Some writers do not distinguish between emotions and feelings. Thus, Darwin, in his _Descent of Man_, calls pleasure and pain "emotions."

Marshall (_op. cit._, chapter ii) makes emotions, and even intuitions, "instinct-feelings." Dewey, in his _Ethics_ (p. 251), appears to treat emotions as synonymous with feelings. Gardiner, in his interesting and careful study, _Affective Psychology in Ancient Writers after Aristotle_ (_Psychological Review_. May, 1919), treats of "what are popularly called the feelings, including emotions."

On the other hand, in ethical writings the word, "feelings," very often means no more than pleasure and pain. Thus, _Seth_ (_A Study of Ethical Principles_, p. 63), makes feelings synonymous with pleasure and pain. Muirhead (_Elements of Ethics_, p. 46), says, "by feeling is meant simply pleasure and pain"; and to have "interest" in, he defines as to have pleasure in (p. 46).

This narrowing of the meaning of the word on the part of ethical writers is, perhaps, natural. The hedonistic moralists made pleasure and pain the only ultimate reasonable stimulants to action. Many moralists opposed them (see, later, Chapters XXIV and XXV). So pleasure and pain became "the feelings," _par excellence_. Both Dewey and Alexander sometimes speak as if, by the word "feeling," we meant no more than pleasure and pain. So does Kant.

The modern psychologist sometimes distinguishes pleasure and pain from "agreeableness" and "disagreeableness." Marshall, a high authority on pleasure and pain, refuses to draw the distinction (_op. cit._, Part III. chapter vi). But he also refuses to call pleasure and pain sensations, regarding them as "qualifications of our sensations," like intensity, duration, and the like.

Are pleasures, as pleasures, alike? and are pains, as pains, alike?

Jeremy Bentham refused to distinguish between kinds of pleasures. On the other hand, John Stuart Mill did so (see Chapter XXV in this volume); and S. Alexander, in his work ent.i.tled _Moral Order and Progress_, maintains that pleasures differ in kind, and cannot be compared merely in their intensity (see page 202).

The whole matter is complicated enough, and there is occupation for the most disputatious. But I do not think that these disputes very directly affect the argument of my chapter.

Sec 50. That there is a relation between feeling and action, but that the two are by no means nicely adjusted to each other, has been recognized in many quarters.

Darwin, discussing the mental and moral qualities of man, points out that the satisfaction of some fundamental instincts gives little pleasure, although uneasiness is suffered if they are not satisfied. Seth (_op.

cit._, p. 64) says that feelings "guide" action; and he claims that the energy of a moving idea lies in the feeling which it arouses (p. 70).

On the quant.i.ty of emotion, and its relation to action, see Stephen, The Science of Ethics, ii, iii, 25.

Sec 51. It appears to be repugnant to Green to admit that feeling-- pleasure--can be the direct object of action; and he denies roundly that a sum of pleasures can be made an object of desire and will at all (_Prolegomena to Ethics_, Sec 221; see Sec 113 of this book). Moreover, he maintains, and in this Dewey follows him, that the making of pleasure an object is evidence of the existence of unhealthy desires. I cannot but think this, taken generally, an exaggeration. Of course, what is called "a man of pleasure" is a pretty poor sort of a thing.

Sec 52. In this section I do not touch at all upon the immemorial dispute concerning what has been called "the 'freedom' of the will."

Indeed, I leave it out of this book altogether. The moralist must, I think, a.s.sume that man has natural impulses and is a rational creature.

Those who are interested in the problem above mentioned, may turn to my _Introduction to Philosophy_, chapter xi, Sec 46, where the matter is discussed, and references (in the corresponding note) are given.

Chapter XVI.--The matter of this chapter appears, clear enough, but it may be well to give a few references touching the two conceptions of the functions of Reason.

Men of quite varying views have inclined to the doctrine which appeals to me. I think it is to be gotten out of Hegel. Green, who is much influenced by him, takes, as the rational end of conduct, a "satisfaction on the whole," which implies a harmonization and unification of the desires (see, in this book, Chapter XXVI, Sec 122). Spencer, in his _Study of Sociology_, defines the rational as the consistent.

Stephen, in his _Science of Ethics_, chapter ii, Sec 3, says: "Reason, in short, whatever its nature, is the faculty which enables us to act with a view to the distant and the future." He claims that rationality tends to bring about a certain unity or harmony. Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, (pp. 572-581), says that reason harmonizes the impulses.

The champions of the opposite view are the intuitionists proper--such men as Kant, Reid, Price, even Sidgwick. To judge of their doctrine--they were great men, be it remembered, and worthy of all respect--I suggest that the reader wait until he has read the chapter on _Intuitionism_ in this volume, Chapter XXIII.

5. CHAPTERS XVII TO XIX.--What is said in Chapter XVII seems too obviously true to need comment. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the chapter is not full of plat.i.tudes. But even plat.i.tudes are overlooked by some; and there is some merit in arranging them systematically. Besides, they may serve as a spring-board.

As to Chapter XVIII, I suggest reading chapter vii, of Westermarck's book on _The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_. It is ent.i.tled _Customs and Laws as Expressions of Moral Ideas_.

For Chapter XIX, one may read Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, Part I, chapter vi, where he shows how the mere "group morality" gradually gives place to a wider morality in which the concept of humanity plays a part. In the same work, Part II, chapters i and ii, the author treats of religious or sub-religious ideas as affecting conduct. Compare Westermarck, _op. cit._, chapter xl. See, also, _The Ancient City_, by Fustel de Coulanges.

6. CHAPTERS XX TO XXII.--What is said in Chapter XX may be well reinforced by turning to Hobhouse (_op. cit._), Part I, chapter iii, where he traces the gradual evolution of rational morality in the field of justice. See, also, Westermarck, (_op. cit._) chapters ix and x, i. e., "The Will as the Subject of Moral Judgment and the Influence of External Events," and "Agents under Intellectual Disability." In the last chapter referred to, animals, drunkards, idiots, the insane, etc., come on the stage. The chapter is full of curious information.

In Chapter XXI (Sec 86), I have spoken of the hesitating utterances of moralists touching any duties we may owe to the brutes. I suggest that before anyone dogmatize in detail on this subject he read with some care such a comprehensive work as Miss Washburn's _The Animal Mind_. The book is admirable. Chapters x and xliv of Westermarck's work are instructive and entertaining on this subject. Hegel disposes of the animals rather summarily. See his _Philosophy of Right_, Sec 47.

Sidgwick, _The Methods of Ethics_, Book III, chapter iv, 2, is well worth consulting. See in my own volume, Chapter x.x.x, Sec 141.

For Chapter XXII, I give no references. I appeal only to the common sense of my reader.

7. Chapters XXIII to XXIX.--For the chapters on the Schools of the Moralists, XXIII to XXIX, I shall give briefer notes than I should have given, were the chapters not already so well provided with foot-notes.

So far as the first four of these chapters are concerned, I shall a.s.sume that enough has been said, drawing attention only to two points which concern Chapter XXIII.

It is very interesting to note that one of our best critics of intuitionism, Hemy Sidgwick, was himself an intuitionist. His _Methods of Ethics_ deserves very close attention. Again Intuitions are often spoken of as if they had been shot out of a pistol, and had neither father nor mother. To understand them better it is only necessary to read chapter viii of Dr. H. R. Marshall's little book, _Mind and Conduct_, which shows how difficult it is to mark intuitions off sharply, and to treat them as if they had nothing in common with reason.

Those interested in the ethics of evolution, treated in Chapter XXVII, should not miss reading the fourth chapter of Darwin's _Descent of Man_. Huxley's essay, _Evolution and Ethics_, might be read. The "Prolegomena" to the essay is, however, much more valuable than the essay itself. Spencer's general theory of conduct is best gathered from his _Data of Ethics_, which was reprinted as Part I of his _Principles of Ethics_. The volume by C. M. Williams, ent.i.tled, _A Review of Evolutionary Ethics_, gives a convenient account of a dozen or more writers who have treated of ethics from the evolutionary standpoint. It is well not to overlook what Sidgwick has to say of evolution and ethics; see _The Methods of Ethics_, Book I, chapter ii, Sec 2.

As for Chapter XXVIII, on "Pessimism," it is enough, I think, to refer the reader to Book IV, in Schopenhauer's work on _The World as Will and Idea_. The Book is ent.i.tled _The a.s.sertion and Denial of the Will to Live, where Self-consciousness has been Attained_. See also his supplementary chapters, xlvi, on "The Vanity and Suffering of Life," and xlviii, "On the Doctrine of the Denial of the Will to Live." For the doctrine of von Hartmann, see chapters xiii to xv, in the part of his work ent.i.tled, _The Metaphysic of the Unconscious_.

For the chapter on Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, I shall give but a few references, though the literature on these writers is enormous. The English reader will find T. K. Abbott's translation of Kant's ethical writings a very convenient volume (third edition, London, 1883). The translation of Hegel's _Philosophy of Right_, by S. W. Dyde (1896), I have found good, where I have compared it with the original. The word "Right" in the t.i.tle is unavoidably ambiguous, for the German word means both "right" and "law." Hegel is dealing, in a sense, with both. I have indicated, in a foot-note, that Nietzsche ought to be read in the original. He is a marvellous artist.

Perhaps I should add that Nietzsche will be read with most pleasure by those who do not attempt to find in his works a system of ethics. I recommend to the reader, especially, his three volumes: _The Genealogy of Morals_; _Beyond Good and Evil_; and _Thus Spake Zarathustra_; (New York, 1911).

8. CHAPTERS x.x.x TO x.x.xVI.--I shall not comment on Chapter x.x.x. It is sufficiently interpreted by what has been said earlier in this book. Nor do I think that Chapter x.x.xI needs to be discussed here. I need only say that many moralists have commented upon the negative aspect of the moral law. It will be remembered that the "demon" of Socrates--a dreadful translation--was a negative sign. I do not think that those who have dwelt upon the negative aspect of morality have reflected sufficiently upon the moral organization of society. We are put to school unavoidably as soon as we are born.

I shall not dwell upon Chapters x.x.xII and x.x.xIII. Here I appeal merely to the good sense of the reader.

But Chapter x.x.xIV demands more attention. He who is ignorant of history, and has come into no close contact with the organization and functioning of any state other than his own, is as unfit to pa.s.s judgment upon states generally, as is the man who has never been away from his native village to pa.s.s judgment upon towns generally--towns inhabited by various peoples and situated in different quarters of the globe. His lot may, it is true, happen to be cast in a good village; but how he is to tell that it is good, I cannot conceive. He has no standard of comparison.

Fortunately, his ignorance is not as harmful as it might be. The Rational Social Will, which is penetrated through and through with traditions wiser than the whims of the individual, carries him along upon its broad bosom, and makes decisions for him.

The sociologist and the political philosopher should be consulted, as well as the historian, by one who would make a satisfactory list of books touching the subject of this chapter. But the moralist may be allowed to suggest a few t.i.tles, some of them very old ones. Plato's _Republic_ is fascinating, and Aristotle's _Politics_ is the shrewdest of books. But compare the state as conceived by these men with our notions of a modern democracy! More's _Utopia_ is a delight. To get back to earth and see what _history_ means to a state, and to its const.i.tution and laws, read Sir Henry Maine's _Ancient Law_. States are not made in a day, although, under abnormal conditions, governments may be upset, and new ones set up, within twenty-four hours. After such unhistorical proceedings, one can scarcely expect "fast colors." One or two washings will suffice to show what was there before.

He who has a weakness for the operatic can peruse Rousseau's _Social Contract_ and the _Declaration of the Rights of Man_ published in the great French Revolution. As an antidote, I suggest Bentham's essay on _Anarchical Fallacies_.

But reading will do little good--even historical reading--unless one also thinks. It is wonderful how much knowledge a man may escape, if he is born under the proper star. I once knew an undergraduate in an American university, who attended compulsory chapel for more than three years, and who still thought that the Old Testament was a history of the Ancient Romans.

There is quite too much to say about Chapters x.x.xV and x.x.xVI. The only thing to do is to say nothing. I shall touch upon just one point in each chapter. I venture to beg the teacher, when he treats of International Ethics, to read in cla.s.s, with his students, those pages in which Sir Thomas More describes the principles upon which the Utopians conducted their wars. Remember that Sir Thomas was not merely a statesman, but, by common consent, a learned, a great, and a good man. Mark the reaction of the undergraduate mind.

The one matter upon which I shall comment in Chapter x.x.xVI, is the question of belief as an object of approval or of censure. Westermarck states (_The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, Volume I, chapter viii, p. 216), that neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Church regarded _belief, as such_, as an object of censure. Yet each was willing to punish heresy. The point is most interesting, and I hazard an explanation. The churches were organizations with a definite object.

They made use of reward and punishment. This was reasonable enough, abstractly considered. However, doctrine was the affair of the theologian. Now the theologian, like the philosopher, is a man who a.s.sumes that he is concerned with _proofs_, and with proofs only. If a thing is _proved_, how can a man _help_ believing it? Only if he _will_ not, which is sheer obstinacy or perversity. Let him, then, be punished on account of his defective character (see Westermarck, I, chapter xi, p. 283).

I think the apparent quibbling here can be gotten rid of by recognizing the truth emphasized in Sec Sec 167-168, namely, that logical proofs play but a subordinate part in the adoption or rejection of beliefs touching a vast number of matters both secular and religious. If we can influence men's emotions, we can influence their beliefs. Both State and Church have this power. It is a power that can be abused. But it is, on the whole, a good thing that men's beliefs can thus be influenced. There would be no stability in human society could they not. Every ignorant man--and many men are ignorant--would be at the mercy of every clever talker; and he would change his beliefs every day. As men act on beliefs, this means that he would zig-zag through life to the detriment of all orderly development. I beg the reader, learned or unlearned, to put aside prepossessions, and to look at things as they are in this field.