I can well recall the scene. We were on some high ground which was intersected by rocky ravines and sandhills. Just below where we stood was the village, into which the enemy were putting a good many sh.e.l.ls, and beyond it lay the line of the Pet.i.t Morin stream with its wooded, shelving banks, upon which the enemy was holding a strong rearguard position on the further bank.

The 5th Brigade was brought up in support of the 4th, and the heavy artillery were got into action. The crossing of the river at this point was stoutly opposed for a considerable time; but the pa.s.sage of it, when secured, was much a.s.sisted by the cavalry and the 1st Division, which had effected a crossing some way higher up.

The detailed story of this great fight is worth the telling.

Approaching the river on a fairly wide front, on the right of the 1st Corps was the 1st Guards Brigade with a troop of the 15th Hussars, some Cyclists, the 23rd Field Co., R.E., and the 26th Brigade, R.F.A., which, under General Maxse, formed the advance guard to the 1st Division in its advance from Jouy-sur-Morin to Ba.s.sevelle. A French Cavalry Division was operating on our right and front, covered by our Cavalry Division.

At 9.15 a.m. a French cavalry officer reported to Maxse that French cavalry was in occupation of the heights to the north of Bellot. At 9.30 a.m. the 1st Batt. Black Watch and one battery of the 26th Brigade, R.F.A., had reached Bellot village, and the main guard was approaching the village through a ravine, when a battery of the enemy's horse artillery opened fire on the column from high ground near Fontaine St. Robert. The fire was quickly silenced by French horse artillery guns which co-operated with our 26th Brigade. The casualties were remarkably low considering the circ.u.mstances.

An alarming report reached General Maxse that a brigade of French cavalry was cooped up in Bellot exposed to artillery fire, and that a large force of German infantry was advancing southwards through the woods to attack them. This somewhat delayed the further advance of our troops.

It was 10.40 a.m. when Colonel Grant Duff advanced to seize and picket the heights north of the valley of the Pet.i.t Morin and to safeguard the advance of the column down the valley to Sablonnieres. This main guard crossed the Pet.i.t Morin at 11 a.m., and shortly afterwards the advance guard was in contact with some 250 of the enemy's jager of the Guard in the thick woods north of the ravine.

Some close fighting ensued, during which the Black Watch and Cameron Highlanders suffered casualties. The enemy lost some 50 killed and 50 wounded. Subsequently the advance was continued northwards on Hondevilliers, the 1st Guards Brigade advancing on the east and the 3rd Brigade on the west of the ravine. Advanced troops reached Ba.s.sevelle. The 43rd Howitzer Brigade and 26th Heavy Battery were engaged in supporting the advance of the 2nd Division during the day.

On the left the 4th (Guards) Brigade and the 41st Brigade, R.F.A., under Lieutenant-Colonel Lushington, R.F.A., formed the advanced guard to the 2nd Division moving from St. Simeon _via_ Rebais and La Tretoire.

When the vanguard of the 3rd Coldstream Guards had just pa.s.sed La Tretoire, sh.e.l.l fire was opened on them from the high ground round Boitron.

The enemy's guns did not remain long in action; but the crossing was held by the enemy, who had a machine-gun battery. The valley is closely wooded, and the machine guns were so well placed that, whenever our infantry came into action, they were met by a heavy fire from these guns. The other battalions were brought up one by one to support the 3rd Coldstream Guards; two guns were placed at the bend in the road just north of La Tretoire, and howitzers were also brought up north of that village.

At 12 noon the Worcestershire Regt. was sent to a.s.sist the 4th (Guards) Brigade, and moved _via_ La Tretoire--Launoy--N. of Ruine--Moulin Neuf, to force the pa.s.sage of the river at Le Gravier, and to work up stream to a.s.sist the Guards Brigade.

By 1.30 p.m. the bridge had been seized by the Worcestershire Regt., who captured about 30 prisoners in the farm by the bridge. The 2nd Grenadier Guards also managed to cross at La Forge.

The enemy retired, leaving a good many dead and two machine guns in our hands.

An advance was then made to the north of Boitron church, where the Divisional Artillery came into action.

The Connaught Rangers were despatched to work down the right bank to a.s.sist the pa.s.sage of the 3rd Division. They encountered some opposition at Le Moulin du Pont, but pushed on to near Orly, where they found the 3rd Division already across the river.

At 2.30 p.m. the Grenadiers and 2nd Batt. Coldstream Guards were sent northwards to protect the front, whilst the Highland Light Infantry were sent towards Bussieres to endeavour to cut off the enemy's retreat.

The remainder of the 5th Infantry Brigade were engaged with small bodies of the enemy in the woods north-east of the Becherelle--Maison Neuve road, but the Brigadier-General withdrew his three battalions, fearing they would fire on the 4th Brigade and Highland Light Infantry, and they reached Boitron about 5 p.m., except one company of the Connaught Rangers, which worked through the woods and emerged at Le Cas Rouge, and claimed to have headed off some German stragglers.

Meanwhile, at about 4.30 p.m. the enemy made a counter-attack with machine guns against our gun position from the woods north-west of Boitron church. This was dealt with by the Guards Brigade. The 3rd Coldstream Guards and Irish Guards made a direct attack, whilst the 2nd Coldstream Guards swung round against the enemy. The whole machine-gun battery of five guns surrendered with 100 personnel.

I then went to Smith-Dorrien, whose Headquarters were at Doue. His corps had then forced the pa.s.sage of the river, but had encountered severe opposition in doing so.

I found the 3rd Corps on the left advancing well at all points, driving the enemy before them and inflicting considerable loss all along the line. Pulteney was in touch with the 8th French Division on his left; and Gough, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (4th Hussars, 5th Lancers, and 16th Lancers), was successfully engaged all the morning on the left flank. There appeared to be a considerable force of the enemy in the woods lying to the south of Lizy, north of the Marne, and later reports stated that some 90 German guns were deployed there against the right flank of the 6th French Army.

I impressed on Pulteney the necessity for pushing on to the utmost of his ability in aid of the 6th Army. It looked as if he would have considerable opposition at Changis and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. The Germans retiring over the Marne at the latter place occupied the town in strength and blew up the bridge.

Although the 3rd Corps were not able to pa.s.s the Marne till daybreak on the 10th, there could be no doubt that the vigour of Pulteney's attack took considerable pressure off the right of the 6th French Army. The British troops fought all along the line with splendid spirit, energy, and determination, and they were skilfully handled and led.

From what I could observe, however, it seemed to me that the infantry were not in a wide enough formation, and perhaps in some cases the field artillery were not pushed far enough forward. I called attention to these points in the following Memorandum, which was issued on the 10th:--

"The latest experiences have shown that the enemy never neglects an opportunity to use all his available artillery in forward positions under cover of cavalry and other mobile troops.

"Our cavalry is now organised in two Divisions, the first of three, the second of two Brigades, each with a Brigade of Horse Artillery. During the present phase of the operations--which consist of as rapid a pursuit and pressure of the enemy as possible in his retreat--two Corps will generally be in first line. A Cavalry Division will be directed to work on the front and flank of either Corps and well in advance. The Commander of the cavalry will remain in the closest concert with the Corps Commanders on the flank on which he is working.

"The Corps Commanders will send forward with the cavalry as much of their field artillery as can be usefully employed in hara.s.sing the enemy's retirement. They will place them under the direction of the Cavalry Commander for the day, the latter officer being responsible for their safety.

"When, owing to the approach of darkness, the field artillery can no longer find useful targets, they will be withdrawn from the cavalry back to the Division to which they belong. Should the enemy make any decided stand during such operations and a general action arise or become imminent, the field artillery in the front will either fall back or retain their position, at the discretion of the Corps Commander, and again come under their Divisional Commander.

"The withdrawal from under the supervision of the Cavalry Commander will always remain at the discretion of the Corps Commander.

"I wish to call the attention of Corps Commanders to the necessity of warning their infantry against what is known as 'bunching up.' Losses and delay in overcoming rearguards resistance during the present phase of the operations have undoubtedly been caused by this.

"Instances have also occurred when undue delay in effecting the pa.s.sage of a river has been caused by a failure to realise the nature of the problem from the purely local standpoint.

"Small flanking parties, crossing at unguarded points by hastily improvised means, will dislodge hostile infantry and Maxims much more quickly and effectively than by frontal attacks, however powerfully supported by artillery."

On the night of the 9th and 10th, the 3rd Corps occupied La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and the left bank of the Marne, but were unable to cross, and our left ran roughly eastward through Bussieres and Boitron to Hondevilliers.

In all the villages which the enemy had so hastily occupied and evacuated, there was evidence of violent damage and looting.

At La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Doue, and Rebais, there were signs of great disorder and lack of discipline.

At daybreak on the 9th the advance on the Marne was continued. My Headquarters were now at Coulommiers, where a number of Air reports were received early in the day. They seemed to show that the powerful German battery of 90 guns which had been located on the previous day in Lizy had been withdrawn, and that the enemy in front of the 5th French Army was somewhat reduced. The front of the 5th French Army was apparently clear up to the Marne.

A considerable concentration of Germans was said to be between Chateau-Thierry and Marigny, but as the large columns in the rear were seen to be marching north, this looked only like a strong rearguard.

The following orders were issued to the troops at 7-30 p.m. on the 8th:--

"General Headquarters, "September 8th, 1914.

"1. The enemy are continuing their retreat northwards and our Army has been successfully engaged during the day with their rearguards on the Pet.i.t Morin, thereby materially a.s.sisting the progress of the French Armies on our right and left, which the enemy have been making great efforts to oppose.

"2. The Army will continue the advance north to-morrow at 5 a.m., attacking rearguards of the enemy wherever met. The Cavalry Division will act in close a.s.sociation with the 1st Corps and gain touch with the 5th French Army on the right. Gen. Gough, with the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades, will act in close a.s.sociation with the 2nd Corps and gain touch with the 6th French Army on the left.

"3. Roads are allotted as follows:--

"_1st Corps._

"Eastern road, Sablonnieres--Hondevilliers--Nogent--l'Artaud--Saulchery, eastern side of Charly-sur-Marne.

"Western road: La Tretoire--Boitron--Pavant--western side of Charly--Villiers-sur-Marne--Domptin--Coupru; both inclusive.

"_2nd Corps._

"Western road: St. Ouen--Saacy--Mery--Montreuil inclusive, and all roads between this and western road of 1st Corps exclusive.

"_3rd Corps._

"Western road: La Ferte-sous-Jouarre--Dhuisy; western road of 2nd Corps exclusive.