"He did not have the pleasure of finishing it.

"The prince, seeing that the reader did not understand his importunity, struck a gong and ordered the servant who appeared to conduct the young man out of his presence.

"Later, he declared to Lang-Ho that his protege had no talent at all, and reprimanded him severely for having sent the poet to the palace.

"But my master did not like to be thus criticized.

"So, a little while after that, one day, when that same prince was in an agreeable frame of mind, Lang-Ho invited him to the reading of one of his works.

"The n.o.bleman declared that he had never heard anything more beautiful.

"'That is true,' said Lang-Ho, 'but you ought to have said this the first time you heard it.'

"And he revealed to the prince that these verses were those of the young man whom he had judged so harshly."

From this story two lessons may be drawn:

The first is, that if common sense indicates that judgment should not change from scorn to enthusiasm, when it is a question of the same object, practical sense insists that one should be certain of impartiality of judgment, by avoiding the influence of questions which relate to environment and surrounding circ.u.mstances.

The second concerns opportunity.

We have already had occasion to say how much some things, which seem desirable at certain times, are questionable when the situation changes.

Bad humor creates ill-will; therefore it is abominably stupid to provoke the manifestation of the second when one has proved the existence of the first.

In order that there may be a connection between the faculty of judgment and that of deduction, it is essential that nothing should be allowed to interpose itself between these two phases of the argument.

Harmony between all judgments is founded on common sense, but it is practical common sense, which indicates this harmony with precision.

It is also practical common sense which serves as a guide to the orator who wishes to impress his audience.

He will endeavor first to choose a subject which will interest those who listen to him.

In this endeavor he ought, above all, to consult opportunity.

And, as we have remarked on many occasions, the Shogun expresses theories on this subject, to which the people of the twentieth century could not give too much earnest consideration.

"There are," said he, "social questions, as, for example, dress and custom.

"With time, opinions change, as do forms and manners, and this is quite reasonable.

"The progress of science by ameliorating the general conditions of existence, introduces a need created by civilization which rejects barbarous customs; the mentality of a warrior is not that of an agriculturist; the man who thinks about making his possessions productive has not the same inclinations as he whose life is devoted to conquest, and the sweetness of living in serenity, by modifying the aspirations, metamorphoses all things.

"In order to lead attention in the direction which is governed by reason, it is indispensable for the orator that he should expound a subject whose interpretation will satisfy the demand of opportunity, which influences every brain.

"Practical sense will make him take care to speak only of things that he has studied thoroughly.

"It will induce him to expound his theory in such a way that his hearers will have to make no effort to a.s.similate it.

"That which is not understood is easily criticized, and practical sense would prevent an orator from attempting to establish an argument whose premises would offend common sense.

"He would be certain of failure in such a case.

"His efforts will be limited, then, to evoking common sense, by employing practical sense, so far as what refers to the application of principles which he desires to apply successfully."

Yoritomo recommends this affiliation for that which concerns the struggle against superst.i.tion.

"Superst.i.tion," he says, "offends practical sense as well as common sense, for it rests on an erroneous a.n.a.lysis.

"Its foundation is always an observation marred by falsity, establishing an a.s.sociation between two facts which have nothing in common.

"There are people who reenter their homes if, when they reach the threshold, they perceive a certain bird; others believe that they are threatened with death if they meet a white cat."

Without going back to the days of Yoritomo, we shall find just as many people who are the victims of superst.i.tions concerning certain facts, which are only the observance of customs fallen into disuse, and whose practise has been perpetuated through the ages, altho, as we have said in the preceding chapter, the purpose of the custom has disappeared, but the custom itself has not been forgotten.

It is in this way that the origin of the superst.i.tion concerning salt dates back to the time of the Romans, who (while at variance with the principles of contemporary agriculture) sowed salt in the fields of their enemies and thought that by so doing they would make them sterile.

To that far-distant epoch can be traced the origin of the superst.i.tion concerning the spilling of salt.

Whatever may have been its cause, superst.i.tion is the enemy of common sense, for, when it does not originate in an abolished custom, it is the product of a personal impression, a.s.sociating two ideas absolutely unconnected.

"Practical sense," Yoritomo continues, "is a most valuable talent to cultivate, for it prevents our judging from appearances.

"Frivolous minds are always inclined to draw conclusions from pa.s.sing impressions; they adopt neither foresight, nor precaution, nor approximation.

"There are people who will condemn a country as utterly unattractive, because they happened to have visited it under unfavorable circ.u.mstances.

"Others, without considering what a country has previously produced, and that at present the grain has not been planted, will declare unfertile the soil which has been untilled for some months.

"On the other hand, if they visit a house on a sunny day, it would be impossible for them to a.s.sociate it with the idea of rain.

"It would be most difficult to make these people alter their judgment, prematurely formed, and, in spite of the most authoritative a.s.sertions and the most self-evident proofs, their initial idea will dominate all those which one would like to instil into their minds.

"One moment would, however, suffice for reason to convince them that the variations of atmosphere and the conditions of cultivation can modify the aspect of a country, of a field, and of a house, to the extent of giving them an appearance totally different from the one which they seemed to have.

"But he who judges by appearances never rejoices in the possession of that faculty which may be called reason in imagination.

"This is a gift, developed by practical sense and which common sense happily directs in right channels.

"Those who are endowed with this faculty can, with the help of reasoning, and by means of thought, build up a future reality based on a judgment whose affirmation admits of no doubt.

"It is not a question of hypothesis, no matter how well-founded it is.

"Experience, in this case, is united with deduction to form a preconceived but certain idea.

"By cultivating practical sense, we shall escape the danger of idealization which, with people of unbalanced mentality, often sheds an artificial light upon the picture."

There is still another point to which Yoritomo calls our attention, in order to encourage us to cultivate the twin reasoning powers whose advantages we are trying to commend in this chapter: