11. "A Being originally and necessarily capable of comprehending itself, it is not improper to call infinite, for we can have no idea of any bounds to it's knowledge or power."

12. "A series of finite causes cannot possibly be carried back _ad infinitum_."

13. "Our imagination revolts at the idea of an intellectual soul of the universe, that is, of an intelligence resulting from arrangement."

14. "The actual existence of the universe compels us to come at last to an _originally existent and intellectual Being_, because if the immediate maker of the universe has not existed from all eternity, he must have derived his being and senses from one who has, and that being we call G.o.d."

15. "G.o.d must be present to all his works, if we admit no power can act but where it is, he must therefore exist every where, because his works are every where."

16. "As no being can unmake or materially change himself (at least none can annihilate himself) so G.o.d is unchangeable, for no Being G.o.d made can change him and no other Being can exist but what G.o.d made."

17. "Two infinite intelligent beings of the same kind would coincide, therefore there can only be one G.o.d."

18. "Nothing can be more evident, than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each other from all eternity."

19. "That happiness is the design of the creation because health is designed and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule is as evident as that the design of the Mill-wright must have been, that his machine should not be obstructed."

20. "As a state of sickness is comparatively rare with a state of health, happiness the result of health, and the end of the creation happiness, so the end of the creation is already in a great measure answered."

21. "Pleasure tends to continue and propagate itself, pain to check and exterminate itself."

22. "As our knowledge and power in respect to shunning pains and procuring pleasures advance with our experience, nothing is wanting to enable us to exterminate all pains, but a continuance of being.

23. "Our enjoyments continually increase in real value from infancy to old age."

24. "A future moral distribution is probable, because G.o.d is infinitely powerful and wise."

25. "Since reverence, grat.i.tude, obedience, confidence are duties to men, so they are to G.o.d; and as we pray to men, so we should pray to G.o.d."

26. "Prescience, predetermination and infinite benevolence are no argument against prayer to the Deity."

27. "A wish produced by nature is evidence of the thing wished for, but a future state is wished for, therefore there is evidence of a future state."

28. "As we have no idea how we came originally to be produced, for what we know to the contrary our reproduction may be as much the course of nature as our original production.."

29. "A gloom and melancholy belong more to atheists than to devout people."

OBSERVATIONS.

Dr. Priestley will hardly doubt, after this collection from his work that it has at least been read before it is attempted to be answered.

It is in the writer's power to quote the page and line for each a.s.sertion, but it would be stuffing this publication with unnecessary references. Dr. Priestley will be able to know what are his own sentiments and what not without recurring to his printed Letters.

There has been also another difficulty in cla.s.sing the several exceptions under the different heads; what is false, what is absurd, and what is inadmissible bordering so nearly on each other. Nice distinctions cannot in such respect be made, but the whole together form the main argument which is to be answered.

The first and princ.i.p.al a.s.sertion is, that effects have their adequate cause; it is then added, that the universe is an effect, that it therefore must have a cause, and to this cause in the English language is given the name of G.o.d. This proposition is true, provided the universe is an effect, but that is a _postulatum_ without concession and without a proof. This _original Being_ he advances in another place to be that only something which existed uncaused from all eternity, and which could not have been a Being, like a man or a table, incapable of comprehending, itself, for such existences would require another superior Being. But if the universe is not adopted as an effect, if it is taken as existing from all eternity, the universe becomes an intelligent Being, and there or no where is the Deity sought after.

Such a Being we may properly speak of and reason upon. The whole is subjected to our sensations and our experience. But of his own _uncaused Being_ Dr. P. says we cannot properly speak. Is not that alone an argument of there being no such thing? His friend Dr. Clarke says, we cannot have an idea of an impossible thing. Now this discovered Deity is allowed to be that of which we can have no idea.

So far at least it is allied to the impossible.

As to the argument of cause and effect, the latter certainly implies the former; but when we give the name of effect to any thing, we must be certain it is an effect, for we may be so far mistaken perhaps as to call that an effect which is a cause, at least what is an effect to-day may be a cause to-morrow, as in the instance of generation; for though a son does not beget his father, he too has his offspring in which he may be said to live over again, and if we are to argue only from experience, most probably that alone is the resurrection and the life to come. But if it is contended that our experience relates only to finite causes, or causes incapable of comprehending themselves, it must at the same time be allowed, that all our reasoning is founded only on experience. This Dr. P. at least allows even while he keeps reasoning about a Deity, which he calls an infinite cause capable of comprehending itself, though n.o.body is capable of comprehending it, and of which we therefore can have no experience. Yet he will a.s.sert, that _thinking_ persons seldom are convinced by _thinking_. This is odd language for a reasoner. When another philosopher or divine attempts to prove a G.o.d in their own way, Dr. Priestley can readily see his fallacies and absurdities. Dr. Clarke, the former great champion of G.o.d Almighty, is made very light of. He thought, foolish man, to prove the existence of a Deity merely by our having an idea of that existence, which would go to prove the truth of every unnatural conceit that ever entered into the heart of man; and contended farther that it would be equally absurd to suppose no Deity as two and two did not make four. It would indeed be absurd, says Dr. Priestley provided we agreed that the universe is a _caused_ existence, for G.o.d is the name we give for the cause of the universe, which in such case must exist. It is only denying that the universe is a caused existence, and then the absurdity is taken away.

Dr. Priestley, for the sake of making Dr. Clarke absurd, will readily allow the denial capable of being made; and for the same purpose he seems gravely to have taken upon himself to prove that school-boy's difficulty, that two and two do make four, for he says, that four is the term agreed upon in language to be given to the sum total of two and two, and that to deny the Deity is at least not so absurd as to say that two and two do not make four.

Dr. Priestley says he finds no difficulty in excluding every thing from the mind except s.p.a.ce and duration. He allows then at least, that there is no manifest absurdity in supposing there is no Deity, for nothing can be proved by reasoning if the conclusion can be denied without absurdity, nor can there be a manifest absurdity in denying the existence of what there is no difficulty in excluding from the mind.

Yet after all he adds (somewhat inconsistently) that we cannot exclude the idea of a Deity, if we do not exclude an existent universe. This Deity he defines to be a most simple Being; simple and infinite; terms which but ill agree together.

The infinite or boundless existence of this pretended Deity is a property more insisted upon than any other, and whatever other properties are given to him they are all in the infinite degree. The properties alledged to be proved are, eternity, infinite knowledge and power, unchangeableness, unity, omnipotence, action from all eternity, and independence. Benevolence and moral government are also ascribed to him but confessedly with a less degree of certainty, though the most desireable of all his given properties. Upon the subject of benevolence, Dr. Priestley only advances, that where it is not proved by the happiness of his creatures to exist, he would rather chuse to conclude he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that he wanted benevolence. If he means to argue that it is more rational to conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his argument is no more a truism. As a wish, that the Deity may not want benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence is in a.s.serting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions.

That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant, that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and worship them. G.o.d is said to have made man in the image of himself. If he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes G.o.d in his own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so differs the G.o.d of each devotee. They are all idolaters or anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not the one or the other.

The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world.

At last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain is necessary for happiness. But if pain is, as he says, in this world necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter?

He answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough for a future supply of happiness. If it is objected, why have we not had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of age, instead of waiting 'till our deaths at so many different ages? He can only finish his argument by allowing that the ways of G.o.d are inscrutable to man, that every thing is for the best and refer us to _Candide_ for the rest of his philosophy; nor will he ever resolve the question, "if evil and pain are good and necessary now, why will they not always be so? Take a view of human existence, and who can even allow, that there is more happiness than misery in the world? Dr.

Priestley thinks to give the turn of the scale to happiness, by making it depend intirely upon health, notwithstanding he says in another place that human sensations are a ma.s.s collected from the past, present and future, and as a man grows up the present goes on to bear a less proportion to the other two. It would indeed be a short but lame way of proving that "happiness is the design of the creation" because health is designed, and sickness is only an exception, not a general rule."

Many a healthy man has certainly been unhappy, or else had a man better study health than virtue. If the mill-wright make a poor machine he is a poor workman; G.o.d in like manner designing health and introducing sickness is but a poor physician. In another place Dr. Priestley having considered, that he had a.s.serted that human sensations arise from ideas of the past and future as well as the present, finds himself obliged to alter his notions of happiness, so far as to say that happiness is more intellectual than corporeal. But it is rather extraordinary to a.s.sert at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal feelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the Deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to be taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by feeling pain?" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps be possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity.

It was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute he allows of omnipotence.

Next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the Deity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal happiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders.

After observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From thence he proceeds to a.s.sert, that atheists may believe it within the course of nature, that men as moral agents may after death be re-produced, and therefore that there may be a future state though there be no G.o.d, because he reasons it may be in the course of nature.

This allows that the course of nature may be as it is without a G.o.d, and that there is therefore no _natural_ proof of a Deity. His farther argument on this head is, that "things usually happen in a state of nature that are proper. A future state is proper. (To carry on the supposed state of melioration and complete the moral government of the universe.) It is therefore probable." This is an argument perhaps more of wish than probability, but let it have such force as belongs to it.

It is not the wish of the answerer by supporting atheism to give encouragement to immorality, but should he unwarily or with weak minds do so, the argument of the Deity's existence is independent of such considerations. It were better to seek another support for morality than a belief in G.o.d; for the moral purpose in believing a Deity (an invisible Being, maker of all, our moral governor, who will hereafter take cognizance of our conduct,) is not a little checked by considering, that he leaves the proof of his very existence so ambiguous, that even men with a habit of piety upon them cannot but have their doubts, whilst on this existence so much of the moral purpose depends. If this is not an argument against the morality of a Deity, it is at all events one against his _infinite_ morality though moral is an attribute to be given to him in the infinite degree as much as any other.

It is said, infinite intelligence must have procured a necessary fitness of things, and that this forms morality. "His will could not be bia.s.sed by other influence; therefore he must have willed morality, because necessarily fit. Then comes infinite power, and yet no morality in the world or a very small portion of it. We cannot to any purpose, do what we will, argue against experience. That it must be, yet that it is not. What must be, will be. If it is not, there is no _must_ in the case.

It is next said, that virtue gives a better chance for happiness than vice. This also is but a weak argument for the moral government of the universe, unless it be for a moral government by chance. Virtue ought to be the certain and immediate parent of happiness, if a moral governor existed with an uncontrouled dominion. If virtue tends to happiness, or has only a better chance of doing so, it is allowed, that a sensible atheist should hold it right to be virtuous. The latter end of a righteous man is certainly more likely to be happy than that of an unrighteous one. But let an atheist be righteous, and he can be as certain of happiness in his latter end as any other. Let another life be desirable, as it certainly is, his doubts upon it will not prevent it. Who could wish an end better or more happy than that of Mr. Hume, who most indubitably was an atheist. But if an atheist be not so good as a Theist, Dr. Priestley perhaps, will allow him to be better than a sceptic, as any principles for systematising nature are better than none at all. A Theist is not without his doubts as well as the sceptic; an atheist, once firmly becoming so, will never doubt more; for we may venture to say no miracles or new appearances will present themselves to him to draw his belief aside.

Still every thing is as G.o.d intended it--so a.s.serts Dr. Priestley; and therefore it cannot by him be denied that crimes and vices, are of his intention. The Theist exclaims in triumph, "He that made the eye, must he not see?" But who made the eye? Or grant that G.o.d made the eye, which can only see in the light, must he necessarily see in the dark?

It is again a.s.serted, "the power which formed an eye had something in view as certainly as he that constructed a telescope. If any Being formed any eye, grant it. But if the eye exists necessarily as a part of nature; as much as any other matter, or combination of matter, necessarily existed, the result of the argument is intirely different.

It is far from being a necessary part of the atheist's creed to exclude design from the universe. He places that design in the energy of nature, which Dr. Priestley gives to some other extraneous Being. It is rather inconsistent also in him to say, that an atheist rightly judging of his own situation upon his own principles, ought not to hold himself quite secure from a future state of responsibility and existences, and yet to say he must in his own ideas hold himself soon to be excluded for ever from life.

As to the immutability of the Deity, it is difficult to guess how that is proved, except by the argument of _Lucus a non lucendo_, because every thing is changing here; therefore the Deity never changes; which is neither an argument _a priori_ nor _posteriore_, but _sui generis_, merely applicable to the Deity.

From the imperial infinite intelligence of the Deity an argument is formed of his unity. Dr. Priestley says, "that two _infinite_ intelligent Beings would coincide, and therefore that there can only be one such Being." Two parallels will never coincide. That is one of the first axioms of Euclid, in whom Dr. Priestley believes as much as in his bible. If the Beings are infinite in extent and magnitude they must certainly coincide, but if they are only infinite in intelligence, it does not seem to be necessary that they should.

The ubiquity of G.o.d is proved in this short way: "G.o.d made every thing, G.o.d controuls every thing. No power can act but where it is. Therefore G.o.d is present every where. The workman must certainly be present at his work, but when the work is done he may go about other business. If all the properties of matter, such as gravity, elasticity and other such existed only by the perpetual leave and agency of the Deity, it may be argued he is in all places where matter is. s.p.a.ce, empty s.p.a.ce will still exist without him. In this mode of proof Dr. Priestley must, contrary to the Newtonian system argue for a _Plenum_, before he proves the ubiquity. He cannot exclude s.p.a.ce from his mind, nor can he exclude gravity from matter. Yet can he admit matter as well as s.p.a.ce to be eternal, because he will not allow the inactivity of G.o.d." "If G.o.d's works had a beginning he must have been _for a whole eternity_ inactive." He seems to have an odd notion of eternity, for he there allows it could have an end. The argument would be fairer in concluding "he must have been inactive _or doing something else_."

The Deity set up, if not the creator of matter, is at least the matter of it, nor will his advocates by any means allow him to be material himself. They see some incongruity in admitting one piece of matter to be so complete a master of another. However Dr. Priestley and other arguers for a Deity would do well to consider, that whatever is not matter, is a s.p.a.ce that matter may occupy. Therefore if G.o.d is not matter, and also is not s.p.a.ce, he is nothing. Dr. Priestley allows matter eternal, and its properties of gravity, elasticity, electricity and others equally eternal. He says directly, that matter cannot exist without it's perpetually corresponding powers. The adjustment of those powers he places in the Deity. But as we never see matter without the adjustment of those properties as well as the existence of them, this drives him at last to say, the Deity must also have created matter, according to his system eternally created it, cotemporarily with himself. Ideas absurd and irreconcileable!

Discoursing upon the hypothesis of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms"

Dr. Priestley asks, "what reason we have to think that small ma.s.ses of matter can have power without communication _ab extra_?" Let this question be returned, "have we not reason to think so from attraction the most common property in matter." To get rid of this difficulty he will not allow an atom of matter to be possessed originally of the most simple powers, though he is ready to allow matter to have been eternal.

A magnet according to this system must sometime have existed without its magnetic power. He concludes there must be some original existent Being. He shall be allowed many original existent Beings if it pleases him. A man may be an originally existent being, as well as any other.

He is superior to other animals in this world. In like manner there may be allowed superior Beings to man (as most probably there are) and yet those superior Beings not have made man.

Dr. Priestley will have it, that all bodies are moved by external force. That does not seem quite necessary. Motion may as well be a.s.serted to be originally a property of matter, or its true natural state and rest a deprivation of that property, as that rest should be its natural state. Hume thought so and Hume was no great fool, notwithstanding Dr. Priestley makes so light of him. In fact matter never is, and therefore most probably never was found to be in a state of rest. Nor has Dr. Priestley any reason to suppose gravity, elasticity and electricity to have been imprest on bodies by a superior Being, and not originally inherent in matter, unless to favour his own hypothesis of a Deity. He absolutely says matter could not have had those powers without a communication from a superior and intelligent Being. If matter is perceived in regulated motion, it is added bluntly, that it must be by a mover possessed of a competent intelligence, and that a Being therefore of such power and intelligence _must_ exist. Whoever finds no difficulty in believing the contrary will find as little difficulty in Mr. Hume's hypothesis, that motion might as well as other powers and properties have been originally inherent in matter, or at least have been a necessary result of some matter acting upon another.

It has always been a doubt with Theists, whether they can better prove their G.o.d's existence by moral or physical considerations. Dr.