Trans.).]

[Footnote 89: Referring to the power of the Supreme Court in our scheme of government, Jefferson said "It is a misnomer to call a government republican, in which a branch of the supreme power is independent of the nation." Works, Vol. X, p. 199.]

[Footnote 90: Lee, Source Book of English History, p. 336.]

[Footnote 91: Commentaries on the Const.i.tution of the United States, sec. 1399; cf. Infra pp. 321-325.]

[Footnote 92: Const.i.tutional History as Seen in American Law, p. 80.]

[Footnote 93: _Ibid._, p. 258.]

[Footnote 94: For a list of these cases see United States Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 131. Appendix CCx.x.xV. Banks and Brothers Edition.]

[Footnote 95: Dissenting opinion Inter-State Commerce Commission, v.

Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 United States, 144.]

[Footnote 96: For a discussion of these cases see "The Legal Tender Decisions" by E.J. James, Publications of the American Economic a.s.sociation, Vol. III.]

[Footnote 97: Report of the Am. Bar a.s.sociation, 1895, p. 246.]

[Footnote 98: For a discussion of this recent use of the injunction by our Federal Courts see Annual Address of the President of the Georgia Bar a.s.sociation, John W. Akin, on "Aggressions of the Federal Courts,"

1898; W.H. Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," Economic Studies, Vol.

III; Stimson, Handbook of Am. Labor Laws.]

[Footnote 99: "We should like to see the law so changed that any man arrested for contempt of court, for an act not performed in the presence of the court and during judicial proceedings, should have a right to demand trial by jury before another and an impartial tribunal. It is not safe, and therefore it is not right, to leave the liberties of the citizens of the United States at the hazard involved in conferring such autocratic power upon judges of varied mental and moral caliber as are conferred by the equity powers which our courts have inherited through English precedents." Editorial in the _Outlook_, Vol. LXXIV, p. 871.]

[Footnote 100: C.H. Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United States, Vol. II, p. 347.]

[Footnote 101: Art. III, sec. 2.]

[Footnote 102: The const.i.tutions of Maine (since 1820), Rhode Island (since 1842), Florida (since 1875), and Missouri (const.i.tution of 1865, but omitted in const.i.tution of 1875 and since).

A provision of this kind is also found in the Ma.s.sachusetts const.i.tution of 1780, from which it was copied in the New Hampshire const.i.tution of 1784. Its purpose in these two const.i.tutions, however, was not to guard against the subsequent exercise of the judicial veto, since the latter was then unknown, but to make the judges of the Supreme Court an advisory body to the legislature.]

[Footnote 103: Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 9.]

[Footnote 104: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, p. 218.]

[Footnote 105: Works, Vol. I, p. 29. Cralle's Ed.]

[Footnote 106: Supra, p. 18.]

[Footnote 107: Infra p. 239.]

[Footnote 108: Pennsylvania and Georgia had only a single legislative body.]

[Footnote 109: "There was certainly no intention of making the appointment of the Presidential electors subject to popular election. I think it is evident that the framers were anxious to avoid this."

Burgess, Political Science and Const.i.tutional Law, Vol. II, p. 219.

According to Fiske, "electors were chosen by the legislature in New Jersey till 1816; in Connecticut till 1820; in New York, Delaware, and Vermont, and with one exception in Georgia, till 1824; in South Carolina till 1868. Ma.s.sachusetts adopted various plans, and did not finally settle down to an election by the people until 1828." The Critical Period of American History, p. 286.]

[Footnote 110: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 421.]

[Footnote 111: Madison, Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 450.]

[Footnote 112: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 158.]

[Footnote 113: Boutmy, Studies in Const.i.tutional Law, p. 91 (Eng.

Trans.).

See also Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 254.]

[Footnote 114: Previous to Andrew Johnson's administration but six measures were pa.s.sed over the President's veto. Up to 1889 the veto power of the President had been exercised four hundred and thirty-three times, and in but twenty-nine instances had it been overridden by the required two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. Fifteen measures vetoed by Andrew Johnson were pa.s.sed over his veto--more than in the case of all other Presidents combined. Mason, The Veto Power, p.

214.]

[Footnote 115: Mason, The Veto Power, p. 214.]

[Footnote 116: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 151. Hamilton's statement, which was made in support of a motion to give the President an absolute veto on acts of Congress, was not correct. William III vetoed no less than four acts of Parliament, and his successor used the veto power for the last time in 1707. Medley, English Const.i.tutional History, p. 315.]

[Footnote 117: Supra, p. 19.]

[Footnote 118: Infra, p. 231.]

[Footnote 119: Senate in South Carolina and Maryland (const.i.tutions of 1776) exceptions, Infra p. 239.]

[Footnote 120: Const.i.tution, Art. II. Sec. I.]

[Footnote 121: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 503.]

[Footnote 122: Ibid., p. 494.]

[Footnote 123: For a discussion of this feature of our government see the following chapter.]

[Footnote 124: Under the Articles of Confederation the Congress of the United States was required to "publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations as in their judgment require secrecy." Art. IX.]

[Footnote 125: The Revolutionary const.i.tutions of New York and Pennsylvania provided that the doors of the legislature should be kept open at all times for the admission of the public except when the welfare of the state should demand secrecy.]

[Footnote 126: Cf. Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p.

63.]

[Footnote 127: Quoted from Article on Reporting in Encyclopedia Brittanica.]

[Footnote 128: Vol. XIV, p. 62. See also Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons, Vol. I, pp. 590-596.]

[Footnote 129: Greene, The Provincial Governor, pp. 198-199.]

[Footnote 130: Cooley, Const.i.tutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp.

514-516.]