensive operations. After the surrender of Poland, three ducks basing at Memel, and others in the eastern Baltic Sea, redeployed to the North Sea, so that in all, twenty-three of the thirty commissioned ducks patrolled the North Sea in the first month of the war.

Five ducks were assigned to lay minefields in four British ports and one French port. When Hitler barred attacks on French shipping, the mining mission to France was canceled. Four ducks laid a total of thirty-six TMB magnetic mines in four ports on the British east coast and in the English Channel. Two of the fields (Dover and Hartlepool) failed to produce. The field at Ordfordness, planted by Karl Daublebsky von Eichhain in U-13 U-13, produced handsomely: three ships for 27,203 tons sunk. The field at Flamborough Head, planted by Heinz Buchholz in U-15 U-15, sank two medium freighters for 4,274 tons.

The other ducks and the Type VII U-36 U-36 patrolled offensively and defensively in every nook and cranny of the confined waters of the North Sea. Two ducks, patrolled offensively and defensively in every nook and cranny of the confined waters of the North Sea. Two ducks, U-9 U-9 and and U-19 U-19, hunted British warships off northeast Scotland. Several ducks reconnoitered the east end of the English Channel. One duck, U-14 U-14, patrolled the British naval base at Scapa Flow. Another, U-20 U-20, patrolled all the way north to Narvik, Norway, above the Arctic Circle. Others cruised the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

Owing to fuel limitations, the ducks could not stay out for more than about eighteen days. Many patrols, however, were shorter. Some ducks sailed from Wilhelmshaven and returned directly there. Others went on to Kiel via the Kiel Canal. Still others sailed from Kiel to the North Sea via the Kattegat and Skagerrak and returned to Kiel via that route. Most ducks required a week or more of repairs in the shipyards between patrols. In the interval, the crews were granted liberty and leave. Only a few ducks were able to mount two patrols in September.

The North Sea was aswarm with commercial traffic: British ships, neutral ships of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and other nations. Many neutrals were transporting "contraband" (ore, chemicals, food, weapons, timber, etc.) to the British Isles. But the ducks were too small, too slow (13 knots maximum speed), and underarmed to stop and "visit and search" shipping in conformance with the Submarine Protocol. Moreover, for political reasons, Hitler had decreed that clearly marked neutrals in the North Sea were not to be stopped. As a result, ducks were compelled to limit attacks to targets they were permitted to sink "on sight" by surprise attack: British warships and submarines and British shipping unequivocally under escort.

On the rare occasions when permissible targets appeared, the duck skippers attacked boldly. Both Fritz Frauenheim in U-21 U-21 and Udo Behrens in and Udo Behrens in U-24 U-24 shot at British destroyers off northeast Scotland. Frauenheim claimed-and was credited with-a kill, but neither attack was successful. Horst Wellner in shot at British destroyers off northeast Scotland. Frauenheim claimed-and was credited with-a kill, but neither attack was successful. Horst Wellner in U-14 U-14 and Werner Winter in and Werner Winter in U-22 U-22 both were wrongly credited with sinking Polish submarines. They subsequently attacked British submarines and both were again wrongly credited with kills. No duck sank-or even damaged-a British warship in September. both were wrongly credited with sinking Polish submarines. They subsequently attacked British submarines and both were again wrongly credited with kills. No duck sank-or even damaged-a British warship in September.

A few skippers found escorted or unescorted British merchant ships. Otto Kretschmer in U-23 U-23 fired a full-bow salvo of three torpedoes and one reload at an old 2,000-ton coaster under escort, but all four torpedoes malfunctioned or missed. Wilhelm Frolich in the Type VII fired a full-bow salvo of three torpedoes and one reload at an old 2,000-ton coaster under escort, but all four torpedoes malfunctioned or missed. Wilhelm Frolich in the Type VII U-36 U-36 stopped, searched, and then sank the unescorted 1,000-ton British coaster stopped, searched, and then sank the unescorted 1,000-ton British coaster Truro Truro, after the crew abandoned ship. Werner Heidel in U-7 U-7 also stopped and sank an unescorted British freighter, the 2,700-ton also stopped and sank an unescorted British freighter, the 2,700-ton Akenside Akenside. These were the only two ships sunk by all the U-boats in the North Sea to September 22.

The vast flow of contraband in neutral ships in the North Sea infuriated Raeder and Donitz. On September 23, Raeder met with Hitler in Danzig to urge relaxations in the U-boat rules, which not only would free the ducks to stop (i.e., attack) neutrals in the North Sea but would also reduce the risk and increase opportunities for the next wave of Atlantic boats. Having conquered Poland and despairing of persuading France and Great Britain to back out of the war, Hitler was then drawing plans to turn about and attack westward into France. He foresaw an early collapse of France. After that, he believed, Great Britain would seek peace.

A relaxation in the U-boat rules therefore fit Hitler's plan to maintain pressure on the West. He approved tightening the screws on neutral traffic in the North Sea and other measures favoring the U-boats, which the OKM passed to Donitz on the following day, September 24. These were: * Restrictions on French shipping, including the mining of French ports, were lifted. "French ships are to be treated in the same way as British ships."

* U-boats were authorized to use "armed force" against any Allied merchant ship which broadcast the submarine alarm, SSS SSS. Such ships, without exception, were subject to "seizure and sinking." However, "rescue of crews is to be attempted."

* Allied "passenger" ships carrying 120 people or less (and hence presumed to be mainly cargo ships) could be sunk in accordance with the Submarine Protocol or prize rules. However, under no circumstances were "passenger" ships carrying more than 120 people to be sunk.*

The U-boat force cheered the relaxation of these rules. The authorization to sink French ships greatly reduced risks, opened the way for night surface attacks on Allied convoys, and increased the number of legal merchant-ship targets by about 500 ships of about 2.7 million gross tons. Inasmuch as all British ships were under orders to broadcast SSS SSS upon sighting a submarine, the authorization to sink Allied ships making such a broadcast also greatly reduced risks by eliminating the requirement to search such ships before sinking them. upon sighting a submarine, the authorization to sink Allied ships making such a broadcast also greatly reduced risks by eliminating the requirement to search such ships before sinking them.

The relaxations were not all that was desired. Even though Allied ships broadcasting SSS SSS could now be sunk without search, U-boat skippers still had to at least attempt to rescue the crews, a risky process at best. The prohibition against sinking a passenger ship carrying more than 120 people imposed on the skippers the difficult task of judging (by counting lifeboats, etc.) how many people might be on board. A request to sink on sight all armed ships and all blacked-out ships sailing close to the British Isles had not been approved. could now be sunk without search, U-boat skippers still had to at least attempt to rescue the crews, a risky process at best. The prohibition against sinking a passenger ship carrying more than 120 people imposed on the skippers the difficult task of judging (by counting lifeboats, etc.) how many people might be on board. A request to sink on sight all armed ships and all blacked-out ships sailing close to the British Isles had not been approved.

Upon receiving the relaxed rules for the North Sea, the ducks fell upon neutral shipping in those waters with boldness and vigor. Heidel in U-7 U-7 sank two Norwegians. Harro von Klot-Heydenfeldt in sank two Norwegians. Harro von Klot-Heydenfeldt in U-4 U-4 sank two Finns and a Swede. Hannes Weingartner in sank two Finns and a Swede. Hannes Weingartner in U-16 U-16 sank a Swede. Joachim Schepke in sank a Swede. Joachim Schepke in U-3 U-3 sank a Dane and a Swede. Frolich, in the Type VII sank a Dane and a Swede. Frolich, in the Type VII U-36 U-36, sank one Swede and captured another, which he escorted to Germany, concluding a month-long patrol. In all, the North Sea U-boats sank or captured ten neutrals for 13,000 tons in one week.

The hue and cry from Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Helsinki was so deafening that Hitler was compelled to back down. On September 30 he reimposed restrictions on the ducks which brought the attack on neutrals in the North Sea to a halt. Thereafter the ducks were restricted to offensive patrolling or minelaying in British waters.

British submarines patrolling in the North Sea hunted U-boats. Seahorse Seahorse fired three torpedoes at fired three torpedoes at U-36 U-36 and claimed a kill, but it was not so. Another British sub-marine (unidentified) shot at Otto Kretschmer in and claimed a kill, but it was not so. Another British sub-marine (unidentified) shot at Otto Kretschmer in U-23 U-23 in the Kattegat but also missed. Several other ducks had close encounters with British submarines, but all evaded the attacks. in the Kattegat but also missed. Several other ducks had close encounters with British submarines, but all evaded the attacks.

One duck was lost. She was U-12 U-12, commanded by Dietrich von der Ropp, age thirty. On September 22 Donitz sent her into the English Channel to attack British troopships. On the basis of the earlier reconnaissance by ducks, Donitz did not believe the British had mined the channel. But he was wrong. Between September 11 and 17, the British and French planted 3,000 floating (or anchored) mines on a line between Dover and Cape Gris-Nez. On September 25 they commenced augmenting the barrier with another 3,636 mines, which were controlled electrically from shore stations and monitored with banks of underwater hydrophones. On October 8 U-12 U-12 hit a mine and blew up with the loss of all hands. She was the first U-boat lost from which there were no survivors. Still disbelieving the Allies had planted a minefield in the channel, Donitz incorrectly attributed her loss to ASW surface forces. hit a mine and blew up with the loss of all hands. She was the first U-boat lost from which there were no survivors. Still disbelieving the Allies had planted a minefield in the channel, Donitz incorrectly attributed her loss to ASW surface forces.