He asks the question so often asked before, How can multiplicity come from unity? And after giving Ibn Sina's scheme of the emanation of the Intelligences one after the other, and criticizing it in the manner of Gazali and Maimonides, he gives his own solution that the variety and multiplicity of the world tends to one end, which is the order of the world. And thus are reconciled plurality and unity. (_cf._ Gersonides above, p. 351).[427]

He discusses the question of angels or Intellects, gives the views of the philosophers concerning their nature and number, each being the effect of the superior and the cause of the inferior, and objects to their idea on the ground that these cannot be the same as the Biblical angels, who are messengers of G.o.d to mankind. He then gives his own view that the number of angels is infinite, not as the philosophers say ten or fifty, and that they are not related to each other as cause and effect, but that though they are immaterial Intellects they are individuated and differentiated according to the degree of understanding they have of G.o.d.[428]

In discussing the second fundamental principle, Revelation, Albo argues in the good old fashion that man is the n.o.blest creature of the sublunar world, and the most distinctive and n.o.blest part of man--his form and essence--is the theoretical reason. Hence the purpose of man must be the realization of the theoretical intellect. At the same time, and with little consistency, Albo takes the part of Judah Halevi and Crescas, employing their arguments, without naming them, that the philosophers and the philosophizing theologians are wrong who make human immortality, perfection and happiness depend solely upon intellectual activity. He comes to the conclusion, therefore, that spiritual understanding, which gives perfection of soul when in combination with practice, is not acquisition of ideas but the intention of doing the will of G.o.d in the performance of good deeds, and not that of pleasure or reward.[429]

This being so, it becomes an important question what are the practices which tend to human perfection, and what are those which tend the other way. In general we may conclude, as like desires and rejoices in like, that those deeds which give the soul pleasure before and after performance are good and helpful, while those which cause subsequent pain, regret and sorrow are bad, and tend away from the soul's perfection.

But the criterion of pleasure and pain just suggested is not sufficient as a guide in conduct, for a great deal depends upon a man's temperament. What a hot-blooded man may commend and find pleasure in, the phlegmatic temperament will object to, and will feel discomfort in doing. Besides, as the good deed is always a mean between two extremes, which it is hard to measure precisely; and as the good deed is that which pleases G.o.d, and beyond generalities we cannot tell what does, and what does not please G.o.d, since we do not know his essence, it was necessary for man's sake that G.o.d should reveal his will to mankind through a prophet. Thus Revelation is proved by reason.[430]

This leads to the problem of prophecy, one of the derivative principles of Revelation. The divine influence from which man gets a knowledge of the things pleasing and displeasing to G.o.d, he cannot obtain without the divine will. Instead of magic, divination, and communication with evil spirits and the dead, which the ancient heathen employed in order to learn the future, G.o.d sent prophets to Israel, to tell the people of the will of G.o.d. Foretelling the future was only secondary with them.

Prophecy is a supernatural gift, whether it takes place with the help of the imagination or not. If it were a natural phenomenon dependent upon the intellectual power of the individual and his faculty of imagination, as the philosophers and some Jewish theologians think, there should have been prophets among the philosophers.

Here again we see Albo adopt the view of Halevi and Crescas against the intellectualism of Maimonides and Gersonides. His further cla.s.sification of the grades of prophecy is based upon Maimonides, though Albo simplifies it. Instead of eleven Albo recognizes four grades in all, including that of Moses. The great majority of mankind, he says, stop with the ability to a.n.a.lyze, such as is exhibited in the a.n.a.lysis of things into matter and form, and so on, though not all of them go so far. But there are some few who go farther and are enabled to speak words of wisdom and to sing praises to G.o.d without being able to account for the power. This is the holy spirit ("Ruah ha-Kodesh"). Some go still farther, and through the strength of their reason and imagination they dream true dreams and receive prophecies; though, the imagination having the upper hand, they struggle very hard and tremble and faint, almost losing their soul. This is the first stage of prophecy. The second stage is when the imagination and reason are equal. In that case there is no struggle or fainting. Visions come to the prophet at night in dreams, or in a revery at daytime. The forms that appear are not real, but the meanings they convey are. Such are the figures of women, horses, basket of summer fruit, and so on, in the visions of Zechariah and Amos. The third stage is when the reason gets the better of the imagination and there are no forms or images, but real essences and ideas, like the visions of Ezekiel, which represent real things in the secrets of nature and divinity. The prophet in this stage also hears an angel speaking to him and giving him information of importance to himself or others. In all these cases the will of G.o.d is essential. No preparation can replace it. Finally the fourth stage is reached when the imagination does not come into play at all. In this stage there is no angel or form, and the message comes to the prophet at daytime while he is awake. He hears a voice telling him what he desires to know; and whenever he chooses he can summon this power. Moses alone attained to this final stage. Outside of the prophets, the righteous and the pious have various degrees of power according to the degree of their union with G.o.d. Some can in this way influence the powers of nature to obey them, as a person can, by thinking of food, make his mouth water. So they can by taking thought cause rain and storm. Others can bring down fire from above and revive the dead.

Through the influence of a prophet the gift of prophecy may sometimes rest upon individuals who are themselves unprepared and unworthy.

Witness the revelation on Sinai where the entire people, six hundred thousand in number, were endowed with the spirit of prophecy, and that too of the highest degree, like Moses himself. The prophetic medium reflects the spirit of prophecy on others as a smooth surface reflects the light of the sun upon dark bodies. This is why prophecy is found only in Israel and in Palestine, because the ark and the Tables of Stone, upon which the Shekinah rests, reflect the divine spirit upon those who are worthy and have in them something resembling the contents of the ark, namely, the Torah and the commandments.[431]

Among the true beliefs we have seen (p. 416) that Immutability of the Law is related to the principle of Revelation. Hence this is the place to discuss this question. Can a divine religion change with time or not?

It would seem at first sight that it cannot. For the giver expresses his will in the Law, and his will never changes. The receivers are the same, _i. e._, the same nation, and a nation does not change. Finally the purpose of the Law or religion is to give people true opinions, and these never change.

And yet on further reflection there seems no reason why religion should not change with the change of the recipient, as the physician changes his prescription with the progress of the patient, and as a matter of fact we find that the commandments given to Adam were different from those given to Noah and to Abraham and to Moses. Adam was not allowed to eat meat, Noah was. Abraham was commanded circ.u.mcision. High places were at first permitted and later forbidden. Maimonides makes the immutability of the Law a fundamental dogma, relying upon the commandment, "Thou shalt not add thereto, and thou shalt not diminish therefrom" (Deut. 13, 1). But in the first place the verse refers to changes in the mode of observing the laws; and besides, it says nothing about G.o.d himself changing the Law.

The phrases "an eternal statute," "throughout your generations," "it is a sign for ever," are no proof of the eternity of the Law; for not all commandments have these expressions attached, and this shows rather that the others are subject to change. Besides, the expressions, "for eternity," and so on, are not to be taken absolutely. They are often used to express finite periods of time.

After the Babylonian Exile two changes were made. They changed the characters in which the Bible was written, and the order and names of the months, beginning with Tishri instead of Nisan. There is no reason, therefore, why other laws might not change, too. We need not, then, regard Immutability of the Law as a fundamental dogma with Maimonides.

Hasdai Crescas also cla.s.ses it with true beliefs and not with fundamental principles.

Albo resolves the problem as follows: A matter that is revealed by G.o.d himself cannot be changed by a prophet unless it is changed by G.o.d himself. The first two commandments, "I am the Lord thy G.o.d, &c.," and "Thou shalt not have other G.o.ds, &c.," were heard by the people directly from G.o.d without the intervention of Moses, hence they cannot be changed by any prophet. It follows therefore that the three fundamental dogmas, existence of G.o.d, Revelation and Reward and Punishment can never be changed by a prophet, for they are implied in the first two commandments, which were heard from G.o.d himself. The rest of the commandments, as they were heard from G.o.d through the interpretation of Moses, can be changed by a prophet as a temporary measure. The other laws which were given by Moses may be changed by a later prophet even permanently. But the prophet must be greater than Moses, and he must show this by the greatness, number, publicity and permanence of his miracles, which must excel those of Moses. He must likewise show that he was sent by G.o.d to change the Law, as clearly as Moses proved that he was sent to give it. But it is unlikely that any such prophet will come, for the Torah says that there never was or will be any prophet like Moses.[432]

Before discussing the third fundamental dogma, Albo finds it desirable to dispose first of a few other problems implied by this dogma, one of which, G.o.d's knowledge, was postponed to this place, though it is connected with Revelation, because it cannot well be separated in discussion from the problem of Freedom. Providence is the other related problem, which is derived from the dogma of Reward and Punishment.

There is nothing that is new in Albo's treatment of knowledge and Freedom. He insists like Maimonides that G.o.d must be omniscient, and on the other hand the contingent cannot be denied, and neither can freedom.

He gives the stock arguments, which it is not necessary to reproduce at this late hour. And his solution is that of Maimonides that in G.o.d human freedom and divine Omniscience are reconcilable because G.o.d's knowledge is not our knowledge.[433]

Nor is there anything original in Albo's discussion of the problem of Providence. He recognizes with Maimonides and others that a strong argument against special Providence is the observed inequality between the destinies of men and their apparent merits. And he endeavors in the well worn method to give reasons and explanations for this inequality which will not touch unfavorably G.o.d's justice or his special Providence. The reasons are such as we met before and we shall not repeat them. Albo also gives a few positive arguments to prove the reality of special Providence for man. He sees in various natural and human phenomena evidence of deviation from the merely "natural" as demanded by the principles of Aristotle's Physics or the laws of uniformity. This shows special Providence. Thus the existence of dry earth, the heaviest element, above water, cannot be accounted for by the laws of Physics. The phenomenon of rain cannot be reduced to law, hence it argues will and purpose and Providence. Admonition in dreams is direct evidence of special Providence, and it is scarcely likely that man, who has special equipment above the other animals in his reason, should not also receive special care above that which the lower animals have. Now they are protected in the species, hence man is provided for as an individual.[434]

Having disposed of the auxiliary dogmas, Albo takes up the fundamental principle of Reward and Punishment. He cites various opinions on the subject, which are dependent upon the idea one entertains concerning the nature of the soul. Thus if one holds that the human soul is not different in kind from the animal soul, it follows that as there is no reward and punishment for the animal, there is none for man. And if one regards the human soul as merely a capacity or possibility of intelligence he must necessarily conclude that the soul perishes with the body and there is no spiritual reward and punishment after death.

The only reward there is must therefore be corporeal, during life. On the other hand, our general experience, which brings before us many cases of good men suffering and bad men enjoying prosperity, would seem to argue against corporeal reward and punishment in this world. This taken together with the philosophical opinion that the soul is an immaterial and indestructible substance gives rise to the third view that the only recompense is spiritual after death. None of these views is satisfactory to Albo. The first two because they are based upon an erroneous notion of the soul. All agree, philosophers as well as theologians, that the human soul is different in kind from the soul of the animal; and it is likewise admitted that the human soul is immortal.

His criticism of the third view so far as it is based upon the intellectualist idea that the thing of highest value is intellectual effort, and the only reward is immortality which intellectual activity engenders, is similar to that of Halevi and Crescas in its endeavor to refute this notion and to subst.i.tute for it the religious view that the soul is an independent substance having a capacity for intelligence _in G.o.d's service_. The degree in which a person realizes this service determines his reward and punishment. The argument from experience Albo does not answer here, but we may suppose he regards it as answered by what he said in his discussion of Providence, where he tries to account for the prosperity of the wicked and the adversity of the righteous.

Albo's own view accordingly is that which he also attributes to the Bible that there is a twofold reward, in this world and in the next.

There is still a difference of opinion concerning the nature of the true and ultimate reward, whether it is given to the soul alone, or to body and soul combined in resurrection. He quotes Maimonides's opinion, with whom he agrees, that the real reward is purely spiritual enjoyed by the soul alone. To be sure, after the coming of the Messiah the bodies of the righteous will be resurrected to make known abroad G.o.d's wonders, or to give these people bodily pleasure for the pain they suffered during life, or to give them additional opportunity to acquire perfection so that they may have a greater reward later. But this state of resurrected life will last only for a time, and then all will die again, and the souls will enjoy spiritual life forever.

The other opinion, held by Nachmanides, is that the real and ultimate reward is that of body and soul united to everlasting life. Albo is not satisfied with this view, his objections being among others that if only the perfect are resurrected, the rest will remain without any reward at all, not to mention the difficulty that it is not likely that the human body--a perishable thing--will change into a matter that will last forever.

As to the nature of reward and punishment after death, Albo tells us that reward will consist in the soul's realization that its endeavors in this world were correct, and in the next world it will be prepared to join the spiritual beings, which will give it great joy. The erring soul will find itself in a position where it will still desire the corporeal pleasures of this world, but will not be able to have them for want of corporeal organs. At the same time it will also entertain the other more natural desire of a spiritual substance to join the other spiritual beings in the other world. This feeling too it will not be able to satisfy because of its want of perfection. This division of desires unsatisfied will cause the soul excruciating torture, and this is its punishment.[435]

CONCLUSION

Our task is done. We have now reached the limit we have a.s.signed ourselves. We have traced objectively and with greater or less detail the rationalistic movement in mediaeval Jewry from its beginnings in the ninth and tenth centuries in Babylon among the Karaites and Rabbanites to its decline in Spain and south France in the fifteenth century. We have followed its ascending curve from Saadia through Gabirol, Bahya and Ibn Daud to its highest point in Maimonides, and we likewise traced its descent through Gersonides, Crescas and Albo. We took account of its essential nature as being a serious and conscientious attempt to define a Jewish _Weltanschauung_ in the midst of conflicting claims of religions and philosophies. The Jewish sacred writings had to be studied and made consistent with themselves in regard to certain ethical and metaphysical questions which forced themselves upon the minds of thinking men. In this endeavor it was necessary to have regard to the system of doctrine that was growing up among their Mohammedan neighbors and masters--itself inherited from Greece--and adjust its teachings to those of Judaism. The adjustment took various forms according to the temperament of the adjuster. It embraced the extremes of all but sacrificing one of the two systems of doctrine to the other, and it counted among its votaries those who honestly endeavored to give each claim its due. The system of Judaism was the same for all throughout the period of our investigation, excepting only the difference between Karaites and Rabbanites. This was not the case with the system of philosophic doctrine. There we can see a development from Kalam through Neo-Platonism to Aristotelianism, and we accordingly cla.s.sified the Jewish thinkers as Mutakallimun, Neo-Platonists or Aristotelians, or combinations in varying proportions of any two of the three systems mentioned.

It was not our province to treat of the mystic movement in mediaeval Jewry as it developed in the Kabbalistic works and gained the ground yielded in the course of time by the healthier rationalism. To complete the picture it will suffice to say that as the political and economic conditions of the Jews in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries deteriorated, and freedom and toleration were succeeded by persecution and expulsion, the Jews became more zealous for their own spiritual heritage as distinguished from foreign importations; philosophy and rationalism began to be regarded askance, particularly as experience showed that scientific training was not favorable to Jewish steadfastness and loyalty. In suffering and persecution those who stuck to their posts were as a rule not the so-called enlightened who played with foreign learning, but the simple folk who believed in Torah and tradition in the good old style. The philosophical and the scientific devotees were the first to yield, and many of them abandoned Judaism.[436] Thus it was that mysticism and obscurantism took the place of enlightenment as a measure of self-defence. The material walls of the Ghetto and the spiritual walls of the Talmud and the Kabbala kept the remnant from being overwhelmed and absorbed by the hostile environment of Christian and Mohammedan. The second half of the fourteenth, and the fifteenth century were not favorable to philosophical studies among the Jews, and the few here and there who still show an interest in science and philosophy combine with it a belief in Kabbala and are not of any great influence on the development of Judaism.

Shemtob ben Joseph ibn Shemtob (ab. 1440) author of a work ent.i.tled "Emunot,"[437] is a strong opponent of Greek science and philosophy. He is not content with attacking the lesser lights and extremists like Albalag or Gersonides or Abraham ibn Ezra. He goes to the very fountain-head of Jewish Aristotelianism and holds Maimonides responsible for the heresies which invaded the Jewish camp. He takes up one doctrine after another of the great Jewish philosopher and points out how dangerous it is to the true Jewish faith. Judah Halevi and Nachmanides represent to him the true Jewish att.i.tude. The mysteries of the Jewish faith are revealed not in philosophy but in the Kabbala, which Maimonides did not study, and which he would not have understood if he had studied it, for he had no Kabbalistic tradition.

Unlike Shemtob, his son Joseph ben Shemtob (d. 1480)[438] shows great admiration for Aristotle and Maimonides. But he is enabled to do so by lending credence to a legend that Aristotle in his old age recanted his heretical doctrines, in particular that of the eternity of the world.

Joseph ben Shemtob made a special study of Aristotle's Ethics, to which he wrote a commentary, and endeavored to show that the Stagirite's ethical doctrines had been misunderstood; that the highest good of man and his ultimate happiness are to be sought according to Aristotle not in this world but in the next. It was likewise a misunderstanding, he thinks, when Maimonides and others make Aristotle deny special Providence. True science is not really opposed to Judaism. At the same time he too like his father realizes the danger of too much scientific study, and hence agrees with Solomon ben Adret that the study of philosophy should be postponed to the age of maturity when the student is already imbued with Jewish learning and religious faith.

The son of Joseph, bearing the name of his grandfather, Shemtob ben Joseph (fl. ab. 1461-89), followed in his father's footsteps,[439] and wrote a commentary on the "Guide of the Perplexed" of Maimonides, whom he defends against the attacks of Crescas.

Isaac ben Moses Arama (1420-1494)[440] is the author of a philosophico-homiletical commentary on the Pentateuch ent.i.tled, "Akedat Yizhak," and a small treatise on the relations of philosophy and theology. He was also interested in Kabbala and placed Jewish revelation above philosophy.

Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437-1508),[441] the distinguished Jewish statesman who went with his brethren into exile at the time of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, was a prolific writer on Biblical exegesis and religious philosophy. Though a great admirer of Maimonides, on whose "Guide" he wrote a commentary, and whose thirteen articles of the creed he defended against the strictures of Crescas and Albo, he was nevertheless an outspoken opponent of the rationalistic att.i.tude and has no phrases strong enough for such men as Albalag, Gersonides, Moses of Narbonne and others, whom he denounces as heretics and teachers of dangerous doctrines. He does not even spare Maimonides himself when the latter attempts to identify the traditional "Maase Beres.h.i.t" and "Maase Merkaba" with the Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics (_cf._ above, p.

303 f.), and adopts Kabbalistic views along with philosophic doctrines.

He is neither original nor thoroughly consistent.

His son Judah Leo Abarbanel (1470-1530)[442] is the author of a philosophical work in Italian, "Dialoghi di Amore," (Dialogues of Love), which breathes the spirit of the Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Italy. It is under the influence of Plato and Plotinus and identifies G.o.d with love, which is regarded as the essential principle of all life and activity in the world, including even the inorganic natural processes. There is no attempt made to construct a Jewish philosophy, and though all evidence is against it, some have made it out that Judah Abarbanel was a convert to Christianity.

In the same country, in Italy, Judah ben Yechiel Messer Leon of Mantua[443] (1450-1490) made a name for himself as a student of Cicero and of mediaeval Latin scholasticism. He wrote a rhetoric in Hebrew based upon Cicero and Lactantius, and composed logical works based upon Aristotle's Latin text and Averroes. As an original student of philosophy he is of no importance.

Two members of the Delmedigo family of Crete, Elijah (1460-1498) and Joseph Solomon,[444] are well known as students of philosophy and writers on philosophical and scientific subjects.

Thus the stream of philosophical thought which rose among the Jews in Babylonia and flowed on through the ages, ever widening and deepening its channel, pa.s.sing into Spain and reaching its high water mark in the latter half of the twelfth century in Maimonides, began to narrow and thin out while spreading into France and Italy, until at last it dried up entirely in that very land which opened up a new world of thought, beauty and feeling in the fifteenth century, the land of the Renaissance. Jewish philosophy never pa.s.sed beyond the scholastic stage, and the freedom and light which came to the rest of the world in the revival of ancient learning and the inventions and discoveries of the modern era found the Jews incapable of benefiting by the blessings they afforded. Oppression and gloom caused the Jews to retire within their sh.e.l.l and they sought consolation for the freedom denied them without in concentrating their interests, ideals and hopes upon the Rabbinic writings, legal as well as mystical. There have appeared philosophers among the Jews in succeeding centuries, but they either philosophized without regard to Judaism and in opposition to its fundamental dogmas, thus incurring the wrath and exclusion of the synagogue, or they sought to dissociate Judaism from theoretical speculation on the ground that the Jewish religion is not a philosophy but a rule of conduct. In more recent times Jewry has divided itself into sects and under the influence of modern individualism has lost its central authority making every group the arbiter of its own belief and practice and narrowing the religious influence to matters of ceremony and communal activity of a practical character. There are Jews now and there are philosophers, but there are no Jewish philosophers and there is no Jewish philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY[D]

GENERAL WORKS

SOLOMON MUNK, Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, Paris 1859, pp.

461-511. A brief historical resume of philosophical authors and books.

German translation by Beer, Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden, Leipzig, 1852. English translation by Isidor Kalisch, Philosophy and Philosophical Authors of the Jews, Cincinnati, 1881.

A. SCHMIEDL, Studien uber judische, insonders judisch-arabische Religionsphilosophie, Wien, 1869.

MORITZ EISLER, Vorlesungen uber die judischen Philosophen des Mittelalters (3 parts), Wien, 1870-84.

DAVID KAUFMANN, Geschichte der Attributenlehre in der judischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters von Saadia bis Maimuni, Gotha, 1877.

SIMEON BERNFELD, ??? ????? ,?????? ????????? ????? ??????, Warsaw, 1897.