Destiny And Power - Destiny and Power Part 50
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Destiny and Power Part 50

"I DON'T THINK THE AVERAGE AMERICAN" Ibid.

POTTER STEWART SWORE THE NEW DIRECTOR IN BPB diary, January 30, 1976. See also NYT, January 31, 1976, for an account of the swearing-in.

DONALD RUMSFELD AND HIS WIFE, JOYCE BPB diary, January 30, 1976.

A MEMORANDUM FROM FOUR SENIOR CIA OFFICERS The officers were L. C. Dirks, G. F. Donnelly, J. H. Taylor, and R. Lehman. ("George Bush: Calm Between Storms," footnote 7, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/.) There were also practical concerns. "A manager who can assemble the experts he needs in five minutes can operate efficiently; one who needs an hour will gradually accumulate new experts in his immediate office." (Ibid.) "GOING THROUGH" LF, 16465.

THE DIRECTOR'S SEVENTH-FLOOR OFFICE LF, 169.

"WHAT ARE THEY TRYING" LSY, 194.

AT HOME-THE BUSHES HAD MOVED BPB diary, February 23, 1976.

THE CIA SENT MEN OUT Ibid.

THE BUSHES' MAIL WAS NO LONGER DELIVERED Ibid.

PACKAGES THAT ARRIVED AT THE HOUSE Ibid.

GEORGE W. HAD BEEN PLANNING Ibid., July 15, 1976.

"WE ARE SICK ABOUT IT" Ibid.

A CHAUFFEURED CHEVROLET LF, 16869.

MARBLE WALLS WHERE ROWS Ibid., 169.

HE MET WEEKLY Ibid.

MANY DAYS WERE TAKEN UP Ibid.

(FIFTY-ONE TIMES IN HIS YEAR AS DIRECTOR) Ibid.

HE SPENT HIS LUNCH HOUR Ibid.

LATE IN THE AFTERNOONS Author interview with Henry Kissinger.

BY SEVEN P.M., IF THE SOCIAL LF, 16970.

BUSH COULD NOT TALK OPENLY Ibid., 170.

"I CAN'T BELIEVE IT" BPB diary, February 23, 1976.

HER FAVORITE PART OF THE WEEK Ibid., March 1, 1976.

"I MUST CONFESS" Ibid., July 13, 1976.

"VERY DEPRESSED" BB, 135.

"BARBARA HAD DEPRESSION" Author interview with GHWB.

"HE WOULD SUGGEST" BB, 135.

"I ALMOST WONDER" Ibid.

"SOMETIMES THE PAIN WAS SO GREAT" Ibid.

"IT SEEMS SO SIMPLE" Ibid., 13536.

THE CIA POST BPB diary, March 1, 1976.

THE RANGE OF CONCERNS ATB, 24950.

IN 1976, BUSH WAS FURIOUS LF, 17475.

"FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES" Ibid., 175.

ASSASSINATED IN BEIRUT Ibid., 17172.

THE ISSUE WAS WHETHER Ibid., 171.

IN A TENSE MEETING Ibid.

WAS JOINED BY KISSINGER AND SCOWCROFT Ibid., 172.

THEY WERE SEATED Ibid.

BUSH WAS ON HIS FEET Ibid.

"ASSASSINATION SIGNALED" Ibid.

ONE THING BUSH TOOK AWAY Ibid., 173.

THE RESPECT WAS MUTUAL Author interview with Brent Scowcroft.

"HE WAS GENIAL AND THOUGHTFUL" Ibid.

"KISSINGER FRANKLY DIDN'T HAVE TIME" Ibid.

OVERARCHING CONCERN For Bush's experience with Team B, I drew on, for instance, Anne Hessing Cahn and John Prados, "Team B: The Trillion Dollar Experiment," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 1993, 2229; Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York, 2007), 35153; Ranelagh, Agency, 62224; LSY, 198201; Naftali, GHWB, 3233; Wicker, GHWB, 4547; James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet (New York, 2004), 74; NYT, March 6, 1988, as well as Garthoff below.

FEBRUARY 1960 HAD MARKED Raymond L. Garthoff, "Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities," CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/.

"THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES" Ibid.

THE CHIEF OF AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE DISSENTED Ibid.

DON RUMSFELD, WAS PUSHING Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 22232.

AS WAS REAGAN Cahn and Prados, "Team B," 2425.

THE FORMATION OF A "TEAM B" Ibid., 24; LSY, 198200; Ranelagh, Agency, 62224.

"LET HER FLY!!" Cahn and Prados, "Team B," 24; Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 352.

IT WAS "A BAD IDEA" NYT, March 6, 1988.

IT WAS WISEST, BUSH DECIDED, TO KEEP Naftali, GHWB, 33; LSY, 198. As Parmet wrote, "It was, [Bush] explained, better to set it up than to say 'we are always going to have a hard-line team checking you guys." (LSY, 198.) THE RESULTS WERE EVIDENT David Binder, "New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms," NYT, December 26, 1976.

"WAS MORE THAN SOMBER" Ibid.

"ALL THE EVIDENCE POINTS" Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 74.

AS IT TURNED OUT Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 352. See also Naftali, GHWB, 33, and LSY, 199201. "Bush did not accept these conclusions and was furious when they leaked; nevertheless, the process gave credence to a particularly dark vision of the Soviet threat that people close to the far right, led now by Ronald Reagan, would soon tout," wrote Naftali. "Among CIA professionals, however, Bush earned high praise for his handling of the Team B matter. By letting outsiders in, he had reduced pressures that might have forced a greater politicization of intelligence estimates." (Naftali, GHWB, 33). In a 1995 interview with Herbert Parmet, Bush said Team B "proved that intelligence is less than objective, that there's always going to be subjectivity in it when it comes to Soviet estimates." (LSY, 201.) IN LATE JUNE, JIMMY CARTER "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, www.cia.gov.library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence, 87.

BUSH MET CARTER IN HERSHEY Ibid., 8788.

BUSH TRAVELED TO PLAINS Ibid., 8889.

TO REPORTERS BEFOREHAND, CARTER Ibid., 89.

THE MEETING WITH CARTER Ibid.

BUSH RETURNED TO PLAINS Ibid., 92.

"JIMMY WAS GOING TO CLEAR" Ibid.

BUSH LED A CONVERSATION Ibid., 9293.

"NOW I FIND MYSELF" BPB diary, October 22, 1976.

BUSH CALLED CARTER "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," 97. Carter had been advised by some to keep Bush on for a few months to send a bipartisan signal about leadership in the intelligence community. "Appointing a DCI along with a list of the new administration cabinet et al politicizes an office that should be above and beyond politics," Robert Amory, Jr., wrote in a pre-election memorandum. He added: "By all reports, George Bush has done a remarkable job of taking over a badly demoralized CIA, tautening the ship and renewing the confidence of its, by and large, superb professionals." (Memorandum of Robert Amory, Jr., September 13, 1976, NLC-171087-25, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.) "EXOTIC AND VERY CLOSELY HELD" "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," 97. In preparation for the meeting with Bush, Carter was advised to make the point that, as president-elect, he was "not in a position to authorize any clandestine activities until" he became president and a review of all such operations was complete. The fear, according to a staff memo: "Transitions have been particularly risky times when authority for the conduct of clandestine activities has become blurred to the detriment of our national security." ("Memorandum for the President-elect," from Jack Watson, Stuart Eisenstadt, and David Aaron, November 18, 1976, NLC-1261-31-7, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library.) BUSH OFFERED TO SEND ALONG A LETTER "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," 97.

BUSH RETURNED TO PLAINS Ibid.

SITTING ON THE CARTERS' SOFA, HIS BACK TO THE BAY WINDOWS Author interview with Jimmy Carter.

NO INCOMING PRESIDENT "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," 92. See also Naftali, GHWB, 33, and LSY, 206.

AFTER RAISING THE QUESTION "In-Depth Discussions with Carter," 9798.

CARTER AGREED, SAYING, "OKAY" Ibid., 98.

"HE HAS NEVER ENJOYED A JOB MORE" BPB diary, January 18, 1977.

BUSH WAS "TOO WEDDED" Author interview with Jimmy Carter. A leak to Evans and Novak calling the Bush briefing in Plains a "disaster" seems to have been overblown; Carter recalled to the author that he was always planning on naming his own CIA director. (WP, November 27, 1976.) See also David Aaron to the President-Elect, November 27, 1976, NLC-7667-87, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library. Aaron worried that Bush was giving background briefings on the Carter meeting to David Binder of The New York Times. (Ibid.) "IF I HAD ACCEDED" Author interview with Jimmy Carter.

BUSH BRIEFED CARTER ATB, 264.

BUSH ALSO WARNED CARTER Ibid.

WHEN AN ISSUE AROSE LF, 17879.

"I DON'T NEED TO WORRY" Ibid., 179.

"YOU LEARN WHAT" Author interview with GHWB.

"I WONDER...IF GEORGE" BPB diary, October 22, 1976.

Part V: The Age of Reagan, 1977 to 1989 I...THOUGHT THAT IT WAS PRUDENT Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York, 1990), 255.

EIGHTEEN: A President We Won't Have to Train I'M SO DIGGING IN ATB, 28283.

BUSH HAS TO BE "ACCEPTABLE" Document, undated, box 20/5, James A. Baker III Papers, Princeton.

"I WENT HOME" Author interview with GHWB.

"THERE [HAVE] BEEN" ATB, 271.

"THERE IS A MISSING" Ibid.

SPEAKING WARMLY OF "NORMALCY" Ibid., 272.

"SOMEHOW I WILL CHURN" Ibid.

IN HOUSTON, THE BUSHES HAD BOUGHT BPB diary, January 18, 1977.

FIRST INTERNATIONAL BANK BECAME BUSH'S HOME BASE Ibid. See also LSY, 208.

JOINED THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION BPB diary, April 5, 1977.

HE ACCEPTED INVITATIONS Ibid.

REFUSING A DIRECTORSHIP ATB, 270.

DECLINED AN OFFER FROM ROSS PEROT Author interview with GHWB; LSY, 209.

"I'LL PAY YOU A LOT OF MONEY" Author interview with GHWB.

("THIS WAS BEFORE ROSS") Ibid.

THE PEROTS ONCE VISITED KENNEBUNKPORT Ibid.

WHEN HE DID HIS DUE DILIGENCE Ibid.

"WELL, THIS IS YOUR BIG MISTAKE" Ibid.

EVERYTHING BUSH WAS DOING ATB, 271.