In the daharavidya (Ch. Up. VIII, 1 ff.) the text, 'those who depart having known here the Self, and those true desires,' declares at first a meditation on the small ether, i.e. the highest Self, and separately therefrom a meditation on its qualities, viz. true desires, and so on.

The doubt here arises whether, in the meditation on those qualities, the meditation on the highest Self--as that to which the qualities belong-- is to be repeated or not.--It is not to be repeated, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the highest Self is just that which is const.i.tuted by the qualities--freedom from all evil, and so on--and as that Self so const.i.tuted can be comprised in one meditation, there is no need of repeating the meditation on account of the qualities.--This view the Sutra sets aside. The meditation has to be repeated. The highest Self indeed is that being to which alone freedom from evil and the other qualities belong, and it forms the object of the first meditation; yet there is a difference between it as viewed in its essential being and as viewed as possessing those qualities; and moreover, the clause 'free from evil, from old age,' &c. enjoins a meditation on the Self as possessing those qualities. It is therefore first to be meditated on in its essential nature, and then there takes place a repet.i.tion of the meditation on it in order to bring in those special qualities. The case is a.n.a.logous to that of 'the offerings.' There is a text 'He is to offer a purodasa on eleven potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the supreme ruler, to Indra the self-ruler.' This injunction refers to one and the same Indra, possessing the qualities of rulership and so on; but as, through connexion with those several qualities, the aspects of Indra differ, the oblation of the purodasa has to be repeated. This is declared in the Sankarshana, 'The divinities are different on account of separation.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'offerings.'

43. On account of the plurality of indicatory marks; for that (proof) is stronger. This also is declared (in the Purva Mimamsa).

The Taittiriyaka contains another daharavidya, 'The thousand-headed G.o.d, the all-eyed one,' &c. (Mahanar. Up. XI). Here the doubt arises whether this vidya, as being one with the previously introduced vidya, states qualities to be included in the meditation enjoined in that vidya, or qualities to be included in the meditations on the highest Self as enjoined in all the Vedanta-texts.--The former is the case, the Purvapakshin holds, on account of the leading subject-matter. For in the preceding section (X) the meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-matter. 'There is the small lotus placed in the middle of the town (of the body), free from all evil, the abode of the Highest; within that there is a small s.p.a.ce, free from sorrow--what is within that should be meditated upon' (Mahanar. Up. X, 23). Now, as the lotus of the heart is mentioned only in section X, the 'Narayana-section'

('the heart resembling the bud of a lotus, with its point turned downwards,' XI, 6), we conclude that that section also is concerned with the object of meditation to which the daharavidya refers.--Against this view the Sutra declares itself, 'on account of the majority of indicatory marks'; i.e. there are in the text several marks proving that that section is meant to declare characteristics of that which const.i.tutes the object of meditation in all meditations on the highest being. For that being which in those meditations is denoted as the Imperishable, Siva, Sambhu. the highest Brahman, the highest light, the highest ent.i.ty, the highest Self, and so on, is here referred to by the same names, and then declared to be Narayana. There are thus several indications to prove that Narayana is none other than that which is the object of meditation in all meditations on the Highest, viz. Brahman, which has bliss and the rest for its qualities. By 'linga' (inferential mark) we here understand clauses (vakya) which contain a specific indication; for such clauses have, according to the Purva Mimamsa, greater proving power than leading subject-matter (prakarana). The argumentation that the clause 'the heart resembling the bud of a lotus flower,' &c., proves that section to stand in a dependent relation to the daharavidya, is without force; for it being proved by a stronger argument that the section refers to that which is the object of meditation in all meditations, the clause mentioned may also be taken as declaring that in the daharavidya also the object of meditation is Narayana. Nor must it be thought that the accusatives with which the section begins (sahasrasirsham, &c.) are to be connected with the 'meditating' enjoined in the previous section; for the 'meditating' is there enjoined by a gerundive form ('tasmin yad antas tad upasitavyam'), and with this the subsequent accusatives cannot be construed. Moreover, the subsequent clause ('all this is Narayana,' &c., where the nominative case is used) shows that those accusatives are to be taken in the sense of nominatives.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the plurality of indicatory marks.'

44. There is option with regard to what precedes (i.e. the altar made of bricks) on account of subject-matter, and hence there is action; as in the case of the manasa cup.

In the Vajasaneyaka, in the Agnirahasya chapter, there are references to certain altars built of mind, 'built of mind, built of speech,' &c. The doubt here arises whether those structures of mind, and so on, which metaphorically are called fire-altars, should be considered as being of the nature of action, on account of their connexion with a performance which itself is of the nature of action; or merely of the nature of meditation, as being connected with an activity of the nature of meditation. The Sutra maintains the former view. Since those things 'built of mind, and so on,' are, through being _built_ (or _piled _up), const.i.tuted as fire-altars, they demand a performance with which to connect themselves; and as in immediate proximity to them no performance is enjoined, and as the general subject-matter of the section is the fire-altar built of bricks--introduced by means of the clause 'Non-being this was in the beginning'---which is invariably connected with a performance of the nature of outward action, viz. a certain sacrificial performance--we conclude that the altars built of mind, &c., which the text mentions in connexion with the same subject-matter, are themselves of the nature of action, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar built of bricks. [FOOTNOTE 668:1]. An a.n.a.logous case is presented by the so-called _mental_ cup. On the tenth, so-called avivakya, day of the Soma sacrifice extending over twelve days, there takes place the mental offering of a Soma cup, all the rites connected with which are rehea.r.s.ed in imagination only; the offering of that cup is thus really of the nature of thought only, but as it forms an auxiliary element in an actual outward sacrificial performance it itself a.s.sumes the character of an action.

[FOOTNOTE 668:1. So that for the actual outward construction of a brick altar there may optionally be subst.i.tuted the merely mental construction of an imaginary altar.]

45. And on account of the transfer.

That the altar built of thought is an optional subst.i.tute for the altar built of bricks, and of the nature of an action, appears therefrom also that the clause 'of these each one is as great as that previous one,'

explicitly transfers to the altars of mind, and so on, the powers of the previous altar made of bricks. All those altars thus having equal effects there is choice between them. The altars of mind, and so on, therefore are auxiliary members of the sacrificial performance which they help to accomplish, and hence themselves of the nature of action.-- Against this view the next Sutra declares itself.

46. But it is a meditation only, on account of a.s.sertion and what is seen.

The altars built of mind, and so on, are not of the nature of action, but of meditation only, i.e. they belong to a performance which is of the nature of meditation only. For this is what the text a.s.serts, viz.

in the clauses 'they are built of knowledge only,' and 'by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.' As the energies of mind, speech, sight, and so on, cannot be piled up like bricks, it is indeed a matter of course that the so-called altars constructed of mind, and so on, can be mental constructions only; but the text in addition specially confirms this by declaring that those altars are elements in an activity of purely intellectual character, and hence themselves mere creatures of the intellect. Moreover there is seen in the text a performance consisting of thought only to which those fires stand in a subsidiary relation, 'by the mind they were established on hearths, by the mind they were built up, by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat; by the mind they chanted, and by the mind they recited; whatever rite is performed at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial rite there is, that, as consisting of mind, was performed by the mind only, on those (fire- altars) composed of mind, built up of mind.' From this declaration, that whatever sacrificial rite is actually performed in the case of fire- altars built of bricks is performed mentally only in the case of altars built of mind, it follows that the entire performance is a mental one only, i.e. an act of meditation.--But, an objection is raised, as the entire pa.s.sus regarding the altars of mind does not contain any word of injunctive power, and as the text states no special result (from which it appears to follow that the pa.s.sus does not enjoin a new independent performance), we must, on the strength of the fact that the leading subject-matter is an actual sacrificial performance as suggested by the altars built of brick, give up the idea that the altars built of mind, &c., are mental only because connected with a performance of merely mental nature.--This objection the next Sutra refutes.

47. And on account of the greater strength of direct statement, and so on, there is no refutation.

The weaker means of proof, const.i.tuted by so-called leading subject- matter, cannot refute what is established by three stronger means of proof--direct statement, inferential mark, and syntactical connexion-- viz. that there is an independent purely mental performance, and that the altars made of mind are parts of the latter. The direct statement is contained in the following pa.s.sage, 'Those fire-altars indeed are built of knowledge,'--which is further explained in the subsequent pa.s.sage, 'by knowledge alone these altars are built for him who knows this'--the sense of which is: the structures of mind, and so on, are built in connexion with a performance which consists of knowledge (i.e.

meditation).--The inferential mark is contained in the pa.s.sage, 'For him all beings at all times build them, even while he is asleep.' And the syntactical connexion (vakya) consists in the connexion of the two words evamvide (for him who knows this), and kinvanti (they build)--the sense being: for him who accomplishes the performance consisting of knowledge all beings at all times build those altars. The proving power of the pa.s.sage above referred to as containing an indicatory mark (linga) lies therein that a construction mentally performed at all times by all beings cannot possibly connect itself with a sacrificial performance through the brick-altar, which is constructed by certain definite agents and on certain definite occasions only, and must therefore be an element in a mental performance, i.e. a meditation.--The next Sutra disposes of the objection that the text cannot possibly mean to enjoin a new mental performance, apart from the actual performance, because it contains no word of injunctive force and does not mention a special result.

48. On account of connexions and the rest, as in the case of the separateness of other cognitions. And this is seen (elsewhere also); as declared (in the Purva Mimamsa).

That the text enjoins a meditative performance different from the actual performance of which the brick-altar is a const.i.tuent element, follows from the reasons proving separation, viz. _the connexions_. i.e. the things connected with the sacrifice, such as the Soma cups, the hymns, the recitations, and so on. What is meant is that the special mention of the cups, and so on, made in the pa.s.sage 'by the mind the Soma cups were drawn thereat,' proves the difference of the performance.--The 'and the rest' of the Sutra comprises the previously stated arguments, viz.

direct statement, and so on. 'As other meditations,' i.e. the case is a.n.a.logous to that of other meditations such as the meditation on the small ether within the heart, which are likewise proved by textual statement, and so on, to be different and separate from actual outward sacrificial performances.--The existence of a separate meditative act having thus been ascertained, the requisite injunction has to be construed on the basis of the text as it stands.

Such construction of injunctions on the basis of texts of arthavada character is seen in other places also; the matter is discussed in Pu.

Mi. Sutras III, 5, 21.--The result of the meditative performance follows from the pa.s.sage 'of these (altars made of mind, and so on) each is as great as that former one (i.e. the altar built of bricks)'--for this implies that the same result which the brick-altar accomplishes through the sacrifice of which it forms an element is also attained through the altars made of mind, and so on, through the meditations of which they form parts.--The next Sutra disposes of the argumentation that, as this formal transfer of the result of the brick-altar to the altars built of mind, and so on, shows the latter to possess the same virtues as the former, we are bound to conclude that they also form const.i.tuent elements of an actual (not merely meditative) performance.

49. Not so, on account of this being observed on account of similarity also; as in the case of Death; for (the person in yonder orb) does not occupy the worlds (of Death).

From a transfer or a.s.similation of this kind it does not necessarily follow that things of different operation are equal, and that hence those altars of mind, and so on, must connect themselves with an actual outward performance. For it is observed that such a.s.similation rests sometimes on a special point of resemblance only; so in the text, 'The person in yonder orb is Death indeed,'--where the feature of resemblance is the destroying power of the two; for the person within yonder orb does certainly not occupy the same worlds, i.e. the same place as Death.

a.n.a.logously, in the case under discussion, the fact that the altars made of mind are treated as, in a certain respect, equivalent to the altar built of bricks, does not authorise us to connect those altars with the sacrificial performance to which the altar of bricks belongs. When the text says that the altar made of mind is as great as the altar of bricks, this only means that the same result which is attained through the brick- altar in connexion with its own sacrificial performance is also attained through the altar of mind in connexion with the meditational performance into which it enters.

50. And by a subsequent (Brahmana) also the 'being of such a kind' of the word (is proved). But the connexion is on account of plurality.

The subsequent Brahmana (Sat. Br. X, 5, 4) also proves that the text treating of the altars made of mind, and so on, enjoins a meditation only. For that Brahmana (which begins 'This brick-built fire-altar is this world; the waters are its enclosing-stones,' &c.) declares further on 'whosoever knows this thus comes to be that whole Agni who is the s.p.a.ce-filler,' and from this it appears that what is enjoined there is a meditation with a special result of its own. And further on (X, 6) there is another meditation enjoined, viz. one on Vaisvanara. All this shows that the Agnirahasya book (Sat. Br. X) is not solely concerned with the injunction of outward sacrificial acts.--But what then is the reason that such matters as the mental (meditative) construction of fire-altars which ought to be included in the Brihad-aranyaka are included in the Agnirahasya?--'That connexion is on account of plurality,' i.e. the altars made of mind, and so on, are, in the sacred text, dealt with in proximity to the real altar made of bricks, because so many details of the latter are mentally to be accomplished in the meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option with the previous one.'

51. Some, on account of the existence of a Self within a body.

In all meditations on the highest Self the nature of the meditating subject has to be ascertained no less than the nature of the object of meditation and of the mode of meditation. The question then arises whether the meditating Self is to be viewed as the knowing, doing, and enjoying Self, subject to transmigration; or as that Self which Praj.a.pati describes (Ch. Up. VIII, 1), viz. a Self free from all sin and imperfection.--Some hold the former view, on the ground that the meditating Self is within a body. For as long as the Self dwells within a body, it _is_ a knower, doer, enjoyer, and so on, and it can bring about the result of its meditation only as viewed under that aspect. A person who, desirous of the heavenly world or a similar result, enters on some sacrificial action may, after he has reached that result, possess characteristics different from those of a knowing, doing, and enjoying subject, but those characteristics cannot be attributed to him as long as he is in the state of having to bring about the means of accomplishing those ends; in the latter state he must be viewed as an ordinary agent, and there it would be of no use to view him as something different. And the same holds equally good with regard to a person engaged in meditation.--But, an objection is raised, the text 'as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1) _does_ declare a difference (between the agent engaged in sacrificial action, and the meditating subject), and from this it follows that the meditating Self is to be conceived as having a nature free from all evil, and so on.--Not so, the Purvapakshin replies; for the clause, 'howsoever they meditate on him,' proves that that text refers to the equality of the object meditated upon (not of the meditating subject).--To this the next Sutra replies.

52. But this is not so, (but rather) difference; since it is of the being of that; as in the case of intuition.

It is not true that the meditating subject must be conceived as having the ordinary characteristics of knowing, acting, &c.; it rather possesses those characteristic properties--freedom from evil, and so on-- which distinguish the state of Release from the Samsara state. At the time of meditation the Self of the devotee is of exactly the same nature as the released Self. 'For it is of the being of that,' i.e. it attains the nature of that--as proved by the texts, 'as the thought of a man is in this world, so he will be when he has departed,' and 'howsoever he meditate on him, such he becomes himself.' Nor can it be maintained that these texts refer only to meditation on the highest Self (without declaring anything as to the personal Self of the devotee); for the personal Self const.i.tutes the body of Brahman which is the object of meditation, and hence itself falls under the category of object of meditation. The character of such meditation, therefore, is that it is a meditation on the highest Self as having for its body the individual Self, distinguished by freedom from evil and the other qualities mentioned in the teaching of Praj.a.pati. And hence the individual Self is, in such meditation, to be conceived (not as the ordinary Self, but) under that form which it has to attain (i.e. the pure form which belongs to it in the state of Release). 'As in the case of intuition'--i.e. as in the case of intuition of Brahman. As the intuition of Brahman has for its object the essential nature of Brahman, so the intuition of the individual soul also has for its object its permanent essential nature.

In the case of sacrificial works the conception of the true nature of the Self forms an auxiliary factor. An injunction such as 'Let him who is desirous of the heavenly world sacrifice,' enjoins the performance of the sacrifice to the end of a certain result being reached; while the conception of the Self as possessing characteristics such as being a knowing subject, and so on--which are separate from the body--has the function of proving its qualification for works meant to effect results which will come about at some future time. So much only (i.e. the mere cognition of the Self as something different from the body) is required for works (as distinguished from meditations).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'being in the body.'

53. But those (meditations) which are connected with members (of sacrifices) are not (restricted) to (particular) sakhas, but rather (belong) to all sakhas.

There are certain meditations connected with certain const.i.tuent elements of sacrifices-as e.g. 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om (as) the Udgitha '(Ch. Up. I, 1, 1); 'Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the five worlds' (Ch. Up. II, 2, 1), &c. The question here arises whether those meditations are restricted to the members of those sakhas in whose texts they are mentioned; or to be connected with the Udgitha, and so on, in all sakhas. There is here a legitimate ground for doubt, in so far as, although the general agreement of all Vedanta-texts is established, the Udgitha, and so on, are different in each Veda since the accents differ in the different Vedas--The Purvapakshin declares that those meditations are limited each to its particular sakha; for, he says, the injunction 'Let him meditate on the Udgitha' does indeed, verbally, refer to the Udgitha in general; but as what stands nearest to this injunction is the special Udgitha of the sakha, in whose text this injunction occurs, and which shares the peculiarities of accent characteristic of that sakha, we decide that the meditation is enjoined on members of that sakha only.--The Sutra sets this opinion aside. The injunction of meditations of this type is valid for all sakhas, since the text expressly connects them with the Udgitha in general. They therefore hold good wherever there is an Udgitha. The individual Udgithas of the several sakhas are indeed distinguished by different accentuation; but the general statement, 'Let him meditate on the Udgitha.' suggests to the mind not any particular Udgitha, but _the_ Udgitha in general, and hence there is no reason to restrict the meditation to a particular sakha. From the principle moreover that all sakhas teach the same doctrine, it follows that the sacrifice enjoined in the different sakhas is one only; and hence there is no reason to hold that the Udgitha suggested by the injunction of the meditation is a particular one. For the Udgitha is only an element in the sacrifice, and the sacrifice is one and the same. The meditations are not therefore limited to particular sakhas.

54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.

The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one sakha only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct statement, and so on, their application in all sakhas, since the sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all sakhas; so there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion being undertaken by members of all sakhas.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is connected with const.i.tuent elements of the sacrifice.'