"9. Establishment of friendly relations with all nations.

Immediate resumption of diplomatic relations with the Russian Soviet Republic and Poland. Reestablishment of the Workmen's _Internationale_ on the basis of revolutionary social policy in the spirit of the international conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal."

It will be observed that the difference between these demands and those of the Bolsheviki (Spartacans) is precisely the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee--one of terminology. Some even of these principles were materially extended by interpretation three weeks later.

On March 24th the Independent Socialists in the new Prussian Diet, replying to a query from the Majority Socialists as to their willingness to partic.i.p.ate in the coming Prussian Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, stated conditions which contained the following elaboration of point 3 in the program given above:

"The most important means of production in agriculture, industry, trade and commerce shall be nationalized immediately; the land and its natural resources shall be declared to be the property of the whole people and shall be placed under the control of society."

The answer, by the way, was signed by Adolph Hoffmann, whose acquaintance we have already made, and Kurt Rosenfeld, the millionaire son-in-law of a wealthy leather dealer.

The essential kinship of the Independents and Spartacans will be more clearly apparent from a comparison of the latters' demands, as published on April 14th in _Die rote Fahne_, then appearing in Leipsic. They follow:

"Ruthless elimination of all Majority Socialist leaders and of such Independents as have betrayed the Soviet system and the revolution by their cooperation with Majority Socialists.

"Unconditional acceptance of the demands of the Spartacus Party's program.[66]

[66] _Vide_ chapter xi.

"Immediate introduction of the following measures: (a) Liberation of all political prisoners; (b) dissolution of all parliamentary gatherings; (c) dissolution of all counter-revolutionary troop detachments, disarming of the _bourgeoisie_ and the internment of all officers; (d) arming of the proletariat and the immediate organization of revolutionary corps; (e) abolition of all courts and the erection of revolutionary tribunals, together with the trial by these tribunals of all persons involved in bringing on the war, of counter-revolutionaries and traitors; (f) elimination of all state administrative officials and boards (mayors, provincial councillors, etc.), and the subst.i.tution of delegates chosen by the people; (g) adoption of a law providing for the taking over by the state without indemnification of all larger undertakings (mines, etc.), together with the larger landed estates, and the immediate taking over of the administration of these estates by workmen's councils; (h) adoption of a law annulling war-loans exceeding twenty thousand marks; (i) suppression of the whole _bourgeois_ press, including particularly the Majority Socialist press."

Some of the members of the former right wing of the Independent Socialists left the party and went over to the Majority Socialists following the party congress of the first week in March. They included the venerable Eduard Bernstein, who declared that the Independents had demonstrated that they "lacked utterly any constructive program." The dictates of party discipline, however, together with the desperation of suffering, were too much for the great ma.s.s of those who had at first rejected Bolshevist methods, and the German Bolsheviki received material reinforcements at a time when they would have been powerless without them.

The Spartacans had lost their armed battle against the government, but they had won a more important bloodless conflict.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Red or White Internationalism Which?

All revolutions have their second phase, and this phase ordinarily presents features similar in kind and varying only in degree. After the actual overthrow of the old government a short period of excited optimism gives place to a realization of the fact that the administration of a state is not so simple as it has appeared to the opposition parties, and that the existing order of things--the result of centuries of natural development--cannot be altered over night. Under the sobering influence of this realization ultra-radicalism loses ground, the revolutionary government accepts the aid of some of the men who have been connected with the deposed government, and the administration of affairs proceeds along an orderly middle course.

But other revolutions, as has been stated, have had a different inception, and none have depended for their successful execution and subsequent development on a people so sorely tried, so weakened physically and morally, and--last but not least--so extensively infected with the virus of internationalism. In so far as revolutions were not the work of a group of selfish aspirants for power, they were brought about by patriotic men whose first and last thought was the welfare of their own country, and who concerned themselves not at all about the universal brotherhood of man or the oppressed peoples of other lands or races. The German revolutionists, however, scoffed at patriotism as an outworn dogma. The majority of their adherents came from the poorest and most ignorant stratum of the people, the cla.s.s most responsive to the agitation of leaders who promised that division of property contemplated by Communist Socialism.

The Independent Socialists had "made the revolution." They claimed the right to determine its development. The _bourgeoisie_, itself incapable of restoring the old order and, for the most part, not desiring to do so, supported the parent Socialist Party as the lesser of two evils. The Independents found themselves without the power to determine what course "their revolution" should take. All revolutionary history showed that this course would not be that desired by the Independent leaders and promised by them to their radical followers. The occurrences of the first month following the revolution again demonstrated what might be called the natural law of revolutionary development. The Majority Socialists in the government refused to let themselves be hurried into disastrous socializing experiments. They refused to ban intelligence and ability merely because the possessors happened not to be _Genossen_.

They even believed (_horribile dictu!_) that private property-rights should not be abolished out of hand. They were so recreant to the principles of true internationalism that they resented foreign aggressions against Germans and German soil, and they actually proposed to resist such aggressions by force.

With heretics like these there could be no communion. They could not even be permitted to hold communion among themselves if it could be prevented, and the result was, as we have seen, the efforts of the Independents and Spartacans to wreck the tabernacle.

To recount the developments of the period from the crushing of the March uprising to the signing of the Peace of Versailles would be but to repeat, with different settings, the story of the first four months of Republican Germany. This period, too, was filled with Independent Socialist and Spartacan intrigues and armed opposition to the government, culminating in the brief but b.l.o.o.d.y reign of the Communists in Munich in April. Strikes continued to paralyze industry. No food supplies of any importance were received. The National a.s.sembly at Weimar continued to demonstrate the philosophic tendencies, academic learning and political immaturity of the German people. Distinct left wings came into being in both the Majority Socialist and Democratic parties. Particularism, the historic curse of the country, again raised its head.

Red internationalism in Germany received a marked impetus from the events in Hungary at the end of March, when Count Michael Karolyi handed the reins of government over to the Bolshevist leader Bela Kun. An effort has been made to represent this as a bit of theatricals staged by Karolyi with the support and encouragement of Berlin. Such an explanation is symptomatic of the blindness of those who will not see the significance of this development. To a.s.sert that the German Government, itself engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Bolshevism at home and threatened with an irruption of the Bolshevist forces of Russia, would deliberately create a new source of infection in a contiguous land requires either much mental hardihood or a deep ignorance of existing conditions. The author is able to state from first-hand knowledge that the German Government was completely surprised by the news from Budapest, and that it had no part, direct or indirect, in bringing about Karolyi's resignation or the accession to power of the Hungarian Bolsheviki.

The developments in Hungary were made inevitable by the unwisdom with which this "liberated unit of the Austro-Hungarian Empire" was treated.

When the November armistice was concluded, there was a "gentlemen's agreement" or understanding that the demarcation line established by the armistice should be policed by French, English or American troops. It was not observed. Jugo-Slavs, Serbians and Roumanians were permitted not only to guard this line, but to advance well beyond it. The enemy occupation of the country extended to nearly all portions of Hungary upon which the central part, including Budapest, depended for coal, metals, wood, meats and even salt. The Czechs took possession of Pressburg, rechristened it Wilson City, and advanced along the Danube to within twenty miles of Budapest. Distress became acute.

Then, on March 19th, the French Colonel Vix sent a note to Karolyi establishing a new demarcation line far inside the one established in November and at places even inside the lines held by Allied troops.

Karolyi's position was already insecure. He had been welcomed when he a.s.sumed office as the restorer of nationalism and peace. The support accorded him had been largely due to his record as an opponent of Austria and a friend of the Entente. He had been under surveillance almost throughout the war because of his known pro-Ally sentiments, and only his prominence saved him from arrest. Now, when his supposed influence with the Allies was discovered to be non-existent, his only remaining support was shattered and he went. Hungary, infected with Bolshevism by Russian propagandists and returned prisoners of war, went over to the camp of Lenine.

Another factor contributed greatly to the growth of the radical Independent Socialist and Bolshevist movement in Germany. This was the obvious dilemma of the Allies in the case of Russia, their undeniable helplessness and lack of counsel in the face of applied Bolshevism.

Thousands of Germans came to believe that Bolshevism was a haven of refuge. Nor was this sentiment by any means confined to the proletariat.

A Berlin millionaire said to the writer in March:

"If it comes to a question of choosing between Bolshevism and Allied slavery, I shall become a Bolshevik without hesitation. I would rather see Germany in the possession of Bolshevist Germans than of any _bourgeois_ government wearing chains imposed by our enemies. The Allies dare not intervene in Russia, and I don't believe they would be any less helpless before a Bolshevist Germany."

Scores of well-to-do Germans expressed themselves in the same strain to the author, and thousands from the lower cla.s.ses, free from the restraint which the possession of worldly goods imposes, put into execution the threat of their wealthier countrymen.

With the conclusion of the peace of Versailles we leave Germany. The second phase of the revolution is not yet ended. Bolshevism, crushed in one place, raises its head in another. Industry is prostrate. Currency is so depreciated that importation is seriously hampered. The event is on the knees of the G.o.ds.

But while the historian can thus arbitrarily dismiss Germany and the conditions created by the great war, the world cannot. From a material economic viewpoint alone, the colossal destruction of wealth and means of transportation, and the slaughter of millions of the able-bodied men of all nations involved are factors which will make themselves felt for many years. These obstacles to development and progress will, however, eventually be overcome. They are the least of the problems facing the world today as the result of the war and--this must be said now and it will eventually be realized generally--as a result of the Peace of Versailles. The men responsible for this peace declare that it is the best that could be made. Until the proceedings of the peace conference shall have been made public, together with all material submitted to it, including eventual prewar bargains and treaty commitments, this declaration cannot be controverted. One must a.s.sume at least that the makers of the peace believed it to be the best possible.

The _bona fides_ of the peace delegates, however, while it protects them from adverse criticism, is a personal matter and irrelevant in any consideration of the treaty and its probable results. Nor is the question whether any better treaty was possible, of any relevancy. What alone vitally concerns the world is not the sentiments of a few men, but what may be expected from their work. As to this, many thoughtful observers in all countries have already come to realize what will eventually be realized by millions.

The Treaty of Versailles has Balkanized Europe; it has to a large degree reestablished the multiplicity of territorial sovereignties that handicapped progress and caused continuous strife more than a century ago; it has revived smouldering race-antagonisms which were in a fair way to be extinguished; it has created a dozen new _irredentas_, new breeding-places of war; it has liberated thousands from foreign domination but placed tens of thousands under the yoke of other foreign domination, and has tried to insure the permanency not only of their subjection, but of that of other subject races which have for centuries been struggling for independence. Preaching general disarmament, it has strengthened the armed might of one power by disarming its neighbors, and has given to it the military and political domination of Europe. To another power it has given control of the high seas. It has refused to let the laboring ma.s.ses of the world--the men who fought and suffered--be represented at the conference by delegates of their own choosing.

Such a treaty could not bring real peace to the world even if the conditions were less critical and complex. As they are, it will hasten and aggravate what the world will soon discover to be the most serious, vital and revolutionary consequence of the war. What this will be has already been dimly foreshadowed by the almost unanimous condemnation of the treaty by the Socialists of France, Italy, England and nearly all neutral countries.

Virtually all Americans and even most Europeans have little conception of the extent to which the war and its two great revolutions have awakened the cla.s.s-consciousness of the proletariat of all lands.

Everywhere the laboring ma.s.ses have been the chief sufferers. Everywhere composing an overwhelming majority of the people, they have nowhere been able to decide their own destinies or have an effective voice in government except through revolution. Everywhere they have been the p.a.w.ns sacrificed on the b.l.o.o.d.y chessboard of war to protect kings and queens, bishops and castles. They are beginning to ask why this must be and why they were not permitted to have a voice in the conference at Versailles, and this question will become an embarra.s.sing one for all who try to find the answer in the textbooks of governments as governments today exist.

Deplore it though one may, Internationalism is on the march. Nor is it confined even today to people who work with their hands. Its advocates are to be found--have been found by hundreds in America itself--in the ranks of the thinkers of every country. The press in America has for months been pointing out the prevalence of internationalist sentiments among school-teachers and university professors, and it has been gravely puzzled by this state of affairs. It considers it a paradox that Internationalism exists among presumably well educated persons.

One might as well call it a paradox for a victim of smallpox to have an eruption. It is no paradox. It is a symptom. And, incorrectly diagnosed and ignorantly treated, it is a dangerous disease.

The physician diagnoses a disease at the outset, if he can, and aborts it if possible. If it be contagious, he employs precautions against its spread. No part of these precautions consists in ordering other people at the point of a rifle not to catch the disease.

The greatest task of the governments of the world today is to diagnose correctly and treat intelligently. The proletarians have learned their strength. A new era is dawning.

That era will be marked by an internationalism whose character and extent will depend upon the wisdom with which the masters of the world administer the affairs of their peoples. And the question which every man should ask himself today is:

Shall this Internationalism be Red or White?

CHAPTER XIX

The Weimar Const.i.tution

The provisional const.i.tution adopted at Weimar in February, 1919, was naturally only a makeshift. It contained but ten paragraphs, furnishing the barest outline for the organization of the new state. Its basis was a draft of a proposed const.i.tution made by Dr. Hugo Preuss, a leading authority on const.i.tutional law, who had been appointed Minister of the Interior. This draft was published on January 20th. More than a hundred representatives of the various German states met in the Department of the Interior at Berlin on January 25th to consider it. This conference appointed a commission from its number, which was in session for the next five days in Berlin and then adjourned to Weimar, where it finished the draft of the provisional const.i.tution.

Even the short period intervening between the first publication of the Preuss draft and its submission to the National a.s.sembly had sufficed to bring about one important and significant development. Preuss himself was an advocate of the so-called _Einheitsstaat_, a single state on the French plan, divided into departments merely for administrative purposes. Many of his friends of the German Democratic Party and all Socialists also wanted to do away with the separate states, both for doctrinal and selfish partisan reasons. Preuss realized from the beginning the impossibility of attaining his ideal completely, but he endeavored to pave the way by a dismemberment of Prussia, the largest and dominant German state, and by doing away completely with several of the smaller states, such as Anhalt, Oldenburg, etc. His const.i.tutional draft of January proposed the creation of sixteen "territories of the state" (_Gebiete des Reichs_): Prussia (consisting of East Prussia, West Prussia, and Bromberg), Silesia, Brandenburg, Berlin, Lower Saxony, the three Hansa cities (Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck), Upper Saxony, Thuringia, Westphalia, Hesse, the Rhineland, Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemberg, German-Austria, and Vienna.

It became quickly apparent that Preuss and his followers had underestimated the strength of the particularistic, localized patriotism and respect for tradition cherished by a great part of the Germans. Not only were the South Germans aroused to opposition by the implied threat of a possible eventual onslaught on their own state boundaries, but the great majority of the Prussians as well protested mightily against the proposed dismemberment of Prussia. The unitarians saw themselves compelled to yield even in the temporary const.i.tution by inserting a provision that "the territory of the free states can be altered only with their consent." The plan to reduce the states to mere governmental departments was thus already defeated.

With the erection by the National a.s.sembly of the _Staatenausschuss_, or Committee of the States,[67] the draft of the const.i.tution was laid before that body for further consideration. On February 21st the committee submitted the result of its deliberations to the National a.s.sembly, which referred it in turn to a special committee of twenty-eight members, whose chairman was Conrad Haussmann, a member of the German Democratic Party.