"5. We consider that membership in learned societies, even though the appointment thereto may have a _quasi_ Governmental origin, should not be considered as coming within the Const.i.tutional provision, and it may well be that as to certain trifling gifts, such as photographs, the rule of _de minimis lex non curat_ should be deemed to apply."

I agreed to the report of the subcommittee and agreed to the bill, permitting certain officers to accept the presents tendered to them, where there were good reasons therefor; but I am free to say that I was somewhat disappointed that the subcommittee had not reported in favor of abolishing the practice entirely, instead of discriminating between presents and decorations, as they did.

The bill pa.s.sed the Senate without debate and without objection.

It went to the House, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, through Mr. Denby, of Michigan, submitted a most admirable report, which was far more in line with my own ideas than was the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. I agree with the conclusions arrived at by the Committee on Foreign Affairs so thoroughly that I am going to give most of that report here:

" . . . The subcommittee expresses the hope that this adverse disposition of these bills, which contains items fairly representative of the great majority of the requests for Congressional sanction for the acceptance of foreign orders, decorations, or presents, by officials of the United States, will be regarded as notice to officials of the United States that this committee at least, and it is hoped all future committees dealing with this subject-matter, will refuse to consider such requests, except as hereinafter noted.

"The Committee of Foreign Affairs has been required to devote much time to the consideration of bills to grant permission to accept such gifts. The committee has in the past very generally declined to recommend favorably any such legislation, except in the case of decorations offered to American citizens by official or quasi- official scientific a.s.sociations for eminent scientific achievements."

Article 1, section 9, paragraph 8, of the Const.i.tution of the United States is quoted, and the report proceeds:

"The Congress has been frequently importuned since the adoption of the Const.i.tution to grant its consent for the acceptance of orders, decorations, and presents offered to officials of our Government, frequently upon pretexts the most trivial and for services the most commonplace, when services of any kind were rendered at all. A glance at the requests now on file, summarized in Calendar No. 378, which accompanies S. 7096, will show that the offers of foreign gifts, decorations, etc., have been made in the great majority of cases to officials for services in the direct line of their duty, and which in themselves, in the majority of cases, were not deserving of any special commendation. Following a practice which, because of reciprocal considerations, probably operates satisfactorily between foreign powers, the Governments of the world frequently tender to our officers decorations or presents upon such occasions as the first visit of a fleet to a foreign power, or the presence of individual officers representing our Government at reviews and public ceremonials, and to our diplomatic officials upon the termination of their missions, or upon occasions of rejoicing, jubilees of sovereigns, etc. While the practice of exchanging such graceful souvenirs is not unpleasing among the nations which recognize and reciprocate the courtesy, it is entirely inappropriate that officials of this Government should accept, or desire to accept, such presents.

"The prohibition of the Const.i.tution appears to have been put there out of a well-founded desire to safeguard our officials from the insidious influence of a natural but not desirable sense of obligation toward the powers donor. The history of nations abounds with instances of the giving of rich presents to retiring amba.s.sadors and ministers upon the conclusion of treaties or the satisfactory termination of negotiations. There can be no doubt of the danger of recognizing that the agent of our Government may properly be compensated by another to which he is accredited. Another and obvious objection to permitting our officials to receive gifts or decorations from foreign powers is that, having no orders of n.o.bility and no decorations in this country, and not recognizing the propriety of offering to officials of other powers, we can in no way reciprocate.

It is beneath the dignity of the American Government to receive, through its representatives, presents for which it can make no return. The Const.i.tutional prohibition is, in the opinion of the subcommittee, a wise one, to which Congress should very seldom permit any exception.

"Therefore the subcommittee earnestly hopes that the Committee may put itself on record so unequivocally in this instance as to clearly indicate that it will not, except under circ.u.mstances the most unusual and extraordinary, grant permission to any official of the Government to receive such presents.

"To that end the subcommittee further recommends that this report may, by resolution, be adopted as expressing the view of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; that this report may be printed, and that a copy may be communicated to the Secretary of State.

"(Signed) Edwin Denby, "H. W. Palmer, "H. D. Flood, Subcommittee,

"Adopted by the Committee of Foreign Affairs, April 7, 1910.

"Frederic L. Davis, Clerk."

I have no doubt that these two reports, first the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and second, the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, taken together, will effectually stop the application for permission to accept both presents and decorations from foreign Governments. Indeed, I do not think that the Secretary of State will again consent to apply to Congress in behalf of officers who have been tendered presents and decorations.

CHAPTER x.x.x ISLE OF PINES, DANISH WEST INDIES, AND ALGECIRAS

For a number of years there was considerable controversy over the ownership of the Isle of Pines, a small island separated from Cuba by about thirty miles of water, containing 1200 square miles. This dot of land was not of the slightest account to the United States, so far as I could see; but after the treaty of peace with Spain, a number of Americans purchased land there for the purpose of establishing homes. When the United States withdrew from Cuba and the Cuban Republic was established, and the flag of Cuba was extended over the Island of Pines, those American residents protested and insisted that the island belonged to the United States. They had considerable ground for this contention, as Mr. Meikeljohn, when a.s.sistant Secretary of War, had written a number of letters in which he stated that the Isle of Pines had been ceded to the United States by Spain, and therefore was a part of our territory, although attached at the time to the division of Cuba for governmental purposes.

The treaty of peace provided in article one that Spain relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over, and t.i.tle to, Cuba; and in article two, that Spain cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

A strict construction of the treaty of peace with Spain would probably give the island to the United States under article two.

Cuba, however, insisted that the island was a part of Cuban territory, but it was provided in article six of the Platt amendments that the t.i.tle to the island should be left to future adjustment by treaty.

Cuba granted to the United States two very valuable coaling stations, and the United States on its part agreed to enter into a treaty by which we should relinquish whatever t.i.tle we might have to the Island of Pines in favor of Cuba.

A rather interesting incident occurred in connection with this treaty which I believe I violate no confidence in now detailing, as both Presidents have retired from office. President Roosevelt was very anxious that the treaty be ratified; he was also most solicitous that we should retain friendly relations with the Republic of Cuba, and felt that the island was not of the slightest importance to the United States from any standpoint, declaring that he would not accept it. I was at the White House one day when the treaty was before the committee, and he showed me a letter written to him by President Palma, of Cuba, and my recollection is that he gave me a copy of it for such use as I might desire to make. Mr. Palma urged in that letter that the Senate act favorably on the treaty, because if it did not his re-election as President of the Cuban Republic would thereby be endangered.

So much opposition to the treaty developed in the Senate that I deemed it useless to endeavor to bring it to a vote; and really, as I look at it now, there is very little use for the treaty at all, as Cuba is and has been exercising jurisdiction over the Isle of Pines. Cuba must be giving the island a good government for the American residents, as I have heard nothing from the island for several years.

It was during the Fifty-seventh Congress that the treaty with Denmark, providing for the purchase by the United States of the Danish West Indies, consisting of the Islands of St. Thomas, St.

John, and St. Croix, came before the committee. I reported the treaty to the Senate and urged, and finally secured, its ratification.

The United States by this treaty agreed to pay five million dollars to Denmark for the islands.

We first attempted to purchase the islands in 1865, during the administration of President Lincoln. Secretary Seward was particularly anxious that the United States should acquire them, and a treaty was negotiated and agreed to by Denmark. The treaty was not acted upon during the administration of President Johnson, and because President Grant was particularly anxious for its ratification, Charles Sumner, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (as in the case of the Santo Domingo treaty), opposed its ratification by the Senate, and it was defeated.

President Grant showed a far-sighted policy in favoring the acquisition of every foot of territory which we could secure in the West Indies. The Danish islands are of great importance to the United States in a strategic way, whether the strategy be military or commercial. St. Thomas is the natural point of call for all European trade bound for the West Indies, Central America, or Northern South America. These islands, together with Porto Rico, occupy the north-eastern corner of the Caribbean Sea; and they are of more importance now than ever, because of the fact that we are constructing the Isthmian ca.n.a.l. In view of that ca.n.a.l, and the European settlements in South America, every additional acquisition by the United States in the West Indies is invaluable.

Porto Rico is difficult of defense. The harbors are poor, while the harbor in the Island of St. Thomas can be made one of the very best in the West Indies. Our own officers who investigated the subject reported that the Island of St. Thomas possesses all the natural advantages of a second Gibraltar.

The Danish Parliament, after a long debate, declined to ratify the treaty of 1901 which had been ratified by the Senate, and for the present at least the subject is in abeyance.

I still hope, before I shall retire from the Committee on Foreign Relations, that the United States may succeed in purchasing these valuable islands.

During the Winter of 1906 there occurred in the Senate a very interesting debate over the appointment of representatives of the United States to partic.i.p.ate in the so-called Algeciras Conference, held in Algeciras in 1905 to consider conditions in Morocco. No action was taken by the Senate, and in due course the act or treaty agreed to at that conference was submitted to the Senate for ratification.

I do not think there can be the slightest doubt that President Roosevelt had full authority to appoint the delegates on the part of the United States, and that he was thoroughly justified in contending that it was not only the right but the duty of the United States to partic.i.p.ate in this conference. The action of the President in accepting the invitation to the conference and appointing the delegates, and the very important part therein which he took personally, in addition to the interest manifested through his representatives, very properly received the commendation of the people of this country and of the whole European world.

The Moroccan Empire was one of the earliest and most interesting of the world's Governments. During the latter part of the eighteenth century Morocco occupied the attention of the maritime nations of the civilized world, as it was the home of the Barbary pirates who preyed upon the commerce of all the nations. The United States itself paid tribute for the purchase of immunity from these pirates.

One of our earliest treaties, made before the adoption of the Const.i.tution in 1787, was a treaty of peace and friendship with Morocco. We entered into several treaties with Morocco later, and joined in treaties concerning that country in 1865 and 1880 with Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, and other Nations.

For many years Great Britain and France have claimed to have superior rights in Morocco, and it has seemed to be the desire of France to annex it. Germany has intervened, and the country has been a bone of contention among the European Nations. In 1904 Great Britain and France, by a secret treaty, agreed that France should have the dominating control in Morocco, and that Great Britain should dominate in Egypt. Germany opposed the French Protectorate and insisted that an international conference of the powers should be called.

At one time it seemed that war was inevitable, and it probably was averted only by the Algeciras Conference. The United States was asked to partic.i.p.ate, as we had partic.i.p.ated in the conference of 1880. If we had not accepted the invitation there would have been no conference, as two of the great powers had served notice that all nations represented at the 1880 conference must partic.i.p.ate in the Algeciras Conference, or they would withdraw. Our partic.i.p.ation was in the interest of averting a European war.

The General Act or Treaty agreed to at that conference was a lengthy and important one. Its details are not of much importance, as our delegates signed it under a significant reservation that we would not a.s.sume any obligation or responsibility for the enforcement of the Act.

When it came to the Senate, there was quite a combat over its ratification. We could not secure its endors.e.m.e.nt during the session which closed the first of July, 1906, but we were able to reach an agreement that it should be voted on in committee and in the Senate during the month of December following.

President Roosevelt was very much concerned about its ratification, and on June 26, 1906, when it seemed pretty certain that the Senate would adjourn without acting on the general Act, he wrote me this quite characteristic letter:

"White House, Washington, _June 26, 1906_.

"My dear Senator Cullom:

"Having reference to the letter which Secretary Root wrote you yesterday about the Algeciras Convention, I can only add that I earnestly hope this matter will receive favorable report from the committee at this session. I am literally unable to understand how any human being can find anything whatever to object to in this treaty; and to reject it would mean that for the first time since the adoption of the Const.i.tution this Government will be without a treaty with Morocco. It seems incredible that there should be a serious purpose to put us in such a position.

"Sincerely yours, "(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt."

The General Act would probably not have been ratified by the Senate had we not agreed on the form of the resolution of ratification.

That resolution provided:

"Resolved further, that the Senate, as a part of this act of ratification, understands that the partic.i.p.ation of the United States in the Algeciras Conference and in the formation and adoption of the general Act and Protocol which resulted therefrom, was with the sole purpose of preserving and increasing its commerce in Morocco, the protection as to life, liberty, and property of its citizens residing and travelling therein, and of aiding by its friendly offices and efforts in removing friction and controversy which seemed to menace the peace between powers signatory with the United States to the treaty of 1880, all of which are on terms of amity with this Government, and without purpose to depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids partic.i.p.ation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope."

After this form of resolution had been agreed to by those favoring and those opposing the treaty, I showed it to President Roosevelt.

He expressed his satisfaction with it, and the Act was ratified by the Senate.

I have endeavored to cover only a very few of the more important matters which have come before the Committee on Foreign Relations since I have been its chairman. The treaties before the committee have embraced almost every subject of contact between two independent Nations. Numerous treaties involving extradition, boundaries, naturalization, claims, sanitation, trade-marks, consular and diplomatic friendship, and commerce, and many other subjects, have been before the committee and have been acted upon and ratified by the Senate. During the period of which I am now writing, I believe that we have ratified treaties with almost every independent Nation of the world. The many important matters now pending, or of more recent date, I am not at liberty to refer to, the injunction of secrecy not yet having been removed.

The Foreign Relations Committee will continue in the future, as it has in the past, one of the Senate's foremost committees.

CHAPTER x.x.xI CONGRESS UNDER THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION