I despatched a letter to Lord Kitchener on this day, in which the following pa.s.sage occurs:--

"I feel very seriously the absolute necessity for retaining in my hands complete independence of action and power to retire towards my base should circ.u.mstances render it necessary."

On this day Pulteney arrived, and the formation of the 3rd Army Corps under his command was commenced forthwith. It was composed of the 4th Division and the 19th Brigade, with some mounted troops temporarily attached, pending the arrival of the 6th Division, which had now been ordered to France.

On the morning of the 31st, Headquarters were moved to Dammartin.

After riding round to see whatever troops I could, we reached there early in the afternoon. Huguet was waiting for me with more information and messages from Joffre. The demand that we should stand and fight was not only urgently repeated, but was actually backed by imperative messages from the French President, and from Lord Kitchener and the British Government, yet at this very moment Lanrezac was actually throwing back the left flank of the 5th Army and widening the gap between us. At the same time Lord Kitchener was a.s.suring the Home Government that our losses were comparatively small, and that all deficiencies had been made good.

I retain the most profound belief that, had I yielded to these violent solicitations, the whole Allied Army would have been thrown back in disorder over the Marne, and Paris would have fallen an easy prey into the hands of the Germans.

It is impossible to exaggerate the danger of the situation as it existed. Neither on this day nor for several subsequent days did one man, horse, gun, or machine gun reach me to make good deficiencies.

I refused. This brought Lord Kitchener to Paris, where I met him on September 1st at the British Emba.s.sy. I went there with my Chief of Staff at his urgent request, regarding him as a representative of His Majesty's Government.

I deeply resented being called away from my Headquarters at so critical a time. Two important actions were fought by considerable detachments of the Army under my command during this day, over which there was no one to exercise any co-ordinating control. Either might have easily brought on a general engagement.

The interview had one important result. M. Millerand (the War Minister) and M. Viviani (the Prime Minister) were present at the Conference, and before them all I was able to give a clear exposition of my views as to the future conduct of the Allied operations.

M. Millerand undertook to lay this doc.u.ment before General Joffre at once. This great statesman and invaluable servant of his country occupied the post of War Minister during most of the time I was in France. His invariable kindness and courtesy, coupled with his skilful and astute appreciation of the military situation throughout all its difficult and varying periods, will always be gratefully remembered by me.

The result of my proposals will be the better understood if I quote General Joffre's reply to the War Minister, and a personal letter which I received from the Commander-in-Chief on the same subject.

"Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est, Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.

"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Ministre de la Guerre.

"J'ai recu les propositions du Marechal French que vous avez voulu me communiquer; elles tendent a organiser sur la Marne une ligne de defense qui serait tenue par des effectifs suffisamment denses en profondeur et particulierement renforces derriere le flanc gauche.

"Les emplacements actuels de la Ve Armee ne permettent pas de realiser le programme trace par le Marechal French et d'a.s.surer a l'Armee Anglaise, en temps voulu, une aide efficace sur la droite.

"Par contre, l'appui de l'Armee du General Maunoury qui doit se porter a la defense des fronts Nord-Est de Paris est toujours a.s.sure a l'Armee Anglaise sur la gauche; celle-ci pourrait, dans ces conditions, tenir sur la Marne pendant quelque temps, puis se retirer sur la rive gauche de la Seine qu'elle tiendrait de Melun a Juvisy; les forces Anglaises participeraient ainsi a la defense de la capitale et leur presence serait pour les troupes du camp retranche un precieux reconfort.

"Je dois ajouter que des instructions viennent d'etre donnees aux Armees en vue de coordonner leurs mouvements, et qu'il pourrait etre desavantageux de modifier ces instructions. Elles tendent a placer nos troupes dans un dispositif leur permettant de prendre l'offensive dans un delai a.s.sez rapproche. Le date de leur mouvement en avant sera communique au Marechal French afin de permettre a l'Armee Anglaise de participer a l'offensive generale."

"Grand Quartier General des Armees de l'Est, etat Major, Au G.Q.G. le 2 septembre 1914.

"Le General Commandant-en-Chef a M. le Marechal French, Commandant-en-Chef les Forces Anglaises.

"Monsieur le Marechal,

"J'ai l'honneur de vous addresser mes remerciements pour les propositions que vous avez bien voulu soumettre au Gouvernement de la Republique, relatives a la co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise et qui m'ont ete communiquees.

"La situation actuelle de la 5e Armee ne permet pas a cette Armee d'a.s.surer a l'Armee Anglaise un appui suffisamment efficace sur la droite.

"En raison des evenements qui se sont pa.s.ses depuis deux heures, je ne crois pas possible actuellement d'envisager une manoeuvre d'ensemble sur la Marne avec la totalite de nos forces. Mais j'estime que la co-operation de l'Armee Anglaise a la defense de Paris est la seule qui puisse donner un resultat avantageux dans les conditions exposees par la lettre ci-jointe que j'adresse a M. le Ministre de la Guerre et dont j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir la copie.

"Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Marechal, l'expression de ma haute consideration et mes sentiments de cordiale camaraderie."

I replied as follows:--

"Mortcerf, "September 3rd, 1914, 12 noon.

"To the Commandant-en-Chef from Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces.

"Dear General,

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your very kind and cordial letter of September 2nd (3332).

"I felt some considerable hesitation in putting forward my views as to the general trend of the future operations, and I am much indebted to you for the kind and friendly support which you have accorded to my expression of opinion.

"I have now received your 'Instruction No. 4' and your 'Note pour les Commandants d'Armee' of September 2nd, and I completely and clearly understand your plans and the part you desire me to take in carrying them out.

"You may rely on my most cordial co-operation in every respect.

"My troops have very much appreciated the kind consideration you have shown them in sending so many decorations for distribution.

(Signed) "FRENCH."

I touch with some diffidence on less agreeable features of this memorable discussion in Paris.

Lord Kitchener arrived on this occasion in the uniform of a Field Marshal, and from the outset of his conversation a.s.sumed the air of a Commander-in-Chief, and announced his intention of taking the field and inspecting the troops.

On hearing this, the British Amba.s.sador (Sir Francis, now Lord, Bertie) at once emphatically objected, and drafted a telegram to the Foreign Secretary stating clearly and unmistakably his views, and demanding instructions. He gave this despatch to Lord Kitchener to read. The latter then asked for my opinion, and I said my views on the subject coincided entirely with those of the Amba.s.sador.

After some discussion, the Secretary of State decided to abandon his intention, and the telegram to Sir Edward Grey was not sent. In the conversation which followed between us all, Lord Kitchener appeared to take grave exception to certain views which I expressed as to the expediency of leaving the direction of the operations in the field in the hands of the military chiefs in command in the field.

He abruptly closed the discussion and requested me to accompany him for a private interview in another room.

When we were alone he commenced by entering a strong objection to the tone I a.s.sumed. Upon this I told him all that was in my mind. I said that the command of the British Forces in France had been entrusted to me by His Majesty's Government; that I alone was responsible to them for whatever happened, and that on French soil my authority as regards the British Army must be supreme until I was legally superseded by the same authority which had put that responsibility upon me. I further remarked that Lord Kitchener's presence in France in the character of a soldier could have no other effect than to weaken and prejudice my position in the eyes of the French and my own countrymen alike. I reminded him of our service in the field together some 13 years before, and told him that I valued highly his advice and a.s.sistance, which I would gladly accept as such, but that I would not tolerate any interference with my executive command and authority so long as His Majesty's Government chose to retain me in my present position. I think he began to realise my difficulties, and we finally came to an amicable understanding.

Important telegrams and messages were then brought me, and I told Lord Kitchener that it was impossible for me to absent myself any longer from my Headquarters, whither I at once repaired with all possible speed.

It is very difficult for any but soldiers to understand the real bearing and significance of this Paris incident. If the confidence of the troops in their commander is shaken in the least degree, or if his influence, power and authority are prejudiced by any display of distrust in his ability to conduct operations, however slight the indications of such distrust may be, the effect reacts instantly throughout the whole Army. This is more than ever true with troops which, as at the moment in question, were being subjected to great and severe demands upon their courage, endurance, and, above all, _faith in their leaders_.

Then again there was the effect which might have been produced on the French. Ministers and Generals were present and witnessed Lord Kitchener's apparent a.s.sertion of his right to exercise the power and authority of a Commander-in-Chief in the Field.

Fortunately, the incident terminated in a manner which led to no regrettable publicity. Lord Kitchener realised his mistake and left Paris that night.

I did not reach my Headquarters at Dammartin until about 7 in the evening of September 1st. Two important rearguard actions had been fought during the day, one at Nery--where Captain Bradbury was killed, whilst "L" battery fought heroically against overwhelming odds--and the other at Villers-Cotterets.

The proximity of the enemy, and the close presence of detachments of hostile cavalry with guns, which had broken through our line, required the retirement of my Headquarters to Lagny on the Marne. As it was necessary to move with precaution, this place was not reached until 1 a.m. on the 2nd.

I have already reproduced the communications from General Joffre under date September 2nd, in connection with the Paris interview on the 1st.

Although I did not receive these doc.u.ments until late on the 2nd, they indicated the ideas which occupied my own mind on that day, namely, the defence of the Marne with a view to a subsequent offensive.