But Germany is suspected of nourishing ideas of this kind, and utterances of some of their prominent men, _occasional sayings of the Kaiser included_, tend to give substance to this suspicion. In vain Germans object that their country has all the 44 years since 1870 kept the peace in Europe. We have done the same, would the others reply, and we have not, as Germany has done, again and again threatened war when things did not run according to her wishes or humours.

_Germany has in fact abstained from actual peace breaking. But she was regarded and has not a little done to acquire the fame, as the latent or virtual disturbing element in European politics._

This view in regard to political Germany has greatly been enhanced through many of her actions during the present war. It is natural enough, though not particularly edifying, that in a war each party ascribes all the guilt thereof to the opponents and poses as the innocent who maliciously was surprised when not dreaming of any harm. But the cantankerous way in which almost the whole political and intellectual Germany has handled this question and has treated it as a crime not to take in every respect the German view of the case and of all the details of warfare has strengthened the feeling that this nation has come to regard itself as a sort of high judge of Europe. People were reminded of that ill-considered harangue to German soldiers at the time of the China expedition when they were entreated to act towards the Chinese like the Huns under Attila. _This and the eagerness to crush by overwhelming power every small nation that ventures to take sides with the Allies as well as the proclaiming of rights for submarines and Zeppelins upon her own authority--these and similar measures have only been too suited to nourish the conception that Germany places herself in the role of the scourge of G.o.d._

How this feeling reacts upon political thought is ill.u.s.trated by a conversation a German socialist has had in the summer of 1915 on neutral ground with a French socialist politician of no jingoish leanings at all on the possibilities of peace.

Even if Germany declared herself ready to relinquish Belgium and to return to France every inch of ground occupied, his countrymen would not accept peace from her, explained the Frenchman.

And on the question, "Why not?" he replied pa.s.sionately: "Because it would be the German peace; because it would yet leave Germany the all powerful of Europe; because it would make us depend upon the whims and tempers of that conceited military nation."

"But are you going to bleed yourself to death?"

was the next question, and the reply, uttered in a voice where sadness mingled with determination, was:

"Yes, rather be ruined!"

This is a specimen of the feeling created by the present war, and I am afraid the sentiment has not abated a whit yet. Germans have done a good deal in attempts to detach the French from the English.

They have told them that they are only the poor seduced tools of the base and egotistic Britishers, that Germans did not bear them any malice, that they rather pitied them and would fain be ready to come to terms with them. But declarations of this sort proved only how little the French mentality was understood this side of the Vosges. The French nation is too much impressed by the memory of her great past and the part played by her in European politics to stand being pitied and patted like children of tender age. It will be respected as an equal who acts with the full knowledge of the state of things and is too much given to political reflection to accept willingly any view of the war that visibly is coloured by the interest of Germany in the dissension between the two great Powers of Western Europe. The anti-German feeling runs still very high in France; her leading papers excel without any exception in extremely harsh language against everything German, and the great ma.s.s of those who in former years had propagated the idea of a Franco-German understanding are now dead against it.

A similar feeling has step by step got hold of the British nation. From not being very popular at its beginning in England, the war has come to be regarded as a greater national concern than any of its predecessors. The frantic if not hysterical outbursts of hatred against England in Germany when the former decided to stand by France in the war were at first not taken too seriously. But by and by the unceasing utterances of spite have, together with the known acts of German aerial and submarine warfare, deeply reacted on the British mind. The feeling is now general that England has never before had an enemy so full of hatred against her, so ardently desirous of causing her irreparable harm as she now has in present day Germany.

Even such socialist papers as the _New Statesman_, which before the war had no anti-German bias at all, have arrived at the same conclusion concerning what may be called a German peace as the French socialist politician whose opinions were given above characterised it. In an article called "The Case for the Allies," and especially addressed to Americans, the _New Statesman_ explains in its number of December 30th that peace with an unbeaten Germany would mean "Mittel Europa from the Baltic to the Black Sea," that nothing would prevent its expansion through the Balkans to El Arish and Bagdad, that throughout this vast area the authority, if not the suzerainty, of Berlin would be acknowledged and that the small European States north and northwest of Germany would without any resistance--by the mere force of things--come to be subjected to the dictate of Germany. In the words of the _New Statesman_, as the result of an inconclusive peace, "militarism would be more firmly established than ever by the record of its marvellous success and by the manifest need for a military organisation proportionate to so vast an expansion."

Is this feeling justified? Does it appreciate facts at their exact value? _There is undoubtedly an influential section in Germany which entertains feelings of this kind._ It has its adherents particularly in naval circles and amongst the intellectuals of the nation and in a considerable degree also in the financial world. These sections hate in England partly the happy possessor of what in their opinion ought by right to belong to the German race and partly the power without which German expansion would meet with no resistance worth speaking of by European nations. _This section of anti-English on principle or by deeply rooted hatred, influential as it is, is, however, not the whole nation._ It has only now the hold of her mind because it has succeeded in instilling into her the belief that England is the secret manufacturer of the present war, that she is the selfish fermenter of hatred in Europe, the scheming brewer of strife on the Continent.

England has become to the average German mind a real nightmare, a sort of a Frankenstein or any such spookish monster, and as she now, by the vicissitudes of the war, has indeed become the most dangerous of Germany's opponents it is not possible to educate people from the inside to a more rational view of her part in this war and in European politics altogether.

There you have the greatest hindrances to peace in Europe. I did not mention Russia. But the war between Germany, inclusive of Austria-Hungary, and Russia is of quite a different nature. It is more of a war of the older order. It has, of course, also evoked a good deal of hatred. But on the whole it is as wars go, more of an objective nature. There are material differences on which it would not be impossible to compromise. But there is no such deeply-seated irrational opposition, which now sets Germans and English and French and Germans against each other. The war between the Central Powers and Russia is, comparatively speaking, an accident in the political history of Europe. _The war between England, France and Germany is a catastrophe in European civilisation.

As a war it is most irrational, and just because of its absurdity it is so utterly difficult to find a solution for it, and there is little hope that unless some outside force intervenes, it may end otherwise than by absolute general exhaustion._

Things would be otherwise if there were reasonable hopes of a concerted action on the part of the international union of the socialist parties. But such hopes, if they ever could be entertained, have by now become a thing of the past. In the three countries named the majority of the leaders of organised labour have taken sides in the war alongside of their governments and have by this more or less given up independency and lost the confidence of their former comrades in the opposite camp. Distrust, which in general has so much contributed to bring about this war, prevails also in the ranks of the socialists in regard to the leaders of the movement on the other side of the frontier. Minorities everywhere work for a greater independency as a step to a better international understanding. But they have as yet nowhere succeeded in winning the majority of the movement over to their views and policy, and even if they did, all sorts of hindrances would by the governments be put in the way of these Socialists to a.s.semble internationally in sufficient number for work of this nature.

Nor is it to be expected that revolts of the discontented ma.s.ses will be vast enough to force the governments into peace negotiations against their will. The possibilities of centralised governments against revolutionary upheavals as long as these remain locally isolated, which in the face of the enormous extent of the section of the globe directly drawn into the war is most probable, are too great to let these movements have a great chance of changing the policy of the rulers. This would only happen when at least some of these cla.s.ses or parties which at present support the war come round to their opinion, of which very few signs are at present to be seen.

The work of small minorities everywhere, the war has got hold of the minds of the millions in all countries and has filled nations against nations with such distrust and spite as in the history of civilised mankind never before have been witnessed.

How little we are justified to expect peace from the action of these socialists who stand by governments in the war is, as far as my own country is concerned, shown by the fact that the big meetings now (and, I am willing to admit, it is the intention of the initiators to hold them in favour of peace) led by the leaders of the majority of the social-democratic party, such as Messrs. Scheidemann, David, Ebert and others, turn out in practice as meetings in support of the policy of the government in regard to the question of war and peace. In order to defend their own political att.i.tude the speakers are compelled to shift the responsibility for the war and its continuation wholly on the shoulders of the governments of the opposite countries and their supporters, and by this they increase in the mind of their hearers the conviction that nothing short of a defeat of these countries will bring the war to a desirable end. In England the majority of the Labour Party and a considerable number of the best known socialist leaders and in France the most influential leaders of socialist party support also the war policy of their respective governments in all princ.i.p.al issues. The well meant and praiseworthy attempts to convene a full International Socialist Congress for the purpose of settling these differences by finding a common line of action are, I am sorry to say, under the circ.u.mstances most likely to prove abortive. _They will founder on the self-contradiction that the Socialists of the Entente countries argue that their governments hate the idea of German militarism coming out unbeaten and unreduced out of this war which in their opinion was provoked by it, whilst the leaders of the German Socialists in power would rather see this same militarism which they in former years have so violently attacked and denounced, come out victorious than have it interfered with by outside influence._

In short, sections of the socialist movement will a.s.sist other forces in the action for peace, but the movement as a whole is incapable to act in the matter as a force of compelling strength.

Help must in the main come from outside.

Consequently President Wilson's action in his note to the belligerents of December 20th would have been the right thing, even if it had offended in some way against the rules of diplomatic procedure. Under so exceptional circ.u.mstances as these occasioned by the present war extraordinary steps are certainly justified and breaches of etiquette of little significance. But the note was faultless in this respect, and it can moreover be said that in no way did it endanger legitimate interests of the one or the other section of the belligerents. It offends only in spirit against Cain's word, "Am I my brother's keeper?" and in distinct words against the conception that war is a private affair of states may it ever so much interfere with the material and moral welfare of other nations.

The step has not at once succeeded. But it has opened the way; nay, it has forced the door open for discussion in a fashion that n.o.body will be strong enough to shut it again. True, the Central Powers have by their offer of peace negotiations forestalled the note by a week. But this offer would have come to naught without Mr. Wilson's action. Harsh as the reply of the Allies is to the offer, it would most likely have been put in much more negating terms had not the American note caused the Entente Allies to avoid a blunt "No"

and content themselves with raising objections and interjecting accusations. By this they have w.i.l.l.y-nilly provoked a debate and instead of shutting the door kept it well open.

People may call this a small success. In fact it is a beginning, and for the first as such sufficient. The question is now what shall the next step be and how can the debate be directed to positive proposals?

Of course, as these articles were given by this Socialist-Author for publication any one is at liberty to reproduce them.

In conducting the peace negotiations, President Wilson will have the benefit of the services of Colonel House, the one man who, I believe, is best fitted to protect the interests of America and of humanity at such a conference. I, of course, saw Colonel House during the war in Berlin and in America and I consider that no man alive is his superior in either knowledge of the whole situation or in ability to cope with the trained diplomats of Europe. Human nature is much the same and the gentle mannered Texan who has been so successful in American politics will not fail when representing us at the table of Peace.

CHAPTER XXVII

AFTER THE WAR, WHAT?

No one but a fortune teller or professional seer dares to predict the condition of the world after this war. Only mere suggestions can be thrown out, shadows of prophecy as to what may come.

Will the tide of emigration turn from Europe and the United States to other countries or will people of German birth and descent leave America to return to the Fatherland after the war?

I made it my business after I had learned German to talk to many of the plain people in Berlin and elsewhere, to get their views.

I found that the common soldiers, especially those representing the cla.s.s of skilled workingmen in the industrial centres were almost unanimous in saying that after the war and at the first opportunity they intended to leave Germany, to turn from a country capable of perpetrating this calamity on the world, a country where they have been subject not alone to military service but to a cruel and oppressive caste system of discipline.

I believe that Germany will enact laws against emigration and that there will be zones of espionage on all German frontiers designed to watch and keep back such Germans as may seek to escape to other countries.

In Austria even more stringent laws will be necessary to keep the unmarried males from leaving.

I know that experts of the United States Government believe at least three millions of Slovaks, Greeks, etc., will leave America after the war, taking with them the money they have earned, for investment in new opportunities in the Old Country.

With this view I cannot agree. The soil of the European continent is too poor, wages too small, hours too long, and distaste for the military and caste systems too great, to tempt those who have tasted the equality and the freedom of America. Why to-day an ordinary coal miner in Pennsylvania can earn $5,000 a year--a sum greater than the pay of a Prussian or Austrian general! Why should this miner go back to insult and slavery?

The greatest problem of Germany comes after the war--when these millions of men, trained for four years or more to murder, shall return. It will be hard for them to settle down to regular work, impossible for them to submit again to the iron discipline of German civil life. Will they not, as Bloch predicts, possibly, re-enact the horrors of the French Commune, or even those of the French Revolution?

It is hard to understand why Prussian autocracy does not freely offer what it will be compelled to give after the war--equal suffrage in Prussia, fair representation in the Reichstag--a government responsible to the Reichstag. Is it not better for the Emperor to offer this--following Bismarck's saying that "in Prussia the revolutions are made by the rulers."

And who of all rulers in history seemed to sit more securely on his throne than Nicholas who is now learning from his keepers what a Czar really is?

The Emperor said to me once, "Is it not wonderful how the German people bear their sufferings in this war?" I said I thought it was wonderful. It is that and more,--it is almost a miracle--that a whole nation can so nearly approach this delirium.

The autocratic idea survives in Germany--on November 22, 1917, the Conservative Union of the Province of Brandenburg unanimously adopted the following resolution.

"The Prussian State, fundamentally a people of its Princes, is the foundation on which the German Empire rests.

"Not sovereignty of the people but Kingship by Divine Right is its corner stone.

"We implore our deputies to do their best to prevent the Kingship being debased into a sham Kingship and being replaced by that sovereignty of the people by means of the alteration of the Prussian franchise."

After reading this can any one wonder that the Kaiser believes he is called by G.o.d to rule the Germans?

"Kingship by Divine Right"--is quite a development of a Kingship that originated in foreclosure proceedings, when Prussia was taken for a debt by the crafty, rich Hohenzollern Burgraf of Nuremberg.

Is it any wonder that the Kaiser once said to me during the war, "Everything seems to be going my way--don't you think G.o.d is helping me?"

The efforts of those in charge of the German propaganda to sow dissensions among the Allies are more than awkward.

For some time after the landing in force of the British troops in France, the newspapers of Germany were filled with cartoons representing the British refusing to leave Calais; and now that America has entered the war even so intelligent a philosopher as Chancellor Hertling speaks as follows:

"If those who hold power in France forcibly repress every suggestion of peace, and try to rouse fresh will for war by a show of a.s.surance of victory, in spite of the frightful sacrifices the war has cost the country, and must cost still further, it is because they are sustained by the hope of help from America. In this hope they patiently tolerate the Americans also making themselves at home in France, turning Bordeaux into a great American harbour with immense loading and unloading wharves, and cutting down the forests of the Gironde in order to build a camp in the neighbourhood of Bordeaux for the expected army. French workmen tolerate in their factories the compet.i.tion of American workmen, with whom they are not in sympathy, and the owners allow them to look into the secrets of their business, all so that the new Ally may help to take the revenge on the hated Germans."