TO DORO'S 1992 WEDDING AT CAMP DAVID HE WORE BB, 469.
THE PRESIDENT WORE ONE SOCK THAT SAID "MERRY" Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 42324; Cramer, What It Takes, 1043.
A HIDEAWAY DESK Author interview with Patricia Presock.
A WORLD MAP HUNG ABOVE Ibid.
THE TAPPING OF HIS THUMB ON HIS DESK Author interview with Boyden Gray.
BRENT SCOWCROFT WOULD BE ANXIOUS Author interview with Brent Scowcroft.
"A MORTAL FEAR" Ibid.
IF BUSH WERE ANGRY Author interview with Dan Quayle.
"IN THE TESTICLES" GHWB diary, November 7, 1989.
DOMINGO QUICHO, A VETERAN AWT, 29.
IF BUSH WERE ALONE GHWB diary, November 7, 1989.
"IT'S A GREAT MIX" ATB, 32627.
AMONG HIS FAVORITE ARTISTS: DOLLY PARTON Time, February 4, 1980; ATB, 32627.
ANNE MURRAY Author interview with Patricia Presock.
WITH PORK RINDS AND DR PEPPER Author interview with Tim McBride.
LIFE "WAS NONSTOP" Ibid.
ONE SUMMER WEEKEND GHWB diary, July 30, 1989.
AFTER LUNCH BUSH TOOK A NAP Ibid.
THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY AWT, 18890; Naftali, GHWB, 8586, 8996; LSY, 390, 408, 411, 421, 424, 437, 452. I am indebted to Jeffrey A. Engel, "Bush, Germany, and the Power of Time: How History Makes History," Diplomatic History 37, no. 4 (2013): 63963, and to Gates, From the Shadows, 48395, for insights about Bush and the issue of reunification. I also learned much from Zelikow and Rice, Germany Reunited and Europe Transformed.
AT YALTA IN THE WANING HOURS See, for instance, Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World (Cambridge, Mass., 2007).
"GERMAN REUNIFICATION HAD" AWT, 182.
TO BRING EAST GERMANY AND WEST GERMANY TOGETHER Ibid.
RATIFYING THE MARCH OF THE FORCES OF FREEDOM Naftali, GHWB, 86, notes that reunification could "bring [Germany] into NATO and end the Cold War." (Ibid.) HAD BUSH NOT PRESSED Engel, "Bush, Germany, and the Power of Time," Diplomatic History, 63963. See also Jeffrey A. Engel, "A Better World...but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On," Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (2010): 2546. As Engel wrote of the period, Bush "was well aware that the wrong move at every turn could snatch defeat-and anarchy-out of the jaws of potential triumph and peace." (Ibid., 27.) Engel also observed that Bush's vision for a postCold War Europe "mimicked the post-1945 world American leaders aspired to lead before the Cold War thwarted their internationalist plans." (Ibid., 29.) THATCHER AND MITTERRAND WERE SKEPTICAL In February 1990, Thatcher told Bush: "Everyone accepts that there will be German unification, and that it will come very fast indeed. All are worried about the consequences, and the uncertainty." (GHWB, "Telephone Conversation with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of United Kingdom," February 24, 1990, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.) Two days later, Mitterrand explained: "It is a fact of life that Europeans will always be suspicious of Germany because of the War, although the Europeans may be vague in articulating this suspicion." (GHWB, "Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand," February 26, 1990, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.) IF "WE ARE NOT CAREFUL" Gaddis, Cold War, 250.
"THE PURPOSE OF NATO" Author interview with Dan Quayle. I am grateful to Jeffrey Engel for pointing out Thatcher's debt to Lord Ismay for this description of the mission of NATO.
"I DON'T THINK" GHWB diary, February 26, 1990.
IN FEBRUARY 1990, BUSH RECEIVED Ibid., February 10, 1990.
"CHANGE-THE AMAZING CHANGE" Ibid.
A QUESTION OF BALANCE AND OF ORDER As Bush explained to Kohl prior to Malta, "We will go forward cautiously, but will be forward-leaning on arms control and other issues-as part of a strong Alliance....Stability should be the by-word. We don't want inadvertently to create instability." (GHWB, "Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany," November 29, 1989, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC.) ON THE MORNING AFTER MALTA AWT, 200.
"I HOLD NO RANCOR" GHWB quoted in Engel, "Bush, Germany, and the Power of Time," 650. As Gates observed: "Alone among the leaders of the Western alliance and the Soviet Union, George Bush believed in his heart that the Germans had changed, and he was prepared to gamble a very great deal on that faith. He would cast his lot with Helmut Kohl and the German people." (Gates, From the Shadows, 484.) "WHO'S THE ENEMY?" GHWB diary, February 24, 1990.
ONGOING SUPPORT OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV To Mitterrand in July 1990, Bush described Gorbachev as "the best bet there is in the Soviet Union." Mitterrand replied: "We won't find another man of that caliber in Moscow. He's a very strange phenomenon to come out of the 1917 revolution." (GHWB, "Meeting with President Mitterrand of France," July 9, 1990, Houstonian Hotel, Houston, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence, BSC.) "DESTABILIZE HIM AND WE LOSE" AWT, 190.
GORBACHEV ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON Ibid., 279. My account of the Lithuanian crisis, the Bush-Gorbachev summit in Washington, Soviet support for German reunification, and what Naftali called the "two-pronged" Bush strategy of reaching an understanding with Gorbachev over Lithuania and trade agreements (Naftali, GHWB, 93), is drawn from AWT, 27990; Naftali, GHWB, 9096; and the sources cited below.
THE CONVERSATION WAS WIDE RANGING AWT, 279. "Since we are in a radically new phase of our relations, we need a radically different view of, and approach to, each other," Gorbachev said. "The confrontation we got into after World War II wasted our time and energy, while others-the former vanquished-were moving ahead." (GHWB, "Meeting with President Gorbachev," May 31, 1990, Oval Office, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence, BSC.) Bush also observed: "The U.S. has not been a historic threat to the Soviet Union, nor vice versa. Problems arose only when the Cold War developed." (Ibid.) On the question of Germany, Bush said that he had "become more sensitive" on the subject of "Soviet losses in World War II." He wanted Gorbachev to know that "We are attuned to that driving point for the Soviet Union, the fact that so many lost their lives." It was important, Bush said, "to get that comment on the table before we get-inevitably-to Germany, so you would know that I am sensitive to that historical fact. We do not want winners and losers." (Ibid.) THE "OLD SUSPICIONS" AWT, 279.
LITHUANIA. ONE OF THE BALTIC STATES Ibid., 21529, 27980; Naftali, GHWB, 91. Led by Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania had issued a declaration of independence in March 1990, and affirmed it in the face of Soviet demands to retract the declaration or face stiff consequences. ("Timeline: Lithuania," BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2133386.stm.) See also Minutes, NSC Deputies Committee Teleconference, April 21, 1990, Situation in Lithuania 1990 (1), 198990 Subject File, Condoleezza Rice Files, NSC, GBPL (OAID CF00721-002); "West European Reaction to Soviet Pressure on Lithuania, n.d., April 21, 1990, Situation in Lithuania 1990 (1), 198990 Subject File, Condoleezza Rice Files, NSC (OAID CF00721-002); and a Gorbachev letter on the subject to Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev to GHWB, May 2, 1990, Situation in Lithuania 1990 [1], 198990 Subject File, Condoleezza Rice Files, NSC (OAID CF00721-002). In the Washington meeting, Bush told Gorbachev: "To the degree that we see a commitment to your own principles of self-determination, we can cooperate. I have tried to conduct myself in a constrained way because I know you have big problems. But I am being hit both on my left and on my right by those who say I am subordinating U.S. dedication to principle." Yet Bush also showed he appreciated Gorbachev's position. "I will be honest: some of Landsbergis' moves could look to you like putting a finger in your eye." (GHWB, "Meeting with President Gorbachev," May 31, 1990, Oval Office, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence, BSC.) MOSCOW, HOWEVER, HAD CRACKED DOWN AWT, 21516.
INSTITUTED AN ENERGY EMBARGO Naftali, GHWB, 92.
BUSH WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE Ibid.
IN A LARGER MEETING AWT, 281.
WOULD STRATEGICALLY ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION Ibid.
HE PROPOSED, INSTEAD, THAT THE NEW GERMANY Ibid., 282.
BUSH INTERVENED WITH A TECHNICAL POINT Ibid.
THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, NONBINDING ACCORDS Ibid. See also www.britannica.com/event/Helsinki-Accords.
"SHRUGGING," BUSH RECALLED AWT, 282.
"YES," GORBACHEV TOLD BUSH Ibid.
THE CABINET ROOM WENT QUIET Ibid.
APPEARED STUNNED AND DISMAYED Ibid.
THERE WAS HEATED BACK-AND-FORTH Ibid. "By this time the dismay in the Soviet team was palpable," Bush recalled. One Soviet official's "eyes flashed angrily as he gestured to [another Soviet official]. They snapped back and forth in loud stage whispers in an agitated debate as Gorbachev spoke. It was an unbelievable scene, the likes of which none of us had ever seen before-virtually open rebellion against a Soviet leader." (Ibid., 28283.) The scene continued, and eventually included Gorbachev. It was, Bush recalled, a "fascinating display." (Ibid., 283.) GORBACHEV MAY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTING Ibid., 28384.
"BUTTONHOLED" BUSH AFTER A STATE DINNER Ibid., 283.
"HE TOLD ME" Ibid., 28384.
BUSH WENT UPSTAIRS BUT SLEPT POORLY Ibid., 284.
BUSH TOOK JIM BAKER Ibid., 285.
"THE DEAL I SUGGESTED" Ibid. For Baker's reports of earlier conversations with Gorbachev on Lithuania, see James A. Baker III to GHWB, "Memorandum for the President," Moscow, May 18, 1990, Department of State Virtual Reading Room, http://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/FOIADocs/000053DC.pdf, accessed November 24, 2014.
THERE WAS A FURTHER SECRET CONDITION AWT, 285.
"WE COULD HAND" Ibid.
THE NEXT MORNING BUSH AND GORBACHEV GHWB diary, June 2, 1990; AWT, 286.
CAMP DAVID WAS EVERYTHING AWT, 28687.
("TALK ABOUT BEGINNER'S LUCK!") Ibid., 287.
"WE DEVELOPED A FEELING" Ibid.
"I'VE HEARD SOME REPORT" GHWB diary, June 2, 1990.
"WELL, I DON'T KNOW" Ibid.
THE PRESIDENT CONSULTED Ibid.
"TOLD HIM" Ibid.
THEY STROLLED THE WOOD-CHIP TRAILS AWT, 287; GHWB diary, June 2, 1990.
THERE WAS A FRIENDLY SUPPER Ibid.
IT WAS A CANDID CONVERSATION Ibid.
THEY RETURNED TO WASHINGTON GHWB diary, June 3, 1990.
BUSH BROUGHT GORBACHEV UP Ibid.
BUSH EAGERLY TOOK HIS GUEST Ibid.
THERE WAS GOOD NEWS Ibid.
"HE WAS THRILLED" Ibid.
THEY WENT DOWNSTAIRS Ibid.
"I'VE GOT TO GET" Ibid.
BARBARA WAS ENDURING A GENERATIONAL CONTROVERSY BB, 33542.
"BECAUSE SHE HASN'T" GHWB diary, April 16, 1990.
MRS. BUSH INVITED RAISA GORBACHEV ALONG BB, 33638.
"MAYBE WE SHOULD ADJUST" "Barbara Bush-Wellesley College Commencement," June 1, 1990. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxhuPIzOIfc.
SHE RECEIVED HER MOST SUSTAINED APPLAUSE Ibid.
"AND I WISH HIM WELL" Ibid.
MRS. BUSH WAS A POPULAR FIGURE Ann McDaniel, "Barbara Bush: The Steel Behind the Smile," Newsweek, June 22, 1992. See also LSY, 42527.
WHEN THE CELEBRITY BIOGRAPHER KITTY KELLEY "Barbara Bush: The Steel Behind the Smile," Newsweek, June 22, 1992.
"A FUNNY, SOMETIMES ACERBIC WOMAN" Ibid. McDaniel added: "The joke in Washington is that Bush selected Dan Quayle as vice president to ensure that someone at his side would provide an adoring glance." (Ibid.) "SHE REALLY IS THE LEADER" Author interview with GHWB.
"SHE NEVER BECOMES CROSS" Ibid.
"SHE'S VERY PERCEPTIVE" Ibid.
IN EAST BERLIN AWT, 29192; 291301 covers much ground on reunification.
SUPRISINGLY HARD-LINE SET OF PROPOSALS Ibid., 292.
BAKER SAW THAT Ibid.
THE SOVIETS NEEDED SOME REASSURANCE Ibid.
BUSH UNDERSTOOD GORBACHEV'S POSITION Ibid., 294. "We needed a bold proposal if it was to win over the Soviets to German membership in NATO," Bush recalled. (Ibid.) WITH SCOWCROFT AND OTHERS Ibid., 29293. See also "NATO Military Strategy," July 1990, NATO-Strategy (8), Subject Files, Heather Wilson Files, NSC (OAID CF00293008).
A JULY SUMMIT IN LONDON For background on the summit, see GHWB to Francois Mitterrand, April 17, 1990, NATO Summit-June 1990, Subject Files, John A. Gordon Files, NSC (OAID CF01640025).
THE KEY PROVISIONS OF BUSH'S PROPOSAL AWT, 29495.
FROM LONDON, THATCHER AWT, 29395. See also GHWB to Margaret Thatcher, n.d., NATO Summit-June 1990, Subject Files, John A. Gordon Files, NSC (OAID CF01640025). Information within the letter suggests it was drafted and sent prior to June 25, 1990.
THATCHER WANTED TO START OVER AWT, 29495. See also "Draft Summit Declaration: London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," June 21, 1990, Subject Files, John A. Gordon Files, NSC (CF01646024).
"LYNDON HAS ONE THING IN COMMON" BPB diary, June 18, 2000.
THE PRESIDENT MADE AWT, 295.
GORBACHEV GOT THE MESSAGE Ibid.
THE SITUATION IN LITHUANIA Ibid.
GORBACHEV FACED A TUMULTUOUS Ibid.
IN MID-JULY, HELMUT KOHL Ibid., 29596; Naftali, GHWB, 99100. See also NYT, July 15, 1990.
IT WAS A DEAL GORBACHEV FELT AWT, 29596.
WATCHING FROM WASHINGTON Ibid., 29697.
WHO IN TURN CREDITED THE BUSH-LED COALITION GHWB, "Telcon with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union," July 17, 1990, Presidential Telcon Files, Presidential Correspondence Files, BSC. Reflecting on German reunification, Gorbachev told Bush: "The results take into consideration our common interests-of Germany, yours and ours. I believe that without the meeting in Washington and at Camp David, without the results of the NATO Summit and the London Declaration, without the major work in my conversation with Kohl and your talks with Kohl, without the activities of our foreign economic agencies, without this real political action it would have been difficult to arrive at the proximity in our points of view. We achieved all this because we understood each other's position. We tried to take into account each other's views." (Ibid.) IT WAS THE KIND OF MESSAGE Engel, "A Better World...but Don't Get Carried Away," 45. As Engel wrote: "Personal diplomacy mattered to George H. W. Bush, and served as one of the three fundamental pillars of his diplomatic style alongside his penchant for stability and sovereignty, and his faith in multilateral solutions to global problems." (Ibid.) THIRTY-SIX: I've Got to Do What I Think Is Right IF WE DIDN'T HAVE THIS GHWB diary, July 24, 1990.
READ MY LIPS: I LIED Greene, Presidency of George Bush, 84.