_Impellimur_: ?????e?a, s.e.xt. _Adv. Math._ VII. 391, as often.

--25. _Oportet videri_: "ought to be seen." For this use cf. 39, 81 and 122 of this book. _Videri_ at the end of this section has the weak sense, "to seem." Lucretius often pa.s.ses rapidly from the one use to the other; cf. I.

262 with I. 270, and Munro's n., also _M.D.F._ II. 52, _Em. Liv._ p. 42.

_Non poterit_: as the Academics allege. _Naturae ... alienum_: Cic. uses this adjective with the dat, and also with the ablative preceded by _ab_; I doubt whether the phrase _maiestate alienum_ (without the preposition) can be right in _De Div._ II. 102, where the best texts still keep it. _Non occurrit ... aget_: occurrit is probably the perfect. Cf. n. on 127.

--26. _Quid quod si_: Goer., outrageously reads _quid quod si, si_.

_Tollitur_: the verb _tollere_ occurs as frequently in this sense as a?a??e?? does in s.e.xtus. _Lux lumenque_: Bentl. _dux_ The expression _dux vitae_ is of course frequent (cf. _N.D._ I. 40, _T.D._ V. 5 and Lucretius), but there is no need to alter. _Lux_ is properly natural light, _lumen_ artificial, cf. _Ad Att._ XVI. 13, 1. _lumina dimiseramus, nec satis lucebat_, D.F. III. 45 _solis luce ... lumen lucernae_. There is the same difference between f?? and fe????, the latter is used for the former (fe???? ??????) just as _lumen_ is for _lux_ (_si te secundo lumine his offendere_--_Ad Att._ VII. 26, 1) but not often _vice versa_. Trans. "the luminary and the lamp of life," and cf. s.e.xt. _Adv. Math._ VII. 269 where the fa?tas?a is called fe????. _Finis_: so in the beginning of the _Nicom.

Eth._ Aristot. a.s.sumes that the actual existence of human exertion is a sufficient proof that there is a te???. _Aperta_: a reminiscence of the frequently recurring Greek terms e??a??pte??, e??a??pt???? etc., cf. s.e.xtus _pa.s.sim_, and _D.F._ I. 30. _Initium ... exitus_ = a??? ... te???.

_Tenetur_: MSS. _tenet_, the nom. to which Guietus thought to be _ratio_ above. ?p?de????: cf. the definition very often given by s.e.xt. e.g. _Pyrrh.

Hyp._ II. 143 ????? d?' ????????e??? ??at?? (premisses) ?ata s??a?????

ep?f??a? (conclusion) e??a??pt?? ad????, also Diog. VII. 45, ????? d?a t??

a???? ?ata?aa??e??? t? ??tt?? ?ata?aa??e??? pe?a????ta (if the reading be right).

--27. _Notio_: another trans. of e????a. _Conclusisse_: although the Greeks used s?pe?asa instead of ep?f??a sometimes for the conclusion of the syllogism, they did not use the verb s?pe?a??e?? which has been supposed to correspond to _concludere_. It is more likely to be a trans. of s??a?e??, and _conclusum argumentum_ of s??a?t???? ?????, which terms are of frequent occurrence. _Rationibus progredi_: to a similar question s.e.xtus answers, ??? est?? a?a??a??? ta? e?e???? (the dogmatists) d??at?????a?

p??a??e??, p?asat?de?? ??pa????sa? (_Adv. Math._ VIII. 367). _Sapientiae ... futurum est_: for the dat. with _facio_ and _fio_ see Madv. _Gram._ 241, obs. 5, _Opusc._ I. 370, _D.F._ II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. _Lex veri rectique_: cf. 29; the _const.i.tutio veri_ and the determination of what is _r.e.c.t.u.m_ in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy.

_Sapientique satis non sit_: so Manut. for the _sapientisque sit_ of the MSS. Halm after Dav. reads _sapientis, neque satis sit_, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run _neque dubitari potest quin satis sit_, which gives the exact opposite of the sense required. _Ratum_: cf. 141.

--28. _Perceptum_: thoroughly known and grasped. Similar arguments are very frequent in s.e.xtus, e.g. _Adv. Math._ VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be _provable_. Cf. 109 of this book. _Postulanti_: making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. _De Leg._ I. 21. _Consentaneum esse_: a???????? e??a?. _Ut alia_: _although_ others. _Tantum abest ut--ut_: cf. Madv. _Gram._ 440 a.

--29. _Pressius_: cf. _De Fato_ 31, 33, _N.D._ II. 20, _T.D._ IV. 14, _Hortensius_ fragm. 46 ed. n.o.bbe. The word is mocked in 109. _Decretum_: of course the Academics would say they did not hold this d??a as _stabile fixum ratum_ but only as _probabile_. s.e.xtus however _Pyrrh. Hyp._ I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. _Sent.i.tis enim_: cf. _sentis_ in _D.F._ III. 26. _Fluctuare_: "to be at sea," Halm _fluctuari_, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. _Summa_: cf. _summa philosophiae_ _D.F._ II. 86. _Veri falsi_: cf. n. on 92. _Quae visa_: so Halm for MSS. _quaevis_, which edd. had changed to _quae a quovis_.

_Repudiari_: the selection depended on the _probabile_ of course, with the Academics. _Veri falsique_: these words were used in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them "the undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere a.s.sertions, as s.e.xt. says, ???? fase? ?s?? fe?eta?

???? fas?? (_A.M._ VII. 315), fase? e? fas?? ep?s?e??seta? (_ib._ 337).

_Cognoscendi initium_: cf. 26, "This I have," the Academic would reply, "in my _probabile_." _Extremum expetendi_: a rather unusual phrase for the ethical _finis_. _Ut moveri non possint_: so ???e?s?a? is perpetually used in s.e.xt. _Est ut opinor_: so Halm after Ernesti for _sit_ of the MSS. I think it very likely that the MSS. reading is right, and that the whole expression is an imitation of the Greek ???a??? e???s?? and the like. The subj. is supported by _D.F._ III. 20, _De Off._ I. 8, _Ad Att._ XIII. 14, 3, where _ut opinor_ is thrown in as here, and by _Ac._ II. 17, _D.F._ III.

21, 24, _N.D._ I. 109, where _si placet_ is appended in a similar way.

----30--36. Summary. With respect to physical science, we might urge that nature has constructed man with great art. His mind is naturally formed for the attainment of knowledge (30). For this purpose the mind uses the senses, and so gradually arrives at virtue, which is the perfection of the reason. Those then who deny that any certainty can be attained through the senses, throw the whole of life into confusion (31). Some sceptics say "we cannot help it." Others distinguish between the absolute absence of certainty, and the denial of its absolute presence.

Let us deal with these rather than with the former (32). Now they on the one hand profess to distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that no absolutely certain method for distinguishing between true and false is possible (33). This is absurd, a thing cannot be known at all unless by such marks as can appertain to no other thing.

How can a thing be said to be "evidently white," if the possibility remains that it may be really black? Again, how can a thing be "evident" at all if it may be after all a mere phantom (34)? There is no definite mark, say the sceptics, by which a thing may be known.

Their "probability" then is mere random guess work (35). Even if they only profess to decide after careful pondering of the circ.u.mstances, we reply that a decision which is still possibly false is useless (36).

--30. _Physicis_: neuter not masc.; cf. I. 6. _Libertatem et licentiam_: _et_ = "and even." _Libertas_ = pa???s?a as often in Tacitus. _Abditis rebus et obscuris_: cf. n. on I. 15, and the word s??es??ase??? s.e.xt.

_Adv. Math._ VII. 26. _Lucem eripere_: like _tollere_ (n. on 26), cf. 38, 103 and _N.D._ I. 6. For the sense see n. on 16, also 61. _Artificio_: this word is used in Cic. as equivalent to _ars_ in all its senses, cf. 114 and _De Or._ II. 83. _Fabricata esset_: the expression is sneered at in 87.

_Quem ad modum primum_: so Halm rightly for MSS. _prima_ or _primo_, which latter is not often followed by _deinde_ in Cicero. _Primum_ is out of position, as in 24. _Appet.i.tio pulsa_: = _mota_, set in motion. For ????

see 24. _Intenderemus_: as in the exx. given in 20. _Fons_: "reservoir,"

rather than "source" here. It will be noted that s???ata?es?? must take place before the ???? is roused. _Ipse sensus est_: an approach to this theory is made in Plat. _Theaet._ 185, 191. Cf. especially s.e.xt. _Adv.

Math._ VII. 350 ?a? ??? e? d?afe?e?? a?t?? t?? a?s??se??, ??? ??? p?e????, ??? de a?t?? e??a? ta? a?s??se?? ... ??? stase?? ???e St?at??. All powers of sensation with the Stoics, who are perhaps imitated here, were included in the ???e??????, cf. n. on I. 38. _Alia quasi_: so Faber for _aliqua_.

"_In vera et aperta part.i.tione nec Cicero nec alius quisquam aliquis--alius dixit, multo minus alius--aliquis_," _M.D.F._ III. 63. Goer. on the other hand says he can produce 50 exx. of the usage, he forbears however, to produce them. _Recondit_: so the e????a? are called ap??e?e?a? ???se??

(Plut. _De Sto. Repug._ p. 1057 a). In s.e.xt. _Adv. Math._ VII. 373 ??? is called ??sa???s?? fa?tas???. _Similitudinibus_: ?a?' ?????s?? s.e.xt.

_Pyrr. Hyp._ II. 75. Cic. uses this word as including all processes by which the mind gets to know things not immediately perceived by sense. In _D.F._ III. 33 it receives its proper meaning, for which see Madv. there, and the pa.s.sages he quotes, "a.n.a.logies" will here best translate the word, which, is used in the same wide sense in _N.D._ II. 22 38. _Construit_: so MSS. Orelli gave _const.i.tuit_. _Not.i.tiae_: cf. 22. Cic. fails to distinguish between the f?s??a? e????a? or ????a? which are the p?????e??, and those e????a? which are the conscious product of the reason, in the Stoic system. Cf. _M.D.F._ III. 21, V. 60, for this and other inaccuracies of Cic. in treating of the same subject, also Zeller 79. _Rerumque_: "facts". _Perfecta_: _sapientia_, _virtus_, _perfecta ratio_, are almost convertible terms in the expositions of Antiocheanism found in Cic. Cf. I.

20.

--31. _Vitaeque constantiam_: which philosophy brings, see 23.

_Cognitionem_: ep?st???. _Cognitio_ is used to translate ?ata????? in _D.F._ II. 16, III. 17, cf. n. on I. 41. _Ut dixi ... dicemus_: For the repet.i.tion cf. 135, 146, and _M.D.F._ I. 41. The future tense is odd and unlike Cic. Lamb. wrote _dicimus_, I would rather read _dicamus_; cf. n. on 29. _Per se_: ?a?' a?t??, there is no need to read _propter_, as Lamb. _Ut virtutem efficiat_: note that virtue is throughout this exposition treated as the result of the exercise of the _reason_. _Evertunt_: cf. _eversio_ in 99. _Animal ... animo_: Cic. allows _animus_ to all animals, not merely _anima_; see Madv. _D.F._ V. 38. The rule given by Forc. s.v. _animans_ is therefore wrong. _Temeritate_: p??pete?a, which occurs _pa.s.sim_ in s.e.xt.

The word, which is constantly hurled at the dogmatists by the sceptics, is here put by way of retort. So in s.e.xt. _Adv. Math._ VII. 260, the sceptic is called e???t?t?? for rejecting the ?ata??pt??? fa?tas?a.

--32. _Incerta_: ad??a. _Democritus_: cf. I. 44. _Quae ... abstruserit_: "_because_ she has hidden." _Alii autem_: note the ellipse of the verb, and cf. I. 2. _Etiam queruntur_: "actually complain;" "go so far as to complain." _Inter incertum_: cf. Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 7, 12, d?af??a? e??a? ad???? ?a? a?ata??pt??, ?a? pa?ta e? e??a? a?ata??pta ??

pa?ta de ad??a (quoted as from Carneades), also 54 of this book. _Docere_: "to prove," cf. n. on 121. _Qui haec distinguunt_: the followers of Carneades rather than those of Arcesilas; cf. n. on I. 45. _Stellarum numerus_: this typical uncertainty is constantly referred to in s.e.xt. e.g.

_P.H_. II. 90, 98, _A.M_. VII. 243, VIII. 147, 317; where it is reckoned among things a?????? e???ta a???s?a?. So in the Psalms, G.o.d only "telleth the number of the stars;" cf. 110. _Aliquos_: contemptuous; ap??e???e????

t??a?. Cf. _Parad._ 33 _agrestis aliquos_. _Moveri_: this probably refers to the speech of Catulus; see Introd. p. 51. Aug. _Cont. Ac._ III. 15 refers to this pa.s.sage, which must have been preserved in the second edition.

--33. _Veri et falsi_: these words Lamb. considered spurious in the first clause, and Halm brackets; but surely their repet.i.tion is pointed and appropriate. "You talk about a rule for distinguishing between the true and the false while you do away with the notion of true and false altogether."

The discussion here really turns on the use of terms. If it is fair to use the term "true" to denote the _probably true_, the Academics are not open to the criticism here attempted; cf. 111 _tam vera quam falsa cernimus_.

_Ut inter r.e.c.t.u.m et pravum_: the sceptic would no more allow the absolute certainty of this distinction than of the other. _Communis_: the apa?a??a?t?? of s.e.xtus; "in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf.

????? fa?tas?a a?????? ?a? ?e?d??? s.e.xt. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410), also 175. _Notam_: the s?e??? of s.e.xtus; cf. esp. _P.H_. II. 97 sq. _Eodem modo falsum_: s.e.xt. _A.M._ VII. 164 (R. and P. 410) ??de?a est?? a?????

fa?tas?a ???a ??? a? ?e???t? ?e?d??. _Ut si quis_: Madv. in an important n.

on _D.F._ IV. 30 explains this thus; _ista ratione si quis ... privaverit, possit dicere_. I do not think our pa.s.sage at all a.n.a.logous to those he quotes, and still prefer to construe _quem_ as a strong relative, making a pause between _quis_ and _quem_. _Visionem_: Simply another trans. of fa?tas?a. _Ut Carneades_: see s.e.xt. _A.M._ VII. 166 t?? te p??a???

fa?tas?a? ?a? t?? p??a??? ?aa ?a? ape??spast?? ?a? d?e??de?e??? (R. and P. 411). As the trans. of the latter phrase in Zeller 524 "probable undisputed and tested" is imperfect, I will give s.e.xtus' own explanation.

The merely p??a?? is that sensation which at first sight, without any further inquiry, seems probably true (s.e.xt. _A.M._ VII. 167--175). Now no sensation is perceived _alone_; the percipient subject has always other synchronous sensations which are able to turn him aside (pe??spa?, pe??e??e??) from the one which is the immediate object of his attention.

This last is only called ape??spast?? when examination has shown all the concomitant sensations to be in harmony with it. (s.e.xt. as above 175--181.) The word "undisputed," therefore, is a misleading trans. of the term. The d?e??de?e?? ("thoroughly explored") requires more than a mere apparent agreement of the concomitant sensations with the princ.i.p.al one.

Circ.u.mstances quite external to the sensations themselves must be examined; the time at which they occur, or during which they continue; the condition of the s.p.a.ce within which they occur, and the apparent intervals between the person and the objects; the state of the air; the disposition of the person's mind, and the soundness or unsoundness of his eyes (s.e.xt.

181--189).

--34. _Communitas_: apa?a??a??a or ep????a t?? fa?tas???; s.e.xt. _A.M._ VII.

403, _P.H._ I. 127. _Proprium_: so s.e.xt. often uses ?d??a, e.g. _A. M._ IX. 410. _Signo notari_: _signo_ for _nota_, merely from love of variety.

The _in_ before _communi_, though bracketed by Halm after Manut., Lamb. is perfectly sound; it means "within the limits of," and is so used after _notare_ in _De Or._, III. 186. _Convicio_: so Madv. _Em._ 143 corrected the corrupt MSS. readings, comparing _Orator_ 160, _Ad Fam._ XV. 18. A.W.

Zumpt on _Pro Murena_ 13 rightly defines the Ciceronian use of the word, "_Non unum maledictum appellatur convicium sed multorum verborum quasi vociferatio_." He is wrong however in thinking that Cic. only uses the word _once_ in the plural (_Ad Att._ II. 18, 1), for it occurs _N.D._ II. 20, and elsewhere. _Perspicua_: e?a???, a term used with varying signification by all the later Greek schools. _Verum illud quidem_: "which is indeed what _they_ call 'true'." _Impressum_: n. on 18. _Percipi atque comprehendi_: Halm retains the barbarous _ac_ of the MSS. before the guttural. It is quite impossible that Cic. could have written it. The two verbs are both trans. of ?ata?aa?es?a?; Cic. proceeds as usual on the principle thus described in _D.F._ III. 14 _erit notius quale sit, pluribus notatum vocabulis idem declarantibus_. _Subtiliter_: Cic.'s constant trans. of a????? or ?at' a???e?a? (_pa.s.sim_ in s.e.xt. e.g. _P.H._ II. 123).

_Inaniterne moveatur_: MSS. agree in _ve_ for _ne_, on which see _M.D.F._ IV. 76. _Inaniter_ = ?e??? = ?e?d??. Cf. n. on I. 35, also II. 47, _D.F._ V. 3 (_inaniter moveri_), _T.D._ IV. 13, _De Div._ II. 120, 126, 140 (_per se moveri_), Greek ?e??pa?e?? (s.e.xt. _P.H._ II. 49), ?e??pa?e?a (= _inanis motus_, s.e.xt. _A.M._ VIII. 184), ?e??pa??ata ?a? a?ap?asata t?? d?a???a?

(_ib._ VIII. 354), d?a?e??? ?e???s?? (_ib._ VII. 241), d?a?e??? fa?tas?a (_ib._ VIII. 67), and the frequent phrase ????a t?? d?a???a?. For the meaning see n. on 47. _Relinquitur_: so in s.e.xt. ap??e?pe?? is constantly used as the opposite of a?a??e?? (_tollere_).

--35. _Neminem_ etc.: they are content to make strong statements without any mark of certainty. _Primo quasi adspectu_: the _merely_ p??a?? fa?tas?a is here meant; see 33.

--36. _Ex circ.u.mspectione_, etc.: the d?e??de?e??; see n. on 33. _Primum quia ... deinde_: for the slight anacoluthia, cf. _M.D.F_ ed. II. p. 796.

_Iis visis_, etc.: i.e. if you have a number of _things_, emitting a number of _appearances_, and you cannot be sure of uniting each _appearance_ to the _thing_ from which it proceeds, then you can have no faith in any _appearance_ even if you have gone through the process required by Carneades' rules. _Ad verum ipsum_: cf. 40. _Quam proxime_: cf. 47, and also 7. _Insigne_: s?e???, the same as _nota_ and _signum_ above. _Quo obscurato_: so Lamb. for MSS. _obscuro_ which Halm keeps. Cf. _quam obscurari volunt_ in 42 and _quo sublato_ in 33. _Argumentum_: Cic. seems to be thinking of the word te??????, which, however, the Stoics hardly use. _Id quod significatur_: t? s?e???t?? in s.e.xt.

----37--40. Summary The distinction of an animal is to act. You must either therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to a.s.sent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the arts and virtue itself, require a firm a.s.sent to be given to some phenomena, he therefore who does away with a.s.sent does away with all action in life (38, 39).

--37. _Explicabamus_: 19--21 and 30 (_quae vis esset in sensibus_).

_Inanimum_: not _inanimatum_, cf. _M.D.F_. IV. 36. _Agit aliquid_: I. 23.

_Quae est in nostra_: Walker's insertion of _non_ before _est_ is needless, cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the a.s.sent given to it, that is involuntary (s.e.xt. _A.M._ VIII. 397 t? e? ?a?

fa?tas?????a? a????t?? ??). For _in potestate_ cf. _De Fato_ 9, _N.D._ I.

69

--38. _Eripitur_: cf. 30. _Neque sentire_: Christ om. _neque_; but the sceptics throughout are supposed to rob people of their senses. _Cedere_: cf. e??e??, e???? in s.e.xt. _P.H._ I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51, t?? de a?s??t???? eta e??e?? ?a? s???ata?ese?? ?????ta? [?a? fa?tas?a]; also 66 of this book. ???e???: cf. 34. _Adsent.i.tur statim_: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before, esp. 20. _Memoriam_: cf. 22. _In nostra potestate_: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the _Ac. Post._, which see.

--39. _Virtus_: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. _Ante videri aliquid_ for the doctrine cf. 25, for the pa.s.sive use of _videri_, n. on 25. _Adsentiatur_: the pa.s.sive use is ill.u.s.trated by Madv. _Em._ 131, the change of construction from infin. to subj. after _necesse est_ on _D.F._ V. 25. _Tollit e vita_: so _De Fato_ 29.

----40--42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different cla.s.ses of sensations. Then they put forward their two strong arguments, (1) _things_ which produce _sensations_ such as might have been produced in the same form by other _things_, cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) _sensations_ must be a.s.sumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real _perceptions_, while the true are always of a form which the false _may_ a.s.sume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions, partly not.

The following two a.s.sertions they strive to prove, (1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an unreality (41). To prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot be given to either cla.s.s (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly known sensation."]

--40. _Quasi fundamenta_: a trans. probably of ?ee???? or the like; cf.

??spe? ?ee???? in s.e.xt. _A.M._ V. 50. _Artem_: method, like te???, cf.

_M.D.F._ III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. _Vim_: the general character which attaches to all fa?tas?a?; _genera_ the different cla.s.ses of fa?tas?a?.

_Totidem verbis_: of course with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition. Carneades largely used the _reductio ad absurdum_ method. _Contineant ... quaestionem_: cf. 22 and _T.D._ IV. 65 _una res videtur causam continere_. _Quae ita_: it is essential throughout this pa.s.sage to distinguish clearly the _sensation_ (_visum_) from the _thing_ which causes it. Here the _things_ are meant; two _things_ are supposed to cause two _sensations_ so similar that the person who has one of the _sensations_ cannot tell from which of the two _things_ it comes.

Under these circ.u.mstances the sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide _things_ into those which can be perceived (known with certainty) and those which cannot. _Nihil interesse autem_: the sceptic is not concerned to prove the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever difference may exist, cf. 85. _Alia vera sunt_: Numenius in Euseb. _Pr. Ev._ XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed that truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of _things_, though not of _sensations_. If we could only pierce _through_ a sensation and arrive at its source, we should be able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to a.s.sume that _sensation_ and _thing_ correspond. Cf. s.e.xt. _P.H._ I. 22 pe?? e?

t?? fa?s?a? t???? ? t???? t? ??p??e?e??? (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) ??de?? ?s?? af?s?te?, pe?? de t?? e? t????t?? est??

??p???? fa??eta? ??te?ta?. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever denied, as some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do not give us correct information about them.

_Eiusdem modi_: cf. 33 _eodem modo_. _Non posse accidere_: this is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (_D.F._ I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from _recta oratio to obliqua_. Halm with Manut. reads _potest_. Cf. 101.

--41. _Neque enim_: a remark of Lucullus' merely. _Quod sit a vero_: cf.