History of Dogma - Volume II Part 21
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Volume II Part 21

"Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali." Ibid.: [Greek: hupotage Theou aptharsia, kai paramone aptharsias doxa agennetos ... horasis Theou peripoietike aptharsias; aptharsia de eggus einai poiei Theou]. In this chapter Irenaeus contemplates the manner of appearance of the Logos (as man) from the point of view of a [Greek: sunnepiazein]. His conception of the capacity and destination of man enabled him to develop his ideas about the progressive training of the human race and about the different covenants (see below). On this point cf. also IV. 20. 5-7. The fact that, according to this way of looking at things, the Good and Divine appeared only as the _destination_ of man--which was finally to be reached through divine guidance--but not as his _nature_, suggested both to Irenaeus and Tertullian the distinction between "natura" and "gratia" or between "substantia" and "fides et iust.i.tia." In other words, they were led to propound a problem which had occurred to the Gnostics long before, and had been solved by them in a dualistic sense. See Irenaeus II. 29. 1: "Si propter substantiam omnes succedunt animae in refrigerium, et superfluum est credere, superflua autem et discessio salvatoris; si autem propter iust.i.tiam, iam non propter id, quod sint animae sed quoniam sunt iustae ... Si enim natura et substantia salvat, omnes salvabuntur animae; si autem iust.i.tia et fides etc." II. 34. 3: "Non enim ex n.o.bis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur," II.

34. 4. Tertullian adv. Marc. III. 15: "Christi nomen non ex natura veniens, sed ex dispositione." In Tertullian these ideas are not unfrequently opposed to each other in this way; but the relationship between them has by no means been made clear.]

[Footnote 559: On the psychology of Irenaeus see Bohringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some pa.s.sages he reckoned the [Greek: pneuma] in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33-5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The [Greek: eikon] is realised in the body, the [Greek: h.o.m.oiosis] is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of G.o.d realised through obedience (V.

6. 1). The [Greek: h.o.m.oiosis] is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the [Greek: pnoe], not the [Greek: pneuma], that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenaeus appealed to 1 Cor. XV.

45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenaeus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom.

Alongside of this G.o.d's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see -- 1. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenaeus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo ... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, _datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis_." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In -- 2 Irenaeus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural goodness and wickedness: [Greek: pantes tes autes eisi physeos]. In -- 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil(!): "liberae sententiae ab initio est h.o.m.o et liberae sententiae est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." -- 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suae potestatis arbitrium hominis _servavit_ (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." -- 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." -- 3: "[Greek: to autexousion tou anthropou kai to symbouleutikon tou Theou me biazomenou]." IV. 4. 3: "h.o.m.o rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suae potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."]

[Footnote 560: As a matter of fact this view already belongs to the second train of thought; see particularly III. 21-23. Here in reality this merely applies to the particular individuals who chose disobedience, but Irenaeus almost everywhere referred back to the fall of Adam. See, however, V. 27. 2: "Quicunque erga eum custodiunt dilectionem, suam his praestat communionem. Communio autem dei vita et lumen et fruitio eorum quae sunt apud deum bonorum. Quic.u.mque autem absistunt secundum sententiam suam ab eo, his eam quae electa est ab ipsis separationem inducit. Separatio autem dei mors, et separatio lucis tenebrae, et separatio dei amissio omnium quae sunt apud eum bonorum." V.

19. 1, 1. 3, 1. 1. The subjective moralism is very clearly defined in IV. 15. 2: "Id quod erat semper liberum et suae potestatis in homine semper servavit deus et sua exhortatio, ut iuste iudicentur qui non obediunt ei quoniam non obedierunt, et qui obedierunt et crediderunt ei, honorentur incorruptibilitate."]

[Footnote 561: Man's sin is thoughtlessness; he is merely led astray (IV. 40. 3). The fact that he let himself be seduced under the pretext of immortality is an excuse for him; man was _infans_, (See above; hence it is said, in opposition to the Gnostics, in IV. 38. 4: "supergredieutes legem humani generis et antequam fiant homines, iam volunt similes esse factori deo et nullam esse differentiam infecti dei et nunc facti hominis." The same idea is once more very clearly expressed in IV. 39. 3; "quemadmodum igitur erit h.o.m.o deus, qui nondum factus est h.o.m.o?" i.e., how could newly created man be already perfect as he was not even man, inasmuch as he did not yet know how to distinguish good and evil?). Cf. III. 23. 3, 5: "The fear of Adam was the beginning of wisdom; the sense of transgression led to repentance; but G.o.d bestows his grace on the penitent" ... "eum odivit deus, qui seduxit hominem, ei vero qui seductus est, sensim paullatimque misertus est." The "pondus peccati" in the sense of Augustine was by no means acknowledged by Irenaeus, and although he makes use of Pauline sayings, and by preference such as have a quite different sense, he is very far from sharing Paul's view.]

[Footnote 562: See IV. 37. 7: "Alias autem esset nostrum insensatum bonum, quod esset inexercitatum. Sed et videre non tantum n.o.bis esset desiderabile, nisi cognovissemus quantum esset malum non videre; et bene valere autem male valentis experientia honorabilius efficit, et lucem tenebrarum comparatio et vitam mortis. Sic et coeleste regnum honorabilius est his qui cognoverunt terrenum." The main pa.s.sage is III.

20. 1, 2, which cannot be here quoted. The fall was necessary in order that man might not believe that he was "naturaliter similis deo." Hence G.o.d permitted the great whale to swallow man for a time. In several pa.s.sages Irenaeus has designated the permitting of evil as kind generosity on the part of G.o.d, see, e.g., IV. 39. 1, 37. 7.]

[Footnote 563: See Wendt, l.c., p. 24.]

[Footnote 564: See III. 23. 6.]

[Footnote 565: See V. I. 1: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quae sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verb.u.m exsistens, h.o.m.o factus fuisset ... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes," etc.; III. 23. 2, 5. 3: "libertatem restauravit"; IV. 24. 1: "reformavit humamum genus"; III. 17. 1: "spiritus sanctus in filium dei, filium hominis factum, descendit c.u.m ipso a.s.suescens habitare in genere humano." III. 19. 1: IV. 38. 3: 39. 1, 2. Wendt's summary, l.c., p. 24: "By the Logos becoming man, the type of the perfect man made its appearance," formulates Irenaeus' meaning correctly and excludes the erroneous idea that he viewed the Logos himself as the prototype of humanity. A real divine manhood is not necessary within this train of thought; only a _h.o.m.o inspiratus_ is required.]

[Footnote 566: See Hippol. Philos. X. 33 (p. 538 sq.): [Greek: Epi toutois ton panton archonta demiourgon ek pason syntheton ousion eskeuasen, ou Theon thelon poiein esphelen, oude angelon, all'

anthropon. Ei gar Theon se ethelese poiesai, edunato; echeis tou logou to paradeigma; anthropon thelon, anthropon se epoiesen; ei de theleis kai Theos genesthai, hupakoue to pepoiekoti.] The famous concluding chapter of the Philosophoumena with its prospect of deification is to be explained from this (X. 34).]

[Footnote 567: See Tertull. adv. Marc. II. 4-11; his undiluted moralism appears with particular clearness in chaps. 6 and 8. No weight is to be attached to the phrase in chapter 4 that G.o.d by placing man in Paradise really even then put him from Paradise into the Church. This is contrary to Wendt's opinion, l.c., p. 67. ff., where the exposition of Tertullian is _speciosior quam verior_. In adv. Marc. II. 4 ff. Wendt professes to see the first traces of the scholastic and Romish theory, and in de anima 16, 41 the germ of the subsequent Protestant view.]

[Footnote 568: See IV. 5. 1, 6. 4.]

[Footnote 569: See IV 14. 1: "In quantum enim deus nullius indiget, in tantum h.o.m.o indiget dei communione. Haec enim gloria hominis, perseverare et permanere in dei servitute." This statement, which, like the numerous others where Irenaeus speaks of the adoptio, is opposed to moralism, reminds us of Augustine. In Irenaeus' great work, however, we can point out not a few propositions which, so to speak, bear the stamp of Augustine; see IV. 38. 3: [Greek: hupotage Theou aphtharsia].]

[Footnote 570: See the pa.s.sages quoted above, p. 241 f.]

[Footnote 571: See III. 18. 1. V. 16. 1 is very remarkable: [Greek: En tois prosthen chronois elegeto men kat' eikona Theou gegonenai ton anthropon, ouk edeiknuto de, eti gar aoratos en ho logos, ou kat' eikona ho anthropos egegonei. dia touto de kai ten h.o.m.oiosin iadios apebalen]; see also what follows. In V. I. 1 Irenaeus even says: "Quoniam iniuste dominabatur n.o.bis apostasia, et c.u.m natura essemus dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam diabolus." Compare with this the contradictory pa.s.sage IV. 38: "oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere"

etc. (see above, p. 268), where _natura hominis_ is conceived as the opposite of the divine nature.]

[Footnote 572: See Wendt, l.c., p. 29, who first pointed out the two dissimilar trains of thought in Irenaeus with regard to man's original state, Duncker having already done so in regard to his Christology.

Wendt has rightly shown that we have here a real and not a seeming contradiction; but, as far as the explanation of the fact is concerned, the truth does not seem to me to have been arrived at. The circ.u.mstance that Irenaeus did not develop the mystic view in such a systematic way as the moralistic by no means justifies us in supposing that he merely adopted it superficially (from the Scriptures): for its nature admits of no systematic treatment, but only of a rhetorical and contemplative one.

No further explanation can be given of the contradiction, because, strictly speaking, Irenaeus has only given us fragments.]

[Footnote 573: See V. 16. 3: [Greek: en to proto Adam prosekopsamen, me poiesantes autou ten entolen]. IV. 34. 2: "h.o.m.o initio in Adam in.o.bediens per mortem percussus est;" III. 18. 7-23: V. 19. 1: V. 21. 1: V. 17. 1 sq.]

[Footnote 574: Here also Irenaeus keeps sin in the background; death and life are the essential ideas. Bohringer l.c., p. 484 has very rightly remarked: "We cannot say that Irenaeus, in making Adam's conduct and suffering apply to the whole human race had started from an inward, immediate experience of human sinfulness and a feeling of the need of salvation founded on this." It is the thoughts of Paul to which Irenaeus tried to accommodate himself without having had the same feeling about the flesh and sin as this Apostle. In Tertullian the mystic doctrine of salvation is rudimentary (but see, e.g. de anima 40: "ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur," and other pa.s.sages); but he has speculations about Adam (for the most part developments of hints given in Irenaeus; see the index in Oehler's edition), and he has a new realistic idea as to a physical taint of sin propagated through procreation. Here we have the first beginning of the doctrine of original sin (de testim. 3: "per diabolum h.o.m.o a primordio circ.u.mventus, ut praeceptum dei excederet, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine infectum suae etiam d.a.m.nationis traducem fecit." Compare his teachings in de anima 40, 41, 16 about the disease of sin that is propagated "ex originis vitio" and has become a real second nature). But how little he regards this original sin as guilt is shown by de bapt. 18: "Quaie innocens aetas festinat ad baptismum." For the rest, Tertullian discussed the relationship of flesh and spirit, sensuousness and intellect, much more thoroughly than Irenaeus; he showed that flesh is not the seat of sin (de anima 40). In the same book (but see Bk. V. c. 1) he expressly declared that in this question also sure results are only to be obtained from revelation. This was an important step in the direction of secularising Christianity through "philosophy"

and of emasculating the understanding through "revelation." In regard to the conception of sin Cyprian followed his teacher. De op. et eleem. 1 reads indeed like an utterance of Irenaeus ("dominus sanavit illa quae Adam portaverat vulnera"); but the statement in ep. 64. 5: "Recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contraxit" is quite in the manner of Tertullian, and perhaps the latter could also have agreed with the continuation: "infanti remittuntur non propria sed aliena peccata."

Tertullian's proposition that absolutely no one but the Son of G.o.d could have remained without sin was repeated by Cyprian (see, e.g., de op. et eleem. 3).]

[Footnote 575: III. 22. 4 has quite a Gnostic sound ... "eam quae est a Maria in Evam recirculationem significans; quia non aliter quod colligatum est solveretur, nisi ipsae compagines alligationis reflectantur retrorsus, ut primae coniunctiones solvantur per secundas, secundae rursus liberent primas. Et evenit primam quidem compaginem a secunda colligatione solvere, secundam vero colligationem primae solutionis habere loc.u.m. Et propter hoc dominus dicebat primos quidem novissimos futuros et novissimos primos." Irenaeus expresses a Gnostic idea when he on one occasion plainly says (V. 12. 3): [Greek: En to Adam pantes apothneskomen, hoti psychikoi.] But Paul, too, made an approach to this thought.]

[Footnote 576: See III. 23. 1, 2, a highly characteristic statement.]

[Footnote 577: See, e.g., III. 9. 3, 12. 2, 16. 6-9, 17. 4 and repeatedly 8. 2: "verb.u.m dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, qui est dominus noster Jesus Christus."]

[Footnote 578: See IV. 6. 7.]

[Footnote 579: See III. 11. 3.]

[Footnote 580: See III. 6.]

[Footnote 581: See III. 19. 1, 2: IV. 33. 4: V. 1. 3; see also Tertullian against "Ebion" de carne 14, 18, 24; de praeser. 10. 33.]

[Footnote 582: See III. 21, 22: V. 19-21.]

[Footnote 583: See the arguments, l.c., V. 19. 1: "Quemadmodum adstrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, salvatur per virginem, aequa lance disposita virginalis in.o.bedientia per virginalem obedientiam," and other similar ones. We find the same in Tertull., de carne 17, 20. In this connection we find in both very extravagant expressions with regard to Mary (see, e.g. Tertull., l.c. 20 fin.: "uti virgo esset regeneratio nostra spiritaliter ab omnibus inquinamentis sanctificata per Christum." Iren. III. 21. 7: "Maria cooperans dispositioni (dei);" III. 22. 4 "Maria obediens et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta est salutis" ... "quod alligavit virgo Eva per incredulitatem, hoc virgo Maria solvit per fidem"). These, however, have no doctrinal significance; in fact the same Tertullian expressed himself in a depreciatory way about Mary in _de carne_ 7. On the other hand it is undeniable that the later Mariolatry has one of its roots in the parallel between Eve and Mary. The Gnostic invention of the _virginitas Mariae in partu_ can hardly be traced in Irenaeus III. 21. 4. Tertullian (de carne 23) does not seem to know anything about it as yet, and very decidedly a.s.sumed the natural character of the process. The popular conception as to the reason of Christ's birth from a virgin, in the form still current to-day, but beneath all criticism, is already found in Tertullian _de carne_ 18: "Non competebat ex semine humano dei filium nasci, ne, si totus esset filius hominis, non esset et dei filius, nihilque haberet amplius Salomone, ut de Hebionis opinione credendus erat Ergo iam dei filius ex patris dei semine, id est spiritu, ut esset et hominis filius, caro ei sola competebat ex hominis carne sumenda sine viri semine. Vacabat enim s.e.m.e.n viri apud habentem dei s.e.m.e.n." The other theory existing side by side with this, viz., that Christ would have been a sinner if he had been begotten from the s.e.m.e.n, whereas he could a.s.sume sinless flesh from woman is so far as I know scarcely hinted at by Irenaeus and Tertullian. The fact of Christ's birth was frequently referred to by Tertullian in order to prove Christ's kinship to G.o.d the Creator, e.g., adv. Marc. III. 11. Hence this article of the _regula fidei_ received a significance from this point of view also. An Encrat.i.te explanation of the birth from the Virgin is found in the old treatise _de resurr._ bearing Justin's name (Otto, Corp. Apol. III., p.

220.)]

[Footnote 584: See, e.g., III. 18. 1 and many other places. See the pa.s.sages named in note, p. 276.]

[Footnote 585: So also Tertullian. See adv. Marc. III. 8: The whole work of salvation is destroyed by Docetism; cf. the work _de carne Christi_.

Tertullian exclaims to the Docetist Marcion in c. 5: "Parce unicae spei totius...o...b..s." Irenaeus and Tertullian mean that Christ's a.s.sumption of humanity was complete, but not unfrequently express themselves in such a manner as to convey the impression that the Logos only a.s.sumed flesh.

This is particularly the case with Tertullian, who, moreover, in his earlier time had probably quite naive Docetic ideas and really looked upon the humanity of Christ as only flesh. See Apolog. 21: "spiritum Christus c.u.m verbo sponte dimisit, praevento carnincis officio." Yet Irenaeus in several pa.s.sages spoke of Christ's human soul (III. 22. 1: V.

1. 1) as also did Melito ([Greek: to alethes kai aphantaston tes psuches Christou kai tou somatos, tes kath' hemas anthropines phuseos] Otto, l.c., IX., p. 415) and Tertullian (de carne 10 ff. 13; de resurr. 53).

What we possess in virtue of the creation was _a.s.sumed_ by Christ (Iren., l.c., III. 22. 2.) Moreover, Tertullian already examined how the case stands with sin in relation to the flesh of Christ. In opposition to the opinion of the heretic Alexander, that the Catholics believe Jesus a.s.sumed earthly flesh in order to destroy the flesh of sin in himself, he shows that the Saviour's flesh was without sin and that it is not admissible to teach the annihilation of Christ's flesh (de carne 16; see also Irenaeus V. 14. 2, 3): "Christ by taking to himself our flesh has made it his own, that is, he has made it sinless." It was again pa.s.sages from Paul (Rom. VIII. 3 and Ephes. II. 15) that gave occasion to this discussion. With respect to the opinion that it may be with the flesh of Christ as it is with the flesh of angels who appear, Tertullian remarks (de carne 6) that no angel came to die; that which dies must be born; the Son of G.o.d came to die.]

[Footnote 586: This conception was peculiar to Irenaeus, and for good reasons was not repeated in succeeding times; see II. 22: III. 17. 4.

From it also Irenaeus already inferred the necessity of the death of Christ and his abode in the lower world, V. 31. 1, 2. Here we trace the influence of the recapitulation idea. It has indeed been a.s.serted (very energetically by Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 73 f.) that the Christ of Irenaeus was not a personal man, but only possessed humanity. But that is decidedly incorrect, the truth merely being that Irenaeus did not draw all the inferences from the personal humanity of Christ.]

[Footnote 587: See Iren. V. 31. 2: "Surgens in carne sic ascendit ad patrem." Tertullian, de carne 24: "Bene quod idem veniet de caelis qui est pa.s.sus ... et agnoscent qui eum confixerunt, utique ipsam carnem in quam saevierunt, sine qua nee ipse esse poterit et agnosci;" see also what follows.]

[Footnote 588: See Iren. IV. 33. 11.]

[Footnote 589: See Iren. IV. 20. 4; see also III. 19. 1.]

[Footnote 590: He always posits the unity in the form of a confession without describing it. See III. 16. 6, which pa.s.sage may here stand for many. "Verb.u.m unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster, qui et pa.s.sus est pro n.o.bis et ressurrexit propter nos.... Unus igitur deus pater, quemadmodum ostendimus, et unus Christus Iesus domiuns noster, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semelipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et h.o.m.o plasmatio del, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impa.s.sibilis pa.s.sibilis et verb.u.m h.o.m.o." V. 18. 1: "Ipsum verb.u.m dei incarnatum suspensum est super lignum."]

[Footnote 591: Here Irenaeus was able to adopt the old formula "G.o.d has suffered" and the like; so also Melito, see Otto l.c., IX. p. 416: [Greek: ho Theos peponuen hupo dexias Israelitidos] (p. 422): "Quidnam est hoc novum mysterium? iudex iudicatur et quietus est; invisibilis videtur neque erubescit: incomprehensibilis prehenditur neque indignatur, incommensurabilis mensuratur neque repugnat; impa.s.sibilis pat.i.tur neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondit verb.u.m, coelestis sepelitur et id fert." But let us note that these are not "doctrines," but testimonies to the faith, as they were always worded from the beginning and such as could, if need were, be adapted to any Christology. Though Melito in a fragment whose genuineness is not universally admitted (Otto, l.c., p. 415 sq.) declared in opposition to Marcion, that Christ proved his humanity to the world in the 30 years before his baptism; but showed the divine nature concealed in his human nature during the 3 years of his ministry, he did not for all that mean to imply that Jesus' divinity and humanity are in any way separated.

But, though Irenaeus inveighed so violently against the "Gnostic"

separation of Jesus and Christ (see particularly III. 16. 2, where most weight is laid on the fact that we do not find in Matth.: "Iesu generatio sic erat" but "Christi generatio sic erat"), there is no doubt that in some pa.s.sages he himself could not help unfolding a speculation according to which the predicates applying to the human nature of Jesus do not also hold good of his divinity, in fact he actually betrayed a view of Christ inconsistent with the conception of the Saviour's person as a perfect unity. We can indeed only trace this view in his writings in the form of an undercurrent, and what led to it will be discussed further on. Both he and Melito, as a rule adhered to the simple "filius dei filius hominis factus" and did not perceive any problem here, because to them the disunion prevailing in the world and in humanity was the difficult question that appeared to be solved through this very divine manhood. How closely Melito agreed with Irenaeus is shown not only by the proposition (p. 419): "Propterea misit pater filium suum e coelo sine corpore (this is said in opposition to the Valentinian view), ut, postquam incarnatus esset in, utero virginis et natus esset h.o.m.o, vivificaret hominem et colligeret membra eius quae mors disperserat, quum hominem divideret," but also by the "propter hominem iudicatus est iudex, impa.s.sibilis pa.s.sus est?" (l.c.).]

[Footnote 592: The concepts employed by Irenaeus are _deus_, _verb.u.m_, _filius dei_, _h.o.m.o_, _filius hominis_, _plasma dei_. What perhaps hindered the development of that formula in his case was the circ.u.mstance of his viewing Christ, though he had a.s.sumed the _plasma dei_, humanity, as a personal man who (for the sake of the recapitulation theory) not only had a human nature but was obliged to live through a complete human life. The fragment attributed to Irenaeus (Harvey II., p. 493) in which occur the words, [Greek: tou Theou logou henooei te kath' hupostasin physike henothentos te sakri], is by no means genuine. How we are to understand the words: [Greek: hina ex amphoteron to periphanes ton physeon paradeichthe] in fragment VIII.

(Harvey II., p. 479), and whether this piece belongs to Irenaeus, is uncertain. That Melito (a.s.suming the genuineness of the fragment) has the formula of the two natures need excite no surprise; for (1) Melito was also a philosopher, which Irenaeus was not, and (2) it is found in Tertullian, whose doctrines can be shown to be closely connected with those of Melito (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 249 f.). If that fragment is genuine Melito is the first Church teacher who has spoken of two natures.]

[Footnote 593: See Apol. 21: "verb.u.m caro figuratus ... h.o.m.o deo mixtus;" adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius dei miscens in semetipso hominem et deum;" de carne 15: "h.o.m.o deo mixtus;" 18: "sic h.o.m.o c.u.m deo, dum caro hominis c.u.m spiritu dei." On the Christology of Tertullian cf. Schulz, Gottheit Christi, p. 74 ff.]

[Footnote 594: De carne 5: "Crucifixus est dei filius, non pudet quia pudendum est; et mortuus est dei filius, prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossible est;"

but compare the whole book; c. 5 init.: "deus crucifixus," "nasci se voluit deus". De pat. 3: "nasci se deus in utero pat.i.tur." The formula: [Greek: ho gennetheis, ho megas Theos] is also found in Sibyll. VII.

24.]

[Footnote 595: De carne I, cf. ad nat. II. 4: "ut iure consistat collegium nominis communione substantiae."]

[Footnote 596: De carne 18 fin.]