The first Punic war began B.C. 264, and lasted twenty-four years. Before we present the leading events of that memorable struggle, let us glance at the power of Carthage-the formidable rival of Rome.

(M834) As has been narrated, Carthage was founded upon a peninsula, or rocky promontory, sixty-five years before the foundation of Rome. The inhabitants of Carthage, descendants of Phnicians, were therefore of Semitic origin. The African farmer was a Canaanite, and all the Canaanites lacked the instinct of political life. The Phnicians thought of commerce and wealth, and not political aggrandizement. With half their power, the h.e.l.lenic cities achieved their independence. Carthage was a colony of Phnicians, and had their ideas. It lived to traffic and get rich. It was washed on all sides, except the west, by the sea, and above the city, on the western heights, was the citadel Byrsa, called so from the word ??sa, a hide, according to the legend that Dido, when she came to Africa, bought of the inhabitants as much land as could be encompa.s.sed by a bull's hide, which she cut into thongs, and inclosed the territory on which she built the citadel. The city grew to be twenty-three miles in circuit, and contained seven hundred thousand people. It had two harbors, an outer and inner, the latter being surrounded by a lofty wall. A triple wall was erected across the peninsula, to protect it from the west, three miles long, and between the walls were stables for three hundred elephants, four thousand horses, and barracks for two thousand infantry, with magazines and stores. In the centre of the inner harbor was an island, called Cothon, the sh.o.r.es of which were lined with quays and docks for two hundred and twenty ships. The citadel, Byrsa, was two miles in circuit, and when it finally surrendered to the Romans, fifty thousand people marched out of it. On its summit was the famous temple of aesculapius. At the northwestern angle of the city were twenty immense reservoirs, each four hundred feet by twenty-eight, filled with water, brought by an aqueduct at a distance of fifty-two miles. The suburb Megara, beyond the city walls, but within those that defended the peninsula, was the site of magnificent gardens and villas, which were adorned with every kind of Grecian art, for the Carthaginians were rich before Rome had conquered even Latium. This great city controlled the other Phnician cities, part of Sicily, Numidia, Mauritania, Lybia-in short, the northern part of Africa, and colonies in Spain and the islands of the western part of the Mediterranean. The city alone could furnish in an exigency forty thousand heavy infantry, one thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand war chariots.

The garrison of the city amounted to twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse, and the total force which the city could command was more than one hundred thousand men. The navy was the largest in the world, for, in the sea-fight with Regulus, it numbered three hundred and fifty ships, carrying one hundred and fifty thousand men.

Such was this great power against which the Romans were resolved to contend. It would seem that Carthage was willing that Rome should have the sovereignty of Italy, provided it had itself the possession of Sicily. But this was what the Romans were determined to prevent. The object of contention, then, between these two rivals, the one all-powerful by land and the other by sea, was the possession of Sicily.

(M835) During the first three years of the war, the Romans made themselves masters of all the island, except the maritime fortresses at its western extremity, Eryx and Panormus. Meanwhile the Carthaginians ravaged the coasts of Italy, and destroyed its commerce. The Romans then saw that Sicily could not be held without a navy as powerful as that of their rivals, and it was resolved to build at once one hundred and twenty ships.

A Carthaginian quinquereme, wrecked on the Bruttian sh.o.r.e, furnished the model, the forests of Silo the timber, and the maritime cities of Italy and Greece, the sailors. In sixty days a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships was built and ready for sea. The superior seamanship of the Carthaginians was neutralized by converting the decks into a battle-field for soldiers. Each ship was provided with a long boarding-bridge, hinged up against the mast, to be let down on the prow, and fixed to the hostile deck by a long spike, which projected from its end. The bridge was wide enough for two soldiers to pa.s.s abreast, and its sides were protected by bulwarks.

(M836) The first encounter of the Romans with the Carthaginians resulted in the capture of the whole force, a squadron of seventeen ships. The second encounter ended in the capture of more ships than the Roman admiral, Cn. Scipio, had lost. The next battle, that of Mylae, in which the whole Roman fleet was engaged, again turned in favor of the Romans, whose bad seamanship provoked the contempt of their foes, and led to self-confidence. The battle was gained by grappling the enemy's ships one by one. The Carthaginians lost fourteen ships, and only saved the rest by inglorious flight.

(M837) For six years no decided victories were won by either side, but in the year B.C. 256, nine years from the commencement of hostilities, M.

Atilius Regulus, a n.o.ble of the same cla.s.s and habits as Cincinnatus and Fabricius, with a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships, manned by one hundred thousand sailors, encountered the Carthaginian fleet of three hundred and fifty ships on the southern coast of Sicily, and gained a memorable victory. It was gained on the same principle as Epaminondas and Alexander won their battles, by concentrating all the forces upon a single point, and breaking the line. The Romans advanced in the shape of a wedge, with the two consuls' ships at the apex. The Carthaginian admirals allowed the centre to give way before the advancing squadron. The right wing made a circuit out in the open sea, and took the Roman reserve in the rear, while the left wing attacked the vessels that were towing the horse transports, and forced them to the sh.o.r.e. But the Carthaginian centre, being thus left weak, was no match for the best ships of the Romans, and the consuls, victorious in the centre, turned to the relief of the two rear divisions. The Carthaginians lost sixty-four ships, which were taken, besides twenty-four which were sunk, and retreated with the remainder to the Gulf of Carthage, to defend the sh.o.r.es against the antic.i.p.ated attack.

(M838) The Romans, however, made for another point, and landed in the harbor of Aspis, intrenched a camp to protect their ships, and ravaged the country. Twenty thousand captives were sent to Rome and sold as slaves, besides an immense booty-a number equal to a fifth part of the free population of the city. A footing in Africa was thus made, and so secure were the Romans, that a large part of the army was recalled, leaving Regulus with only forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry. Yet with this small army he defeated the Carthaginians, and became master of the country to within ten miles of Carthage. The Carthaginians, shut up in the city, sued for peace; but it was granted only on condition of the cession of Sicily and Sardinia, the surrender of the fleet, and the reduction of Carthage to the condition of a dependent city. Such a proposal was rejected, and despair gave courage to the defeated Carthaginians.

(M839) They made one grand effort while Regulus lay inactive in winter quarters. The return of Hamilcar from Sicily with veteran troops, which furnished a nucleus for a new army, inspired the Carthaginians with hope, and a.s.sisted by a Lacedaemonian general, Xanthippus, with a band of Greek mercenaries, the Carthaginians marched unexpectedly upon Regulus, and so signally defeated him at Tunis, that only two thousand Romans escaped.

Regulus, with five hundred of the legionary force, was taken captive and carried to Carthage.

(M840) The Carthaginians now a.s.sumed the offensive, and Sicily became the battle-field. Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, landed on the island with one hundred and forty elephants, while the Roman fleet of three hundred ships suffered a great disaster off the Lucanian promontory. A storm arose, which wrecked one hundred and fifty ships-a disaster equal to the one which it suffered two years before, when two-thirds of the large fleet which was sent to relieve the two thousand troops at Clupea was destroyed by a similar storm. In spite of these calamities, the Romans took Panormus and Thermae, and gained a victory under the walls of the former city which cost the Carthaginians twenty thousand men and the capture of one hundred and twenty elephants. This success, gained by Metellus, was the greatest yet obtained in Sicily, and the victorious general adorned his triumph with thirteen captured generals and one hundred and four elephants.

(M841) The two maritime fortresses which still held out at the west of the island, Drepanum and Lilybaeum, were now invested, and the Carthaginians, shut up in these fortresses, sent an emba.s.sy to Rome to ask an exchange of prisoners, and sue for peace. Regulus, now five years a prisoner, was allowed to accompany the emba.s.sy, on his promise to return if the mission was unsuccessful. As his condition was now that of a Carthaginian slave, he was reluctant to enter the city, and still more the Senate, of which he was no longer a member. But when this reluctance was overcome, he denounced both the peace and the exchange of prisoners. The Romans wished to retain this n.o.ble patriot, but he was true to his oath, and returned voluntarily to Carthage, after having defeated the object of the amba.s.sadors, knowing that a cruel death awaited him. The Carthaginians, indignant and filled with revenge, it is said, exposed the hero to a burning sun, with his eyelids cut off, and rolled him in a barrel lined with iron spikes.

(M842) The emba.s.sy having thus failed, the attack on the fortresses, which alone linked Africa with Sicily, was renewed. The siege of Lilybaeum lasted till the end of the war, which, from the mutual exhaustion of the parties, now languished for six years. The Romans had lost four great fleets, three of which had arms on board, and the census of the city, in the seventeenth year, showed a decrease of forty thousand citizens. During this interval of stagnation, when petty warfare alone existed, Hamilcar Burca was appointed general of Carthage, and in the same year his son Hannibal was born, B.C. 247.

(M843) The Romans, disgusted with the apathy of the government, fitted out a fleet of privateers of two hundred ships, manned by sixty thousand sailors, and this fleet gained a victory over the Carthaginians, unprepared for such a force, so that fifty ships were sunk, and seventy more were carried by the victors into port. This victory gave Sicily to the Romans, and ended the war. The Roman prisoners were surrendered by Hamilcar, who had full powers for peace, and Carthage engaged to pay three thousand two hundred talents for the expenses of the war.

(M844) The Romans were gainers by this war. They acquired the richest island in the world, fertile in all the fruits of the earth, with splendid harbors, cities, and a great acc.u.mulation of wealth. The long war of twenty-four years, nearly a whole generation, was not conducted on such a scale as essentially to impoverish the contending parties. There were no debts contracted for future generations to pay. It was the most absorbing object of public interest, indeed; but many other events and subjects must also have occupied the Roman mind. It was a foreign war, the first that Rome had waged. It was a war of ambition, the commencement of those unscrupulous and aggressive measures that finally resulted in the political annihilation of all the other great powers of the world.

But this war, compared with those foreign wars which Rome subsequently conducted, was carried on without science and skill. It was carried on in the transition period of Roman warfare, when tactics were more highly prized than strategy. It was by a militia, and agricultural generals, and tactics, and personal bravery, that the various Italian nations were subdued, when war had not ripened into a science, such as was conducted even by the Greeks. There was no skill or experience in the conduct of sieges. The navy was managed by Greek mercenaries.

(M845) The great improvement in the science of war which this first contest with a foreign power led to, was the creation of a navy, and the necessity of employing veteran troops, led by experienced generals. A deliberative a.s.sembly, like the Senate, it was found could not conduct a foreign war. It was left to generals, who were to learn marches and countermarches, sieges, and a strategical system. The withdrawal of half the army of Regulus by the Senate proved nearly fatal. Carthage could not be subdued by that rustic warfare which had sufficed for the conquest of Etruria or Samnium. The new system of war demanded generals who had military training and a military eye, and not citizen admirals. The final success was owing to the errors of the Carthaginians rather than military science.

CHAPTER x.x.x.

THE SECOND PUNIC OR HANNIBALIC WAR.

The peace between the Carthaginians and Romans was a mere truce. Though it lasted twenty-one years, new sources of quarrel were acc.u.mulating, and forces were being prepared for a more decisive encounter.

Before we trace the progress of this still more memorable war, let us glance at the events which transpired in the interval between it and the first contest.

(M846) That interval is memorable for the military career of Hamilcar, and his great ascendency at Carthage. That city paid dearly for the peace it had secured, for the tribute of Sicily flowed into the treasury of the Romans. Its commercial policy was broken up, and the commerce of Italy flowed in new channels. This change was bitterly felt by the Phnician city, and a party was soon organized for the further prosecution of hostilities. There was also a strong peace party, made up of the indolent and cowardly money-worshipers of that mercantile State. The war party was headed by Hamilcar, the peace party by Hanno, which at first had the ascendency. It drove the army into mutiny by haggling about pay. The Libyan mercenaries joined the revolt, and Carthage found herself alone in the midst of anarchies. In this emergency the government solicited Hamilcar to save it from the effect of its blunders and selfishness.

(M847) This government, as at Rome, was oligarchic, but the n.o.bles were merely mercantile grandees, without ability-jealous, exclusive, and selfish. The great body of the people whom they ruled were poor and dependent. In intrusting power to Hamilcar, the government of wealthy citizens only gave him military control. The army which he commanded was not a citizen militia, it was made up of mercenaries. Hamilcar was obliged to construct a force from these, to whom the State looked for its salvation.

He was a young man, a little over thirty, and foreboding that he would not live to complete his plans, enjoined his son Hannibal, nine years of age, when he was about to leave Carthage, to swear at the altar of the Eternal G.o.d hatred of the Roman name.

(M848) He left Carthage for Spain, taking with him his sons, to be reared in the camp. He marched along the coast, accompanied by the fleet, which was commanded by Hasdrubal. He crossed the sea at the Pillars of Hercules, with the view of organizing a Spanish kingdom to a.s.sist the Carthaginians in their future warfare. But he died prematurely, B.C. 229, leaving his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, to carry out his designs, and the southern and eastern provinces of Spain became Carthaginian provinces. Carthagena arose as the capital of this new Spanish kingdom, in the territory of the Contestana. Here agriculture flourished, and still more, mining, from the silver mines, which produced, a century afterward, thirty-six millions of sesterces-nearly two million dollars-yearly. Carthage thus acquired in Spain a market for its commerce and manufactures, and the New Carthage ruled as far as the Ebro. But the greatest advantage of this new acquisition to Carthage was the new cla.s.s of mercenary soldiers which were incorporated with the army. At first, the Romans were not alarmed by the rise of this new Spanish power, and saw only a compensation for the tribute and traffic which Carthage had lost in Sicily. And while the Carthaginians were creating armies in Spain, the Romans were engaged in conquering Cisalpine Gaul, and consolidating the Italian conquests.

(M849) Hasdrubal was a.s.sa.s.sinated after eight years of successful administration, and Hannibal was hailed as his successor by the army, and the choice was confirmed by the Carthaginians, B.C. 221. He was now twenty-nine, trained to all the fatigue and dangers of the camp, and with a native genius for war, which made him, according to the estimation of modern critics, the greatest general of antiquity. He combined courage with discretion, and prudence with energy. He had an inventive craftiness, which led him to take unexpected routes. He profoundly studied the character of antagonists, and kept himself informed of the projects of his enemies. He had his spies at Rome, and was frequently seen in disguises in order to get important information.

(M850) This crafty and able general resolved, on his nomination, to make war at once upon the Romans, whom he regarded as the deadly foe of his country. His first great exploit was the reduction of Saguntum, an Iberian city on the coast, in alliance with the Romans. It defended itself with desperate energy for eight months, and its siege is memorable. The inhabitants were treated with savage cruelty, and the spoil was sent to Carthage.

(M851) This act of Hannibal was the occasion, though not the cause, of the second Punic war. The Romans, indignant, demanded of Carthage the surrender of the general who had broken the peace. On the fall of Saguntum, Hannibal retired to Carthagena for winter quarters, and to make preparations for the invasion of Italy. He collected an army of one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, sixteen thousand cavalry, and fifty-eight elephants, a.s.sisted by a naval force. But the whole of this great army was not designed for the Italian expedition. A part of it was sent for the protection of Carthage, and a part was reserved for the protection of Spain, the government of which he intrusted to his brother Hasdrubal.

(M852) The nations of the earth, two thousand years ago, would scarcely appreciate the magnitude of the events which were to follow from the invasion of Italy, and the war which followed-perhaps "the most memorable of all the wars ever waged," certainly one of the most memorable in human annals. The question at issue was, whether the world was to be governed by a commercial oligarchy, with all the superst.i.tions of the East, or by the laws of a free and patriotic State. It was a war waged between the genius of a mighty general and the resources of the Roman people, for Hannibal did not look for aid so much to his own State, as to those hardy Spaniards who followed his standard.

(M853) In the spring, B.C. 218, Hannibal set out from New Carthage with an army of ninety thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry. He encountered at the Ebro the first serious resistance, but this was from the natives, and not the Romans. It took four months to surmount their resistance, during which he lost one-fourth of his army. As it was his great object to gain time before the Romans could occupy the pa.s.ses of the Alps, he made this sacrifice of his men. When he readied the Pyrenees, he sent home a part of his army, and crossed those mountains with only fifty thousand infantry and nine thousand cavalry; but these were veteran troops. He took the coast route by Narbonne and Nimes, through the Celtic territory, and encountered no serious resistance till he reached the Rhone, opposite to Avignon, about the end of July. The pa.s.sage was disputed by Scipio, a.s.sisted by friendly Gauls, but Hannibal outflanked his enemies by sending a detachment across the river, on rafts, two days'

march higher up, and thus easily forced the pa.s.sage, and was three days'

march beyond the river before Scipio was aware that he had crossed. Scipio then sailed back to Pisa, and aided his colleague to meet the invader in Cisalpine Gaul.

(M854) Hannibal, now on Celtic territory on the Roman side of the Rhone, could not be prevented from reaching the Alps. Two pa.s.ses then led from the lower Rhone across the Alps-the one by the Cottian Alps (Mount Geneva); and the other, the higher pa.s.s of the Grain Alps (Mount St.

Bernard), and this was selected by Hannibal. The task of transporting a large army over even this easier pa.s.s was a work of great difficulty, with baggage, cavalry, and elephants, when the autumn snows were falling, resisted by the mountaineers, against whom they had to fight to the very summit of the pa.s.s. The descent, though free from enemies, was still more dangerous, and it required, at one place, three days' labor to make the road practicable for the elephants. The army arrived, the middle of September, in the plain of Ivrea, where his exhausted troops were quartered in friendly villages. Had the Romans met him near Turin with only thirty thousand men, and at once forced a battle, the prospects of Hannibal would have been doubtful. But no army appeared; the object was attained, but with the loss of half his troops, and the rest so demoralized by fatigue, that a long rest was required.

(M855) The great talents by which Scipio atoned for his previous errors now extricated his army from destruction. He retreated across the Ticinio and the Po, refusing a pitched battle on the plains, and fell back upon a strong position on the hills. The united consular armies, forty thousand men, were so posted as to compel Hannibal to attack in front with inferior force, or go into winter quarters, trusting to the doubtful fidelity of the Gauls.

(M856) It has been well said, "that it was the misfortune of Rome's double magistracy when both consuls were present on the field." Owing to a wound which Scipio had received, the command devolved upon Semp.r.o.nius, who, eager for distinction, could not resist the provocations of Hannibal to bring on a battle. In one of the skirmishes the Roman cavalry and light infantry were enticed by the flying Numidians across a swollen stream, and suddenly found themselves before the entire Punic army. The whole Roman force hurried across the stream to support the vanguard. A battle took place on the Trasimene Lake, in which the Romans were sorely beaten, but ten thousand infantry cut their way through the ma.s.ses of the enemy, and reached the fortress of Placentia, where they were joined by other bands.

After this success, which gave Hannibal all of Northern Italy, his army, suffering from fatigue and disease, retired into winter quarters. He now had lost all his elephants but one. The remains of the Roman army pa.s.sed the winter in the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona.

(M857) The next spring, the Romans, under Flaminius, took the field, with four legions, to command the great northern and eastern roads, and the pa.s.ses of the Appenines. But Hannibal, knowing that Rome was only vulnerable at the heart, rapidly changed his base, crossed the Appenines at an undefended pa.s.s, and advanced, by the lower Arno, into Etruria, while Flaminius was watching by the upper course of that stream. Flaminius was a mere party leader and demagogue, and was not the man for such a crisis, for Hannibal was allowed to pa.s.s by him, and reach Faesulae un.o.bstructed. The Romans prepared themselves for the worst, broke down the bridges over the Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator.

(M858) Pyrrhus would have marched direct upon Rome, but Hannibal was more far-sighted. His army needed a new organization, and rest, and recruits, so he marched unexpectedly through Umbria, devastated the country, and halted on the sh.o.r.es of the Adriatic. Here he rested, reorganized his Libyan cavalry, and resumed his communication with Carthage. He then broke up his camp, and marched into Southern Italy, hoping to break up the confederacy. But not a single Italian town entered into alliance with the Carthaginians.

(M859) Fabius, the dictator, a man of great prudence, advanced in years, and a tact.i.tian of the old Roman school, determined to avoid a pitched battle, and starve or weary out his enemy. Hannibal adjusted his plans in accordance with the character of the man he opposed. So he pa.s.sed the Roman army, crossed the Appenines, took Telesia, and turned against Capua, the most important of all the Italian dependent cities, hoping for a revolt among the Campanian towns. Here again he was disappointed. So, retracing his steps, he took the road to Apulia, the dictator following him along the heights. So the summer was consumed by marchings and counter-marchings, the lands of the Hispanians, Campamans, Samnites, Paelignians, and other provinces, being successively devastated. But no important battle was fought. He selected then the rich lands of Apulia for winter quarters, and intrenched his camp at Gerenium. The Romans formed a camp in the territory of the Larinates, and hara.s.sed the enemy's foragers.

This defensive policy of Fabius wounded the Roman pride, and the dictator became unpopular. The Senate resolved to depart from a policy which was slowly but surely ruining the State, and an army was equipped larger than Rome ever before sent into the field, composed of eight legions, under the command of the two consuls, L. aemilius Paulus, and M. Terentius Varro. The former, a patrician, had conducted successfully the Illyrian war; the latter, the popular candidate, incapable, conceited, and presumptuous.

(M860) As soon as the season allowed him to leave his winter-quarters, Hannibal, a.s.suming the offensive, marched out of Gerenium, pa.s.sed Luceria, crossed the Aufidus, and took the citadel of Cannae, which commanded the plain of Ca.n.u.sium. The Roman consuls arrived in Apulia in the beginning of the summer, with eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry.

Hannibal's force was forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, inured to regular warfare. The Romans made up their minds to fight, and confronted the Carthaginians on the right bank of the Aufidus. According to a foolish custom, the command devolved on one of the consuls every other day, and Varro determined to avail himself of the first opportunity for a battle. The forces met on the plain west of Cannae, more favorable to the Carthaginians than the Romans, on account of the superiority of the cavalry. It is difficult, without a long description, to give clear conceptions of this famous battle. Hannibal, it would seem, like Epaminondas and Alexander, brought to bear his heavy cavalry, under Hasdrubal, upon the weakest point of the enemy, after the conflict had continued awhile without decisive results. The weaker right of the Roman army, led by Paulus, after bravely fighting, were cut down and driven across the river. Paulus, wounded, then rode to the centre, composed of infantry in close lines, which had gained an advantage over the Spanish and Gaulish troops that encountered them. In order to follow up this advantage, the legions pressed forward in the form of a wedge. In this position the Libyan infantry, wheeling upon them right and left, warmly a.s.sailed both sides of the Roman infantry, which checked its advance. By this double flank attack the Roman infantry became crowded, and were not free. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal, after defeating the right wing, which had been led by Paulus, led his cavalry behind the Roman centre and attacked the left wing, led by Varro. The cavalry of Varro, opposed by the Numidian cavalry, was in no condition to meet this double attack, and was scattered. Hasdrubal again rallied his cavalry, and led it to the rear of the Roman centre, already in close fight with the Spanish and Gaulish infantry. This last charge decided the battle. Flight was impossible, for the river was in the rear, and in front was a victorious enemy. No quarter was given. Seventy thousand Romans were slain, including the consul Paulus and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was saved by the speed of his horse. The Carthaginians lost not quite six thousand.

(M861) This immense disaster was the signal for the revolt of the allies, which Hannibal before in vain had sought to procure. Capua opened her gates to the conqueror. Nearly all the people of Southern Italy rose against Rome. But the Greek cities of the coast were held by Roman garrisons, as well as the fortresses in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium. The news of the battle of Cannae, B.C. 216, induced the Macedonian king to promise aid to Hannibal. The death of Hiero at Syracuse made Sicily an enemy to Rome, while Carthage, now elated, sent considerable re-enforcements.

(M862) Many critics have expressed surprise that Hannibal, after this great victory, did not at once march upon Rome. Had he conquered, as Alexander did, a Persian, Oriental, effeminate people, this might have been his true policy. But Rome was still capable of a strong defense, and would not have succ.u.mbed under any pressure of adverse circ.u.mstances, and she also was still strong in allies. And more, Hannibal had not perfected his political combinations. He was not ready to strike the final blow. He had to keep his eye on Macedonia, Africa, Sicily, and Spain. Alexander did not march to Babylon, until he had subdued Phnicia and Egypt. Even the capture of Rome would not prevent a long war with the States of Italy.

(M863) Nor did the Romans lose courage when they learned the greatest calamity which had ever befallen them. They made new and immense preparations. All the reserve forces were called out-all men capable of bearing arms-young or old. Even the slaves were armed, after being purchased by the State, and made soldiers. Spoils were taken down from the temples. The Latin cities sent in contingents, and the Senate refused to receive even the envoy of the conqueror.

(M864) Such courage and fort.i.tude and energy were not without effect, while the enervating influence of Capua, the following winter, demoralized the Carthaginians. The turning point of the war was the winter which followed the defeat at Cannae. The great aim of Hannibal, in his expedition to Italy, had been to break up the Italian confederacy. After three campaigns, that object was only imperfectly accomplished, in spite of his victories, and he had a great frontier to protect. With only forty thousand men, he could not leave it uncovered, and advance to Rome. The Romans, too, learning wisdom, now appointed only generals of experience, and continued them in command.

(M865) The animating soul of the new warfare was Marcus Claudius Marcellus, a man fifty years of age, who had received a severe military training, and performed acts of signal heroism. He was not a general to be a mere spectator of the movements of the enemy from the hills, but to take his position in fortified camps under the walls of fortresses. With the two legions saved from Cannae, and the troops raised from Rome and Ostia, he followed Hannibal to Campania, while other Roman armies were posted in other quarters.

Hannibal now saw that without great re-enforcements from Carthage, Spain, Macedonia, and Syracuse, he would be obliged to fight on the defensive.

But the Carthaginians sent only congratulations; the king of Macedonia failed in courage; while the Romans intercepted supplies from Syracuse and Spain. Hannibal was left to his own resources.

(M866) Scipio, meanwhile, in Spain, attacked the real base of Hannibal, overran the country of the Ebro, secured the pa.s.ses of the Pyrenees, and defeated Hasdrubal while attempting to lead succor to his brother. The capture of Saguntum gave the Romans a strong fortress between the Ebro and Carthagena. Scipio even meditated an attack on Africa, and induced Syphax, king of one of the Numidian nations, to desert Carthage, which caused the recall of Hasdrubal from Spain. His departure left Scipio master of the peninsula; but Hasdrubal, after punishing the disaffected Numidians, returned to Spain, and with overwhelming numbers regained their ascendency, and Scipio was slain, as well as his brother, and their army routed.