The authority of the Declaration of Independence was recognized by the Republican party in its platform of 1868, and again in its platform of 1876.[158]

Both parties have during recent years expressed their disapproval of monopolies and trusts, though neither when in power has shown any disposition to enact radical anti-monopoly legislation.

The Democratic party which favored "honest money" in 1880 and 1884 and demanded the repeal of the Sherman Act in 1892 stood for free coinage of silver at 16 to 1 in 1896 and 1900. The Republican party which advocated international bimetallism in 1884, condemned the Democratic party in 1888 for trying to demonetize silver and endorsed bimetallism in 1892, favored "sound money" and international bimetallism in 1896 and renewed its "allegiance to the principle of the gold standard" in 1900.

The Republican platform of 1860 branded "the recent reopening of the African slave trade, under the cover of our national flag, aided by perversions of judicial power, as a crime against humanity." The Democratic party in its platform of 1896 expressed its disapproval of the Income Tax decision of the United States Supreme Court and in both 1896 and 1900 condemned "government by injunction." With these exceptions neither party has ever expressed its disapproval of any exercise of authority by the Federal judiciary.

Neither of the great parties has ever taken a stand in favor of an income tax, government ownership of the railroads or the telegraph, or, if we except the declaration in favor of direct election of United States senators in the Democratic platforms of 1900 and 1904, advocated any important change in our system of government.

Let us now inquire how far the results of a general election can be regarded as an expression of public opinion upon the questions raised in the party platforms. Does a popular majority for a party mean that the majority approve of the policies for which that party professes to stand? It is generally a.s.sumed by the unthinking that this is the case.

But such a conclusion by no means follows. If there were but one question at issue between the parties and every vote was for principle, not for particular candidates, the policy of the successful party would have the approval of the majority. But when the party defines its position on a number of issues this is no longer true. Take, for instance, the Democratic and Republican platforms of 1900, the former containing twenty-five and the latter twenty-nine separate articles in its party creed. Does a majority vote for a party indicate that the majority approve of the entire platform of that party? No thoughtful person would maintain for a moment that all who support a party approve of its entire platform. In the case of the Republican party in 1900, one large cla.s.s of its supporters who believed the money question to be paramount and who feared the consequences of free coinage of silver voted the Republican ticket, though opposed to the att.i.tude of that party on expansion and also on protection. The ardent protectionist may have given the party his support on the strength of its tariff plank alone. He may even have been opposed to the party's position on the silver question and on expansion. Another cla.s.s who may have disapproved of both gold monometallism and protection, but who regarded expansion as the all-important question, supported the Republican party because of its att.i.tude in this matter. It is certain that some who voted the Republican ticket did not approve its expansion policy; some did not approve of its extreme protectionist policy; and some did not approve of its att.i.tude on the money question. Every man who voted the Republican ticket is a.s.sumed to have endorsed the entire policy of the party, though, as a matter of fact, the party may have secured his vote by reason of its position on the one question which he deemed to be of supreme importance. It is, to say the least, extremely probable that every intelligent man who supported the party disapproved of its att.i.tude on one or more questions. Each plank in the platform was put there for the purpose of catching votes. Some gave their vote for one reason, some for another and some for still other reasons. And when, as in our present day party platforms, many separate and distinct bids are made for votes, it is not only possible but highly probable that no single plank in that party's creed was approved by all who voted the party ticket. If the various issues could be segregated and each voted upon separately, it is conceivable that not one of them would command a majority of the entire vote; and yet, by lumping them all together and skilfully pushing to the front and emphasizing each article of its creed before the cla.s.s or in the region where it would find most support, the party may secure a popular majority for its platform as a whole. Both parties in their platforms of 1900 stood for the admission as states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma; both declared in favor of legislation against monopolies and trusts; both favored liberal pensions, the construction of an Isthmian ca.n.a.l, irrigation of arid lands, reduction of war taxes and protection of American workmen against cheap foreign labor. Yet it does not by any means follow that a majority of the people voting really endorsed even these planks which were common to both platforms.

Moreover the party does not always state its position in a clear and unequivocal manner. The Democratic platform while opposing Republican expansion did so with some important reservation. While denouncing the recent expansion policy of the Republican party it made a bid for the support of those who believed in a moderate and conservative expansion policy. The same is true of its att.i.tude on protection. It did not condemn the principle of protection, but merely the abuse of the system through which monopolies and trusts had been fostered. The vague and ambiguous manner in which the party defines its att.i.tude, together with the highly composite character of its platform, largely defeats the end for which it should be framed. As a means of arriving at a definite and authoritative expression of public opinion concerning the political questions of the day it is far from satisfactory. It is conceivable that a party may under this system carry an election and yet not a single principle for which it professes to stand would, if separately submitted, command the approval of a majority of the voters.

The threefold purpose for which the party exists--(1) popular choice of candidates, (2) a clear and definite expression of public opinion concerning the questions with which the government must deal, and (3) the responsibility of the government to the popular majority are all largely defeated under the American system. The last named end of the party is defeated by the Const.i.tution itself, and this, as hereinbefore shown, has operated to defeat the others as well.

We thus see that true party government is impossible under a const.i.tutional system which has as its chief end the limitation of the power of the majority. Where the party which has carried the election is powerless to enforce its policy, as is generally the case in this country, there can be no responsible party government. The only branch of our governmental system which responds readily to changes in public opinion is the House of Representatives. But this is and was designed to be a subordinate body, having a voice in shaping only a part of the policy of the government, and even in this limited field being unable to act except with the concurrence of the President, Senate and Supreme Court. A change in public sentiment is not likely under these circ.u.mstances to be followed by a corresponding change in the policy of the state. Even when such change in sentiment is insistent and long-continued, it may be unable to overcome the resistance of the more conservative influences in the Const.i.tution. The most superficial examination of our political history is sufficient to show that the practical working of our Const.i.tution has in large measure defeated the end of party government. Calhoun's contention that the party had succeeded in breaking down the elaborate system of const.i.tutional checks on the numerical majority is not borne out by the facts.

Eleven general elections since the adoption of the Const.i.tution have resulted in a House of Representatives which had no political support in any other branch of the government. During eighty-four years of our history under the Const.i.tution the party in the majority in the House has not had a majority in all the other branches of the general government, and consequently has not had the power to enforce its policy. From 1874 to 1896--a period of twenty-two years--there were but two years (the 51st Congress) during which the same party had a majority in all branches of the government. But even during this brief period it failed to control the treaty-making power since it lacked the two-thirds majority in the Senate which the Const.i.tution requires. In fact, there has been no time since 1874 when any party had sufficient majority in the Senate to give it an active control over the treaty-making power.

The more important and fundamental changes in public policy which involve an exercise of the amending power are still more securely placed beyond the reach of party control. Not only the power to ratify amendments, but even the power to propose them, is effectually withheld from the party, since it can scarcely ever command the required two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress or a majority in both branches of the legislature in two-thirds of the states.

Under our const.i.tutional system a political party may have a nominal majority in all branches of the government and yet lack the power to enforce its policy. That branch of the government over which the party has most control through frequent elections--viz., the House of Representatives--is the one which has least authority, while those which have most influence in shaping the policy of the government are less directly subject to the penalties of party disapproval, as in the case of the President and Senate, or entirely exempt from any effective party control as in the case of the Supreme Court. The division of authority under our Const.i.tution makes it possible for either house of Congress to give the appearance of support to a measure which public opinion demands and at the same time really accomplish its defeat by simply not providing the means essential to its enforcement. The opportunity thus afforded for the exercise of a covert but effective veto on important legislation is a fruitful source of corruption. The extreme diffusion of power and responsibility is such as to make any effective party control and responsibility impossible. This would be the case even if the party were truly representative of public opinion. But when we consider that the party is organized on a plan which in some measure at least defeats both the popular choice of candidates and the expression of public opinion in party platforms, it is readily seen that the slight degree of party control permitted under our system is in no true sense a popular control.

CHAPTER IX

CHANGES IN THE STATE CONSt.i.tUTIONS AFTER 1787

The effects of the conservative reaction were not confined to the general government. The movement to limit the power of the popular majority was felt in the domain of state as well as national politics.

Even before the Const.i.tutional Convention a.s.sembled the political reaction was modifying some of the state const.i.tutions. This is seen especially in the tendency to enlarge the powers of the judiciary which was the only branch of the state government in which life tenure survived. This tendency received powerful encouragement and support in the adoption of the Federal Const.i.tution which secured to the judiciary of the general government an absolute veto on both federal and state legislation. For as the state courts were not slow in following the precedent set by the Federal courts, what had been before the adoption of the Const.i.tution a mere tendency soon became the practice in all the states. This in reality accomplished a revolution in the actual working of the state governments without any corresponding change in their outward form. It effected a redistribution of political powers which greatly diminished the influence of the popularly elected and more responsible branches of the state government and gave a controlling influence to that branch over which the people had least control.

Not only was the state judiciary allowed to a.s.sume the veto power, but their independence of public opinion was more effectually safeguarded by depriving a mere majority of the legislature of the power to remove them. The provision of the Federal Const.i.tution requiring a two-thirds majority in the legislative body for removal by impeachment or otherwise was quite generally copied. Without some such safeguard the party in control of the legislature could prevent the exercise of the judicial veto by removing from office any judges who dared to oppose its policy.

New York and South Carolina were the only states adopting const.i.tutions during the Revolutionary period, which included provisions limiting the power of the majority to impeach public officials. The New York const.i.tution of 1777 required a two-thirds majority in the lower house, and the South Carolina const.i.tution of 1778 a two-thirds majority in both houses. Pennsylvania copied the impeachment provisions of the Federal Const.i.tution in her const.i.tution of 1790; Delaware went even farther, and in her const.i.tution of 1792, required a two-thirds majority in both houses; Georgia followed the example of the Federal Const.i.tution in 1798; Virginia, in 1830; North Carolina, in 1835; Vermont, in 1836; New Jersey, in 1844; and Maryland, in 1851.

With the progress of this movement to restore the system of checks in the state const.i.tutions the governor regained his independence of the legislature and also many of the rights and prerogatives of which the Revolution had deprived him. He was made coordinate with the legislature, set over against it and generally clothed with the qualified veto power, which made him for all practical purposes the third house of that body. Georgia increased the governor's term of office to two years and gave him the qualified veto power in 1798.

Pennsylvania made his term of office three years and gave him the veto power in 1790. New Hampshire conferred the veto power on him in 1792 and New York in 1821.

This tendency to make the public official less directly dependent upon the people or their immediate representatives is clearly seen in other important changes made in the state const.i.tutions during this period.

Popular control over the legislature was diminished by lengthening the terms of the members of both houses and by providing that the upper house should be elected for a longer term than the lower. Georgia established an upper house in 1789 and made the term of office of its members three years. In 1790 Pennsylvania also added a senate whose members were to be elected for four years, and South Carolina increased the term of its senators from one to four years. Delaware extended the term from one to two years for members of the lower house and from three to four years for members of the upper house and made the legislative sessions biennial instead of annual in 1831. North Carolina increased the term of members of both houses from one to two years and adopted biennial sessions in 1835. Maryland in 1837 extended the term of senators from five to six years, and in 1846 established biennial sessions of the legislature. The responsibility of the legislature was still further diminished by the gradual adoption of the plan of partial renewal of the senate, which was incorporated in the Revolutionary const.i.tutions of Delaware, New York and Virginia and later copied in the Federal Const.i.tution. This ensured the conservative and steadying influence exerted by a body of hold-over members in the upper house.

With the exception of five states in which the members of one branch of the legislature were elected for terms varying from two to five years, the Revolutionary state const.i.tutions provided for the annual election of the entire legislature. This plan made both houses conform to the latest expression of public opinion by the majority of the qualified voters at the polls. And since neither the executive nor the courts possessed the veto power, the system ensured prompt compliance on the part of the law-making body with the demands of the people as expressed in the results of the legislative election.

The influence of public opinion on the state governments was greatly weakened by the const.i.tutional changes above mentioned. The lower branch of the legislature, inasmuch as all its members were simultaneously elected, might be regarded as representative of recent, if not present, public opinion, though effective popular control of that body was made more difficult by lengthening the term of office, since this diminished the frequency with which the voters could express in an authoritative manner their disapproval of the official record of its members. Under the plan adopted present public opinion as formulated in the results of the last election was not recognized as ent.i.tled to control the state senate.

These changes in the state const.i.tutions by which the executive and judicial branches of the government acquired the veto power amounted in practice to the creation of a four-chambered legislature. By thus increasing the number of bodies which it was necessary for the people to control in order to secure the legislation which they desired, their power to influence the policy of the state government was thereby diminished. And when we reflect that not only was legislative authority more widely distributed, but each branch of the state government exercising it was also made less directly dependent on the qualified voters, we can see that these const.i.tutional provisions were in the nature of checks on the numerical majority.

A consideration of the changes made in the method of amending the state const.i.tutions leads to the same conclusion. During the Revolutionary period, as we have seen, the tendency was strongly toward making the fundamental law the expression of the will of the numerical majority.

Difficulties in the way of change were reduced to a minimum. But under the influence of the political reaction which followed, and which produced the Const.i.tution of the United States, the state governments were so organized as to make it more difficult for the majority to exercise the amending power. Georgia in 1789 changed the method of amending the state const.i.tution by requiring a two-thirds majority in a const.i.tutional convention, and made another change in 1798 by which a two-thirds majority in each house of the legislature and a three-fourths majority in each house of the succeeding legislature was required for the adoption of an amendment to the const.i.tution. South Carolina in 1790 adopted a provision guarding against mere majority amendment by making the approval of a two-thirds majority in both branches of two successive legislatures necessary for any changes in the const.i.tution.

Connecticut in 1818 restricted the power of amending by requiring a majority in the house of representatives, a two-thirds majority in both houses of the next legislature, and final approval by a majority of the electors. New York in 1821 adopted a plan which required that an amendment should receive a majority in each branch of the legislature, a two-thirds majority in each branch of the succeeding legislature, and be approved by a majority of the voters. North Carolina in 1835 made a three-fifths majority in each house of the legislature and a two-thirds majority of each house of the following legislature necessary for changes in the const.i.tution.

The judicial veto served the purpose of preventing majority amendment under the guise of ordinary legislation, while a safeguard against const.i.tutional changes favored by a mere majority was thus provided in the extraordinary majority required in both houses of the legislature to propose or adopt amendments. This, as has been shown in the case of the Federal Const.i.tution, is a formidable check on the majority. In view of this restriction upon the proposing of amendments the provision for ratification by a popular majority, which owing to the progress of the later democratic movement has now been generally adopted, is no real concession to the principle of majority rule.

a.s.suming that a two-thirds majority in the legislature is required to propose an amendment, and that the principle of representation is so applied that each party is represented in the legislature in proportion to its popular vote, it would scarcely ever be possible for any party to propose an amendment to the state const.i.tution, since it can not be expected under any ordinary conditions to control two-thirds of the popular vote. But inasmuch as the successful party often secures under our system much more than its proportional share of representation in the legislature, it is by no means unusual for a party to have a two-thirds majority in both houses of a state legislature. This would appear to give the numerical majority under such conditions the power to propose and adopt amendments. Such would be the case if the party were really responsible to those who supported it at the polls. But this would a.s.sume the existence of a purely state party, organized with reference to state issues only, and carrying the election as the advocate of a definite state policy. Moreover, it would presuppose all those means, political and const.i.tutional, by which the majority in the legislature would be accountable to the popular majority in the state.

This is rendered impossible, however, as has been shown, by our system of government.

The above-mentioned changes in the const.i.tutions of the older states may be attributed in large measure to the reaction against democracy which brought about the adoption of the Federal Const.i.tution. They may be regarded as an expression of that distrust and fear of democracy which filled the minds of those who framed and set up our Federal government.

It is not contended, however, that they are now so regarded by the ma.s.ses of the people. The work of deifying the Federal Const.i.tution was soon accomplished. And when the people had come to venerate it as the most perfect embodiment of the doctrine of popular sovereignty that the intelligence of man could devise, it was but natural that they should acquiesce in the proposal to make the state governments conform more closely to the general plan of that instrument. In view of the widespread sentiment which amounted to a blind and unthinking worship of the Const.i.tution, it is not surprising that the political inst.i.tutions of the general government should have been largely copied by the states.

The only surprising thing in this connection is the fact that they did not follow the Federal model more closely, since every feature of it was the object of the most extravagant eulogy. Here we see, however, an inconsistency between profession and practice. The people who tolerated no criticism of the Federal Const.i.tution showed nevertheless a distrust of some of its more conservative features. Much as the indirect election of President and United States senators was favored by the framers of our Federal Const.i.tution, there has been no tendency to apply that principle in the selection of the corresponding state officials.

In all the states framing new const.i.tutions during the Revolutionary period, except Ma.s.sachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York, the governor was elected by the legislature. Pennsylvania abandoned indirect election and adopted election by the qualified voters in 1790; Delaware, in 1792; Georgia, in 1824; North Carolina, in 1835; Maryland, in 1837; New Jersey, in 1844; Virginia, in 1850; and South Carolina, in 1865. South Carolina and Maryland are the only states which have ever had indirect election of the upper house. Both adopted it in 1776, the const.i.tution of South Carolina providing that the members of the lower house should elect the members of the upper house, and the const.i.tution of Maryland requiring that members of the upper house should be chosen by an electoral college. This was abandoned for direct election in South Carolina in 1778 and in Maryland in 1837.

The conservative reaction was soon followed by a new movement toward democracy. This no doubt largely explains the failure of the people to reproduce in their state const.i.tutions all those features which they professed to admire in the Federal Const.i.tution. Not only did they not copy all the new features of that doc.u.ment, but they even discarded some of the then existing provisions of the state const.i.tutions which had been copied in the Federal Const.i.tution. The principle of indirect election which was everywhere recognized in the choice of the state judiciary during the Revolutionary period was gradually abandoned for the more democratic method of direct popular choice which has now become the rule. The life tenure of judges which formerly existed in most of the states has almost entirely disappeared. In all but four states the judges are now chosen for terms varying from two to twenty-one years--the average length of the term being eight or ten years. The combination of direct popular choice with a fixed term of office has had the effect of making the state judiciary much more amenable to public opinion than the corresponding branch of the Federal government. By reason of the relatively long term for which the judges of the state supreme court are elected, however, and the plan of gradual renewal which prevents present public opinion from ever gaining the ascendency in that body, it is still the least responsible and most conservative branch of the state government.

We see, then, two motives exerting an influence in the remolding of the state const.i.tutions, one being the desire to copy the Federal Const.i.tution and the other the belief that the state government should reflect the will of the people. That the attainment of one of these ends would inevitably defeat the other was not generally recognized. The conviction which had become thoroughly rooted in the popular mind that the system of checks and balances was the highest expression of democratic organization ensured the embodiment of the general features of that system in the const.i.tutions of the various states. The const.i.tutional changes having this end in view largely destroyed the responsibility of the state governments to the people and thus prevented the very thing they were designed to accomplish. But however much this system was in reality opposed to the principle of direct popular control, it was adopted by the people with the idea of making the government more readily reflect their will. They were not conscious of any inconsistency in holding tenaciously to the doctrine of checks and balances and at the same time seeking to give the people more control over the state governments. The latter purpose is clearly seen in the const.i.tutional changes relating to the tenure and manner of election of the judiciary and in the adoption of universal suffrage. Summing up the effects of these changes in the state const.i.tutions, we may say that the suffrage was placed upon a democratic basis, the state judiciary was organized on a less irresponsible plan and the appearance of political responsibility secured by applying the principle of direct election to every branch of the state government. The longer term of office established for the legislative and executive branches of the state government, however, together with the increase in the authority of the judiciary and the adoption of the system of checks and balances has upon the whole had the effect of making the state government less responsive to the electorate.

As seen in preceding chapters, the framers of the Federal Const.i.tution made use of the scheme of checks and balances for the purpose of limiting the power of the people. There is little evidence that they favored diffusion of authority except in so far as that authority rested upon a popular basis. Hence they carried the plan much farther in curtailing the power of the House of Representatives than a logical application of the doctrine would have justified, while at the same time giving more authority and power of independent action to the other branches of the general government than was consistent with their avowed, if not real, purpose.

They gave to the executive and judicial branches of the general government power to control the administration of Federal laws. The enforcement of all laws and regulations of the general government, in so far as the President and Senate might desire to enforce them, was guaranteed through the power to appoint and remove those who were entrusted with their execution, while the right of appeal from a state to the Federal courts precluded the possibility of enforcing a state law deemed to exceed the proper limits of state authority.

In the state governments on the other hand we find a high degree of administrative decentralization. The governor, unlike the President, was not given any adequate power to control those entrusted with the execution of state laws. A mult.i.tude of directly elected local officials are the agents of the state for this purpose. And since they reflect the sentiment of the various local interests to which they owe their election, it may and often does happen that a law to which those interests are opposed is rendered practically inoperative through the efforts of those local officials who are sworn to enforce it. The practical working of this system often gives to a local community an administrative veto on such general laws of the state as may be opposed to local sentiment. By this means the general executive authority of the state is weakened and its responsibility correspondingly diminished.

In still another respect the policy of dividing authority and parcelling it out between separate and distinct organs of government has been carried much farther in the state than in the Federal Const.i.tution.

Unlike the Federal government in which executive power is centralized in the President, the state const.i.tutions have created a number of separate officials, boards and commissions, some directly elected and some appointed, independent of each other and irresponsible except in so far as a fixed term of office implies responsibility. This means that instead of one executive the state has many. Only one of them--the governor--has, it is true, a veto on the enactment of laws; but this, as we have seen, is really a legislative and not an executive power. Each of these has what may be termed an administrative veto; that is, the power to negative the laws which they are expected to administer by simply not enforcing them. The impossibility of securing an honest and faithful administration of the laws where the responsibility for their enforcement is divided between a number of separate and practically independent officials, is clearly shown in the experience of the various states. The evils of this system are ill.u.s.trated in the state laws enacted for the purpose of controlling the railway business. Provision is usually made for their enforcement through a railway commission either directly elected or appointed by the governor. That direct election by the people for a fixed term, thereby securing independence during that term, fails to guarantee the enforcement of such laws is strikingly shown in the experience of California, where this body has been continually under the domination of the railway interests.[159]

Under a system which thus minutely subdivides and distributes the administrative function, any effective control over the execution of state laws is made impossible. The governor, who is nominally the head of the executive agencies of the state, is not in reality responsible, since he has no adequate power to compel the enforcement of laws directly entrusted to other independent state officials. Any interest or combination of interests that may wish to prevent the enforcement of certain laws may be able to accomplish their end by merely controlling the one official or board whose duty it is to enforce the law in question. Their task would be a much more difficult one, if it were necessary to control for that purpose the entire executive arm of the state. The opportunity for the corrupt use of money and influence is thus vastly increased, since the people, though they might watch and judge fairly well the conduct of one state executive, can not exercise any effective censorship over a large number of such officials.

This irresponsibility which arises out of a wide diffusion of power is not confined to the executive branch of the state government. The legislature in the course of our political development has taken on the same elaborate committee organization which characterizes, as we have seen, our Federal Congress. The same sinister influences working through similar agencies oppose needed legislation. But although the good bills are frequently killed or mutilated in the secrecy of the committee room, the skilful use of money or other corrupt influence often secures the enactment of laws opposed to the interests of the people. Moreover, the practice known as log-rolling by which the representatives of various local interests combine and force through measures which secure to each of certain localities some advantage at the expense of the state at large are so common as to excite no surprise.

The relation existing between the executive and legislative branches under our system is another source of irresponsibility, since it does not follow simply because a law has been placed upon the statute books of a state that it can be enforced. An act may be pa.s.sed in response to a strong public sentiment, it may be const.i.tutional and the executive may be willing and may even desire to enforce it, and yet be unable to do so. The legislature may, and frequently does, enact laws under the pressure of public opinion while at the same time quietly exercising what is, in effect, a veto on their execution. In the case of much important legislation it can accomplish this by merely not appropriating the funds which are required for their enforcement. The laws against adulteration are a good ill.u.s.tration. An official known perhaps as a dairy and food commissioner may be provided for, whose duty it is to enforce these laws. The nature of the work entrusted to him requires that he should have a corps of a.s.sistants, inspectors who are to keep a watchful eye on the goods likely to be adulterated and collect samples of such goods from the various places in the state where they are exposed for sale, and chemists who are to a.n.a.lyze the samples thus procured and determine whether manufacturers and dealers are complying with the law. Unless an adequate sum is appropriated for this purpose, and for prosecuting those who are violating the law, such laws can not be enforced.

In our state governments the subdivision of authority has been carried so far that no effective control over the enactment or enforcement of state laws is possible. Under the influence of the doctrine of checks and balances the policy of widely distributing political authority has inured to the benefit of those private interests which are ever seeking to control the government for their own ends, since it has supplied the conditions under which the people find it difficult to fix the blame for official misconduct. Indeed it may be said that wherever power should be concentrated to ensure responsibility, it has been almost invariably distributed.

CHAPTER X

MUNIc.i.p.aL GOVERNMENT

Our munic.i.p.al government, like the rest of our political system, was originally an inheritance from England. The governing power in colonial times was a single body, the common council, such as exists in England to-day, composed of mayor, recorder, aldermen, and councilmen. As a rule the councilmen were elected annually by the qualified voters, while the mayor was appointed by the colonial governor. The council had authority to enact local regulations not in conflict with English or colonial legislation. The mayor had no veto and usually no appointing power.

The Revolution did not modify the general scheme of munic.i.p.al government in any important respect. The mayor was still, as a rule, appointed by the governor, who now owed his office directly or indirectly to the qualified voters of the state. The power to grant munic.i.p.al charters, which before the Revolution was exercised by the provincial governor, was now lodged in the state legislature.