Destiny And Power - Destiny and Power Part 69
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Destiny and Power Part 69

THEN, IN OCTOBER 1981 Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Says U.S. Would Bar a Takeover in Saudi Arabia That Imperiled Flow of Oil," NYT, October 2, 1981. See also Friedman, Desert Victory, 4446.

THE UNITED STATES "WOULD NOT ALLOW" NYT, October 2, 1981.

"THERE'S NO WAY" Ibid.

AT TEN P.M. OR SO AWT, 3023.

THE PRESIDENT ASKED Ibid., 303, "While I was prepared to deal with this crisis unilaterally if necessary," Bush recalled, "I wanted the United Nations involved as part of our first response, starting with a strong condemnation of Iraq's attack on a fellow member," Bush recalled. (Ibid.) IN AN INTERAGENCY TELECONFERENCE Ibid., 3045.

BOYDEN GRAY DRAFTED Ibid., 305.

BUSH ALSO ORDERED Ibid., 314.

AFTER A QUICK SHOWER Ibid.

"IN DISARRAY" GHWB diary, August 2, 1990.

"WHAT'S HAPPENING IS" Ibid.

"IT IS NOT" Ibid.

ON IRAQ, BUSH HAD GOOD NEWS Ibid.

THE SOVIET UNION, A LONGTIME ALLY OF IRAQ'S AWT, 314; Baker with DeFrank, Politics of Diplomacy, 116.

BUSH SPOKE WITH BAKER White House Telephone Memorandum Signal Switchboard, August 2, 1990, DF.

AT 8:05 A.M. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1990, 108385. AWT, 315. See also Minutes of NSC/Deputies Committee Meeting, August 2, 1990, NSC Meeting-August 2, 1990 Re: Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Presidential Meetings Files, Richard Haass Files, NSC.

THE PRESS POOL WAS INVITED IN Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990, 108385.

HELEN THOMAS OF UPI Ibid., 1084.

"WE'RE NOT DISCUSSING INTERVENTION" Ibid.

BUSH SIGNALED THAT AWT, 315. As Scowcroft recalled: "The President's comment that he was not contemplating intervention has been taken by some to indicate he was passive or indecisive about the notion of doing anything about the Iraqi invasion until Margaret Thatcher 'put some stiffening in his spine' at their meeting later that day. Such speculation is wrong, though his choice of words was not felicitous." (Ibid.) See also Naftali, GHWB, 103.

"THE TRUTH IS" AWT, 315. As noted, Scowcroft believed the president's language, while "not felicitous," was "picked with two thoughts in mind: First, don't say anything at this early point which would telegraph his thinking. Second, make clear that the NSC meeting was not a decision session but a discussion of the situation and options for reacting." (Ibid.) Bush himself added: "I did know for sure that the aggression had to be stopped, and Kuwait's sovereignty restored. We had a big job ahead of us in shaping opinion at home and abroad and could little afford bellicose mistakes at that start." (Ibid.) EVIDENCE OF BUSH'S EVOLUTION GHWB diary, August 25, 1990. See also Wicker, GHWB, 15261.

"MY FEAR IS OF" GHWB, "Telephone Call to Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom," Oval Office, August 3, 1990, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.

"A BIT CHAOTIC" AWT, 315.

IT WAS ALSO UNWIELDY Minutes of NSC/Deputies Committee Meeting, August 2, 1990, NSC Meeting-August 2, 1990 Re: Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Presidential Meetings Files, Richard Haass Files, NSC.

"IT WAS A BIG THING" Author interview with Richard Haass.

MUCH OF THE TALK AWT, 31518; Naftali, GHWB, 1034.

"A FAIT ACCOMPLI" AWT, 317.

DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS "APPALLED" Ibid.

SIMPLY A "CRISIS DU JOUR" Ibid.

"THE MAJOR CRISIS OF OUR TIME" Ibid.

"IT'S HALFWAY AROUND THE WORLD" GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

"THAT WAS ONE OF" Author interview with Richard Haass.

"I AGREE" Ibid.

BUSH'S SHIFT FROM AWT, 318.

BUSH LEFT AT 9:50 A.M. Schedule of the President, August 2, 1990, DF.

("I REALLY IMPLORE YOU") AWT, 318. For an incisive view of Bush's telephone diplomacy in the Persian Gulf crisis, see Jeffrey Crean, "War on the Line: Telephone Diplomacy in the Making and Maintenance of the Desert Storm Coalition," Diplomacy and Statecraft, 26, no. 1 (March 2015): 12438. See also Wicker, GHWB, 15253.

"GEORGE, GIVE US" AWT, 318.

PAINTING A GRIMMER PORTRAIT Author interview with Richard Haass.

"I AM AS AWARE AS YOU ARE" Haass, War of Necessity, 62.

AT THE PENTAGON Cheney with Cheney, In My Time, 186.

IN COLORADO, BUSH SAT DOWN WITH THATCHER AWT, 319. See also Naftali, GHWB, 104.

A U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT AWT, 319.

"IF IRAQ WINS" Ibid., 31920.

THEN THEY MET THE PRESS "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters in Aspen, Colorado, Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom" August 2, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990, 108588.

IN A LARGE TENT GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

SOME OF WHICH HAD BEEN DRAFTED AWT, 318.

"EVEN IN A WORLD" "Remarks at the Aspen Institute Symposium in Aspen, Colorado," August 2, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George Bush, 1990, 108994.

AFTER THE SPEECH GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

FAHD WAS "EMOTIONAL" AWT, 32021.

"HE DOESN'T REALIZE" Ibid., 320.

FAHD ASKED FOR MORE TIME Ibid., 321.

HE "HELD BACK" GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

"KING FAHD'S HESITATION" AWT, 321.

"A HISTORICAL ARAB PROPENSITY" Ibid.

"WE COULDN'T HAVE A SOLO" Ibid.

AT DUSK BUSH HEADED BACK GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

HAD A MORE DEFINITIVE VIEW Ibid.; Naftali, GHWB, 105.

"THE ENORMITY OF IRAQ" GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

"ALL THE INTELLIGENCE SHOWS" AWT, 322.

(IN 1990 TERMS) For background on the world's oil supply over time, see http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6&cid=regions&syid=1990&eyid=2015&unit=BB.

THE ARAB RELUCTANCE BUSH HAD SENSED GHWB diary, August 3, 1990.

"THE ARABS DON'T SEEM" Ibid.

YEMEN'S ALI ABDULLAH SALEH, AN ALLY Ibid.

"SALEH GOT ME" Ibid.

"FEARS MOUNT THAT" Ibid.

ON SATURDAY, AUGUST 4, 1990, BUSH CONVENED AWT, 327.

MIGHT ENFORCE AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO Ibid., 326, 328.

"BOTH OF THEM ARE" GHWB diary, August 5, 1990.

A DODGINESS WHOSE ROOTS HAD BECOME CLEARER AWT, 325.

A POPULAR DIPLOMAT "Who's Who in the House of Saud," WP, December 22, 2002; WP, January 7, 1994; Atkinson, Crusade, 196. Bob Woodward once referred to Bandar as an "Arab Gatsby." (Woodward, The Commanders, 200.) AFTER LAYING OUT THE THREAT AWT, 325.

"HE SEEMED ILL AT EASE" Ibid.

BANDAR WAS CANDID Ibid.

CALLED FOR 150,000 TO 200,000 TROOPS Cheney with Cheney, In My Time, 187.

"WE'RE SERIOUS THIS TIME" Ibid.

"WE DIDN'T HAVE TIME" Ibid.

CONCERNS ABOUT MUSLIM REACTION Author interview with Richard Haass. See also Wicker, GHWB, 15556.

HAD SADDAM CHOSEN TO DO SO AWT, 335.

"MY WORRY IS THE LACK OF SAUDI WILL" "Minutes of NSC Meeting on Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 4, 1990, Iraq-August 2, 1990December 1990 (8), Working Files, Richard N. Haass Files, NSC (CF01478-030).

FAHD AGREED TO RECEIVE AWT, 329; Cheney with Cheney, In My Time, 18687. In the confusion of the time, Bush had apparently not been told that a team was being prepared to go to Saudi Arabia until he heard about it in a call with Fahd. (GHWB, "Telcon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia," August 4, 1990, Camp David, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.) STILL, THE KING CONTINUED TO EVADE AWT, 329.

"WE WILL GET THE TEAM" AWT, 330.

BANDAR MET WITH Haass, War of Necessity, 67.

THE SAUDIS..."HAD A CHOICE" Ibid.

WORD REACHED THE PRESIDENT GHWB diary, August, 5, 1990.

"BANDAR HAS DOUBLE-DEALT US" Ibid.

DECIDED TO INSIST AWT, 330. See also Cheney with Cheney, In My Time, 188.

"A SAUDI REJECTION" AWT, 330.

MADE A CALL HOME Haass, War of Necessity, 67.

AFTER CHENEY ARRIVED IN SAUDI ARABIA Author interview with Dick Cheney.

ARGUED FOR WAITING Ibid.

FAHD BRUSHED ABDULLAH'S WORDS ASIDE Ibid.

"THE KUWAITIS WAITED" Ibid.

"OKAY, WE'LL DO IT" Ibid.

BUSH CANCELED A SCHEDULED SUNDAY GHWB diary, August 5, 1990.

THE CHINESE HAD AGREED Ibid.

THERE WAS AN UPCOMING VOTE Ibid.

"I DON'T KNOW" Ibid.

AS MARINE ONE FLEW Ibid.

"IT'S BEEN PROBABLY" Ibid.

"THIS IS A TERRIBLY SERIOUS PROBLEM" Ibid.

"IF INDEED THE IRAQIS" Ibid.

BUSH STEPPED OFF THE HELICOPTER AWT, 332; Haass, War of Necessity, 69.